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Namjit vs State Of Kerala
2025 Latest Caselaw 8600 Ker

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8600 Ker
Judgement Date : 11 September, 2025

Kerala High Court

Namjit vs State Of Kerala on 11 September, 2025

Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
                                             2025:KER:67612
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                          PRESENT

    THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

                             &

         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN

THURSDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 / 20TH BHADRA, 1947

                  WP(C) NO. 32114 OF 2025

PETITIONER:

         NAMJIT
         AGED 29 YEARS
         S/O BALAN, PAZHAVELIKAKATHU HOUSE, NARAYANA
         MANGALAM, PULLUT, KODUNGALLOOR, THRISSUR,
         PIN - 680663

         BY ADVS.
         SHRI.M.H.HANIS
         SMT.T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR
         SMT.NANCY MOL P.
         SHRI.ANANDHU P.C.
         SMT.NEETHU.G.NADH
         SMT.RIA ELIZABETH T.J.
         SHRI.SAHAD M. HANIS
RESPONDENTS:

    1    STATE OF KERALA
         REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
         HOME AND VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
         SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001

    2    DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
         THRISSUR RANGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680001

         BY ADVS.
         SRI.K.A.ANAS, GOVERNMENT PLEADER

     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 11.09.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
 WP(C) No.32114 of 2025           :: 2 ::



                                                         2025:KER:67612
                          JUDGMENT

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment

passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala

Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the

sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted

from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District, for a period

of one year from the date of the receipt of the order.

2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after

considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal

activities, the District Police Chief, Thirssur Rural submitted a

proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner

under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the

authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur

Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been

classified as a "known rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of

the KAA(P) Act, 2007.

3. The authority considered four cases in which the

petitioner was involved while passing the order of externment. Out

of the said four cases, the case registered with respect to the last

prejudicial activity is crime No.964/2025 of Kodungallur Police WP(C) No.32114 of 2025 :: 3 ::

2025:KER:67612 Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable

under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110 r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita (for short "BNS").

4. Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government

Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit

that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of

facts and without proper application of mind. According to the

counsel, though the petitioner was released on bail in the case

registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity on stringent

conditions, the said fact is not adverted to in the impugned order,

and the sufficiency of bail conditions was also not considered by

the jurisdictional authority while passing the order. The learned

counsel further urged that in the impugned order, the jurisdictional

authority has not assigned any reason for passing the maximum

period of externment. According to the counsel, when the

maximum period of externment was ordered, it was incumbent

upon the jurisdiction authority to assign special reasons for passing

such an order. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned

order of externment is liable to be set aside.

 WP(C) No.32114 of 2025                 :: 4 ::



                                                               2025:KER:67612

6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted

that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority

after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite

objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the

learned Government Pleader, the sufficiency of the bail conditions

imposed by the court while granting bail to the externee in the

case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity was duly

considered by the jurisdictional authority, and it was after being

satisfied that those conditions are not sufficient to restrain the

externee from repeating criminal activities, the externment order

was passed. It was further submitted that all the procedural

safeguards were complied with while passing the order of

externment against the petitioner, and hence, no interference is

warranted.

7. While considering the rival contentions, it is to be

noted that the case registered against the petitioner with respect

to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.964/2025 of Kodungallur

Police Station, registered, alleging commission of offences

punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110 r/w 3(5) of

BNS. The date of occurrence of the said case was on 17.05.2025.

The records further reveal that the petitioner was arrested in that

case on 22.05.2025 and released on bail on 03.06.2025. It was on

24.06.2025, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the WP(C) No.32114 of 2025 :: 5 ::

2025:KER:67612 KAA(P) Act was mooted by the sponsoring authority. Later the the

impugned order was passed on 11.07.2025. The sequence of the

events narrated above clearly indicates that there is no undue

delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the externment

order.

8. Undisputedly, Ext.P1 order of externment was passed

while the petitioner was on bail in the case registered with respect

to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, while passing the order, it

was incumbent upon the jurisdictional authority to take note of the

fact that the petitioner was on bail in the said case and also to

consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions clamped on him by

the court while granting bail to him. When an effective and

alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating

criminal activities, resorting to an externment order is neither

warranted nor permissible. Therefore, when the petitioner is on

bail, it was imperative for the jurisdictional authority to consider

whether there exists any bail condition that would suffice to deter

the petitioner from engaging in criminal activities further.

9. Keeping in mind the above while reverting to the facts in

the present case, it can be seen that the impugned order, the fact

that the petitioner was released on bail in the last case registered

against him is specifically adverted to. In the impugned order, it is WP(C) No.32114 of 2025 :: 6 ::

2025:KER:67612 clearly mentioned that all the proceedings already initiated against

the petitioner under ordinary criminal law did not yield any result,

and the petitioner is involving in criminal activities again,

disregarding the bail conditions imposed in the earlier cases. A

holistic reading of the impugned order further reveals that the act

of the petitioner violating the bail conditions and being involved in

criminal activities is one of the materials which the jurisdictional

authority relied on to enter into a subjective satisfaction to pass the

externment order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the

jurisdictional authority did not consider the sufficiency of the bail

conditions imposed on the petitioner at the time of passing the

impugned order. The impugned order reveals that the antecedents

of the petitioner and his propensity to be involved in criminal

activities, disregarding the earlier bail orders, persuaded the

jurisdictional authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction

regarding the necessity of passing the externment order.

Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner

in the above regard will fail.

10. The main dispute that revolves around this writ

petition is with respect to the period of externment ordered by the

jurisdictional authority. As already stated, the main grievance of

the petitioner is that, it was without assigning any reason, the

maximum period of externment was ordered. While considering the WP(C) No.32114 of 2025 :: 7 ::

2025:KER:67612 said contention, it is to be noted that the scope of interference by a

court of law in the subjective as well as objective satisfaction

arrived on by the jurisdictional authority that passed an order of

externment is too limited. However, an order of externment

certainly has a heavy bearing on the personal as well as

fundamental rights of an individual. Such an order would certainly

deprive a citizen concerned of his fundamental right of free

movement throughout the territory of India. By such an order, he is

prevented from entering his house and from residing with his

family members during the subsistence of the order as well.

Therefore, while prescribing the maximum period of externment,

the jurisdictional authority must apply its mind properly, and the

order must reflect the necessity of passing the maximum period of

externment. In other words, the order should provide reasons for

invoking the maximum period of externment. In short, the

jurisdictional authority shall exercise its power cautiously, though

the authority is clothed with the power to order a maximum period

of externment, subject to the restriction that it shall not be more

than one year.

11. The Supreme Court in Deepak S/o Laxman Dongre v.

State of Maharashtra and Others [(2023) 14 SCC 707], while

dealing with a preventive detention order passed under the

Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 held that:

 WP(C) No.32114 of 2025              :: 8 ::



                                                                2025:KER:67612

"On a plain reading of Section 58, it is apparent that while passing an order under Section 56, the competent authority must mention the area or District or Districts, in respect of which the order has been made. Moreover, the competent authority is required to specify the period for which the restriction will remain in force. The maximum period provided for is of two years. Therefore, an application of mind on the part of the competent authority is required for deciding the duration of the restraint order under Section 56. On the basis of the objective assessment of the material on record, the authority has to record it subjective satisfaction that the restriction should be imposed for a specific period. When the competent authority passes an order for the maximum permissible period of two years, the order of externment must disclose an application of mind by the competent authority and the order must record its subjective satisfaction about the necessity of passing an order of externment for the maximum period of two years which is based on material on record. Careful perusal of the impugned order of externment dated 15th December, 2020 shows that it does not disclose any application of mind on this aspect. It does not record the subjective satisfaction of respondent No.2 on the basis of material on record that the order of externment should be for the maximum period of two years. If the order of externment for the maximum permissible period of two years is passed without recording subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity extending the order of externment to the maximum permissible period, it will amount to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India."

12. Moreover, this Court in Dinchu Mohanan v. State of

Kerala and another [2015 (2) KHC 101] held that the court is

empowered to annul, amend, or confirm the order of externment

passed under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act. Keeping in mind the

above propositions of law, while coming to the impugned order, it

can be seen that nowhere in the said order, the reasons for

imposing the maximum period of externment adverted to. A bare

perusal of the impugned order reveals that it does not disclose any WP(C) No.32114 of 2025 :: 9 ::

2025:KER:67612 application of mind on this aspect. Therefore, we are of the view

that the impugned order requires modification regarding the

duration of the period of externment.

In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part and Ext. P1

order is modified to the extent that the writ petitioner shall be

interdicted from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District,

for a period of six months from the date of receipt of Ext.P1 order.

Sd/-

DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR JUDGE

Sd/-

                                      JOBIN SEBASTIAN
                                             JUDGE

ANS
 WP(C) No.32114 of 2025         :: 10 ::



                                                   2025:KER:67612

                    APPENDIX OF WP(C) 32114/2025

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1               A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. B3-
                         13147/2025/TSR DATED 11.07.2025 OF
                         THE 2ND RESPONDENT
 

 
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