Kerala High Court
Aneesh K. K vs State Of Kerala on 29 July, 2025
Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
2025:KER:56260
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
TUESDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF JULY 2025 / 7TH SRAVANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 993 OF 2025
CRIME NO.1118/2024 OF PUDUKKAD POLICE STATION, THRISSUR
PETITIONER/PETITIONER:
ANEESH K. K,
AGED 34 YEARS
S/O KOCHUMON, KALLAYIL HOUSE,
THOTTIPPAL VILLAGE, RAPPAL PALLOM DESOM,
THRISSUR, KERALA, PIN - 680310
BY ADVS.
SHRI.SARATH BABU KOTTAKKAL
SMT.ARCHANA VIJAYAN
SHRI.SEBASTIN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY, HOME
DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
THRISSUR RANGE, THRISSUR, THRISSUR, PIN - 680001
3 DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF, THRISSUR RURAL,
IRINJALAKUDA, KERALA, PIN - 680125
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4 STATION HOUSE OFFICER
PUTHUKKAD POLICE STATION, IRINJALAKUDA,
KERALA, PIN - 680301
BY ADV.
SRI. K.A.ANAS, GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 29.07.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
Jobin Sebastian, J.
This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P2 order of externment dated
13.03.2025 passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a)
r/w 15(5) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007
[KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the
petitioner has been interdicted from entering the limits of Thrissur
Revenue District for a period of one year from the date of the
receipt of the order.
2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after
considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal
activities, that the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural submitted a
proposal for initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under
Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised
officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. For
initiation of proceedings, the petitioner was classified as a "known
rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.
3. The authority considered three cases in which the
petitioner got himself involved for passing the order of externment.
The case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last
prejudicial activity and considered by the authority for passing the
impugned order of externment is crime No.1118/2024 of
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Puthukkad Police Station alleging commission of offences
punishable under Sections 189(2), 189(4), 191(2), 191(3), 140(1),
126(2), 127(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109(1), 309(6), 351(3), 61(2),
103(1), 238(a) r/w 190 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short
"BNS").
4. Heard Sri.Sarath Biju Kottakkal, the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A.Anas, the learned
Government Pleader.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that the Ext.P2 order was passed without proper consideration of
facts and without due application of mind. According to the
counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as
well as in passing the order of externment, and hence, the live link
between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the
externment order is snapped. The counsel pointed out that it was
after the release of the petitioner on bail in the case registered
with respect to the last prejudicial activity, the impugned order of
externment was passed. However, while passing the impugned
order, the jurisdictional authority, failed to consider whether the
bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail
were sufficient to deter the petitioner from engaging in further
criminal activities. The counsel urged that the jurisdictional
authority should have passed such an order only after being
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satisfied that the said bail conditions are not sufficient to prevent
the recurrence of prejudicial acts by the petitioner. However, in the
impugned order, there is nothing to suggest that the same was
passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that the
conditions imposed are not sufficient to deter the petitioner from
engaging in criminal activities, and hence, the order is vitiated and
liable to be interfered with.
6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted
that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority
after due application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite
objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the
learned Government Pleader, there is no undue delay in passing
the externment order, and therefore, the petitioner could not be
heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity
and the purpose of externment was snapped. He further submits
that, it was after being satisfied that the conditions imposed on the
petitioner at the time of granting bail were not sufficient to
restrain him from engaging in criminal activities, the jurisdictional
authority passed the order of externment.
7. On perusal of the records, it is evident that it was after
taking into account the petitioner's repeated involvement in
criminal activities, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, has
mooted the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act
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against the petitioner. Altogether three cases formed the basis for
passing the impugned order. The case registered against the
petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime
No.1118/2024 of Puthukkad Police Station registered against the
petitioner alleging commission of offences punishable under
Sections 189(2), 189(4), 191(2), 191(3), 140(1), 126(2), 127(2),
115(2), 118(1), 109(1), 309(6), 351(3), 61(2), 103(1), 238(a) r/w
190 of BNS.
8. The alleged incident constituting the last prejudicial
activity occurred on 23.09.2024. In that case, the petitioner
surrendered before the court on 02.11.2024, and was remanded to
judicial custody. Later, he was released on bail on 30.01.2025.
Thereafter, on 12.02.2025, just thirteen days after the petitioner's
release on bail, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, forwarded
a proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P)Act against
the petitioner. Subsequently, the jurisdictional authority passed the
order of externment on 13.03.2025, thereby the petitioner was
restrained from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District for
a period of one year from the date of receipt of the order.
9. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that
there was no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order.
Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act is having a
significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of
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an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect
the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to
comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the
view that the minimum delay occurred in this case is only
justifiable, and it could not be said that the live link between the
last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is
snapped. Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention
passed under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has
occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no
serious bearing as the consequences of both the orders are
different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of
the personal liberty of the person detained. It stands on a different
footing when compared to an order of externment. We are
cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person
concerned with an intrusion to his personal liberty within the limit
of Article 21, especially when the said order restrains a citizen
from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a
detention order under Section 3 is compared with an order of
externment passed under Section 15(1) of KAA(P) Act, the latter
visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the
nature of proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 is inherently
different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin
C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852].
Moreover, an order under Section 15 can be treated only as
equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when
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the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner.
Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no
inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the
order of externment in this case.
10. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioner
is that, although the petitioner was released on bail in the case
registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, the fact that
the petitioner was released on bail was not taken into
consideration by the jurisdictional authority and the authority did
not consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed on the
petitioner at the time of granting bail. According to the counsel,
the conditions clamped on the petitioner at the time of granting
bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial
activity were sufficient to deter him from indulging further criminal
activities and hence, an order under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P)
Act was not at all necessitated.
11. While considering the above contention, it is to be
noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional
authority from passing an order under KAA(P) Act against a person
who is already on bail. However, when an order is passed against a
person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take
note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions
imposed by a court on such a person while granting bail are
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adequate to prevent him from engaging in criminal activities.
Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it
can be seen that it was after the release of the petitioner on bail in
the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, the
impugned order was passed. Therefore, the jurisdictional authority
while passing the order should be cognizant of the fact that the
petitioner was on bail in the said case and the impugned order
should reflect that the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by
the court while granting bail to the petitioner in the said case were
duly considered while passing Ext.P2 order. A perusal of the
impugned order reveals that in the said order, the fact that the
petitioner was released on bail in the case registered with respect
to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Likewise,
it is specifically mentioned that the petitioner got involved in the
last prejudicial activity, a murder case, while he was on bail in
another murder case. Thus the authority has concluded that there
is every propensity of the petitioner to involve in grave crimes
unless action is taken under Section 15(1)(a) of KAA(P) Act.
Moreover, in the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that
as of now, there exist no bail conditions that would be sufficient to
restrain the petitioner from repeating criminal activities.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that the petitioner cannot
legitimately contend that the jurisdictional authority failed to
consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions.
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12. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all
the necessary requirements before passing an order under Section
15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in
this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority
passed the externment order after thoroughly verifying all the
materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at
the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 15(1)(a) r/w
15(5) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.
In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner
has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ
petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
DR.A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
JUDGE
Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
ANS
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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 993/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE
NOTICE NO. B3-3362/2025/TSR DATED
25.02.2025 OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF POLICE, THRISSUR
Exhibit P2 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER NO. B3-
3362/2025/TSR DATED 13.03.2025 OF THE
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
THRISSUR,
