Kerala High Court
Kerala State Electricity Board Limited vs M/S Pooja Milk Foods (P) Ltd, Regd on 17 September, 2025
Author: A.Muhamed Mustaque
Bench: A.Muhamed Mustaque
W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISANKAR V. MENON
WEDNESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 / 26TH BHADRA, 1947
WA NO. 1096 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 18.07.2024 IN WP(C) NO.25044 OF 2024 OF
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
1 KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LIMITED,
VYDHYUTHI BHAVANAM, PATTOM P.O THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PIN - 695004
2 ASSISSTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD, ELECTRICAL SUB DIVISION,
PALARIVATTOM KOCHI, PIN - 682025
3 ASSISTANT ENGINEER,
KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD LTD, ELECTRICAL SECTION,
PALARIVATTOM, KOCHI, PIN - 682025
BY ADV SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
RESPONDENT/S:
M/S POOJA MILK FOODS (P) LTD, REGD.
OFFICE AT DOOR NO. 55/3070, TAGORE NAGAR, KADAVANTHRA P.O
COCHIN, REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR, U.N MENON, PIN - 682020
BY
ADVS SHRI.C.K.KARUNAKARAN
K.V. KRISHNAKUMAR
LEKSHMI P. NAIR
SHIFNA MUHAMMED SHUKKUR
W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025
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KRISHNA SURESH
MEKHA MANOJ
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 12/9/2025, ALONG WITH
WA.1963/2025, THE COURT ON 17.09.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISANKAR V. MENON
WEDNESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 / 26TH BHADRA, 1947
WA NO. 1963 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.07.2025 IN WP(C) NO.25898 OF 2015 OF
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
THE ASSISTANT ENGINEER, ELECTRICAL SECTION, K.S.E.B.
PALARIVATTOM., PIN - 682025
BY ADV SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
RESPONDENT/S:
M/S.POOJA MILK FOOD PRIVATE LTD.
PONOTH TEMPLE ROAD, KADAVANTHARA, KOCHI-20, HAVING ITS
REGISTERED OFFICE AT 33/283 D1, AMBEDKARA ROAD, VENNALA
P.O., KOCHI-28, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, MOHAN
JOSEPH VARGHESE, S/O. LATE T.O.VARGHESE, PRASANTHI NAGAR,
EDAPPALLY, KOCHI-24., PIN - 682020
BY ADV SHRI.C.K.KARUNAKARAN
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 12.09.2025, ALONG WITH
WA.1096/2024, THE COURT ON 17.09.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & HARISANKAR V. MENON, JJ.
------------------------------------------------------------
W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 "C.R"
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Dated this the 17th day of September, 2025
JUDGMENT
A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.
These intra-court appeals call for a decision on the interpretation
of modern legislation in the context of the policy of liberalisation
protecting the interests of consumers of public utility services.
2. The appellant is the Kerala State Electricity Board and its
officials (hereinafter referred to as the 'licensee'). The licensee
approached this Court in a writ petition, challenging an order of the
Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (hereinafter referred to as the
'CGRF'). CGRF is established by the licensee themselves as
mandated under the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as
the "Act"). The statutory provision under Section 42(5) of the Act
mandates licensees to establish a forum for redressal of grievances
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of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be
specified by the State Commission. The State Commission is a
statutory body constituted under Section 82 of the Act and known as
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission.
3. The learned Single Judge who heard the matter accepted
the objection raised by the respondent-consumer on the question
related to maintainability. The learned Single Judge was of the view
that CGRF is an institutional grievance redressal forum maintained
by the licensee and in the light of the Regulation 27(5) of the Kerala
State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer Grievance
Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations 2005,
(hereafter referred as the "2005 Regulations") a licensee is bound by
awards/orders/directions of CGRF and it is not open for the licensee
to challenge such awards, orders or directions of the CGRF by
invoking writ remedies.
4. We heard the learned Standing Counsel for the Electricity
Board, Shri Riji Rajendran, assisted by Adv. Mitha Sudhindran. The
articulated arguments of the learned Standing Counsel in elaboration
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are to bring home the point that CGRF is a quasi-judicial body,
statutorily constituted, and therefore, there is no difficulty in
questioning such awards/orders/directions by invoking writ
remedies. The learned Standing Counsel pointed out the nature and
functions of CGRF while taking action on a complaint. He particularly
pointed out the whole of Regulations 10 to 12 of the 2005
Regulations. Thus, the learned Standing Counsel argued that these
Regulations show that CGRF is a statutorily constituted quasi-judicial
body and will have to function independently of the licensee. He
placed reliance on the following judgments of the Apex Court in High
Court of M.P. v. Mahesh Prakash [(1995) 1 SCC 203],
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Reliance
Energy Ltd. [(2007) 8 SCC 381], Express Newspaper (P) Ltd.
v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 578], Village Panchayat,
Calangute v. Director of Panchayat [(2012) 7 SCC 550],
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India v. Delhi
International Airport Ltd. [2024 KHC 6571], judgment of a
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Central Power
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Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. v. The Consumer
Grievances Redressal Forum of APCPDCL and Ors.
[2019(1)ALD 257], judgment of the Madras High Court in The
Executive Engineer and Ors. vs. Consumer Grievance
Redressal Forum and Ors. [MANU/TN/5226/2023] and
judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Eminent Sea
Foods(P)Ltd v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Others
[(2008) 2 KLT 294].
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
respondent/consumer, Shri C.K. Karunakaran, defending the
impugned judgments, submitted that the statutory provision never
contemplated licensee questioning the CGRF decision; and that is the
reason that under Section 42(6) of the Act, the consumer alone is
given the right to question the order of CGRF before the learned
Ombudsman. He fairly agreed that the Ombudsman is an
independent body and the decision of the Ombudsman can be
questioned before this Court, invoking writ remedies. He placed
reliance on the draft Electricity Bill, 2001, introduced in the Lok
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Sabha, wherein there was no provision for raising a grievance before
the Ombudsman. The learned counsel further referred to the
Standing Committee report on the bill. In that report, the Standing
Committee noted that CGRF have to work under the licensee and as
such, these forums may not be of help to consumers, and accordingly
recommended the constitution of the Ombudsman to safeguard the
interests of the consumers. It is an independent body. The
Ombudsman was constituted as one more layer for the redressal of
grievances of the consumer. It is particularly pointed out by the
learned counsel Shri C.K. Karunakaran that the State Commission
understood the importance of CGRF and also understood the error or
mistake likely to be committed by CGRF, and accordingly inserted
Regulation 12A of the 2005 Regulations to review the order of CGRF
on the limited ground referred therein. This, according to the learned
counsel, brings a finality to the order of CGRF as far as the licensee
is concerned. He relied on judgments of the Apex Court in Hope
Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board [(1999) 5 SCC 590],
Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corpn. [(2018)
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8 SCC 281] and Kerala SEB v. Thomas Joseph [(2023) 11 SCC
700], Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ram Kishori
Gupta and others[2025 SCC OnLine SC 748], judgment of the
Orissa High Court in Executive Engineer, Electrical (TPNODL),
Balasore Electrical Division-II v. Raj Complex [2023 SCC
OnLine Ori 2312] and judgment of this Court in Kerala State
Electricity Board and Others v. M/s. KSE Ltd. and Another
[2012 (1) KLT 623].
6. There is little scope for dispute regarding the nature and
composition of the CGRF, which is a statutorily constituted forum. It
is required to adopt a judicious approach in adjudicating complaints
and to exercise powers akin to those of any other quasi-judicial body
in resolving grievances. The orders, awards, or directions issued by
the CGRF are executable in the same manner as provided under
Regulation 27(5) of the 2005 Regulations.
7. While we appreciate the meticulous and well-prepared
arguments of the learned Standing Counsel, Shri Riji Rajendran, that
CGRF discharges a quasi-judicial function, but at the same time, we
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cannot remain oblivious to the jurisprudence evolved in protecting
consumer rights through various international instruments, which
call for an interpretation of statutory provisions in the light of
liberalisation policy followed in this Country. Therefore, the
precedents cited by the learned Standing Counsel for the Board may
not have much relevance in deciding this matter, as we are deciding
it from a different perspective of consumer protection and
participation in public utility services. The question raised in this
case is how a licensee is expected to respond to orders or
awards of CGRF. Should they be viewed as decisions external
to the licensee's powers and functions, or must they be
regarded as institutional determinations that enable
consumer participation in the decision-making process,
thereby fostering trust in the governance of the licensee?
8. Modern legislation, introduced in the wake of liberalisation,
expressly envisages consumer involvement in governance as a
measure of accountability and transparency. The issue, therefore, is
whether the creation of the CGRF constitutes an additional
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institutional layer designed to safeguard the consumer interests
within the licensee's decision-making framework or not. To
appreciate this fully, one must revisit the rationale and objectives
underlying deregulation in this country at the threshold of
liberalisation.
9. The deregulation of key sectors of industry, once under the
sole control of the Government, had posed the biggest economic and
political challenge to the states across the globe. Transition from a
state monopoly to a fair competitive market requires structural
reforms. In constitutional democracies, such a transformation is
facilitated through legislation. Fair, transparent and competitive
markets with active private participation are key objectives of the
deregulation. Our country was not an exception to bring reforms to
deregulate the key sectors such as Telecommunication, Electricity,
Petroleum, Insurance, etc. Legislative attempts through various
legislation were to balance the interests of the state with those of the
public, who are the consumers of such sectors and the market
interests of the private participants. The key objectives of the
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reforms, as referred to in various materials referred to hereinafter,
are as follows:
● Consumer participation in institutional governance of public
utility service providers.
● To bring transparency in the governance of public utility service
providers.
● Fair decisions adhering to due procedure in the decision-making
process in public utility services.
● A competitive market with private participation to ensure fair
administrative decisions by such service providers.
● Enhancing accountability of public utility service providers.
● Equitable outcome from the decisions of such utility service
providers.
● To encourage high levels of ethical conduct for those engaged
in the production and distribution of goods and services (see
The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection).
10. The deregulation of these sectors is a transformation from
a monopoly to a competitive market with active private participation.
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The monopoly of the key sector in a constitutionally bound State is
on the line of presumption that the State would act fairly and treat
its citizens on equitable terms. The deregulation paved the way for
private investors to come into the market as service providers.
Deregulation had twin objectives - (i) the sectors controlled and
managed by the State shall be made available to the citizens in an
equitable manner through private participation; and (ii) the private
investors, while remaining competitive, shall ensure efficiency of
their service, including taking measures for protecting the interests
of the consumers.
IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION POLICY IN DOMESTIC
LEGISLATION IN INDIA:
11. We shall refer to the various legislations in India which allow
public participation in the governance or in the decision-making of
the authorities/public utility service providers:
i. Telecom Sector - The internal grievance redressal system in the
telecom sector is a two-tier mechanism consisting of Complaint
Centres and an Appellate Authority. It is designed to ensure time-
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bound, transparent, and consumer-friendly redressal. This
mechanism provides consumers with a structured path to escalate
grievances within the service provider before approaching external
forums such as the TDSAT or consumer courts. The consumer
grievance redressal mechanism is governed by the Telecom
Consumers Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012, as amended by
TRAI from time to time. Regulation 3 of the above Regulations
mandates every telecom service provider to set up an internal
mechanism for consumer grievance redressal, prescribing the
method in which the complaints must be handled and the time period
for redressal. Regulation 9 provides for an Appellate Authority to hear
appeals where a consumer is not satisfied with the redressal of their
complaint by the Complaint Centre, and Regulation 10 mandates
every service provider to establish an Appellate Authority in each
licensed service area to hear appeals against consumer grievance
decisions.
ii. Insurance sector - Internal grievance redressal mechanism is
the first stage of dispute resolution before a policyholder approaches
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external forums such as the Insurance Ombudsman, Consumer
Commissions or Courts. It is governed by the IRDAI (Protection of
Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2017. Annexure I of the IRDAI
(Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2017 prescribes
the grievance redressal procedure for consumers to raise complaints
against insurers. Every insurer must have a Grievance Redressal
Officer (hereinafter referred to as "GRO") at each office or branch.
The GRO is responsible for receiving, resolving, and recording
grievances. The grievance redressal framework requires
policyholders to first approach the GRO of the concerned insurer,
intermediary, or regulated entity. If the response is unsatisfactory or
absent, the complaint can be escalated to the IRDAI's Integrated
Grievance Management System (IGMS), which facilitates re-
examination and ensures resolution by the insurer. Further appeal is
maintainable before the Ombudsman, established under the
Insurance Ombudsman Rules, 2017.
iii. Petroleum and Natural Gas Sector - The Petroleum and
Natural Gas Regulatory Board (hereinafter referred to as "PNGRB")
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was established under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory
Board Act, 2006, as a statutory body to regulate downstream
activities in the petroleum and natural gas sector. Section 11 of the
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 sets out the
functions of the PNGRB, which include protecting the interests of
consumers and entities engaged in petroleum and natural gas
activities, promoting competitive markets, fostering fair trade and
regulating technical standards, safety, and quality of service.
iv. Banking Sector - The grievance redressal framework in the
banking sector is designed to resolve consumer complaints within the
bank itself before escalating to external forums such as the Banking
Ombudsman (under the RBI Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021),
Consumer Commissions, or Courts. The Reserve Bank of India, under
powers conferred by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the RBI
Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 has issued Reserve Bank of
India (Internal Ombudsman) Directions, 2023, which mandates all
banks (Scheduled Commercial Banks, RRBs, Cooperative Banks, and
certain NBFCs) to establish an Internal Grievance Redressal
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Mechanism in the form of an Internal Ombudsman with a view to
strengthen the internal grievance redressal system.
v. Land acquisition - The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "LARR" Act) establishes a
participatory mechanism for acquisition of land for public purpose by
mandating consultation, consent and public hearings at various
stages. The process begins with a Social Impact Assessment
conducted in consultation with Gram Sabhas and local bodies, which
includes public hearings and disclosure of reports to ensure
transparency regarding the social and environmental consequences
of the project as contemplated under Section 4 of the LARR Act.
Following this, a preliminary notification is issued as provided under
Section 11 of the LARR Act, and any person interested in the land
may file objections within sixty days, as provided under Section 15
of the LARR Act, a provision modelled on the earlier Section 5A of
the 1894 Act but broader in scope, allowing challenges not only to
the public purpose and suitability of land but also to environmental
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and resettlement concerns. The Collector is bound to hear these
objections and submit recommendations to the Government, which
must take a final decision after considering both the Social Impact
Assessment and the objections received. Only then can a formal
declaration be made under Section 19 of the LARR Act, followed by
the award of compensation and the preparation of rehabilitation and
resettlement schemes in consultation with the Gram Sabha.
Possession of the land can be taken only after full compensation and
rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are provided, thereby
embedding participatory safeguards at every stage of the acquisition
process.
HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS INFLUENCED DOMESTIC
LEGISLATION:
12. The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer
Protection (UNGCP), 2015
12.1. The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer
Protection serve as a key framework outlining the essential features
of effective consumer protection laws, enforcement mechanisms, and
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redress systems when formulating domestic and regional laws, rules,
and regulations. The guidelines also foster international cooperation
in enforcement and promote the exchange of best practices in
consumer protection. UNCTAD, a UN body, actively advances these
guidelines and encourages Member States to raise awareness about
how Governments, businesses, and civil society can contribute to
strengthening consumer protection in both public and private service
delivery.
12.2. The General Assembly first adopted the above
guidelines in resolution 39/248 of 16 April 1985. The guidelines were
expanded by the Economic and Social Council in resolution
E/1999/INF/2/Add.2 of 26 July 1999 and were revised and adopted
by the General Assembly in resolution 70/186 of 22 December 2015.
12.3. The specific portion of the guidelines related to
consumer grievance redressal is extracted below:
"F. Dispute resolution and redress
37. Member States should encourage the development of fair, effective, transparent and
impartial mechanisms to address consumer complaints through administrative, judicial
and alternative dispute resolution, including for cross-border cases. Member States
should establish or maintain legal and/or administrative measures to enable consumers
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or, as appropriate, relevant organizations to obtain redress through formal or informal
procedures that are expeditious, fair, transparent, inexpensive and accessible. Such
procedures should take particular account of the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged
consumers. Member States should provide consumers with access to remedies that do
not impose a cost, delay or undue burden on the economic value at stake and at the
same time do not impose excessive or undue burdens on society and businesses.
38. Member States should encourage all businesses to resolve consumer disputes in an
expeditious, fair, transparent, inexpensive, accessible and informal manner, and to
establish voluntary mechanisms, including advisory services and informal complaints
procedures, which can provide assistance to consumers.
39. Information on available redress and other dispute-resolving procedures should be
made available to consumers. Access to dispute resolution and redress mechanisms,
including alternative dispute resolution, should be enhanced, particularly in cross-
border disputes.
40. Member States should ensure that collective resolution procedures are expeditious,
transparent, fair, inexpensive and accessible to both consumers and businesses,
including those pertaining to overindebtedness and bankruptcy cases.
41. Member States should cooperate with businesses and consumer groups in furthering
consumer and business understanding of how to avoid disputes, of dispute resolution
and redress mechanisms available to consumers and of where consumers can file
complaints."
12.4. The specific principles outlined in the guidelines
related to good business practice are extracted below:
"IV. Principles for good business practices
11. The principles that establish benchmarks for good business practices for conducting
online and offline commercial activities with consumers are as follows:
(a) Fair and equitable treatment. Businesses should deal fairly and honestly with
consumers at all stages of their relationship, so that it is an integral part of the business
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culture. Businesses should avoid practices that harm consumers, particularly with
respect to vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers;
(b) Commercial behaviour. Businesses should not subject consumers to illegal,
unethical, discriminatory or deceptive practices, such as abusive marketing tactics,
abusive debt collection or other improper behaviour that may pose unnecessary risks
or harm consumers. Businesses and their authorized agents should have due regard for
the interests of consumers and responsibility for upholding consumer protection as an
objective;
(c) Disclosure and transparency. Businesses should provide complete, accurate and not
misleading information regarding the goods and services, terms, conditions, applicable
fees and final costs to enable consumers to take informed decisions. Businesses should
ensure easy access to this information, especially to the key terms and conditions,
regardless of the means of technology used;
(d) Education and awareness-raising. Businesses should, as appropriate, develop
programmes and mechanisms to assist consumers to develop the knowledge and skills
necessary to understand risks, including financial risks, to take informed decisions and
to access competent and professional advice and assistance, preferably from an
independent third party, when needed;
(e) Protection of privacy. Businesses should protect consumers' privacy through a
combination of appropriate control, security, transparency and consent mechanisms
relating to the collection and use of their personal data;
(f) Consumer complaints and disputes. Businesses should make available complaints-
handling mechanisms that provide consumers with expeditious, fair, transparent,
inexpensive, accessible, speedy and effective dispute resolution without unnecessary
cost or burden. Businesses should consider subscribing to domestic and international
standards pertaining to internal complaints handling, alternative dispute resolution
services and customer satisfaction codes."
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HOW DOES DEREGULATION EMPHASISE CONSUMER
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES
13. We shall now refer to principles related to consumer
participation referred to in various literature:
13.1. In an article titled "Governance through public
utilities models: a regional social interaction approach" by
Immacolata Caruso and Tiziana Vitolo, presented at the 43rd
Congress of the European Regional Science Association, University of
Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland, the authors propose a joint
participation model for governance of public utility services as
follows:
"Means such as participation, partnership, empowering and enabling, and community
focus could be seen as fostering transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation,
accountability and equity...
It seems clear that the establishment of managerial models centred upon competition,
more than once mentioned as a consequence of new processes involving public utilities,
calls for industrial policies focused on governance substantially meaning, in this case, a
"joint participation mechanism" aiming to the definition of the roles and prerogatives of
the different subjects involved in the service management, i.e. the subjects of local
authorities, company administrative and management bodies, and all the other
stakeholders (such as consumers' associations, lobbying groups, unions, suppliers,
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citizens-service customers, etc.). It also calls for the setting up of instruments and
mechanisms in order to support the integration between local authorities and associated
companies."1
13.2. It is also pertinent to quote the following lines from
the World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor
People, published by the World Bank:
"Too often, services fail poor people- in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact that
there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can
do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of service provision: by enabling
them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in
policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor."2
13.3. In an article titled "Deregulation and Participation: An
International Survey of Participation in Electricity Regulation" by Anil
Hira, David Huxtable, and Alexandre Leger, the authors outline the
following reasons to advocate for public participation in electricity
sector regulation.
"Participation could lead to both greater enfranchisement and greater appreciation of
Immacolata Caruso & Tiziana Vitolo, Governance Through Public Utilities' Models: A Regional Social
Interaction Approach (43rd Cong. of the Eur. Reg'l Sci. Ass'n, Univ. of Jyväskylä, 2003), available at :(PDF)
Governance through ?public utilities? models: a regional social interaction approach (last visited Sept. 16,
2025).
World Development Report 2004 : Making services work for poor people - overview, World Bank Group,
Available at : World Development Report 2004 : Making services work for poor people - Overview, (last
visited Sept. 16, 2025).
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the complexity and trade-offs of decision making by the public. Moreover, recent studies
point to the effectiveness of consumer influence to balance industrial and labor union
influence, even in nonprivatized systems (Cummins, Phillips, and Tennyson). A number
of emerging empirical studies also suggest that decisions tend to be of greater quality
when stakeholders are directly included (Beirele 2000).
Carl Mitcham suggests several reasons for the need for direct participation, as opposed
to relying primarily on experts to represent public interests (Mitcham). First, experts
cannot escape from public influence. Experts are in the milieu of the public discourse in
the media, and so are subject to ongoing value discussions. Moreover, all decisions of
consequence, by definition, have public consequences. Second, without public
participation, it may be difficult to undertake decisions that bear important
consequences, as the phenomenon of NIMBY (not in my backyard) illustrates.
Third, experts have built-in interests that differ from the public's. Experts often come
from elite backgrounds, and receive their livelihood by playing a reinforcing role to
established systems of power (Hira 1998). Fourth, including the public will lead to better
outcomes (Fischer 2000; Waugh; Williams and Matheny). This idea stems from the
expectation that decisions will be more "sustainable" because the public will be aware
of, and ready to deal with the consequences. As Frank Fischer points out, complex
democratic decision making has to consider the sociological values and legitimation, as
well as the technical merits of an issue to be sustainable (Fischer 2000, 140). In sum,
while experts are needed, direct public participation is also a vital component for
sustainable and democratic regulation."3
13.4. In a policy research working paper titled
"Transforming Electricity Governance in India: Has India's Power
Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?" prepared by Ashish
Hira, A., Huxtable, D. and Leger, A., Deregulation and participation: An international survey of
participation in electricity regulation, 18(1) Governance 53 (2005).
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Khanna, Daljit Singh, Ashwini K Swain and Mudit Narain, published
by the World Bank Group, the authors emphasise the need for active
and effective consumer engagement in the regulatory process as
follows:
"Electricity regulators are primarily drawn from retired bureaucrats, who come in with
their own perspectives and biases. Moreover, with the mandate to rationalise electricity
tariffs and balance competing interests in the sector, the regulators seem to be less
trusted by consumers, and consequently, there is low social acceptance of their
decisions. Consumer participation is thus necessary to ensure representation of public
interest and ensure social acceptance to regulatory decisions. While building consumers'
trust in the regulatory system, it also contributes to institutional and democratic
legitimacy of the independent regulators. Moreover, in the absence of public inputs,
regulators often make major decisions on behalf of the consumers, "on the basis of
limited information" (Littlechild, 2008: 33). Active and effective consumer engagement
in the regulatory process would be able to address the information asymmetry and
improve regulatory decision making."4
Further, the authors point out the different levels of participation that
can be incorporated in a regulatory mechanism, particularly with
regard to the electricity sector, as follows:
"Participation is not something that any system either has in the regulatory framework
or does not. There are varying levels of participation, and there is a spectrum of the
Khanna, A., Singh, D., Swain, A.K. and Narain, M., Transforming Electricity Governance in India: Has
India's Power Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?. Available at: Transforming Electricity
Governance in India: Has India's Power Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?, (last visited Sept.
16, 2025).
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level and quality of consumer participation. Analyzing citizen participation, Arnstein
(1969) presented a ladder of participation with eight rungs/levels, which can be put into
three broad categories: non-participation, tokenism, and citizen power. While 'citizen
power' is the most desirable in the ideal world, it may not be feasible to achieve in the
real world, especially in the case of technical decision making. The desired goals of
transparency and accountability in technical decision-making at the macro level may be
better achieved through informing, consultation and placation, without much
transaction cost."5
13.5. The above literature clearly points out the shift in the
regulatory philosophy of public utility services, showing how
consumer protection and participation have become integral
components of regulation.
THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION POLICY ON ELECTRICITY
LAWS AND CONSUMERS:
14. The Electricity Act, 2003, replaced the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910. The preamble of the Electricity Act 2003 proclaims that,
it is an Act to consolidate the laws relating to generation,
transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally
for taking measures conducive to the development of electricity
industry, promoting competition therein, protecting interest of
Id
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consumers, supply of electricity to all areas, rationalization of
electricity tariff, ensuring transparent policies regarding subsidies,
promotion of efficient and environmentally benign policies, etc.
15. The Electricity Act, 2003, deregulated the distribution of
electricity in India. Section 14 of the Act refers to the licence regime,
and Section 15 of the Act refers to the procedure for granting a
licence. Licensee is defined as a person who has been granted a
licence under Section 14. Thus, it is clear that any person who
complies with the statutory requirements is entitled to a license. The
Act deregulated the electricity service by enabling private players to
provide the service. The question of whether the consumer is allowed
to participate in the governance of electricity distribution will have to
be answered based on the provisions of the Act. Part VI of the Act
contemplates the regulatory procedure for the distribution of
electricity. It is appropriate to refer to Section 42(1) of Part VI of the
Act, which reads thus:
"Section 42. (Duties of distribution licensee and open access):-
(1) It shall be the duty of a distribution licensee to develop and maintain an efficient, .
.
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co-ordinated and economical distribution system in his area of supply and to supply
electricity in accordance with the provisions contained in this Act."
16. As seen from Section 42(1), the law intended to achieve
the following through a licensee:
i. Develop and maintain an efficient distribution system.
ii. A coordinated and economical distribution system.
iii Supply electricity in accordance with the provisions contained in
the Act.
This is the Regulatory Scheme for the distribution of electricity.
17. It is in the light of the above scheme that one must
consider Section 42(5). Section 42(5) reads thus:
"42(5). Every distribution licensee shall, within six months from the appointed
date or date of grant of licence, whichever is earlier, establish a forum for
redressal of grievances of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as
may be specified by the State Commission."
The Scheme of Regulation itself mandates that each licensee has to
establish a Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. Since it is part of
the institutional scheme of governance of the licensee, the
Parliament thought of having another independent layer for the
consumer to raise their grievance. Accordingly, in Section 42(6) of
the Act, it is provided as follows:
"42(6). Any consumer who is aggrieved by non-redressal of his grievances under
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sub-section (5) may make a representation for the redressal of his grievance to
an authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the
State Commission."
18. Composition of CGRF is given under Regulation 3 of Chapter
II of the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer
Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations
2005, which consists of three members, including a Chairperson. The
Chairperson and one member are appointed by the licensee from
among qualified persons with expertise in electrical engineering,
finance, law, or administration in the power sector, possessing ability,
integrity, and standing. The third member is nominated by the
Commission for one year from among persons with a degree in any
discipline, proven integrity and familiarity with consumer affairs, and
who is not and has never been an employee of the licensee. From
this composition itself, it is clear that the members of the CGRF are
not wholly distinct from the licensee, and therefore, the CGRF is not
an entity independent of the licensee. The composition of the CGRF
is further widened under the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory
Commission (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity
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Ombudsman) Regulations, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the "
2023 Regulation"), constituted by four members including a
chairperson appointed by the licensee, a licensee member appointed
by the licensee, a law member appointed by the licensee and a
consumer/prosumer member nominated by the licensee who is
within the jurisdiction of the forum. The mandate for consumer
representation within the CGRF under the 2023 Regulations points
out the participatory approach embedded in the grievance redressal
mechanism under the CGRF.
19. The learned Standing Counsel, Shri Riji Rajendran, referred
to the 2023 Regulations, which replaced the 2005 Regulations, and
pointed out that an internal mechanism has been provided at the
officer level. According to him, this would indicate that the Consumer
Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) is an external mechanism for
redressal of consumer grievances. We find this argument
unsustainable. The constitution of the Internal Grievance Redressal
Cell (hereinafter, "IGRC") at the officer level was intended to
decentralise the functioning of the CGRF, which operates at the
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regional level. The 2023 Regulations replaced the 2005 Regulations;
though the 2023 Regulations do not apply to this case, referring to it
is necessary in the light of our earlier finding that the CGRF is part of
the regulatory scheme of the licensee. The 2023 Regulations
introduced another layer of grievance redressal at the lowest level,
through a designated officer, to ensure prompt resolution of
complaints. This mechanism, termed the IGRC, does not create a
distinct or parallel forum but operates as part of the same internal
grievance redressal scheme. Though the parent Act does not
expressly envisage a three-tier system, the 2023 Regulations provide
for two layers of internal grievance redressal: first at the IGRC, and
then at the CGRF. The IGRC has been structured in the most
decentralised manner at the officer level, while the CGRF continues
to function regionally. In Kerala, the CGRFs are located at
Kottarakkara, Ernakulam, and Kozhikode, covering the South,
Central, and North zones, respectively. It was therefore thought
necessary by the State Regulatory Commission to introduce an
officer-level mechanism to increase accessibility. It must also be
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noted that under Regulation 17(2) of the 2023 Regulations, a
consumer has the option to approach either the IGRC or the CGRF
directly. The nature of the complaint before both is the same. If the
consumer is dissatisfied with the decision of the IGRC, he may place
the very same complaint before the CGRF. This shows that the
IGRC is not a separate forum but rather a decentralised extension of
the CGRF. Thus, the CGRF is also an internal mechanism within the
regulatory framework, and the grievance redressal scheme is
common to both IGRC and CGRF. The mere difference in composition
between the IGRC and CGRF does not render them distinct in
character under the statutory scheme. Section 42(5) of the Act
contemplates a mechanism for consumer grievance redressal; if such
a mechanism provides two levels--one at the officer level and the
other at the regional level, they both remain internal. The
introduction of two levels is meant only to remove barriers of
distance and to make grievance redressal more accessible to the
consumer.
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20. Further, if IGRC is considered as an internal mechanism,
necessarily, CGRF must also be considered as an internal mechanism,
as the constitution of both is for the same purpose. And it is also
seen from the proviso to Regulation 4(4) of the 2023 Regulations
that it is not mandatory for all the licensees other than KSEB to
establish IGRC for the time being. Thus, it is clear that the
constitution of IGRC and CGRF has been envisaged as an internal
mechanism under the regulatory scheme and decisions/awards of
such a forum cannot be treated as an external decision of the
licensee.
21. The Ombudsman appointed under Section 42(6) of the Act
is an independent statutory authority designated by the State
Commission. A plain reading of Section 42(6) shows that the
Legislature never intended to confer upon the licensee a right to
challenge the decision of the CGRF. The consumer alone is given the
right to question the decision of CGRF. The legislative intent is
therefore clear. Though the CGRF functions as a quasi-judicial body,
its decisions, awards, and orders must be treated as decisions of the
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licensee itself in the realm of governance relating to electricity
distribution. They are integral to the institutional decision-making of
the licensee and not separable from it. Consequently, the licensee
can be said to be aggrieved only when a decision is rendered
independently of it, and not otherwise. It is possible that the CGRF
may pass an erroneous order. Such an order, no doubt, may be
reviewed under Regulation 12A of the 2005 Regulations on the
limited grounds referred therein. However, once rendered, a decision
of the CGRF binds the licensee and forms part of its institutional
governance. Only in an extreme case, where the CGRF acts contrary
to statutory provisions, without jurisdiction, or in excess of its
authority, would its order lose the character of being a decision within
the licensee's governance framework. Such an order would instead
be a colourable exercise of power, running contrary to the objectives
of the Electricity Act. In such exceptional circumstances, the licensee
may question the validity of the order. But this cannot extend to
cases where the challenge is only to the merits of the order of the
CGRF.
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Thus, we affirm the judgments of the learned Single Judge. The
writ appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
Sd/-
HARISANKAR V. MENON, JUDGE
ms
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PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure A A TRUE COPY OF RP 534 OF 2023 IN WP(C) 25898 OF
W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025
2025:KER:69106
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure-1 A COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE KSERC DATED 21-
06-2010 REGARDING TARIFF APPLICABILITY TO LT-MILK
PROCESSING UNITS.
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
Annexure R1(d) True extracts of relevant portion from the speech
of the Hon'ble Minister for Power made in the Lok
Sabha on 08.04.2003.
Annexure R1 (c) True extracts of relevant portion from the Report
of the Standing Committee on Energy (2002) of
Thirteenth Lok Sabha on Electricity Bill 2001,
presented to Lok Sabha on 19.12.2002
Annexure R1 (a) True Copy of Order dated 01.09.2008 of the Kerala
State Electricity Regulatory Commission in DP No.
39 of 2008 and connected cases.
Annexure R1 (b) True extracts of relevant portion of Electricity
Bill, 2001
