Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd vs M/S.Ananth Oil Extractions Ltd
2025 Latest Caselaw 5782 Ker

Kerala High Court

Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd vs M/S.Ananth Oil Extractions Ltd on 20 August, 2025

Author: T.R. Ravi

Bench: T.R.Ravi

R.F.A. No.347 of 2005




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                                -1-


            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                              PRESENT

               THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.R.RAVI


WEDNESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 29TH SRAVANA, 1947


                        RFA NO. 347 OF 2005

         AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2004 IN OS NO.163

           OF 2003 OF PRINCIPAL SUB COURT, ERNAKULAM


APPELLANT/DEFENDANT:
          THE DHANLAXMI BANK LTD.
          INCORPORATED UNDER THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT
          HAVING ITS REG. OFFICE AT THRISSUR,
          REP. BY THE SENIOR MANAGER,
          THE DHANALAKSHMI BANK LTD.,
          INDUSTRIAL FINANCE BRANCH,
          XL/7296, M.G. ROAD,
          KOCHI - 682 035.


            BY ADVS.
            SHRI.P.VIJAYARAGHAVAN
            SHRI.K.M.BIJU




RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:

            M/S.ANANTH OIL EXTRACTIONS LTD.,
            A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE INDIAN
            COMPANIES ACT, VASUDEVA BUILDING, T.D. ROAD,
            COCHIN-11,
 R.F.A. No.347 of 2005




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                                      -2-


            REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.


            BY ADVS.
            SMT.SHAHNA KARTHIKEYAN
            SRI.M.P.SREEKRISHNAN



      THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON   10.04.2025,        THE   COURT   ON    20.08.2025   DELIVERED   THE
FOLLOWING:
 R.F.A. No.347 of 2005




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                                   -3-


                                                                        "CR"
                             T.R. RAVI, J.
              --------------------------------------------
                        R.F.A. No.347 of 2005
               --------------------------------------------
               Dated this the 20th day of August, 2025


                              JUDGMENT

The defendant in a suit for money is the appellant. The

parties are referred to by their status in the suit.

2. The plaintiff is a Limited Company. M/s. Sree Ananth

Refineries Ltd. is a sister concern of the plaintiff. The plaintiff

had availed an open cash credit facility and a vehicle loan from

the defendant Bank. M/s. Sree Ananth Refineries Ltd. had

availed an open cash credit facility and a term loan from the

defendant. There were defaults in the repayment of the loan

accounts. The plaintiff owned 9.869 cents in Sy.No.2307, with a

three-storeyed building in Ernakulam Village. An agreement was

entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on

31.1.2000, for the sale of the property to the defendant. The

time fixed for completion of the sale was 6 months. The 1 st and

2nd floors of the building were in possession of the State Bank of

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Travancore, who wanted time till the end of the year 2000 to

vacate the building. The time for completion of the sale was

extended to 31.12.2000, and the same was endorsed in the

agreement. The sale consideration fixed was `220 lakhs.

According to the plaintiff, `170 lakhs out of the said amount

were agreed to be adjusted towards the liability of the plaintiff,

and the balance `50 lakhs was agreed to be credited towards

the liability of M/s.Sree Ananth Refineries Ltd. The sale deed

executed on 28.12.2000 contains a recital to that effect.

3. The plaintiff availed a loan of `224 lakhs from the

KFC. One of the conditions of the loan was that the liabilities of

the defendant would be wiped off. According to the plaintiff, just

before the registration of the sale deed, the defendant insisted

that an additional sum of `5 lakhs should be paid to close the

loan account of the plaintiff. M/s. Sree Ananth Refineries had

mortgaged by deposit of title deed, an extent of 65.435 cents in

Sy.No.136/4 in Maradu Village, as security for the loan granted

to them, and the said property was also to be mortgaged with

the KFC for a working capital loan of `150 lakhs to be granted

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to M/s. Sree Ananth Refineries. The plaintiff's case is that the

defendant had by coercion extracted an additional sum of `5

lakhs, since the plaintiff had to complete the sale by

31.12.2000, by which date the time granted by the Income Tax

Department will end and the title deeds were also to be handed

over to KFC towards security for the loan availed from them. It

is also contended that the defendant had, against the

stipulation in the sale deed, adjusted `175 lakhs towards the

loan account of the plaintiff, and only `45 lakhs was credited

towards the loan account of M/s.Sree Ananth Refineries Ltd.

The suit was filed for recovery of `7,44,791/- with interest at

the rate of 22.75% on `5 lakhs from the date of the suit till the

date of realisation, with costs.

4. The defendant filed written statement contending

that the suit is barred by limitation, that it is bad for non-

joinder of necessary parties, that the proposal for sale of the

building originated from the plaintiff, that the plaintiff did not

disclose the pendency of a rent control petition, and that the

plaintiff did not complete all the formalities for the sale, within

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the stipulated 6 months. It is stated that the draft sale deed

was approved by the Income Tax department and was

forwarded to the defendant on 3.8.2000, but the sale got

delayed by another 4 months. It is stated that there was no

agreement by the defendant to wipe off the entire liabilities by

accepting `170 lakhs. It is contended that as on 31.1.2000, the

amounts outstanding from the plaintiff towards the open cash

credit and vehicle loan account were `184.66 lakhs and `6.02

lakhs respectively, which increased to `188.10 lakhs and `6.25

lakhs by 31.7.2000. It is stated that as on 31.7.2000, the

amounts outstanding from M/s Sree Ananth Refineries were

`47.01 lakhs and `42.86 lakhs in the two loan accounts,

respectively. It is further stated that the total amount due from

the plaintiff as on 28.12.2000, the date of sale, was `209.89

lakhs, which was agreed to be closed at `175 lakhs, on

repeated request of the plaintiff. The contention regarding

coercion is denied. It is further stated that the loan account of

M/s Sree Ananth Refineries was closed only in February 2001,

on remitting `43,31,000/-, over and above the sum of `45 lakhs

which was adjusted from the sale consideration of `220 lakhs.

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5. The following issues were framed for trial.

"1. Whether the defendant is not bound by the terms of the agreement dated 31.01.2000 and the endorsements made by both parties extending the time for execution of the sale deed?

2. Whether the defendant has not committed breach of contract by unilaterally adjusting `175/- lakhs out of the sale consideration towards the liability of plaintiff instead of `170 lakhs agreed to between the parties?

3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the defendant who was creditor had not exercised unlawful coercion on the plaintiff to extort `5 lakhs more than the agreed amount of `170 lakhs towards liability?

4. Whether the plaintiff has committed breach of contract as alleged by the defendant in para.6 of the written statement?

5. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to the amount claimed in the suit?

6. What order as to costs."

6. On the side of the plaintiff, Exts.A1 to A16 were

marked, and PW1 was examined. DW1 was examined on the

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side of the defendant. The trial court found that the defendant

had committed breach of the contract by unilaterally adjusting

`175 Lakhs out of the sale consideration towards the liability of

the plaintiff instead of `170 Lakhs agreed to between the

parties. The Court further found that the defendant was not

entitled to retain the amount of `5 Lakhs, which had been paid

under coercion. The Court found that a payment made under

compulsion is also hit by Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.

All the issues were found in favour of the plaintiff, and the suit

was decreed. The appeal is filed against the judgment and

decree dated 31.11.2004.

7. The appellant contends that Ext.A1 agreement

stipulates the sale of the property to be completed by

30.07.2000 and on payment of `220 Lakhs. The period was

extended till 31.12.2000. Clause 2 of the agreement shows

that time is the essence of the contract. It can be seen from

the endorsement regarding the extension of time that it was at

the request of the plaintiff. It is pointed out that Ext.A1 does

not say that, by the appropriation of the sale consideration of

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`220 Lakhs towards the liability of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's

sister concern, the entire loan liability of the plaintiff and the

sister concern would stand extinguished. It is further pointed

out that though the specific case in the plaint is that the plaintiff

and defendant had agreed to settle the accounts based on a

one-time settlement, no such agreement has been placed on

record. The appellant submits that the plaintiff, being a Limited

Company, and the defendant, being a Scheduled Commercial

Bank, obligations and commitments can be created only

through documents, and no documentary evidence has been

produced in support of the assertions made in the plaint and

the evidence of PW1. Regarding the clause in Ext.A3 sale deed,

which states the manner of appropriation of the sale

consideration of `220 Lakhs, it is submitted that there is no

agreement in Ext.A3 sale deed that the sale consideration of

`220 Lakhs is accepted in full and final settlement of the

liabilities. It is pointed out that in Ext.A8 letter issued by the

Bank on 30.09.2000 to the Kerala Financial Corporation, the

Bank has stated that the balance amount due from the plaintiff

in one account is `198 Lakhs. Another aspect pointed out is

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that the plaintiff did not make any complaint for six months

after the execution of the sale deed, and if there was any

coercion or threat on the part of the Bank, the same would have

been objected to immediately.

8. The counsel for the appellant points out that the

liability of ₹209.89 lakhs has been settled on payment of ₹175

lakhs, and thus a huge sum has been given as remission to the

plaintiff, who has always been a defaulter. The counsel for the

plaintiff submits that a reading of Ext.A3 is sufficient to show

that there was an agreement to settle the liabilities by receiving

₹170 lakhs and that ₹5 lakhs paid subsequently, just before the

execution of the sale deed, was under compulsion, since the

plaintiff had to obtain the credit facility extended by KFC. It is

contended that the evidence of PW1 and DW1 also confirms the

above fact. Ext.A8 dated 30.09.2000 is also relied on to submit

that the One Time Settlement was for a sum of ₹170 lakhs. It is

argued that there is no document to show that before the

execution of the sale deed, there was an agreement to adjust

₹175 lakhs instead of ₹170 lakhs towards the liability of the

plaintiff. It is hence submitted that the adjustment of an

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additional sum of ₹5 lakhs was unilateral. Regarding the

compulsion, it is reiterated that to obtain the loan from the KFC,

a closure certificate had to be obtained from the defendant, and

for the issuance of the closure certificate, the plaintiff was

compelled to pay an additional sum of ₹5 lakhs. It is also

pointed out that the persons who attested Ext.A3 sale deed

were not examined, and DW1, who was examined, could not

state anything about the date on which it was agreed to

increase the amount to ₹175 lakhs instead of ₹170 lakhs. It is

hence submitted that the action of the defendant is hit by

Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. The counsel for the

plaintiff submitted that the apparent reason for the levy of an

additional amount of ₹5,00,000/- was that the sale deed was

executed after 5 months of the agreed date, and the additional

amount was the interest for the delay in performance. It is

submitted that such a claim can only be treated as

compensation and could not have been unilaterally adjusted by

the defendant. It is hence submitted that the judgment of the

trial court in decreeing the suit is fully justified.

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9. Sri P.Vijayaraghavan, counsel appearing for the

appellant relied on the following judgments in favour of his

contentions.

1. Mahabir Kishore & Ors. v. State of M.P., [(1989) 4 SCC 1]

2. Dhrangadhra Municipality & Ors. V Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. [1988 1 GLR 388 = Manu/GJ/0017/1987]

3. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors. v Union of India &

Ors. [(1997) 5 SCC 536]

4. Afsar Sheikh & Anr. V. Soleman Bibi & Ors. [(1976) 2 SCC 142]

5. N.V.Ramaiah. v. State of AP & Ors. [AIR 1986 AP 361]

6. Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd.

[AIR 1963 SC 1279]

7. State of Kerala & Anr. v. M.A.Mathai [(2007) 10 SCC 195]

8. Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das

Mushib & Ors. [AIR 1967 SC 878]

9. General Constructions v. South Indian Bank Ltd.

[(2016) 3 KLT 868].

10. M/s. Bhatia Plastics v. Peacock Industries Ltd. & Anr.

[AIR 1995 Delhi 144]

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11. Future Scaps Infra v. Ankurbhai Arunrao Pavle [AIR 2023 Gujarat 150]

12. Anthoyokkya Viswasa Samrakshana Samithi v.

Paulose [2013 (1) KLT 591]

13. Abdurahiman v. Asharaf Kalapeedikayil [2019 (2) KLT 282]

14. Sasanagouda v. Dr.S.B.Amarkhed & Ors. [AIR 1992 SC 1163]

15. Samuel Aaron v. Damodaran [1959 KLT 16]

16. Kumar Rohit v. Allahabad Bank [2017 (2) KLT SN 63 (Jhar)]

17. Union Bank of India v. G.K.Engineering Works [2018 1 KLT 367]

18. M/s Double Dot Finance Ltd. V. M/s Goyal MG Gases Ltd. & Anr. [ILR 2005 (1) Delhi 161]

19. Afro Asisan Agro Products (Singapore) Ltd. v.

Lekshmi Enterprises, [2023 (2) KLT 316]

20. Silymon v. Deepthi, [2023 (6) KLT 55]

21. Achambat Abdul Rahim v. Achambat Kunhalikutty Hajis son Muhammed Haroon and Ors. [2022 (3) KLJ 86]

22. Venugopal Company(M/s.) v. G.Sasikumar & Ors.

[2022 (1) KHC 169]

23. Hajira & Ors. v. Anto & Ors. [2018 (3) KHC 791(DB)].

24. Leela and Ors. v. Vasu & Ors. [2018(1) KHC 876]

25. Vijayan Nair B. v. S. Thankamani Amma, [2016 (1) KHC 469(DB)]

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26. Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr. [(2008) 17 SCC 491]

27. Punnoose v. Mammi Amma [1962 KLT 354]

28. Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. T.P.Avira & Ors.

[1958 KLT 721]

10. Smt. Shahana Karthikeyan, counsel appearing for

the respondent relied on the following judgments in support of

her arguments.

1. Syed Dastagir v T.R.Gopalakrishnasetty [(1999) 6 SCC 337]

2. Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram & Ors.

[(1977) 1 SCC 669]

3. Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by LRs v Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1242]

4. Dhan Singh Yadav & Anr. v Badri Prasad [AIR 1963 Rajasthan 198]

5. Trikamdas Udeshi v Bombay Municipal Corporation [AIR 1954 Bombay 427]

6. Atlas Express Ltd. V. Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd. [1989 1 All England Reports 641]

7. Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General [2003 KHC 1269]

8. Petlad Bulakhidas Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v Union of India & Anr. [AIR 1970 Gujarat 59]

9. T.G.M.Asadi & Sons v The Coffee Board & Anr. [AIR 1969 Mysore 230]

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10. Union of India & Ors. V Steel Authority of India Ltd.

[AIR 1997 Orissa 77]

CONSIDERATION:-

11. I shall proceed to consider the legal position in the

backdrop of the statutory requirements specified in Section 72

of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads thus;

"A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it"

12. I shall first consider the decisions relied on by the

counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions.

On the question of Pleadings required in such cases:-

13. In Afsar Sheikh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that while it is true that "undue influence", "fraud",

"misrepresentation" are cognate vices which may overlap in

some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are, in view

of Order 6 Rule 4, read with Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity,

particularity and precision. Referring to the principle conveyed

by the maxim secundum allegata et probata, the Court held

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that the plaintiff could succeed only by what he had alleged and

proved and cannot be allowed to travel beyond what was

pleaded by him and put in issue. It was further held that on the

failure of the plaintiff to prove the case pleaded, the court could

not conjure up a new case for him by stretching his pleading

and reading into it something which was not there, nor in issue,

with the aid of an extraneous document.

14. In Ladli Parshad (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court while dealing with a case of undue influence, expressed

the same view that the party relying on such a plea should

state the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner

of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the

other. In M.A.Mathai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

while dealing with a plea of coercion, held that the plaintiff must

bring material and lead evidence to support the contention that

there was lack of free will and free consent and that the

circumstances then prevailing necessitated the plaintiff to agree

to the commands of the defendant into entering in

supplemental agreements. The Apex Court held that there

cannot be an inferential conclusion regarding such matters. In

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Subhas Chandra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying

on the observations in Ladli Parshad (supra), held that

before examining whether undue influence was exercised, the

court has to scrutinise the pleadings to find out whether such a

case has been made out and full particulars of the undue

influence has been stated. In Achambat Abdul Rahim

(supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court held that undue

influence cannot be proved by adducing any amount of

evidence, in the absence of specific pleadings and it is the

burden of the party to ensure that the particulars are clearly set

out in the pleadings. The importance of pleadings was stated by

another learned Single Judge in the decision in Venugopal

Company (supra). The Court in the process referred to the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta

(supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is well

settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence if any,

produced by the parties cannot be considered. The Court also

observed that it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the

substance of the pleadings to determine the question and not

place undue emphasis on the form. In Bachhaj Nahar

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(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no relief can be

granted on the strength of the evidence alone, in the absence of

pleading. The above decision was referred to by a Division

Bench of this Court in a recent decision in Silymon (supra), to

emphasise on the necessity of pleadings. In Moran Mar

Basselios Catholicos (supra), a Constitution Bench of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the parties cannot go outside

the pleadings and set up a new case. In Punnoose (supra), a

learned Single Judge of this Court held that the decision of a

case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the

parties and that it is not the function of the Court to construct a

case not pleaded by the parties. In Leela (supra), a learned

Single Judge of this Court while dealing the validity of a gift

deed, considered the question of sufficiency of pleadings and

held that Order VI Rule 4 and Order VIII Rules 3,4 and 5 have

been incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure not merely as

a rule of procedure and they assume significance because in a

fair trial, no party shall be taken by surprise and a fair

opportunity should be afforded to meet the contentions of the

other party. In Vijayan Nair (supra), a Division Bench of this

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Court held that new facts stated in proof affidavit at variance

with the pleadings cannot be taken into account while

appreciating the evidence.

On the question of Unjust Enrichment:-

15. A Nine member Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court considered the question of refund of amounts

collected as tax, under mistake or coercion, by invoking Section

72 of the Contract Act in Mafatlal Industries (supra). The

Court held that an action under Section 72 was one in

restitution and where the plaintiff has not suffered any real loss

or prejudice, it would be unjust to allow or decree his claim. In

Dhrangadhra (supra), a Division Bench of the Gujarat High

Court considered a case relating to refund of Octroi, allegedly

collected by mistake/coercion. The Court reiterated the

requirement of precise pleadings regarding the mistake or

coercion and also held that apart from the requirement spelt

out by Section 72, there is an additional requirement which lies

embedded by necessary implication, that the plaintiff must be

entitled in law to receive back the amount of money or anything

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delivered by mistake or coercion. The court further held that in

an action based on quasi contract claiming restitution, it has to

be shown that the refusal to grant relief would amount to unjust

enrichment of the defendant. The question of unjust enrichment

in such cases was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme court in

Mahabir Kishore (supra). The Apex Court held that the

doctrine of "unjust enrichment" is that in certain situation it

would be "unjust" to allow the defendant to retain a benefit at

the plaintiff's expense. The Court drew a comparison with the

English law and observed that so far as India is concerned the

aspect is codified under Section 72 of the Contract Act and

hence the statutory provision will apply. In the words of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, "the principle of unjust enrichment

requires: first, that the defendant has been "enriched" by the

receipt of the "benefit"; secondly, that this enrichment is "at the

expense of the plaintiff"; and thirdly, that the retention of the

enrichment be unjust." In N.V.Ramaiah (supra) a Division

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered a claim for

refund of fee illegally collected, under Section 72. The court

held that it is for the plaintiff to plead and satisfy the court that,

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by grant of the relief to him, he would not be unjustly enriched.

The court observed that a provision of law designed to prevent

unjust enrichment cannot be made use of precisely to gain

unjust enrichment. In G.K.Engineering Works (supra), a

Division Bench of this Court considered a case where a Bank

collected larger amount than what it was entitled to collect

under a decree. The Court held that the Bank is not entitled to

retain the excess amount collected, finding that it was a case of

unjust enrichment. In Kumar Rohit (supra), the Jharkhand

High Court was considering a case of auction sale conducted by

a Bank, of a property, which could not have been sold by the

Bank without the prior approval of the Housing Board. The court

held that forfeiture of the amount deposited by the successful

bidder would amount to unjust enrichment.

16. I shall now refer to the judgments referred to by the

counsel for the respondent as against the above contentions. In

Dhan Singh Yadav (supra), a learned Single Judge of the

Rajasthan High Court held that applicability of Section 72 does

not depend on the existence of a contract. That was a case in

which a postal employee who made over payment by bona fide

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mistake of fact to a holder of a postal cash certificate, sued the

holder since the money was recovered by the Postal

Department from the employee. The Court held that the action

was maintainable, despite the absence of any privity of contract

between the plaintiff and the defendant. In T.G.M.Asadi

(supra), a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court, held that

the word "coercion" in Section 72 has to be understood in its

ordinary sense and includes every kind of compulsion, even if it

does not measure up to "coercion" as defined by Section 15 of

the Contract Act. In Petlad Bulakhidas (supra), a learned

Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court took the same view and

held that the term "coercion" used in Section 72 merely means

payment under compulsion, which the defendant has no right to

claim and is not the same as the definition contained in Section

15 of the Contract Act. In Atlas Express (supra), the Queens

Bench Division (Commercial Court) of England, held that where

a party to a contract was forced by the other party to

renegotiate the terms of the contract to his disadvantage and

had no alternative but to accept the new terms offered, his

apparent consent to the new terms was vitiated by economic

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duress. The court held that there was no consideration for the

new agreement. As against the above contention, the counsel

for the appellant referred to the decision of a learned Single

Judge of the Delhi High Court in Double Dot Finance (supra),

wherein it was held that economic duress or coercion, in

contractual relations, cannot be applied to mere financial

pressure and should be a situation where the person alleging

the coercion did not have any alternative course open to him.

The court held that bargaining and thereafter accepting an offer

by give and take to solve one's financial difficulties cannot be

treated as coercion or duress, since such decisions are common

in trade and commerce where decisions are taken which might

not have been taken but for their immediate financial

requirements. In Trikamdas Udeshi (supra), the Bombay

High Court held that amount paid as fine to avoid prosecution

for travelling ticketless was recoverable under Section 72. At

first blush, the said conclusion may appear to be preposterous.

But, it can be seen from a reading of the judgment that the

penalty was levied without legal authority. The court held that

the petitioner before the Court could not have refused to pay

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the amount if he so desired and the parties cannot be "in pari

delicto". In Steel Authority (supra), the Orissa High Court

was dealing with the question whether under Section 72, there

is any distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact.

The Court held that there was no such distinction and the

principle involved was equitable restitution. The judgment is not

relevant to the facts in issue in this appeal.

17. The following principles can be culled out from the

above decisions:

      a)     A suit under Section 72 is based on the
             principles of restitution.

      b)     To lay a proper claim, the plaintiff should plead

specifically the facts which would constitute the ingredients of Section 72, which in the case on hand is "coercion".

c) Coercion for the purpose of Section 72 is not to be treated as confined to the definition under Section 15 of the Contract Act and is to be understood to mean payment under compulsion.