[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
Renjith Kumar vs State Of Kerala on 3 December, 2025
WP(Crl).448/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF DECEMBER 2025/12TH AGRAHAYANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 448 OF 2025
PETITIONER/S:
RENJITH KUMAR
AGED 46 YEARS, S/O MOHANAN NAIR,
SANKARAMANGALATHU HOUSE,
ELANTHOOR VILLAGE & .P.O,
PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, PIN - 689643.
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.SETHUNATH
SHRI.THOMAS ABRAHAM (K/1051/2010)
SHRI.LAKSHMINARAYAN.R
SHRI.SREEGANESH U.
SHRI.GAUTHAM KRISHNAN K.G.
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO HOME
DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 THE STATE POLICE CHIEF
POLICE HEAD QUARTERS, VAZHUTHAKKAD,
THYCAD. P.O, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695014
3 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
S.P OFFICE, NEAR RING ROAD,
PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT,
PATHANAMTHITTA.P.O, PIN - 689645
4 THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
(INVESTIGATING OFFICER), KONNI.P.O,
PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, PIN - 689691
WP(Crl).448/2025
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5 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
ARANMULA POLICE STATION, ARANMULA.P.O,
PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, PIN - 689533
6 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
NEDUMBASSERY POLICE STATION, NEDUMBASSERY P.O,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683585
7 IMMIGRATION OFFICER
2ND FLOOR OF THE AIRLINES BUILDING, COCHIN
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LTD., AIRPORT P.O.,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683111
8 XXXXXXXXXX
BY ADV SHRI.C.DINESH, CGC
OTHER PRESENT:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR-SRI.U.JAYAKRISHNAN
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 03.12.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
Dated this the 3rd day of December, 2025
Petitioner is the sole accused in Crime No.1509/2024 of Aranmula Police
Station. The offences alleged against the petitioner are under Sections 376,
376(2)(n) of IPC, Sections 69, 64(2)(m) of BNS and Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
2. The prosecution case is that the accused, who is not a member of the
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, after promising to marry the defacto
complainant, who is a member of Scheduled Caste community, committed rape
upon her and thereafter refused to marry her and thereby he is alleged to have
committed the aforesaid offences.
3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, even if the entire
allegations raised against the petitioner are believed in its face value, the same
will not constitute the offence under Section 376 of IPC. Therefore, he prayed
for quashing all further proceedings against the petitioner.
4. The petition was strongly opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor.
5. On a perusal of the FI statement, it is revealed that the petitioner and
the defacto complainant were known to each other since their childhood.
Though the defacto complainant was already married, her relationship with the
husband got strained and the said marriage was dissolved. While so, she came
in contact with the petitioner. From the FI statement, it is revealed that she
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lived along with the petitioner at different places and she has no case that the
physical relationship between them was a forceful one. She also became
pregnant and the pregnancy got aborted. Thereafter the relationship with the
petitioner also got strained, which resulted in filing this case against the
petitioner.
6. In the decision in Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764, referring to two other earlier decisions, the Apex Court in paragraph 23 that :
"Recently this Court in XXXX vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 3 SCC
496 held that when the relationship between the parties was purely
consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of
her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape were not made out.
Similarly, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9
SCC 608 arising out of identical facts, this Court has enumerated the
following:
"18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases,
the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an
active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish
whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith
and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The
false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus
to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
7. In the decision in Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra
and Another, (2024) 11 SCC 398, in paragraph 27 & 28 the Apex Court held that :
"27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship
by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally
liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the
false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship
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other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal
liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.
28.Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained
for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with
certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the
alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be
shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of
marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship
without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that
there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact."
8. In paragraph 30, 39 and 40, the Apex Court further held that :
30. It may be also noted that there may be occasions where a promise to
marry was made initially but for various reasons, a person may not be
able to keep the promise to marry. If such promise is not made from the
very beginning with the ulterior motive to deceive her, it cannot be said to
be a false promise to attract the penal provisions of Section 375 IPC,
punishable under Section 376 IPC.
***
39. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged physical
relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious consequences.
It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such long term
relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even
at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent criminal
process. There is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an
otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the Court must also be
mindful.
40. It is evident from the large number of cases decided by this Court
dealing with similar matters as discussed above that there is a worrying
trend that consensual relationships going on for prolonged period, upon
turning sour, have been sought to be criminalised by invoking criminal
jurisprudence."
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9. In Jothiragawan v. State Rep.By the Inspector of Police and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0377/2025 the victim accompanied the accused to a hotel room wherein
she was allegedly raped by him. In spite of that, she again went along with him in the
same hotel room and complained that he committed rape upon her again and again. In
the above background in paragraph 11 and 12 the Apex Court held as follows :
11. We have already found that there is no promise of marriage to
coerce consent from the victim for sexual intercourse; as forthcoming from
the statements made by the victim. The promise if any was after the first
physical intercourse and even later the allegation was forceful intercourse
without any consent. In all the three instances it was the allegation that,
the intercourse was on threat and coercion and there is no consent spoken
of by the victim, in which case there cannot be any inducement found, on a
promise held out. The allegation of forceful intercourse on threat and
coercion is also not believable, given the relationship admitted between the
parties and the willing and repeated excursions to hotel rooms.
12. On a reading of the statements made by the victim before the
Police, both the First Information Statement and that recorded later on, we
are not convinced that the sexual relationship admitted by both the parties
was without the consent of the victim. That they were closely related and
were in a relationship is admitted by the victim. The allegation is also of
threat and coercion against the victim, to have sexual intercourse with the
accused, which even as per the victim's statement was repeated thrice in
the same manner, when she willingly accompanied the accused to a hotel
room. The victim had also categorically stated that after the first incident
and the second incident she was mentally upset, but that did not caution
her from again accompanying the accused to hotel rooms.
10. In the decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC
675, in paragraph 21 & 24, the Apex Court held that:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
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obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good
and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and
consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or
had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception.
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was
made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and
whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where
the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-
representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were
beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention
to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention
of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There
may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a
future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the
evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the
fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called
into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact
that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to
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marry her".
11. In the decision in Rajnish Singh Alias Soni v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another, (2025) 4 SCC 197, after referring to various decisions in paragraph 30,
the Apex Court held that :
"30. In conclusion, the Court held that unless it can be shown that
the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage and
without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that
there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. It was further
held that even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to
the complainant initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship
continued for a period of nine long years would render the plea of the
complainant that her consent for all these years was under misconception of
the fact that the accused would marry her implausible."
12. In the decision in Hiran Das Murali v. State of Kerala, (2025) SCC
OnLine Ker. 6693, in paragraph 12 this court held that : -
"The statement of the victim has been narrated in detail as above, since, a
reading of her version, prima facie, indicates and instance of a romantic
relationship which turned sour subsequently and the parties involved broke
up their relationship. Though there is a reference that, on the first occasion,
she gave permission only for a kiss, he proceeded to rape her, the statement
mentions that after the alleged rape, he continued to stay with her in her
apartment for the next three days and again visited her on several occasions
and again stayed with her. It is baffling and difficult to comprehend, at this
juncture at least, how, if the petitioner had raped her on the first day, she
would still have allowed him to remain in her apartment for the following
three days or even on later and regularly engage in a physical relationship
with him. The above circumstances are prima facie, suggestive of a
consensual relationship."
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi),
MANU/SC/0080/2023, would argue that, unless there is evidence to show that at the
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initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to
marry the victim, the offence under Section 376 IPC will not be attracted. In the above
decision, referring to the earlier decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013)
7 SCC 675, in paragraph 16 the Apex Court held that:
"21.Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained
willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on
each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex
and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide
motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust,
as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a
distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so.
Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
22. xxxxx
23. xxxxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that
at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no
intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There
may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
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intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a
future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the
evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the
fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called
into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact
that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her".
14. In paragraph 20 the Court further held that :
"20. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that
the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the
misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry
her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no
consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause - Secondly of
Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a
difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of
promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from
the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and
would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise
to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach
of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have
given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might
have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the
circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry
as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section
376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts
before the court. "
15. Therefore, the crucial question to be considered is whether at the very
inception there is mutual consent to have sexual intercourse or the same is under a
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misconception of fact, on the promise of marriage or otherwise. Unless there is
evidence to show that at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim, the offence under Section 376
IPC will not be attracted.
16. Even from the averments in the FI statement, it can be seen that the
relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant was a
consensual one. They lived together at different places for a considerable
period, till the relationship got strained. In the above circumstances, it cannot
be held that the consent given by the defacto complainant was vitiated by any
misconception of facts. Therefore, continuation of the proceedings against the
petitioner will only be an abuse of the process of the court and as such this
Crl.M.C. is liable to be allowed.
In the result, this Crl.M.C. is allowed. All further proceedings against the
petitioner in Crime No.1509/2024 of Aranmula Police Station, stands quashed.
Sd/-
C. PRATHEEP KUMAR,
JUDGE
sou.
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APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) NO. 448 OF 2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE HON: HIGH
COURT OF KERALA IN B.A NO. 10678 OF 2024
DATED 7-1-2025
EXHIBIT P5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE HON'
SESSIONS COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA IN CRL.M.P
NO. 901 / 2025 DATED 22-02- 2025
EXHIBIT P6 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF EXTENSION /
MODIFICATION OF EXT.P5 ORDER IN CRL.M.P NO.
1552/ 2025 DATED 5-3-2025
EXHIBIT P7 THE TRUE COPY OF THE PASSPORT OF THE
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
ANNEXURE R7(A) TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 05.01.2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P12 THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF, PATHANAMTHITTA DATED
19-12-2024 IN CRIME NO. 1509/2024 OF
ARANMULA POLICE STATION APPOINTING
T.RAJAPPAN, DY.S.P AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER
