Kerala High Court
Parvathy Prakash vs State Of Kerala on 1 August, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
2025:KER:56366
WP(Crl) No. 823/2025 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
ST
FRIDAY, THE 1 DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 10TH SRAVANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 823 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
PARVATHY PRAKASH, AGED 28 YEARS
D/O. PRAKASH, MURIGAYIL LAKSHAMVEEDU, MUTHUKULAM NORTH, CHEPPAD
KANNIMEL, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN - 690507
BY ADVS.
SRI.M.G.SREEJITH
SMT.VIDYAJITH M.
SMT.SWAPNALEKHA K.T.
SHRI.ROHIT R.
SMT.RESHMA SUKUMARAN
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT
OF KERALA, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN -
695001
2 ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, HOME(SSA) DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695001
3 THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE ALAPPUZHA, FIRST FLOOR, COLLECTORATE,
ALAPPUZHA, KERALA, INDIA, PIN CODE, PIN - 688001
4 THE STATE POLICE CHIEF (DGP)
KERALA STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, VAZHUTHACAUD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA, PIN - 695010
2025:KER:56366
WP(Crl) No. 823/2025 2
5 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
THE DISTRICT POLICE OFFICE, CCSB ROAD, CIVIL STATION WARD,
ALAPPUZHA, KERALA, PIN - 688012
BY ADVS.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:SRI ANAS K A
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 16.07.2025,
THE COURT ON 01.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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WP(Crl) No. 823/2025 3
JUDGMENT
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
The petitioner, Parvathy Prakash, is the wife of Rahul @ Veeran Unni
['detenu', for the sake of brevity] challenges the detention order passed by the 3rd
respondent, District Collector, Alappuzha under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ['KAA(P) Act', for the sake of brevity] dated
21.02.2025.
2. The records would reveal that the detenu has been involved in 11
cases, out of which 6 cases were considered for the invocation of Section 3(1) of
the KAA(P) Act. The details of 6 cases considered for the passing of Ext.P1,
detention order are as follows:
Sl. Police Station Crime No. Offences involved under various Present
No. sections Status of
the case
1 Kareelakulangara 1411/2018 294(b), 341, 323, 324, 34 IPC Pending
trial
2 Kareelakulangara 763/2020 143, 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, Pending
506(i) IPC trial
3 Kareelakulangara 604/2021 143, 147, 148, 149, 294(b), 341, Pending
451, 323, 506(ii), 427 IPC trial
4 Kanakakunnu 367/2023 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 324, 326 Pending
IPC trial
5 Kayamkulam 958/2023 323, 341, 294(b), 427, 506(i), 201, Pending
34 IPC trial
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6 Kareelakulangara 825/2024 189(2), 191(2), 190, 126(2), Pending
109(1), 118(2), 118(1), 115(2), trial
324(4) of BNS
3. The last prejudicial activity against the detenu is Crime No.825/2024
of Kareelakulangara Police Station, registered for offences under Sections 189(2),
191(2), 190, 126(2), 109(1), 118(2), 118(1), 115(2) and 324(4) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita. The crime was registered on 09.11.2024.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned
order was passed mechanically, without due consideration of the relevant materials,
and without arriving at an objective and subjective satisfaction by the detaining
authority. It is submitted that the live link between the last prejudicial act and the
passing of the detention order get snapped. Placing reliance on the dictum laid
down in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala1, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that mere registration of FIR is not sufficient to invoke Section
3 of the KAA(P) Act; something more is required.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that the
grounds for passing the order and the relevant records were not furnished to the
detenu, thereby violating Section 7(2) of the KAA(P) Act and Article 22(5) of the
2017 (3) KHC 517
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Constitution of India. He placed reliance on the judgment in Khudiram Das v.
State of West Bengal2.
6. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the delay of
three months and 13 days between the last prejudicial act and the detention order
is properly explained by the detaining authority, stating plausible and tenable
reasons. After the last prejudicial act, the detenu absconded and later surrendered
before the jurisdictional Magistrate. In the order itself, it is stated that copies were
duly served, and he was informed about his right to submit representation to the
Government and the KAA(P)A Advisory Board. The learned Public Prosecutor
submitted that the impugned order was passed after due application of mind and
upon arriving at both the subjective and objective satisfaction of the detaining
authority; therefore, no interference is warranted in this matter.
7. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.
8. The first contention is with regard to the snapping of the live link due
to the passage of time from the last prejudicial act and the order of detention. In
T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala3, the Apex Court observed as under:
1975 (2) SCC 81
(1989)4 SCC 741
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"10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised
thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person
necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time
when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial
activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be
precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances
and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It
follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by
merely counting number of months between the offending acts and
the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay
between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order,
the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has
satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and
reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when
called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate
whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances
of each case."
9. On perusal of records, it could be seen that the last prejudicial act ie.,
Crime No.825/2024 of Kareelakulangara Police Station was on 09.11.2024. The
detenu, in that case, was implicated as accused No.2. The allegation against the
accused in that crime was that accused Nos.1 to 5 formed themselves into an
unlawful assembly and attacked the defacto complainant with a sword and inflicted
serious injuries. The specific allegation against the detenu/accused No.2 is that he
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inflicted a cut injury with a sword on the right hand of one Sreekuttan.
10. After this incident, the detenu had absconded, and later he
approached this Court and filed a bail application. As per the direction of this Court,
the detenu surrendered before the Investigating Officer on 19.12.2024, was
arrested on that date, and was remanded to judicial custody. On 27.12.2024, he
was released on bail. The proposal was mooted on 19.12.2024 itself, and an
additional report was submitted on 06.02.2025. Considering the facts and
circumstances of this case, it appears that the delay occasioned in this matter was
properly explained by the detaining authority. We are unable to accept the
contention of the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial act and the
detention order got snapped.
11. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
mere registration of the crime by itself is insufficient to invoke the proceedings
under the KAA(P) Act, and the parameters laid down in Stenny Aleyamma Saju
(supra) were not followed in this case. Paragraph 28 of the aforesaid judgment
reads thus:
"28. This Court does not intend to say that mere registration of
FIR is enough under such circumstances. Of course, something more
is necessary which is collected by the Investigating Officer during the
course of investigation. If the data collected in such process is
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adequate enough to meet the requirements under the Statute, so as
to record the 'objective' as well as 'subjective satisfaction' to the
extent it is necessary, it is open for the detaining authority to have it
acted upon and need not wait till completion of the investigation and
submission of the charge sheet under S.173(2) of the Cr.P.C."
12. However, on perusal of records, it could be seen that the detenu was
implicated in this case as accused No.2, and he was later arrested. It appears that
the investigation was completed in this case, and the charge sheet was laid on
28.01.2025 before the jurisdictional Magistrate much before the issuance of the
order. The relevant records which reveals the role of the detenu in the said crime
had also been placed before the authority at the time of submission of the proposal
on 19.12.2024. Therefore, we are not persuaded by the said submission.
13. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the grounds of arrest and the relevant documents were not supplied to the detenu,
and thereby his statutory right under Section 7(2) of the KAA(P) Act and the
constitutional right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India were violated. In
Khudiram Das (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:
"6. The answer to these questions does not present any
serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds
are required to be communicated to the detenu 'as soon as may
be' after the detention. Obviously the reason is two-fold. In the
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first place, the requirement of communication of grounds of
detention acts as a check against arbitrary and capricious exercise
of power. The detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and
put him behind bars at its own sweet will. It must have grounds
for doing so and those grounds must be communicated to the
detenu, so that, not only the detenu may know what are the facts
and materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which
he is being deprived of his personal liberty, but he can also invoke
the power of judicial review, howsoever limited and peripheral it
may be. Secondly, the detenu has to be afforded an opportunity
of making a representation against the order of detention. But if
the grounds of detention are not communicated to him, how can
he make an effective representation? The opportunity of making a
representation would be rendered illusory. The communication of
the grounds of detention is, therefore, also intended to subserve
the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective
representation. If this be the true reason for providing that the
grounds on which the order of detention is made should be
communicated to the detenu, it is obvious that the 'grounds'
mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into
account by the detaining authority in making the order of
detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is
based."
14. On perusal of paragraph No.34 of the detention order itself, it is clear
that the grounds for the detention and the documents were furnished to the
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detenu, and he was informed of his right to submit representation before the
Advisory Board and the Government. We cannot agree with the said submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
15. The last, but not the least, submission by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the impugned order was passed in a mechanical and perfunctory
manner without due application of mind. Upon examination of the records, it is
evident that a rowdy history sheet was registered against the detenu on
11.02.2019. The proceedings under Section 107 Cr.PC were initiated against the
detenu based on the report dated 21.10.2023 of the Station House Officer,
Kareelakulangara Police Station. Thereafter, he was involved in Crime No.825/2024
of Kareelakulangara Police Station.
16. A perusal of the detention order would make it clear that the authority
has considered the efficacy of the bail conditions and submitted an application for
cancellation of bail after being satisfied that various measures initiated against the
petitioner were insufficient to prevent the detenu from further indulging in crimes
and anti-social activities so as to prejudicially affect the public order. The detaining
authority also considered the proposal put forth by the sponsoring authority and,
after arriving at both objective and subjective satisfaction, passed the impugned
order.
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17. In Ibrahim Bachu Bafan and Another v. State of Gujarat &
Others [1985(2) SCC 24], the Apex Court held that it is not open for the Court to
sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction entertained by the detaining authority,
unless the satisfaction is vitiated by malafides or by total absence of materials.
18. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of
detention passed by the authority.
The Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
JUDGE
Sd/-
K. V. JAYAKUMAR
JUDGE
Sbna/
2025:KER:56366
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 823/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit-P1 THE TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF DETENTION
NO.S.C6-372/2025 DATED 21-02-2025
Exhibit -P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29-04-2025 VIDE
G.O.(RT)NO.1397/2025/HOME
Exhibit -P3 TRUE COPY OF CRL MC NO. 5131/2025 IN THE FILES OF
HON'BLE HIGH COURT
Exhibit -P4 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 12-06-2025 IN
Exhibit -P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 20-06-2025 IN OP
NO.110/2025 IN THE FILES OF ADVISORY BOARD UNDER
KAPPA
