Pariyat Fousia vs Sreekandapuram Municipality on 4 February, 2026

Author: P.V.Kunhikrishnan

Bench: P.V.Kunhikrishnan

W.P.(C) No.18511 of 2025




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                IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                  PRESENT

              THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

    WEDNESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 15TH MAGHA, 1947

                           WP(C) NO. 18511 OF 2025


PETITIONER(S):

              PARIYAT FOUSIA,
              AGED 57 YEARS, W/O. LATE ABDUL SALAM, PARIYAT HOUSE,
              ODATH PALAM, CHENGALAI P.O., SREEKANDAPURAM, KANNUR
              DISTRICT., PIN - 670631

              BY ADVS.
              SRI.C.P.PEETHAMBARAN
              SMT.KARTHIKA PEETHAMBARAN
              SMT.NEERAJA VENUGOPAL
              SHRI.ARJUN J DAS
              SMT.DIVYA VARGHESE

RESPONDENT(S):

      1       SREEKANDAPURAM MUNICIPALITY,
              P.O. SREEKANDAPURAM, KANNUR DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY
              ITS SECRETARY., PIN - 670631
      2       THE SECRETARY,
              SREEKANDAPURAM MUNICIPALITY, P.O. SREEKANDAPURAM,
              KANNUR DISTRICT., PIN - 670631
      3       ADDL. R3. KHADER
              AGED45 YEARS,S/O.IBRAHIM , CHERIYANDIYIL
              HOUSE,KOTTOORVAYAL SREEKANDAPURAM,KANNUR (IS
              IMPLEADED AS ADDL.R3 AS PER ORDER DATED 04.02.2026 IN
              I.A. NO.2/2026)

              BY ADVS.
              SHRI.JAYAKUMAR NAMBOODIRI T.V., SC
              SMT.SAKEENA BEEGUM


          THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
04.02.2026, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 W.P.(C) No.18511 of 2025




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                           P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN, J.
                    ---------------------------------------------
                         W.P.(C) No.18511 of 2025
                ------------------------------------------------------
                 Dated this the 04th day of February, 2026


                                 JUDGMENT

The above writ petition is filed with the following

prayers:

"(i). call for the records connecting Exhibit P26 order dated 7/5/2025 issued by the 2nd respondent and quash Exhibit P26 by issuing a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction;

(ii). issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, directing the 2nd respondent to issue paper form of Trade License to the petitioner in view of pendency of Exhibit P-9 Application, in terms of Section 447(6) of the Kerala Municipalities Act and renew the same for the subsequent years, within a time frame fixed by this Hon'ble Court ;

(iii). Petitioner also prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dispense with the English translation of the documents produced in the Vernacular Language. And

(iv). Such other reliefs as deem fit and proper by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case." (SIC)

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by Ext.P26 order

issued by the Secretary to the 1st respondent Municipality.

Admittedly, Ext.P26 is an appealable order. In the light of the

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principle laid down by this Court in Suresh K. v. Municipal

Corporation of Kollam [2026 (1) KHC 406], this Court need not

entertain this writ petition. This Court in the above judgment

observed like this:

"10. It is a settled position that once the period prescribed for limitation for filing an appeal is over and the additional one month for which the Tribunal can condone the delay is also over, the Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal. Admittedly the petitioner has not filed any statutory appeal within the period prescribed or within the period which can be condoned by the tribunal.In such a situation, the question to be decided is whether this Court can entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is manifest error in the order.

11. The Apex Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada and Others v. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited [2020 KHC 6377], observed like this:

"15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2015 Guj. 97 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeal - I), Bangalore, 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.). The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as S.31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition on the

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ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non - suit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under S.31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three - Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under S.31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose." (underline supplied)

12. Relying on this judgment, the Allahabad High Court in Atlantics Intelligence Ltd v. Union of India and Others [2025 SCC OnLine Allahabad 5291], observed like this:

"14. Upon a perusal of the umpteen judgments cited above and sifting through the ratios laid down by the Supreme Court and High Courts in the various judgments, one may extract the principles with regard to maintainability of the writ petitions after expiry of the time frame for filing appeal stipulated in the special statute. The said principles are summarised below:

A. An order that this Court could make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India, but also be consistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws.

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B. In exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in assessing the needs of 'complete justice' of a cause or matter, the High Court should take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly.

C. The prescription of limitation when the statute commands that delay may be condoned to a maximum of one month further would come within the ambit and sweep of the policy of legislation. In such cases, Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply, and accordingly, the Courts shall have no power to condone the delay of any further period even in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. D. The principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case.

15. In the present case, the petitioner has come to this writ Court after the limitation has expired for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Act. In light of the same, we are of the view that entertaining this writ petition would amount to allowing the petitioner to circumvent the statutory appellate procedure. In our view, no proper explanation has been provided by the petitioner for non-filing of the appeal within time and/or non-filing of the writ petition within the limitation period.
16. The dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in Singh Enterprises (supra), Hongo India (P) Ltd.

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(supra) and Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. (supra) has been consistently followed by Supreme Court and various High Courts. In light of the same, this Court is of the view that this Court should not indulge the writ petitioner in condoning the delay as the present case is neither a case of gross violation of principles of natural justice nor patent illegality. Furthermore, writ jurisdiction can certainly not be exercised when invoked to undermine or defeat the application of a statutory regime so as to render the provision of limitation provided in the statute otiose. Ergo, this Court ought not to entertain the present writ petition and the same deserves to be rejected in limine."

13. In Sathish Murthi v. Member Secretary, Art and Heritage Commission, Tvm and Others [2016 KHC 684], the division bench of this court, relying on Thomas's case (supra), has observed like this:

"5. Insofar as WA No. 1017 of 2016 is concerned, challenging Ext. P8 building permit issued on 23/08/2013 and Ext. P10, the recommendation of the Art and Heritage Commission dated 17/07/2013, the appellant therein filed WP (C) No. 14455 of 2014 on 06/06/2014. According to us, that writ petition ought to have been dismissed at the threshold itself for the reason that if the appellant was aggrieved by the building permit, he had a remedy of appeal before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. As per S.510 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, the time limit prescribed for filing an appeal is 30 days from the date of the order. The petitioner in this writ petition did not file any appeal. Instead, long after the expiry of the period prescribed in S.510 of the Act, he filed the writ petition before this Court on 06/06/2014, challenging the building permit. Once a cause of action has become time barred, a litigant cannot

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seek to revive the same by taking recourse to the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise v. Krishna Poduval (2005 KHC 1914 : 2005 (4) KLT 947 : ILR 2005 (4) Ker. 499), where it was held thus:

"7. At the outset we may state that insofar as the respondents have not taken up the original orders imposing penalty in appeals before the Appellate Authority within the maximum period prescribed under S.85(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, they cannot get the appeals revived and heard on merits by resorting to the discretionary remedy before this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Once the period of limitation has run itself out and the Appellate Authority does not have power to condone the delay in filing the appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed under the Act, the remedies of the appellants come to an end just like in the case of a time barred suit and the respondents cannot, by invoking the discretionary remedy under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, resurrect their unenforceable cause of action and require this Court to consider their contentions against the original orders on merit. That would amount to defeating the very law of limitation which we are not expected to do under Art.226. If we are to entertain the contentions of the respondents on merits, that would amount to negating the law of limitation which we have no jurisdiction to do under Art.226 and which may even lead no anomalous results. We are not satisfied that the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is so wide as to resurrect a cause of action which has become unenforceable on account of the law of

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limitation. Further, we are of the firm opinion that the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked against express statutory provisions, however harsh the effect of the provisions may be on an assessee or litigant."

Subsequently, referring to the judgment in Krishna Poduval's case (supra), this Court in Thomas Thomas v. Kottayam Municipality (2008 (4) KHC 26 :

2008 (3) KLT 964 : ILR 2008 (4) Ker. 70 : 2008 (3) KLJ 482) held thus:

"11. From the aforesaid judgments it is clear that once the statutory period of limitation has expired, the party looses its right of appeal. Thereafter it is not open to him to invoke the power of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions and get the delay condoned or to have the matter examined by this Court. Admittedly proviso to R.8(3) authorises the Tribunal to condone delay of only one month if it is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the delay. The power conferred on the Tribunal being restricted, in my view, the above two judgments of this Court gives a complete answer to the contentions of the petitioner."

Therefore, for that reason itself, WP (C) No. 14455 of 2014 should have been dismissed as not maintainable."

14. From the above authoritative judgments of this court and the apex court, it is clear that, once the period prescribed in the statute for filing the appeal and the period which can be condoned as per the statute is over, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained by the High Court. It amounts to invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against statutory rules. That is not permissible. If the Rule's

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vires is challenged, that will be a different situation. But if, within the period of Limitation prescribed for challenging an order, a writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, instead of invoking the alternative remedy, this court can exercise the jurisdiction if the order is inherently unsustainable, or if it is passed without jurisdiction or if it is passed violating the principles of natural justice. Even in such a situation, the invocation of power under Article 226 of the Constitution is the exception and availing the alternative remedy is the rule. But, if a writ petition in such a situation is entertained by the High Court, which was filed within the limitation period prescribed in the statute concerned and ultimately at the final hearing stage, this court found that there is nothing to interfere and at that stage, the limitation period for availing the remedy is also over, whether this court can relegate the party to avail the alternative remedy is the next question. In such situations, to do complete justice to the party, the dictum laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Atlantics Intelligence Ltd (Supra) is to be followed. The Allahabad High Court observed that the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice, which would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case. I am in perfect agreement with the above dictum laid down by the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, the High Court can invoke the principle in Section 14 of the Limitation Act and

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relegate to avail the alternative remedy with a rider that the party approached the High Court within the period prescribed by the statute for availing the statutory remedy.

15. In this case, the order passed under Section 406(3) was on 08.08.2022. The petitioner filed this writ petition on 09.10.2024. This means the writ petition is filed about two years after the date of Ext. P2. The appeal against such an order can be filed only within thirty days as per Section 509(6) of the Act, 1994 and according to the proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Tribunal for the Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit. Thereafter, the Tribunal is functus officio to consider an appeal against an order under Section 406 (3) of the Act 1994. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that this Court cannot entertain a writ petition when the period of limitation specifically mentioned in statute for filing an appeal is over, and the period for which a delay condonation petition can be entertained is also over. Therefore, the challenge against Ext.P2 is to be rejected. Hence, this writ petition is to be dismissed. It is true that the petitioner challenges Ext.P5 in this writ petition. Ext.P5 is only an execution order of Ext.P2, and therefore, as long as Ext.P2 is in force, a challenge against Ext.P5 independently is not possible."

3. The impugned order was passed on 07.05.2025

and this writ petition was filed on 15.05.2025. That means the

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petitioner approached this Court within the statutory period for

filing the appeal. In such circumstances, the petitioner can be

allowed to file an appeal before the Tribunal, in accordance with

law, within a time frame.

Therefore, this Writ Petition is disposed of with the

following directions:

1. The petitioner is free to challenge Ext.P26 by

filing an appeal before the Tribunal, within a

period of one month from the date of receipt of

a certified copy of this judgment.

Sd/-
                                                   P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN,
                                                          JUDGE
nvj

Judgment reserved                NA
Date of Judgment              04.02.2026
Judgment dictated             04.02.2026
Draft Judgment placed         05.02.2026
Final Judgment uploaded        07.02.2026






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                 APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 18511 OF 2025

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1                 TRUE COPY OF THE FMB ISSUED BY THE
VILLAGE OFFICER, SREEKANDAPURAM DATED 22/10/2016 Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE DEATH CERTIFICATE DATED 27/5/2024 OF PETITIONER'S HUSBAND ABDUL SALAM C ISSUED FROM CHEMBILODE GRAMA PANCHAYATH Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE LATEST PROPERTY TAX RECEIPTS DATED 11/9/2023 (SIX IN NUMBERS) Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE CONSENT LETTER DATED 16/08/2017 SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER'S HUSBAND ABDUL SALAM AND RECEIVED BY THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,PWD ROADS DIVISION,KANNUR Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 30/3/2023 ISSUED BY THE ASSISTANT ENGINEER OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT MUNICIPALITY Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 08/04/2024 FILED BY THE PETITIONER'S COUSIN SIDDIQUE UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT TO THE INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT.

Exhibit P6(a) TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 7/5/2024 ISSUED BY THE INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT Exhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF THE DEMAND NOTICE DATED 07/03/2024 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 03.08.2023 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P9 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 21/05/2024 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT.

Exhibit P9(a) TRUE COPY OF THE POSTAL RECEIPT DATED 22/05/2024

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Exhibit P10 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 29/08/2024 IN WP(C ) NO. 22870/2024 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT Exhibit P11 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 12.12.2024 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P12 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER/NOTICE DATED 13.01.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P13 TRUE COPY OF THE LICENSE DATED 15/1/2025 ISSUED BY THE FOOD SAFETY AND STANDARDS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Exhibit P14 TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT FOR WATER QUALITY TEST ISSUED BY THE KERALA WATER AUTHORITY DATED 15/1/2025 Exhibit P15 TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL FITNESS CERTIFICATE FOR FOOD HANDLERS DATED 18/1/2025 ISSUED BY ASSISTANT SURGEON, GOVERNMENT TALUK HOSPITAL, TALIPARAMBA Exhibit P16 TRUE COPY OF THE COVERING LETTER DATED 26/3/2025 ALONG WITH THE DEMAND DRAFT NO. 476061 FOR RS.2,500/- SENT BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P17 TRUE COPY OF THE USER FEE COLLECTION CARD ISSUED BY THE HARITHA KARMA SENA Exhibit P18 TRUE COPY OF THE LATEST APPLICATION DATED 26/3/2025 FOR TRADE LICENSE SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P19 TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER STATEMENT FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS DATED 01/02/2025 IN WP(C ) NO. 1935/2025 BEFORE THIS HON'BLE COURT Exhibit P20 TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT DATED 9/9/2024 FOR THE APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP DOWNLOADED FROM K-
                           SMART
Exhibit P21                TRUE COPY OF THE TANDAPER ACCOUNT DATED
                           18/01/2024   ISSUED     BY    THE   VILLAGE
                           OFFICER SREEKANDAPURAM
Exhibit P22                TRUE COPY OF PROPERTY TAX RECEIPTS
DATED 5/11/2024 (6 IN NUMBERS) ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT

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Exhibit P23 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 09/04/2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P24 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 22/4/2025 IN WP(C ) NO. 1935/2025 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT Exhibit P25 TRUE COPY OF THE BANNER ERECTED IN FRONT OF PETITIONER'S BUILDING BY THE RESPONDENTS ON 5/5/2025 Exhibit P26 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 07/05/2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P27 TRUE COPY OF THE BANNER ERECTED BY THE RESPONDENTS ON 21.06.2025 Exhibit P28 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES DATED 30/4/2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT