Kerala High Court
Shibu George vs Seena Manuel on 20 June, 2025
Author: Sathish Ninan
Bench: Sathish Ninan
Mat.Appeal No.458 of 2015
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
FRIDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 30TH JYAISHTA, 1947
MAT.APPEAL NO. 458 OF 2015
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 22-11-2014 IN OP (DIV) NO.94 OF
2011 OF FAMILY COURT,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/PETITIONER IN O.P.(DIV)NO.94/2011:
SHIBU GEORGE
AGED 37 YEARS
S/O.LATE GEORGE, KALLARACHULLY HOUSE,
EDAKUNNU, PADUVAPURAM P O,
KARUKUTTY VILLAGE, ALUVA TALUK,
PIN 683582
BY ADVS.
SRI.GEO PAUL
SRI.S.ASHOK KUMAR.
SRI.JERRY VARGHESE
SRI.LENIN P. SUKUMARAN
SRI.C.R.PRAMOD
SMT.RADHIKA RAJASEKHARAN P.
SRI.K.S.SREENATH
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT IN O.P.(DIV)NO.94/2011:
SEENA MANUEL
AGED 33 YEARS
D/O.JOSEPH MANI, VILAMTHNATHU HOUSE,
THALAPALAM, PLASSANAL P O,
Mat.Appeal No.458 of 2015
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THALAPALAM VILLAGE, MEENACHIL TALUK,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT 686579
BY ADVS.
SRI.T.ASAFALI
SMT.LALIZA.T.Y.
THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON
11.06.2025, THE COURT ON 20.06.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Mat.Appeal No.458 of 2015
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SATHISH NINAN & P. KRISHNA KUMAR, JJ.
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Mat.Appeal No.458 of 2015
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Dated this the 20th day of June, 2025
JUDGMENT
P.Krishna Kumar, J.
The appellant, who is the husband of the respondent,
filed a petition for divorce on the ground of matrimonial
cruelty under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act before the
Family Court, Ernakulam. By the judgment impugned in this
appeal, the Family Court dismissed the petition.
2. The marriage between the appellant and the
respondent was solemnised on 24.06.2007, in accordance with
Christian rites. The appellant alleges that, from the very
next day of the marriage, the respondent began behaving
unusually and started quarrelling with him, questioning
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whether he had any premarital affairs. She also refused to
engage in sexual relations with him. Hoping that a change in
environment might improve the situation, the appellant took
the respondent to Sharjah, where he was employed at the
time. However, matters deteriorated further as the
respondent continued to display extreme suspicion. She
persistently tried to uncover details about the appellant's
past, and her sceptical and erratic behaviour made it
impossible to maintain a healthy marital life. Consequently,
the appellant took the respondent back to her parental home,
it is alleged.
3. In the meantime, the respondent became pregnant,
and a male child was born to them on 05.09.2008. When the
respondent's brother informed the appellant that she was
causing disturbances at home, the appellant returned to
India and took both the respondent and the child back to
Sharjah, hoping their relationship might improve following
the child's birth. However, the respondent continued to
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exhibit violent behaviour, forcing the appellant to send her
back to India and later to bring her back to Sharjah, and
this repeated on eight occasions within a short span of two
years. During this period, both families intervened, and the
respondent was taken to a clinical psychologist by her
parents, who ensured she underwent counselling sessions for
nearly six months. Based on assurances from her parents that
she had improved, the appellant took her back to the
matrimonial home. However, her harmful conduct persisted.
Eventually, the appellant, convinced that continuing the
marriage would be detrimental and injurious to his well-
being, decided to seek a divorce, it is contended.
4. The respondent denied all the above allegations and
contended that their marital life was happy and meaningful,
and that she always maintained a cordial relationship with
the appellant and his relatives. She further asserted that
the appellant took her to Kerala and back to Sharjah, as
mentioned in the petition, on his whims and fancies and
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without giving her any prior notice. The appellant never
explained why she had to leave the house on such short
notice. In fact, it was the appellant who behaved violently
on certain occasions. The counselling sessions, as
recommended by the psychologist, were attended by both the
appellant and the respondent. The respondent also narrated
in her statement several instances from their life together
to demonstrate that their relationship remained calm and
cordial until she unexpectedly received the divorce notice.
5. After adverting to the oral and documentary
evidence adduced in this case, the trial court concluded
that none of the instances of cruelty cited by the appellant
are sufficient to suggest that it is impossible for the
appellant to live together with the respondent or that it
would be dangerous for him to continue the relationship.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on both
sides.
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7. The appellant reiterated his claims during the
trial when he gave evidence. He withstood the cross-
examination reasonably well. On the other hand, we noted
certain doubtful circumstances in the evidence and pleadings
of the respondent. As previously noted, the respondent's
stand in her written statement was that her life with the
appellant was always cordial and harmonious. She even went
on to state that she was utterly shocked upon learning about
the filing of the divorce petition, as she had been living
in her parental home, believing that the appellant would
return and that they could continue a happy married life.
However, by order in I.A. No. 932/2013 dated 23.03.2013, she
amended her pleadings to allege that the appellant had an
illicit relationship with a woman employed at a hospital in
Dubai, with whom his marriage had initially been arranged.
That proposed marriage did not materialise, allegedly
because the said woman wanted to marry her lover. It is
further alleged that the woman later divorced her husband
and thereafter entered into an illicit relationship with the
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appellant. The woman used to stay with the appellant at
Sharjah every weekend for two nights and one day. While the
respondent was residing in Sharjah with the appellant, she
allegedly received a telephone call from the said woman on
the appellant's mobile phone. Upon being questioned, the
appellant admitted everything to her, and the respondent
believes that this woman is the root cause of the problems
in their marriage, it is alleged.
8. Significantly, the respondent produced two
photographs during the trial, which were marked as Exts. B2
and B2(a) through the appellant. The individual depicted in
the photographs was identified as the aforementioned woman.
9. During cross-examination, the respondent stated
that she was aware of the appellant's alleged illicit
relationship with the said woman even when she received a
copy of the divorce petition. She further stated that,
although she had never met the woman in person, she had seen
her photograph as early as December 2008. The respondent
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also conceded that, at the time of filing her written
objection in this case, she was already in possession of the
said photographs. She admitted that she had obtained the
photographs from the appellant's mobile phone. Additionally,
she stated that the appellant's proposed marriage with the
woman had been called off just before the scheduled date, as
the prospective bride had chosen to marry her lover instead.
The respondent further acknowledged that, ordinarily, a
person whose marriage was cancelled under such circumstances
would not maintain a cordial relationship with the woman.
She also admitted that she had undergone counselling
sessions with two psychologists, along with the appellant.
10. Significantly, the respondent herself acknowledged
that she had accessed and retained photographs from the
appellant's mobile phone as early as 2008, and yet she chose
not to disclose this in her initial pleadings. The belated
amendment to her written statement introducing serious
allegations of an illicit relationship appears to be a
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retaliatory assertion rather than a genuine grievance,
thereby casting doubt on the credibility of her sworn
testimony.
11. Sri. T. Asaf Ali, the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent, vehemently contended that ordinary wear and
tear in family life cannot be equated with matrimonial
cruelty and that such trivial or routine issues should not
form the basis for granting a decree of divorce. He placed
reliance on the decision in Avijin K. Dominic v. Beena (2024
SCC OnLine Ker 740) to support his submission. He further
argued that most of the allegations raised by the appellant--
such as denial of sexual relationship and other alleged acts
of cruelty--have been disproved and are devoid of merit.
12. However, after carefully considering the conduct of
the respondent, the manner in which she chose to defend the
divorce petition, and the other attendant circumstances
discussed above, we are unable to accept the contention
advanced by Sri. Asaf Ali. The cumulative effect of the
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respondent's conduct, as discussed in detail above, leads us
to conclude that the oral testimony of the appellant is more
credible and convincing than the evidence adduced by the
respondent.
13. The main grievance of the appellant is that the
respondent rendered his life intolerable by persistently
raising unfounded suspicions regarding his alleged
extramarital affairs. It is noteworthy that the respondent
did not raise the allegation regarding the appellant's
illicit relationship in her original written statement,
despite admittedly being in possession of photographs of the
said woman. This unexplained delay and the timing of the
amendment introducing the allegation raise serious questions
about her credibility and suggest that the allegation was an
afterthought.
14. The trial court, in our view, failed to properly
appreciate these material aspects and instead adopted an
overly rigid approach by insisting on strict proof of
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cruelty amounting to danger to life or limb, by adopting the
meaning of the terms used in Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce
Act in the literal sense. Such an interpretation is
inconsistent with the settled position of law that mental
cruelty, even in the absence of physical harm, can form a
valid ground for divorce if it causes deep anguish and
renders cohabitation impossible.
15. After considering the above-mentioned factors in
light of the evidence adduced by the appellant, we find
considerable merit in the argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the continuance of a peaceful
and meaningful marital life between the appellant and the
respondent is practically impossible. The conduct of the
respondent, as evidenced by her persistent suspicion,
repeated allegations, and admission of prolonged
counselling, all point to a marital environment devoid of
trust and emotional stability.
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16. This Court, in A v. B [2010 (4) KLT 434], while
interpreting the scope of Section 10 of the Divorce Act,
held that the degree of matrimonial cruelty warranting a
decree of divorce cannot vary among individuals of different
religious faiths merely because different terminologies are
used in their respective personal laws. The Court further
observed that unless uniform standards of matrimonial
cruelty are applied to all citizens, it would amount to a
violation of the principles of equality enshrined in the
Constitution. Following this precedent, in X v. Y [2021 (3)
KHC 315], this Court held that physical violence is not
essential to constitute cruelty within the meaning of
Section 10 of the Divorce Act. It further held that acts
amounting to mental cruelty must be assessed based on the
specific circumstances of each case, including the nature of
life to which the parties are accustomed, as well as their
social and educational backgrounds.
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17. In these circumstances, compelling the appellant to
continue in such a strained relationship would amount to
inflicting further mental cruelty upon him. The cumulative
effect of the above factors justifies the appellant's claim
for divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelty under
Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act. Thus, we are of the
view that the appellant is entitled to get a decree of
divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelty.
18. Apart from this, admittedly, both parties have been
living separately at least since 2011. According to the
appellant, the spouses have been living separately since
15.01.2011, the date on which the respondent was taken to
her home by the appellant for psychological treatment.
Though the respondent has claimed that she was expecting a
reunion with the appellant all along the period when she was
staying at her home, she has not so far made any application
for restitution of conjugal rights. From the subsequent
pleadings she made, we found that the said contention is
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incorrect. Despite various efforts, including professional
counselling, the relationship failed to improve. The
prolonged separation, coupled with the unending discord and
the hostile environment portrayed through the pleadings and
testimony, clearly establishes that the marital bond has
broken down irretrievably. The Apex Court in Samar Ghosh v.
Jaya Ghosh [(2007) 4 SCC 511) observed that the marriage
becomes a fiction, though it is supported by a legal tie,
when there is continuous separation and loss of essential
bond between the couple. It was further held that, if there
has been a long period of continuous separation, it is fair
to conclude that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair.
19. In Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan [2023 SCC
OnLine SC 544], it has been held that where there is an
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, then dissolution of
marriage is the only solution. In Rajib Kumar vs. Sushmita
Saha [2023 LiveLaw (SC) 727], the Apex Court held that
keeping the parties together despite an irretrievable
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breakdown of marriage amounts to cruelty on both sides. Such
a long separation without any intention to resume
cohabitation amounts to cruelty to the spouse. After
considering all the above aspects, we are of the view that
the marriage between the parties could be dissolved on the
said ground as well.
Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The marriage
between the parties will stand dissolved by a decree of
divorce. No costs.
Sd/-
SATHISH NINAN
JUDGE
Sd/-
P. KRISHNA KUMAR
JUDGE
sv
