Kerala High Court
Anil K Emmanuel vs State Of Kerala on 30 October, 2025
Author: Kauser Edappagath
Bench: Kauser Edappagath
O.P.(Crl.) No. 718 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 8TH KARTHIKA, 1947
OP(CRL.) NO. 718 OF 2025
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 26.09.2025 IN CMP NO.4785 OF 2025 IN
CC NO.811 OF 2014 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-I,
NEDUMANGAD
PETITIONER:
ANIL K EMMANUEL
AGED 45 YEARS, S/O EMMANUEL VARGHESE,
VELIYATH, CHEERANCHIRA POST,
CHANGANASSERY,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN - 686106
BY ADVS.
SHRI.AJIT G ANJARLEKAR
SRI.G.P.SHINOD
SRI.GOVIND PADMANAABHAN
SHRI.ATUL MATHEWS
SMT.GAYATHRI S.B.
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
AT THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031
2 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
VANCHIYOOR POLICE STATION,
VANCHIYOOR,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695035
3 JOSE
AGED 76 YEARS, S/O SOLAMAN JOSEPH,
PLAVILAKATHU VEEDU, TC 5/376,
INDIRA NAGAR ROAD, NEAR J J HOSPITAL,
PEROORKADA POST,
O.P.(Crl.) No. 718 of 2025
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THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695005
4 ADVOCATE ANTONY RAJU
AGED 72 YEARS, S/O ALPHONSE,
HOUSE NO: 237, SWATHI NAGAR,
PADINJAREKOTTA, KOTTAYKKAKOM WARD,
VANCHIYOOR POST,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695035
BY ADVS.
SRI.RINU. S. ASWAN
SRI.SASTHAMANGALAM AJITHKUMAR (SR)-R4
SHRI.SREEJITH S. NAIR
SHRI.B.AJITH KUMAR (KOVALAM)- R3
SMT.SHYNI DAS J.S.
SMT.GOPIKA H.H
SHRI.SYAM MOHAN C.
ADDL.DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION
SRI.C.K.SURESH-SR.PP
THIS OP (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.10.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
O.P.(Crl.) No. 718 of 2025
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"C.R."
JUDGMENT
This original petition has been filed by a stranger to the
proceedings challenging Ext.P17 order passed by the Judicial First
Class Magistrate Court-I, Nedumangad (for short, 'the trial court')
dismissing a petition filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor under
Section 239 (1) of BNSS (Section 216 of the Cr.P.C), seeking
addition of a charge.
2. The 3rd and 4th respondents herein face trial before the
trial court in C.C.No. 811 of 2014 for the offences punishable under
Sections 120B, 420, 201, 193, 217 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.
3. The 3rd respondent/1st accused was working as property
section clerk (Thondy section clerk) in the Judicial Second Class
Magistrate Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram, during the period of the
alleged incident. The prosecution case, in short, is that the 1 st
accused entered into criminal conspiracy with the 2 nd accused,
who was the advocate for the accused in S.C.No.147 of 1990
before the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, pursuant to the
said conspiracy, the 1st accused dishonestly delivered to the 2nd
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accused a material object (an underwear) involved in the said
Sessions Case which was in his custody on 09.08.1990, the 2 nd
accused received the same after endorsing its receipt in the
Thondy Register, took the object outside the Court, altered it and
resubmitted on 05.12.1990. Thereafter, the 1 st accused received it
back and forwarded it to the Sessions Court as though it was the
original one. It was alleged that the above-mentioned act was
done to secure an acquittal for the accused in S.C.No.147 of 1990
4. In the year 2022, both the accused/3 rd and 4th respondents
preferred Crl. M.C.Nos. 7805/2022 and 5261/2022 before this
Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., seeking to quash all further
proceedings in CC No.811/2014 mainly on the ground that
cognisance taken was bad due to the bar created under Section
195 (1) (b) of Cr.P.C. In the said proceedings, the petitioner herein,
who is a journalist, and another journalist, namely Sri.M.R.Ajayan,
filed intervening petitions to implead them. Those petitions were
dismissed. The Crl.M.Cs. filed by the 1st and 2nd accused were
allowed as per Ext.P12 order. By that order, the order taking
cognisance of the final report in Crime No. 215 of 1994 and all
further proceedings pursuant thereto, including the proceedings in
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C.C.No. 811 of 2014 were quashed. However, it was clarified that
the order would not preclude the competent authority or the court
concerned from pursuing the prosecution in compliance with the
procedure contemplated under Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. Ext.P12
order was challenged by the 2nd accused as well as Mr M.R.Ajayan
referred above before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, as
per Ext.P13 judgment, set aside Ext.P12 order of this Court and
restored C.C.No.811 of 2014 on file. The Supreme Court further
directed the trial court to conclude the trial within a period of one
year.
5. Thereafter, the parties went on trial. The trial was over,
and the case was posted for arguments. The Assistant Public
Prosecutor then filed Ext.P16 petition before the trial court under
Section 239(1) of BNSS (Section 216 of the Cr.P.C.) to add Section
409 of the IPC as well, in addition to the existing charge. It was
alleged in the petition that, upon scrutiny of the case records and
evaluation of the evidence adduced during trial, it was noticed that
the offence under Section 409 of IPC was also involved, and the
court inadvertently omitted to frame a charge under the said
section. According to the prosecutor, the proposed alteration of
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the charge is essential to facilitate the just, fair and complete
adjudication of the matter and to prevent any miscarriage of
justice arising from the omission of the relevant charge. The trial
court, after hearing both sides, dismissed the said petition as per
Ext.P17 order mainly on two grounds: i) The offence under Section
409 of IPC is not prima facie made out ii) In view of the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court in Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State
of Jharkhand and Another (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058) and
Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others (AIR 2024 SC 4531), the offences under
Sections 409 and 420 of IPC cannot co-exist simultaneously on the
same set of facts.
6. The prosecution did not challenge Ext.P17 order. The
petitioner, who is a journalist and a stranger to the proceedings,
has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to challenge Ext.P17.
7. I have heard Sri.Ajit.G. Anjarlekar, the learned counsel for
the petitioner, Sri.B.Ajithkumar, the learned counsel for the 3 rd
respondent, Sri.Sasthamangalam Ajithkumar, the learned Senior
Counsel for the 4th respondent and Sri.C.K.Suresh, the learned
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Senior Public Prosecutor.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri.Ajit.G. Anjarlekar
submitted that Section 409 of IPC ought to have been added by
the trial court as an additional charge having regard to the fact
that the 1st accused was a public servant, who was entrusted with
the property or with the dominion of the property in his capacity as
public servant and he committed a criminal breach of trust in
respect of the said property. The learned counsel further submitted
that the two decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the trial
court do not apply to the facts of the case. So far as the locus
standi of the petitioner to challenge Ext.P17 order is concerned,
the learned counsel, relying on the observation of the Supreme
Court in Ext.P13 judgment, submitted that since the case involves
allegations which are of such nature in gravity that may interfere
with judicial functions and thereby polluting the mechanism of
administrative justice, the petitioner has every right to bring to the
notice of this Court the illegal order passed by the trial court
especially in a case where the prosecution has not chosen to
challenge the same.
9. The learned counsel for the 3rd respondent/1st accused
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Sri.B.Ajithkumar submitted that the petitioner, being a stranger to
the proceedings, has no locus standi to challenge Ext.P17 order.
The learned counsel further submitted that even the petition for
alteration/addition of charge under 239 (1) of BNSS (Section 216 of
Cr.P.C) could not have been entertained at the instance of the
Public Prosecutor since alteration/addition of charge was within the
exclusive domain of the court. The learned counsel also submitted
that the offence under Section 409 of IPC is not prima facie made
out and Ext.P16 petition was rightly dismissed by the trial court.
10. The 4th respondent/ 2nd accused filed a memo stating that
he has no objection in allowing Ext.P16 petition. The learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent
Sri.Sasthamangalam Ajithkumar also took the same stand.
11. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor, Sri.C.K.Suresh,
submitted that the evidence let in by the prosecution, coupled with
the other materials on record, prima facie show that Section 409 of
IPC has also been attracted and hence the trial court ought to
have allowed Ext. P16 petition.
12. The contention raised by the 4 th respondent that the trial
court ought not to have entertained the application filed by the
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public prosecutor under 239 (1) of BNSS (Section 216 of Cr.P.C)
cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Anant Prakash Sinha @ Anant Sinha v. State of Haryana
and Another [(2016) 6 SCC 105] and the decision of this Court in
Puthiya Purayil Shaji v. State of Kerala (2025 (3) KLT 711). In
Anant Prakash Sinha (supra), the Supreme Court took the view
that even an informant/victim can seek alteration or addition of
charge invoking Section 216(1) of Cr.PC. Relying on the said
decision, this Court in Puthiya Purayil Shaji (supra) held that the
public prosecutor also can maintain an application for alteration or
addition of charge under Section 216(1) of Cr.PC. That apart, the
trial court is well within its power to invoke Section 239 (1) of BNSS
(Section 216 of Cr.PC), if the requirement of alteration or addition
of the charge is brought to the notice of the court by the public
prosecutor by way of a petition.
13. So far as the next contention of the 4 th respondent that
the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge Ext.P17 order is
concerned, it cannot be said that the petitioner is a total stranger
to the proceedings. He, along with another journalist Sri.
M.R.Ajayan had filed intervening applications before this Court
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when the 3rd and 4th respondents filed Cr.M.C's under Section 482
of Cr.P.C, challenging cognisance taken by the trial court resisting
the prayer. Thereafter, Sri. Ajayan, who filed the intervening
petition before this Court, along with the petitioner herein,
challenged Ext.P12 order of this Court before the Supreme Court
by filing a Special Leave Petition. Although the 2 nd accused
objected to the locus of Sri. M.R. Ajayan in preferring the aforesaid
petition on the ground that he is a third party, the Supreme Court
took the view that since the allegation against the accused raises
concerns with regard to tampering with the order of the court,
locus is not important especially since the State is not carrying
forward the matter any further. The petitioner further preferred
Crl.M.P. No.2778/2023 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate
Court-XI, Thiruvananthapuram under Section 340(1) read with
Section 195(1)(b) (i) and (iii) of Cr.P.C for the initiation of
proceedings under Section 340 of Cr.P.C in connection with the
tampering of the material object took place in SC.No.147/1990.
The said petition was dismissed, finding that the Judicial First Class
Magistrate Court-III, Thiruvananthapuram, is the proper court to
initiate the proceedings and therefore the petition is not
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maintainable. The petitioner had also preferred a representation
dated 17.12.2024 before the Additional Chief Secretary, Home
Department, seeking the appointment of a Special Public
Prosecutor for conducting the case. Being aggrieved by the non-
consideration of the representation preferred by the petitioner for
the appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor, he preferred W.P.
(Crl) No.81/2025 before this Court for the appointment of a Special
Public Prosecutor. However, it was rejected as per Ext.P15
judgment.
14. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others (AIR 1987
SC 877) considered the locus standi of the 3rd party/stranger to
oppose the application filed by the public prosecutor for
withdrawal from prosecution and to challenge an order granting
consent to withdraw passed under Section 321 of Cr.PC. It was
held that if the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is
an offence against society and not merely an individual wrong, any
member of society must have locus to initiate a prosecution, as
also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. It was
further held that if he was entitled to oppose the withdrawal of the
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prosecution, it must follow a fortiori that on the turning down of his
opposition by the court, he was entitled to prefer a revision
application to the High Court. Again, the Supreme Court in Abdul
Wahab K.v. State of Kerala and Others (AIR 2018 SC 4265),
held that even a 3rd party or a stranger can challenge an order
passed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C in a revision before the High
Court in an appropriate case. The dictum laid down in both the
above cases can very well be applied in a case where a 3 rd
party/stranger challenges the order dismissing an application
under Section 216 of Cr.P.C as well. That apart, the High Court can
exercise the power of superintendence vested with this court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India correct the illegality
or impropriety of any order or irregularity of any proceeding of a
subordinate criminal court when it is brought to its notice, even by
a stranger. [See Abdul Wahab (supra) and George Alexander v.
State of Kerala, 2025 (4) KLT 94].
15. Section 239 (1) of BNSS (Section 216 of Cr.P.C) gives
considerable power to the trial court to alter or to add to any
charge subject to the conditions mentioned therein, even after
completion of the evidence, arguments heard, and the judgment
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reserved. The expressions "add at any time" and "before judgment
is pronounced" would indicate that the power is very wide and can
be exercised in appropriate cases, in the interest of justice, but at
the same time the court should also see that its orders would not
cause any prejudice to the accused [See Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Karimullah Osan Khan (2014) 11 SCC 538].
Sub-section (4) prescribes the approach to be adopted by the
court where prejudice may be caused. It is settled that the
alteration or addition of charge may be done if in the opinion of
the court there was an omission in the framing of charge or if upon
prima facie examination of the material object on record, it leads
the court to form presumptive opinion as to the existence of the
factual ingredients constituting the alleged offence [See Dr.
Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh
and Others, (2020) 12 SCC 467].
16. In Ext.P16 petition, it was alleged that the charge under
Section 409 of IPC had inadvertently not been framed and that
during the examination of material prosecution witnesses, cogent
and credible evidence had emerged disclosing the commission of
the offence under Section 409 of IPC as well, and the addition of
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the charge is necessary to ensure a fair and just adjudication.
17. Section 409 of the IPC deals with the criminal breach of
trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent, which
reads as follows:
"409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by
banker, merchant or agent - Whoever, being in any manner
entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in
his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business
as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent,
commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property,
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under Section
405 of the IPC, which reads as follows:
"405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in any
manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over
property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own
use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so
to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".
18. Going by the above provisions, to attract the offence
under Section 409 of the IPC, two ingredients are to be
established; namely, (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker
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or an agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty
bound to account for; and (ii) the accused dishonestly
misappropriated or converted it to his own use to the determinant
of the persons who entrusted it.
19. The crucial question is whether the essential ingredients
of the offence under Section 409 of IPC are prima facie attracted
to frame a charge under the said provision. The prosecution case
as born out from the final report and charge framed by the trial
court is that the 1st accused who was working as property clerk in
the Judicial Second Class Magistrate Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram
entered into a criminal conspiracy with the 2nd accused and
pursuant to the said conspiracy, he dishonestly delivered the 2 nd
accused the material object involved in SC No.147/90 to secure
acquittal of the accused therein, and the 2nd accused returned it
after three months after altering. The trial court in the impugned
order found that the 1st accused who was in the charge of the
property section of the court received the material object in
question in the ordinary course of his official duties and there is no
material to show that any authority had lawfully entrusted the
property to him in fiduciary capacity and mere receipt of the
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property for custody or processing, in discharge of his official duty,
without any obligation to deal with it in a particular manner does
not amount to entrustment as contemplated under Sections 405
and 409 of the IPC. It was further found that the prosecution has
not demonstrated that the 1st accused dishonestly
misappropriated or converted the property for his own use and
that the alleged tampering, by itself, does not establish
misappropriation within the meaning of Section 405 of the IPC and
therefore, in the absence of proof of both entrustment and
dishonest misappropriation, the essential ingredients of Section
409 of the IPC are not satisfied. I am unable to subscribe to the
said findings for the following reasons.
20. It is not in dispute that the 1 st accused was a property
clerk at the relevant time. The property clerk, by virtue of his
office, is the custodian of all the properties kept in the property
room/thondi room. When the property involved in the case is kept
in the property room/thondi room, there need not be a separate
order of entrustment entrusting the property to the property clerk.
That apart, the Thondi Register Book has been marked during trial
as Ext.P3. The relevant pages of the Thondi Register Book have
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been separately marked as Ext.P3(a) and Ext.P3(d). The entry in
Ext.P3(a) shows that the 1st accused has entrusted the material
object involved in the case and the 2 nd accused has received the
same from the 1st accused on 09.08.1990. Ext.P3 (d) would show
that after three months, i.e., on 05.12.1990, the 2 nd accused
returned the material object to the 1st accused. The very case of
the prosecution is that the 2 nd accused, after receiving the material
object from the 1st accused, altered it and gave it back to the court
so as to secure an acquittal. The forensic examination report
produced and marked before the trial court would also show that
the material object was subjected to tampering.
21. At the time of framing of charge, it is sufficient if the
court is able to form a presumption regarding the existence of
ingredients constituting the offence found upon the materials
placed before it. The court doesn't need to undertake an analysis
of credibility, veracity or evidentiary value of the materials placed
before it [See Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368]. At that stage, even a strong
suspicion founded on material which leads to form a presumptive
opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting
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the offence alleged would justify the framing of the charge [See
Onkar Nath Mishra and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Another (2008) 2 SCC 561]. As stated already, the materials on
record suggest that the 1st accused, who by virtue of his office was
the custodian of the material object in question, delivered it
without any order of the court to the 2nd accused who tampered it
and returned it to the 1st accused after three months which are
sufficient to attract the ingredients of Section 409 of IPC for the
purpose of framing charge. Therefore, the finding of the trial court
in the impugned order that the ingredients of Section 409 of the
IPC are not prima facie attracted cannot be sustained.
22. It is true that the Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club
Ltd. (supra) and in Arshad Neyaz Khan (supra) has held that the
offence under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC cannot co-exist
simultaneously in the same set of facts. Section 221 of Cr.P.C deals
with the charging of an accused where it is doubtful what offence
has been committed. Sub-section (1) of Section 221 reads thus:
"221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been
committed - (1)If a single act or series of acts is of such
nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts
which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be
charged with having committed all or any of such offences,
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and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he
may be charged in the alternative with having committed
some one of the said offences."
Illustration (a) to Section 221 reads thus:
"(a) A is accused of an act which may amount to theft, or
receiving stolen property, or criminal breach of trust or
cheating. He may be charged with theft, receiving stolen
property, criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may
be charged with having committed theft, or receiving stolen
property, or criminal breach of trust or cheating."
Sub-section (1) of Section 221 of Cr.P.C allows the accused to be
charged with multiple offences in the alternative, or for all
potential offences, and can be tried together. The said provision,
along with illustration (a), provides that an accused could be
charged with both criminal breach of trust and cheating if the facts
are unclear, and then convicted of whichever offence is proven by
the evidence. The question whether, on merits, the offences under
Sections 409 and 420 of the IPC are attracted in this case is
something to be ultimately decided in the trial. The above-
mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court were not rendered in
the context of Sections 221 and 216 of Cr.P.C and hence cannot be
applied to the facts of this case.
23. For the aforementioned reasons, I hold that since the
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ingredients of the offence under Section 409 of the IPC have been
prima facie attracted, the trial court ought to have allowed Ext.P16
petition. Hence, Ext.P17 order is set aside, and Ext.P16 petition is
allowed. The trial court is directed to proceed under sub-clause (3)
or (4) of Section 239 of BNSS, as the case may be. It is made clear
that I have not expressed any final opinion that the prosecution
evidence adduced so far discloses an offence under Section 409 of
the IPC. The observation made in this judgment that the offence
under Section 409 of the IPC has been prima facie attracted and a
charge under that section also could be framed is for the limited
purpose of deciding the petition under Section 239 (1) of BNSS
(Section 216 of Cr.P.C).
24. If the trial court feels that, in view of the addition of
charge, the trial cannot be completed within the period stipulated
in Ext.P13 judgment of the Supreme Court, it is free to address the
Supreme Court seeking an extension of time.
OP(Crl) is disposed of as above.
Sd/-
DR. KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
JUDGE
APA/bng/kp
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APPENDIX OF OP(CRL.) 718/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATED
27/09/1994 ISSUED BY THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA VIDE NO: D2-8384/92.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE FORWARDING LETTER DATED
01/07/1996 ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR, FORENSIC
SCIENCE LABORATORY, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM VIDE
NO: B1-2590/FSL/94, ALONG WITH ENCLOSURE SENT
TO THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 20/01/1996
ISSUED BY THE DETECTIVE SENIOR CONSTABLE TO
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU,
INTERPOL CANBERRA.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 29/01/1996
ISSUED BY INTERPOL CANBERRA TO INTERPOL NEW
DELHI.
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT DATED
16/08/2002 SUBMITTED BY THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CRIME DETACHMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY BEFORE THE ADDITIONAL
CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 15/12/2005
ISSUED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY TO THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CRIME DETACHMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED
16/12/2005 SUBMITTED BY THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CRIME DETACHMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY BEFORE THE ADDITIONAL
CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT DATED
24/03/2006 IN CRIME NO: 215/1994 OF VANCHIYOOR
POLICE STATION
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EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 17/12/2013
ISSUED BY THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM TO THE CHIEF
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE PRINT OUT OF THE CASE
STATUS OF CC NO: 811/2014 PENDING BEFORE THE
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT-1,
NEDUMANGAD
EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE PRINT OUT OF THE FACEBOOK
POST DATED 17/07/2022 OF THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER DATED
10/03/2023 OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT IN
CRIMINAL MC NO: 5261 OF 2022 AND CRIMINAL MC
NO: 7805 OF 2022
EXHIBIT P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON JUDGMENT DATED
20/11/2024 OF THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT IN
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO: 4887 OF 2024 AND SLP
(CRIMINAL) NO: 7896 OF 2023.
EXHIBIT P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 24/07/2023 IN
CRIMINAL MP NO: 2778/2023 OF THE COURT OF THE
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE-XI,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
EXHIBIT P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 18/03/2025
OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT IN WP(CRL.) NO. 81 OF
2025.
EXHIBIT P16 A TRUE COPY OF CRIMINAL MP NO: 4785 OF 2025 IN
CC NO: 811 OF 2014 BEFORE THE COURT OF THE
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE -I,
NEDUMANGAD, PREFERRED BY THE ASSISTANT PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR.
EXHIBIT P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 26/09/2025 OF
THE COURT OF THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS
MAGISTRATE -I, NEDUMANGAD IN CRIMINAL MP NO:
4785 OF 2025 IN CC NO: 811 OF 2014
