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Bharat Raj Meena vs Central Bureau Of Investigation
2024 Latest Caselaw 13385 Ker

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 13385 Ker
Judgement Date : 24 May, 2024

Kerala High Court

Bharat Raj Meena vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 24 May, 2024

Author: Kauser Edappagath

Bench: Kauser Edappagath

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
        THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH
    FRIDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF MAY 2024 / 3RD JYAISHTA, 1946
                     CRL.A NO. 591 OF 2016
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.05.2016 IN CC NO.2 OF 2014 OF
          SPECIAL JUDGE (SPE/CBI) - III, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/ACCUSED:

         BHARAT RAJ MEENA
         S/O.SRI.RAMDEV MEENA, AGED 43 YEARS, RESIDING AT
         WARD NO.12, KHANPOLE GATE, NAINWA, DISTRICT-BUNDI
         (RAJASTHAN)-323801.
         BY ADVS.
         ABRAHAM P.MEACHINKARA
         P.MURALEEDHARAN(K/209/1984)
         ALEXANDER K.C.(K/1057/2021)
         MARGARET MAUREEN DROSE(K/1328/2019)
         JAYAKRISHNAN P.R.(K/1659/2020)
         THOMAS GEORGE(K/1723/2021)


RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:

         CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
         ACB, KOCHI, ERNAKULAM, BY STANDING COUNSEL, HIGH
         COURT OF KERALA, PIN-682031.
         BY ADVS.
         SRI.SREELAL WARRIAR, SC, CBI

     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
20.05.2024, THE COURT ON 24.05.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 Crl.Appeal No.591/2016

                              -:2:-

                                                                "C.R."

                         J U D G M E N T

This appeal has been preferred by the accused in CC

No.2/2014 on the file of Special Judge, (SPE/CBI) III Ernakulam (for

short, 'the trial court') challenging the judgment dated 31/5/2016

convicting and sentencing him under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w

13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the

PC Act').

2. The appellant Bharat Raj Meena was working as

Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force,

Palakkad in 2005. One Sri.P.P.Nandakumar (PW6), Clerk in DSC

Office, Palakkad preferred a complaint alleging demand of bribe

of `10,000/- by the appellant through PW2 Anantha Narayanan,

Constable/RPF Coimbatore, for getting complainant's posting in

Palakkad area following his medical decategorization from RPF

and subsequent absorption in alternative post as clerk in

Personnel Branch under DRM Office, Palakkad. Based on the said

complaint, the Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACB, Kochi

registered FIR vide No.RC19(A)/2005/KER/CBI under Sections 7

and 12 of the PC Act against the appellant and PW2 on 4/8/2005

and entrusted the investigation of the case to PW8. PW7

Nandakumaran Nair, Dy.S.P., CBI/ACB, Kochi, and his team laid a

trap on the same day itself and at the instance of Dy.S.P./Trap

Laying Officer aforesaid, tainted money of bribe was handed over

by PW6 to PW2 which together with some other alleged bribe

money in an envelope and personal cash and diaries were

recovered from PW2 who was then arrested by CBI team.

Thereafter, PW8, the investigation officer, after the investigation

of CBI case RC19(A)/2005/CBI/KER dated 4/8/2005 registered

based on the original complaint dated 4/8/2005 of PW6, filed

three separate final reports on 31/7/2006 bearing

Nos.04/SK/19/A/05/KER, 05/SK/19/A/05/KER and 06/SK/19/

A/05/KER, before the Court of Special Judge-II, CBI, Kochi for the

prosecution of the accused under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d),

Section 7 and 13(1)(d) and Sections 7 and 13(1)(a) of the PC Act

respectively following tender of pardon of the principal accused

PW2 and one Abdul Gafoor from the Court of Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Ernakulam. The final report Nos.04/SK/19/A/05/KER

and 05/SK/19/A/05/KER against the appellant were then taken up

as CC No.2/2014 and CC No.3/2014 respectively by the trial court.

The third final report No.06/SK/19/A/05/KER was quadrifurcated

into four cases by the trial court under Section 219 of Cr.P.C.

while framing the charges. The said cases after splitting up were

then taken up as CC No.4/2014, CC No.2/2015, CC No.3/2015 and

CC 4/2015 for trial. Thereafter, the trial court framed charges

against the appellant in all the above six cases on 26/10/2015.

The trial in all cases commenced simultaneously.

3. In CC No.2/2014 which is the subject matter of this

appeal, PWs 1 to 8 were examined and Exts.P1 to P18 series were

marked and MOs1 to 9 were identified on the side of the

prosecution. DWs1 to 4 were examined and Exts.D1 to D25 were

examined on the side of the defence. Exts.X1 to X1(b1) were

marked as court exhibits. After trial, the appellant was found

guilty, and he was convicted for the offence under Sections 7 and

13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. He was sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of `1 lakh,

in default to suffer simple imprisonment for six months for the

offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act, 1988. No

separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Section 7

of the PC Act. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the

appellant preferred this appeal.

4. I have heard Dr.Abraham P.Meachinkara, the learned

counsel for the appellant and Sri.Sreelal N.Warrier, the learned

standing counsel for the CBI.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant impeached the

finding of the trial court on appreciation of evidence and resultant

finding as to the guilt. The learned counsel submitted that there

is absolutely no legal evidence to prove the demand and

acceptance of bribe by the appellant from PW6 to constitute the

offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The learned

counsel further submitted that the evidence of PWs2, 4, 6 and 7

is not at all reliable and insufficient to connect the appellant with

the crime. The counsel also submitted that without any proof of

receipt of bribe by the appellant, the trial court wrongly drew

presumption under Section 20 against the appellant. There is no

valid sanction to prosecute the appellant, added the counsel. On

the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel supported the

findings and verdict handed down by the trial court and

submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the

case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. First, I shall deal with the contention regarding lack of

sanction. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

Ext.P1 sanction to prosecute the appellant was not proved in

accordance with law. According to the learned counsel, the

sanction for prosecution was accorded by the sanctioning

authority without considering the relevant documents and

applying its mind. The counsel further submitted that the

sanctioning authority was not examined to prove Ext.P1 sanction

order.

7. Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall

take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10,

11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public

servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent

authority referred to in sub-sections (a), (b) and (c). The question

of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public

servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties.

The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public

servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The grant of

sanction is not a mere formality but a solemn act which affords

protection to the government servant against frivolous

prosecution. All the relevant records and materials for the grant

of sanction must be made available to the sanctioning authority,

which must undertake complete and conscious scrutiny of those

records and materials independently applying its mind before

deciding whether to grant sanction or not. The order of granting

or declining sanction should reflect that the sanctioning authority

was furnished with all relevant facts and materials and applied its

mind to all those materials. The validity of the sanction would

therefore depend upon the materials placed before the

sanctioning authority and on the application of mind by the

sanctioning authority to those materials and facts of the case. On

going through the materials and facts, the sanctioning authority

has to apply its own independent mind to generate genuine

satisfaction whether the prosecution has to be sanctioned or not

When the order granting or declining sanction is challenged

before a court, the court must determine whether there has been

an application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority

concerned with the materials placed before it. The order of

sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had

considered the facts and all relevant materials placed before it

(See Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal

(2014) 14 SCC 295 and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of

Gujarat 1997 KHC 1065).

8. The appellant is a Class I officer under the Central

Government. So, the sanction order has to be issued under Article

77(2) of the Constitution of India. The Minister of Railways is the

competent authority for granting sanction for prosecution of the

accused on behalf of the President of India. The formal order of

the prosecution has to be signed and issued by the designated

authority of the concerned Ministry. Here, PW1, the Director of the

Ministry of Railway, New Delhi has signed the sanction order,

Ext.P1. Ext.P1 would show that the sanction was accorded by the

Minister of Railways. Ext.D16 series is the copy of the file

maintained at the Railway Board relating to the sanction granted

to prosecute the appellant. DW4 was the Joint Director of

Vigilance, Recruitment and Security (R&SC). He was examined to

prove Ext.D16 series. Relying on the evidence of DW4 and the

recital in sub paragraph No.1 of paragraph 8 of Ext.D16 series,

the learned counsel for the appellant argued that important

documents including the FIR were not forwarded to the Ministry

of Railways at the time when the sanction for prosecution was

sought. Since the material documents pertaining to the case were

not forwarded to the sanctioning authority, Ext.P1 sanction order

is vitiated, submitted the counsel. DW4 indeed deposed that 52

documents including FIR were not there when the file was

transmitted to the Chief Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) for

sanction. However, the recital in page 8 of Ext.D16 series would

show that the Minister of Railways has made an endorsement

that he has accorded sanction after going through the

investigation report of the case No.RC19(A)2005/CBI/KER as well

as all other relevant records. At any rate, the original case file

contains copies of all the relevant records in respect of the case.

On going through the entire evidence of DW4 and perusing

Ext.D16 series, the trial court found that there is every reason to

believe that even if the documents were not there at the time

when DW4 forwarded the file to the CVC, the documents were

there at the time when the Ministry of Railways perused the

same. On analysis of the evidence, the trial court found that the

Minister of Railways has accorded sanction after considering the

facts of the case and perusing the entire documents. I see no

reason to take a different view.

9. So far as the contention raised by the appellant

regarding the non-examination of the Minister of Railways who

granted the prosecution sanction is concerned, PW1 who was

examined to prove the sanction was the Director of the Ministry

of Railway and he signed the sanction as per the Rules of

Business. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya Pradesh

v. Jiyalal (AIR 2010 SC 1451) has held that there is no requirement

to examine the authority who gave the sanction to prove the

sanction order. In State through Inspector of Police A.P. v.

K.Narasimhachary (AIR 2006 SC 628), it was held that an order of

valid sanction can be proved either by producing the original

sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence

and the grounds of satisfaction or by adducing evidence aliunde

to show that the facts were placed before the sanctioning

authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is evident from

Ext.P1, Ext.D16 series and the evidence of PW1 and DW4 that the

sanctioning authority has applied its mind to the facts of the case

and the materials placed before it. That apart, Section 19(3)(a) of

the PC Act says that no finding, sentence or order passed by a

Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal,

confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any

error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-

section (1) unless, in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice

has in fact been occasioned thereby. There is no proof, much less

a case for the appellant that a failure of justice has been caused

to him. Hence, the submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant that there is no valid sanction for prosecution must fail.

10. As stated already, the prosecution version is that the

appellant while working as Divisional Security Commissioner,

Railway Protection Force, Palakkad, on 2/8/2005 demanded an

amount of `10,000/- from PW6 through PW2 for effecting his

posting at Palakkad and based on Ext.P12 complaint filed by PW6,

PW7 laid the trap on 4/8/2005 and PW2 was caught red-handed

while accepting the bribe amount of `5,000/-. Subsequently, the

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon to PW2, and he

turned approver. It is not in dispute that the appellant was

working as Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection

Force, Palakkad at the time of the alleged incident. It has also

come out in evidence that PW2 was working under him at DSC's

office, Palakkad during the period of the alleged incident. The

appellant has raised a contention that PW2 was a Constable

attached to RPF, Coimbatore and not a staff of the DSC's office,

Palakkad at the time of the alleged incident. PW2 gave evidence

that from July 1991 to 2003, he worked as Constable, RPF,

Palakkad and even though he was transferred to Coimbatore in

2003, he continued working in the DSC's office, Palakkad on a

working arrangement. Ext.D15 muster roll coupled with the

evidence of PW2 clearly establishes that even though PW2 was

transferred from Palakkad to Coimbatore in the month of October,

2003, he continued to work at Palakkad on working arrangement.

It has also come out in evidence that as per Ext.P11 order dated

15/7/2005, PW6 was posted in the DSC's Office, Palakkad. The

prosecution case is that the appellant demanded `10,000/- as

illegal gratification from PW6 through PW2 as a consideration for

effecting the said posting.

11. The prosecution mainly relied on, and the trial court

accepted the evidence of PWs2, 4, 6 and 7 to prove its case and

to fix the culpability on the accused.

12. PW6 was the decoy witness and the de facto

complainant. The crime was registered based on Ext.P12 given by

him. He was working as a Constable in SIB (Special Intelligence

Branch), RPF, Palakkad in the year 2004. He sustained dislocation

of his right shoulder and he was medically decategorized. He was

absorbed in a supernumerary post of Constable in the SIB and

afterwards, he was shifted to DSC's office in the same cadre to

assist clerical staff. He underwent a suitability test for alternate

appointment as clerk and the committee which was constituted

to ascertain his suitability reported his suitability for the post. He

was alternatively appointed as Personnel Branch Clerk on

13/7/2005. He deposed that he approached the appellant and

requested for getting a posting at Palakkad. The appellant agreed

to help him and directed him to meet PW2. Accordingly, he met

PW2 who told him that if the appellant had said so, he might have

been expecting something. PW2 further told him that he would

contact the appellant and inform him. As evident from Ext.P11,

on 15/7/2005, PW6 was posted as Personnel Branch Clerk in

DSC's office. PW6 further deposed that on 2/8/2005, PW2 met

him and told him that the appellant demanded `10,000/- as

reward for his posting in the DSC's office. When he expressed his

difficulty in paying the amount, PW2 asked him to meet the

appellant in his chamber. Accordingly, on 2/8/2005, when he met

the appellant in his chamber and expressed his inability to pay

the amount, the appellant told him that `5,000/- should be paid

as the first instalment and the balance amount of `5,000/- shall

be paid within ten days. Since he was not willing to pay the

money demanded, he reported the matter to PW7 who arranged

the trap. Thereafter, as instructed by PW7, he contacted PW2

over the phone on 4/8/2005 and PW2 made arrangements to

meet the appellant at his chamber at 4.30 p.m. As instructed by

PW7, he entrusted ten 500 rupees notes (MO1 series) to PW7 as

per Ext.P8 Entrustment Mahazar. MO1 series were smeared with

phenolphthalein powder and given to him with instruction to hand

them over to the appellant on demand. PW7 handed over a

mobile phone to him and he was directed to switch on the phone

and to keep it in his pocket. He then went to DSC's office along

with PW7 and two independent witnesses, PW4 Aboobacker and

one Mohandas. At about 6.00 p.m., he got an appointment to

meet the appellant and accordingly he met him at the chamber.

He informed the appellant that he brought the money. The

appellant then directed him to entrust the money with PW2. Then

the appellant along with him came out of the chamber. PW6

further deposed that the appellant got into his official car and

went away. He entrusted the cover containing MO1 series notes

to PW2 who was standing near the car. He received it and kept it

in the pocket of his pants. Then he informed the matter to PW7

over the phone. PW7 and the team rushed to the spot and took

PW2 to the office. PW7 asked PW2 to take the money and he

took the cover given by PW6 containing MO1 series notes and

handed it over to PW7. After that, the right hand of PW2 was

dipped in sodium carbonate solution. The hand as well as the

solution turned to pink colour.

13. PW4 was the witness who accompanied PW7 and

team. He gave evidence in tune with the evidence tendered by

PW6. His evidence would disclose that he was summoned to be a

witness to the trap and accordingly he met PW7 at a lodge at

about 2.30 p.m. His evidence would further disclose that he was a

witness to the entire pre-trap transaction as deposed by PW6 and

thereafter PW7 asked him to accompany him and PW6 to the

DSC's office and observe the transaction. He specifically deposed

that he witnessed PW6 handing over money to PW2. His evidence

would further show that after PW6 gave the signal to PW7 as

instructed, PW7 along with him approached PW2 and took him

into the office and his fingers were dipped into the sodium

carbonate solution and colour change was noticed. He identified

MO4 as the bottle containing the solution, his signature on the

labels pasted on the bottles and MO1 series notes recovered from

PW2.

14. PW7 was the Dy.S.P who registered Ext.P14 FIR on the

basis of Ext.P12 complaint given by PW6, laid the trap and

recovered MO1 series trap money. He deposed that after the

registration of the FIR, as instructed by him, PW6 produced MO1

currency notes, he then applied phenolphthalein powder to it and

prepared Ext.P8 mahazar. He entrusted MO1 series currency

notes with PW6 and gave specific instructions to him that those

should be given to the appellant on demand. After that, he, PW4,

Mohandas and the team went to the DSC's Office, Palakkad with a

direction to give the signal when the appellant accepts money

from PW6. PW7 gave a mobile phone to PW6 with instruction to

dial his mobile number before he enters the room of the appellant

so as to find out the transaction taking place between PW6 and

the appellant. After 15 minutes, he received a call on his mobile

phone from the mobile phone he gave to PW6. He proceeded

immediately to the office of the DSC where he found PW6

standing outside the office. PW6 told him that he met the

appellant who demanded money and directed him to meet PW2

which he did. He further stated that he gave MO1 series bribe

money to PW2. Thereafter, PW7 along with the trap team met

PW2 who, on interrogation, admitted the receipt of the bribe

amount from PW6 as instructed by the appellant. MO1 currency

notes found in a cover kept in the right-side pant pocket of PW2

were seized as per Ext.P4 mahazar. Thereafter, a clear solution of

sodium carbonate was prepared in a glass tumbler and PW2 was

asked to dip his right-hand fingers into the solution. On doing so,

the hand as well as the solution turned pink colour.

15. PW2 gave evidence in tune with the evidence given by

PW6. He deposed that on 13/7/2005, PW6 informed him that he

was declared medically decategorized and he wanted a clerical

posting in the DSC's office in Palakkad for which he met the

appellant. PW6 told him that the appellant informed him that his

decision would be conveyed to him and the appellant asked him

to meet him. According to PW2, he told PW6 that the appellant

might be expecting some money and that he would inform PW6

after contacting the appellant. He further deposed that when he

met the appellant, he told him to inform PW6 that he should pay

`10,000/- for getting a clerical posting in the DSC's office,

Palakkad and he met PW6 and informed the same on 2/8/2005.

When PW6 expressed his financial stringency to him, he told him

to inform the matter to the appellant directly. On 3/8/2005, PW6

informed him that he met the appellant, and expressed his

financial constraints, but the appellant was not convinced.

According to PW2, thereafter he met the appellant who confirmed

that PW6 had met him and expressed his financial difficulty. The

appellant told him that he had already informed PW6 that the

amount should be paid in two instalments and the first instalment

of `5,000/- should be paid immediately and the balance amount

should be paid within ten days. PW2 stated that on the same day,

PW6 told the same to him. PW2 further stated that on 4/8/2005,

PW6 called him over phone and informed him that money would

be ready in noon. Then he instructed PW6 to give the money to

the appellant directly. However, PW6 insisted his presence also

when he gives the money. On 4/8/2005 in the evening, he along

with PW6 went to the office of the appellant to meet him. He met

the appellant who asked him to tell PW6 to wait. Thereafter at

6.00 p.m., he went to the chamber of the appellant along with

PW6. When he came out of the chamber, PW6 was inside the

chamber. After 10 to 15 minutes, both the appellant and PW6

came out of the chamber and the appellant left the place in his

car. PW6 then came to him, gave him a cover stating that the

appellant directed him to entrust the same with him and asked

him to take the same to the residence of the appellant. He

accepted the cover and kept it in his pocket and when he was

about to leave, the CBI officials came to him, apprehended him,

took him to DSC's office and the cover as well as the MO1 series

inside it were seized from his possession. When questioned, he

told CBI officials that MO1 series was the money given by PW6 to

hand over to the appellant for effecting his transfer.

16. Though PWs2, 4, 6 and 7 were cross-examined in

length, nothing tangible could be extracted from their evidence

to discredit their testimony. PW4 who witnessed the trap was an

independent witness. The appellant has no case that he had

enmity towards him. Similarly, PW7 who laid the trap is an official

witness. The appellant has also no case that he had any enmity

towards him. True, PW2 being an approver, his evidence cannot

be relied on without corroboration. The combined effect of

Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian

Evidence Act is that though the conviction of an accused on the

testimony of an accomplice is not illegal, the court, as a matter of

practice will not ordinarily accept his evidence without

corroboration in material particulars. The nature and extent of

corroboration required, of course, must necessarily vary with the

circumstances of each case and the particular circumstances of

the offence alleged in each case. There need not be independent

confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the

independent evidence in the case apart from the evidence of the

accomplice, in itself, be sufficient to sustain conviction. What is

required is there must be some additional evidence rendering

probable that the evidence of the accomplice is true, and it is

reasonably safe to act upon it to hold that the accused has

committed the crime. As stated already, the evidence of PW2 has

been corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of PW6

and PW4. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently

argued that there was no concrete independent evidence to

prove the demand and acceptance. It is not the law that there

should be direct evidence in all cases to prove the demand and

acceptance. It can be proved by acceptable circumstantial

evidence as well. [See Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of

Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731]. Moreover, there is direct evidence in

this case to prove the demand and acceptance. PW6, the decoy

witness, deposed that he directly approached the appellant and

requested a posting at Palakkad and the appellant agreed to help

him and told him to meet PW2 and when he met PW2, he told

him that if the appellant had said so, he might have been

expecting something. He further deposed that on 2/8/2005 again

he met the appellant personally in his chamber and expressed his

inability to pay the amount as directed by PW2 and then the

appellant told him that `5,000/- should be paid as the first

instalment and the balance amount of `5,000/- shall be paid

within 10 days. Thus, there is evidence to show that the demand

for bribe was made by the appellant directly to PW6. PW6 also

deposed that on 4/8/2005 at 6.00 p.m., when he met the

appellant at his chamber and informed him that he brought the

money, the appellant directed him to entrust the money with

PW2 and accordingly he entrusted the money to PW2. Thus, there

is evidence to prove the acceptance of bribe by PW2 from PW6

on behalf of the appellant. The bribe doesn't need to be accepted

by the accused himself to attract the offence under Section 7 of

the PC Act. It is sufficient if there is evidence to show that the

person who accepted the bribe was for and on behalf of the

accused. Thus, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification

have amply been proved by the prosecution through the

evidence of PW2, 4, 6 and 7. The evidence regarding the positive

result of the phenolphthalein test on the hand of PW2 and MO1

currency notes is strong circumstance to suggest that PW2

accepted and handled the tainted notes for and on behalf of the

appellant.

17. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently

argued that there are umpteen circumstances pointing to the

innocence of the appellant. It is submitted that PW6 was a person

working in a clerical cadre and the appellant has neither the

authority nor role or anything to do with his transfer/posting

request. Relying on the evidence of PW3, PW5 and DW2, the

counsel submitted that the Senior DPO was the competent

authority for the absorption of medically decategorized staff for

the alternate appointment and their posting and transfer thereof

as clerk. However, during the cross-examination, when PW2 was

asked as to whether the appellant could suggest the posting of

staff in the DSC's office, he deposed that he can request for filling

up the vacancies. It is pertinent to note that PW6 was working in

the DSC's office, Palakkad at the time of Ext.P10 posting order

and he was relieved from the DSC's office on 13/7/2005. So, it is

quite natural for PW6 to request the appellant to help him. That

apart, he may not be aware of the lack of authority on the part of

the appellant concerning his posting in the DSC's office. So, the

fact that DW2 was the authority to give posting in the personnel

branch alone is not a ground to discard the prosecution version.

What is material is the acceptance of gratification by inducing a

belief or by holding out that he would render assistance to the

bribe giver as rightly held by the trial court. It is immaterial

whether the public servant who received the gratification does

not intend to do the official acts. The Supreme Court in Chaturdas

Bhagwandas Patel v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1976 SC 1497) while

dealing with Section 161 of IPC, which was repealed by the

coming into force of the PC Act, held that the said section does

not require that the public servant must be in a position to do the

official act, favour or service at the time of the demand or receipt

of the gratification. The learned counsel further submitted that

before 13/7/2005, PW6 was working in the appellant's office at

Palakkad itself and, as such, PW6 did not need to request for a

posting in Palakkad as he was working in Palakkad. Ext.P10 order

dated 12/7/2005 would show that PW6 was posted in the

personnel branch of Southern Railway, Palakkad. According to the

prosecution, it was on 13/7/2005 that PW6 met the appellant and

requested his help for getting a posting in the clerical cadre in

the DSC's office, Palakkad and accordingly on 15/7/2005, he was

posted in the DSC's office, Palakkad as per Ext.P11 order dated

15/7/2005. Thus, it is clear that PW6 wanted a posting in the

clerical cadre in the DSC's office, Palakkad itself and that was

why he met the appellant and requested his help. The learned

counsel for the appellant further submitted that if the appellant

was to be trapped, there would be no hindrance and the money

could have been handed over to him at his residence where he

was staying alone instead of giving the money at his chamber.

The said argument is far-fetched and unsupported by any logic or

reason. The time and place chosen by the receiver and giver of

the bribe cannot be doubted on the ground that they could have

chosen some other better place or time. The learned counsel next

submitted that the better electronic evidence in the form of

admitted recorded telephonic conversation between PW6 and

PW2 vide Ext.P8 Entrustment Mahazar and the conversation

between PW6 and PW7 recorded by PW7 at the DSC's office were

available, but, the prosecution wilfully withheld the said material

piece of evidence and hence, the trial court ought to have drawn

adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114(g)

of the Evidence Act. The trial court in paragraphs 149 and 150 of

the judgment has given reason for not drawing adverse

inferences on account of the non-production of those electronic

records. PW7 has categorically deposed during the cross-

examination that the recorded conversation between PW6 and

PW2 covered by Ext.P8 Entrustment Mahazar was recorded only

for the purpose of verification of the complaint. He has also

stated that the telephone call made by PW6 to him at the DSC's

office during the trap proceedings which was recorded by him

was not produced since it was not audible. When the substantive

evidence of PW2 and PW6 is available to prove the trap as well as

the demand and acceptance, the non-production of the electronic

evidence is insignificant as rightly held by the trial court. I see no

reason to take a different view. The learned counsel also

highlighted certain contradictions in the evidence relating to the

time on which PW4 met PW7 and also the commencement and

conclusion of the trap proceedings. The said contradictions are

minor and do not affect the fabric of the prosecution case. Thus,

none of the circumstances pointed out by the learned counsel for

the appellant would in any way help the appellant.

18. Admittedly, the appellant was a "public servant" as

defined under Section 2(c) of the PC Act working as the Divisional

Security Officer, Railway Protection Force, Palakkad at the time of

the alleged incident. As stated already, the evidence of PWs2, 4,

6 and 7 proved the demand and acceptance of the bribe by the

appellant from PW6 through PW2 as well as its recovery. Once

the prosecution has established that the gratification in any form

has been paid or accepted by a public servant, it can be

presumed invoking presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act,

unless the contrary is proved that the gratification was paid or

accepted as a motive or reward to do or forbear from doing an

official act in a charge under Section 7 of the PC Act. Similarly,

once it is proved that the appellant accepted the tainted money

without any protest, either by himself or through his agent, it can

be presumed that he obtained the money within the meaning of

Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

The evidence on record, the sequence of events, and the

circumstances narrated above clearly prove that the appellant

demanded and accepted `5,000/- from PW6 through PW2 as

illegal gratification by abusing his official position as a public

servant and availed pecuniary advantage by adopting corrupt

and illegal means. Thus, the trial court was justified in convicting

the appellant for the offence under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)

(d) of the PC Act. The sentence imposed by the trial court also

appears to be reasonable. There is no merit in the appeal and

accordingly it is dismissed confirming the conviction and

sentence.

Sd/-

DR. KAUSER EDAPPAGATH JUDGE Rp

 
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