Kerala High Court
Chaithanya vs Union Of India on 4 November, 2025
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
TUESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2025 / 13TH KARTHIKA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 1849 OF 2025
CRIME NO.RC-01/2022 OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY KOCHI,
ERNAKULAM
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.08.2025 IN SC NO.3 OF
2022 OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
CHAITHANYA
AGED 30 YEARS
S/O. RAMAIAH, VEERAMMA COLONY, KONDAMODUAREA,
KOTANEMATIPURI VILLAGE, RAJUPALAM MANDAL, GUNTUR
DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, PIN - 522412
BY ADVS.
SHRI.KALEESWARAM RAJ
SMT.CHINNU MARIA ANTONY
SMT.APARNA NARAYAN MENON
KUM.THULASI K. RAJ
RESPONDENT/S:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
KOCHI, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682020
BY ADV SMT.KRISHNA S., CGC
ADV.O.M.SHALINA, DSGI
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
28.10.2025, THE COURT ON 04.011.2025 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
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SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
P.V. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.
..........................................
Crl.A.No.1849 of 2025
..................................................................
Dated this the 4th day of November, 2025
JUDGMENT
P.V. Balakrishnan, J.
This appeal is filed under Section 21(4) of the National
Investigation Act, 2008 challenging the order dated 29.08.2025
in Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2025, in SC No.03/2022/NIA passed by the
Special Court for NIA Cases, Ernakulam, dismissing the bail
application filed by the 1st accused.
2. The prosecution allegation in brief is as follows:
The appellant/1st accused, Kambhampati Chaitanya@
Chaithanya @ Surya, got attracted to the ideology of the banned
terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) during his college days, and
thereafter, he attended various classes and meetings of frontal
organisations of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI
(Maoist) conducted by the co-accused Pinakapani and
Varalakshmi from 2017 to 2019. He got recruited into the
proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) in January 2019,
and thereafter, intentionally conspired with co-accused
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Anjaneyalu and others in the beginning of January 2019, and
travelled to Kambamala Estate in Wayanad, with an intention to
physically join the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI
(Maoist), and joined the Kabani Dalam (squad), an armed squad
of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) under the
Western Ghats Special Zone Committee (WGSZC) of the
proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist). Being a member
of this organisation, for furthering the terrorist activities of the
proscribed terrorist CPI (Maoist), the appellant, along with other
armed PLGA cadres, acted as a gang and visited the tribal
colonies in the Kannur and Wayanad districts and propagated
CPI (Maoist) ideology by distributing notices, pamphlets, etc.,
conducting classes, and raising slogans to attract and recruit
vulnerable youth into the organisation. The said act was
committed to strengthen the proscribed terrorist organisation
and with an intention to commit terrorist acts for furthering the
activities and objectives of CPI (Maoist), and thereby conspired
to wage a war against the Government of India. Further, the
appellant, as a member of the proscribed terrorist organisation
CPI (Maoist), concealed his knowledge about the designs of
waging war against the Union of India by CPI (Maoist) from the
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authorities. Hence, the prosecution alleges that the appellant/1st
accused committed the offences under Sections 120B, 121A,
122, and 123 of IPC and under Sections 18, 20, 38, and 39 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as
UAPA for short).
3. Heard Sri.Kaleewaram Raj, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and Smt.O.M.Shalina, the learned
Deputy Solicitor General of India, appearing for the respondent.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that
the appellant is totally innocent of the allegations levelled
against him. He submitted that the impugned order passed by
the special court for the trial of NIA cases, Ernakulam, is unjust
and is against the settled principles of law and is liable to be set
aside. He submitted that the appellant is in custody from
14.03.2022 onwards, and even though charges were framed on
12.09.2025, there is no likelihood of the trial being completed in
near future, since there are almost 57 witnesses to be examined
and the trial court has not even scheduled the trial. He, by
relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [AIR 2021 SC 712], contended that the
statutory restrictions based under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA
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will not oust the power of the constitutional courts to grant bail
on the ground of long period of incarceration of the accused due
to undue delay in conducting the trial, since it violates Part III of
the Constitution of India. He submitted that the accused
undoubtedly has a right to have a speedy trial as enshrined
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in the instant
case, where the appellant has already undergone 3 years and 7
months of incarceration without any likelihood of a trial being
commenced in the near future, is entitled to be released on bail.
The learned counsel, by relying on the decision in Anjaneyalu v.
Union of India [2025 KHC OnLine 1843], contended that the co-
accused in this case, against whom similar charges have been
raised, has already been granted bail by this Hon'ble Court on
the ground that he has already undergone 3 years of
incarceration. He submitted that the appellant is hence, entitled
to be released on bail, based on the principle of parity, as the
charges levelled against the appellant are similar to or less
severe than those against the co-accused, who has been released
on bail. He contended that the trial court has erroneously
proceeded as though only constitutional courts would be able to
grant bail owing to long incarceration, and the said finding is to
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be set aside. He added that there is no allegation against the
appellant that he had involved himself in any overt or direct acts
of terrorism, and there is no allegation that he has committed
any terrorist act under Section 15 of UAPA.
5. Per contra, the learned Deputy Solicitor General of
India, Smt. O.M. Shalina, vehemently opposed the granting of
bail to the appellant and submitted that the allegations levelled
against him are very serious in nature. She contended that
charges have already been framed in this case on 12.09.2025,
indicating steady progress of proceedings, and that if this Court
gives a specific direction to the trial court, the trial can be
completed within 6 to 9 months. She argued that the materials
collected during the investigation clearly indicate that the
appellant, after joining the Kabani Dalam of the proscribed
terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist), had undergone arms training
and is involved in a terrorist conspiracy and has conspired with
others to wage war against the State. She also contended that
the accused is now involved in four other crimes of serious
nature, all attracting offences under UAPA. She argued that, the
appellant being a native of Andhra Pradesh, there is every
chance of his absconding, if he is released on bail. She would
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submit that in the light of the afore facts, the continued
detention of the appellant by invoking Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA is justified. She would also submit that the appellant
cannot claim parity with Anjaneyalu, the co-accused, since his
role, conduct, degree of involvement etc. are entirely different,
and that the decision in Najeeb's case (supra) has not diluted the
statutory bar under Section 43-D(5) of UAPA.
6. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the
appellant is in custody from 14.03.2022 onwards. It is also not
disputed that the charge sheet was filed before the special court
on 03.09.2022 and charges were framed on 12.09.2025. The
respondent do not dispute the submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that, even though, charges have thus been
framed, the trial has not yet been scheduled. It is further not in
dispute that there are about 57 witnesses to be examined in this
case. It is to be taken note that even the submission made by the
learned counsel for the respondent is to the effect that if a
direction is given by this Court, the trial can be commenced and
finished in a time frame fixed by this Court. If so, it can be
safely found that there is no likelihood of the trial being
completed in the near future.
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7. Now the question to be considered is whether, in the
light of the afore facts and circumstances, i.e., undue delay in
commencing the trial and the long period of incarceration, the
appellant would be entitled to be released on bail. It is true that
Section 43-D(5) places an embargo on the powers of the Special
Court to release the accused on bail, if it is of the opinion that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is prima facie true. It is also true that the
restrictions on granting bail thus specified are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being
in force on granting bail. Furthermore, it is not disputed that on
the earlier occasion, while dismissing the bail application of the
appellant on 11.04.2023, this Court, in Crl.Appl.No.1359 of
2022, has recorded that there are sufficient materials to show
that the appellant is actually involved in the Dalams of the PLGA
of the CPI (Maoist) party.
8. Now be that as it may, it is to be taken note that the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in Najeeb's case (supra),
while considering the bail application of an accused involved in a
case charged inter alia under Sections 16, 18, 19, and 20 of
UAPA, and who had undergone a long period of incarceration,
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has categorically held that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of
the Constitution of India would cover within its protective ambit
not only due process and fairness, but also access to justice and
speedy trial. The court also observed that once it is obvious that
a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would
ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. It went on to
hold that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-
D(5) of UAPA, per se will not oust the ability of the Constitutional
Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution of India and granted bail to the accused who had
already undergone a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein below:
"17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail
on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the
powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of
proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of
such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood
of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the
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period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an
approach would safeguard against the possibility of
provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as
the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial."
9. Subsequently, in the decision in Shoma Kanti Sen v
State of Maharashtra [AIR 2024 SC 2169], the Apex Court by
relying on the decision in Najeeb's case (supra) and rejecting the
contentions of the prosecution that unless the conditions
specified in section 43-D(5) of UAPA are fulfilled the accused is
not liable to be enlarged on bail, held thus:
"38. Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj,
submits that bail is not a fundamental right.
Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail, an
accused charged with offences enumerated in
Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must fulfill the
conditions specified in S.43D(5) thereof. We do not
accept the first part of this submission. This Court
has already accepted right of an accused under
the said offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on
bail founding such right on Art.21 of the
Constitution of India. This was in the case of
Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period
of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to
enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail -
restricting provision of S.43D(5) of the 1967 Act.
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Pre -conviction detention is necessary to collect
evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain
purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an
accused from being fugitive from justice. Such
detention is also necessary to prevent further
commission of offence by the same accused.
Depending on gravity and seriousness of the
offence alleged to have been committed by an
accused, detention before conclusion of trial at the
investigation and post - charge sheet stage has
the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings.
But any form of deprival of liberty results in
breach of Art.21 of the Constitution of India and
must be justified on the ground of being
reasonable, following a just and fair procedure
and such deprival must be proportionate in the
facts of a given case. These would be the
overarching principles which the law Courts would
have to apply while testing prosecution's plea of
pre - trial detention, both at investigation and post
- charge sheet stage."
10. The same principle was also followed by the Apex
Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024
SCC Online SC 1693) and Athar Parwez v. Union of India (2024
KHC 6719). In the decision in Athar Parwez's case, the Apex
Court after discussing Najeeb's case, went on to observe as
follows:
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"At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to
be appreciated and followed by the Courts.
Keeping the statutory provisions in mind but with
the passage of time the effect of that statutory
provision would in fact have to be diluted giving
way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution
where the accused as of now is not a convict and
is facing the charges. Constitutional right of
speedy trial in such circumstances will have
precedence over the bar/strict provisions of the
statute and cannot be made the sole reason for
denial of bail. Therefore, the period of
incarceration of an accused could also be a
relevant factor to be considered by the
constitutional courts not to be merely governed by
the statutory provisions."
11. In the light of the dictums referred above, in the
instant case, it can be stated that eventhough in the initial stage,
the bail application of the appellant was rejected by considering
the legislative policy enshrined in Section 43-D(5) of UAPA, the
rigours of the provision has melted down, due to long period of
incarceration and the delay in conducting trial. Ergo, following
the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and considering the
fact that the appellant has been undergoing incarceration since
14.03.2022 and the fact that the trial in this case is not likely to
be completed in near future, we are of the considered view that,
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this is a fit case where the appellant can be released on bail.
12. At this juncture, we will also take note of the fact that
the co-accused in this case, Anjaneyalu, who faces similar or
much more grave allegations than the appellant, has been
granted bail by this Court as per judgment in Crl.Appl.No.932 of
2025 dated 30.06.2025, considering his period of incarceration
from 12.05.2022 onwards and by following the dictums of the
Hon'ble Apex Court, as discussed afore. Hence the appellant is
also entitled to claim parity along with co-accused Anjaneyalu, in
getting released on bail.
In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed as follows;
1. The order dated 29.08.2025 in Crl.M.P No.131 of 2025
in SC No.3 of 2022/NIA passed by the Special Court for
Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam is set aside.
2. Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2025 in SC No.3 of 2022/NIA is
allowed subject to terms and conditions as follows;
a) The appellant shall be released on bail on executing a
bond for Rs.1 lakh with two solvent sureties each for the
like sum to the satisfaction of the special court.
b) The appellant shall not leave State of Kerala till the
completion of trial in SC No.3 of 2022.
c) The appellant shall furnish to the Investigating Officer
of NIA his place of residence in the State within two days
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of his release.
d) The appellant shall report before the Investigating
Officer on all Wednesdays between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00
a.m., till the end of trial.
e) The appellant shall use only one mobile number during
the period of bail and shall communicate the said number
to the Investigating Officer of the NIA. The appellant shall
remain accessible on the said number through out the
duration of bail and shall not under any circumstances
switch off or discard the device associated with it, without
prior intimation to the Investigating Officer.
f) The appellant shall not tamper with evidence or attempt
to influence or threaten any witnesses in any manner.
g) The appellant shall not engage or associate with any
activities, similar to the offences alleged against him or
commit any other offence while on bail.
In case of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions, it
would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail
granted to the appellant, before the special court.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI,
JUDGE
Sd/-
P.V. BALAKRISHNAN,
JUDGE
Dxy
