Kerala High Court
George vs Sudha @ Lalitha on 6 March, 2024
Author: Anil K. Narendran
Bench: Anil K. Narendran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G. GIRISH
WEDNESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH 2024 / 16TH PHALGUNA, 1945
R.C.REV.NO.64 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 18.12.2023 IN R.C.A. NO.234 OF
2019 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT, IRINJALAKUDA
ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 19.08.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.21 OF
2010 OF RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF), IRINJALAKUDA
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:
GEORGE
AGED 78 YEARS
S/O. ANTHONY, OLLUKKARAN HOUSE, PUDUKKAD DESOM,
PUDUKKAD P.O., THORAVU VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM
TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680302
BY ADV N.L.BITTO
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
SUDHA @ LALITHA
AGED 58 YEARS, WIFE OF MOHANAN BABURAJ,
AYYANITHARA HOUSE, THALIKKULAM VILLAGE, VALAPPAD
P.O., CHAVAKKAD TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN -
680567
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 06.03.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
2
R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024
ORDER
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.21 of
2010 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Irinjalakuda,
a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlady, invoking the
provisions under Section 11(3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition
schedule shop room, for the bona fide need of her husband for
starting readymade business. In the Rent Control Petition, the
landlady has stated that there is a small room near the petition
schedule shop room, which is lying vacant. Business cannot be
conducted in the said room alone. Besides, the entrance to the said
room is from the petition schedule shop room. Before the Rent
Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed counter,
opposing the order of eviction sought for. On the side of the
landlady, Exts.A1 to A4 were marked and the husband of the
landlady was examined as PW1. On the side of the tenant, Exts.B1
and B2 were marked. The tenant has not chosen to adduce any oral
evidence. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record,
the Rent Control Court, by the order dated 25.02.2012, dismissed
the Rent Control Petition, declining an order of eviction under
Section 11(3) of the Act, on a finding that the need projected in the
Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section
11(3) of the Act is not bona fide. Based on that finding, the Rent
Control Court did not adjudicate on the applicability of the provisos
to Section 11(3) of the Act. Challenging the order dated 25.02.2012
of the Rent Control Court, the landlord filed R.C.A.No.31 of 2012,
invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That
appeal was allowed by the judgment dated 08.02.2018, granting
an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, on a finding
that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking
eviction of the tenant is bona fide and that the provisions of the
first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act have no application in the
facts and circumstances of the case and that the tenant is not
entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3).
2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the
Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.31 of 2012, the tenant filed
R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018 before this Court, invoking the provisions
under Section 20 of the Act. By the judgment dated 31.01.2019,
this Court disposed of R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018 by remanding the
matter to the Rent Control Court for the purpose of considering the
first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. The rest of
the findings entered under Section 11(3) of the Act were confirmed
and the parties were given liberty to adduce further evidence with
regard to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act.
3. After the order of remand, the Advocate Commissioner,
who submitted Ext.C1 report and Ext.C1(a) rough plan, was
examined as PW2. The tenant was examined as RW1. After
considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control
Court found that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no
application in the facts of the case on hand and that the tenant is
not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the Rent Control Court, by the order
dated 19.08.2019, allowed R.C.P.No.21 of 2010 under Section 11(3)
of the Act and directed the tenant to put the landlady in vacant
possession of the petition schedule shop room, within a period of
one month. Challenging the finding of the Rent Control Court on
the applicability of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of
the Act and the order of eviction granted under Section 11(3) of
the Act, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.234 of 2019 before the Rent
Control Appellate Authority, Irinjalakuda, which ended in dismissal
by the judgment dated 18.12.2023, confirming the finding of the
Rent Control Court that the tenant failed to prove the first and
second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the
tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking
the provisions under Section 20 of the Act.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant.
5. The issue that requires consideration in this Rent Control
Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the
findings of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority
in the impugned order/judgment on the applicability of the first and
second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act.
6. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3) of
the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation
or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on
him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control
Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another
building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or
village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for
special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to
do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control
Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in
possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on
the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such
building and there is no other suitable building available in the
locality for such person to carry on such trade or business.
7. As already noticed hereinbefore, by the order of this
Court dated 31.12.2019 in R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018, the matter was
remanded to the Rent Control Court only for the purpose of
considering the applicability of the first and second provisos to
Section 11(3) of the Act. The rest of the finding entered under
Section 11(3) of the Act was confirmed by that order.
8. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent
Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has
another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town
or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for
special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to
do so.
9. In M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC
355] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on
the ground of bona fide requirement was sought for under Section
14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said decision,
the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in Ram Narain Arora
v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141], wherein it was held that the
question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with
the question regarding bona fide requirement. Whether the
landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other
accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not
solely depend upon pleadings and non-disclosure by the landlord.
The landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to
the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case
and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was
prejudiced. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found
that, even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other
two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises
was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High
Court, thus no prejudice has been caused, and the parties have
squarely dealt with this question.
10. In Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique
[2020 (1) KHC 21] the question that arose before a Division
Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead under
first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability of vacant
building in his possession and seek to explain special reason for
non-occupation of such premises, in a proceeding initiated for
eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division
Bench held that the initial burden to prove that landlord is in
possession of the vacant building, if any, is only upon the tenant
unless the landlord himself admits any such vacant building to be
in his possession. Only when the primary burden of proof in this
behalf is discharged by the tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord
to show otherwise or that the vacant premises are not suited to his
needs. He can successfully discharge his part of the burden by
adducing evidence either through his own testimony or others or in
any other legal manner. Law does not require the landlord to plead
that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special
reasons for its non-occupation. It is up to the tenant alone to take
up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession
of premises.
11. In Vasantha Mallan, relying on the law laid down by
the Apex Court in M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355] the
Division Bench held that, it is not incumbent on the landlord to
disclose in his pleading availability of vacant building in his
possession. The non-disclosure of vacant premises cannot be
picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of
the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the
Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for
the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant
buildings available in his possession. Nor does first proviso to
Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the
buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his
requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than pleadings.
Failure of the landlord to disclose availability of buildings in his
possession and plead special reasons for not occupying them,
cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for rejecting the claim
of the landlord as not bona fide. What could at the most be said is
that it might be a fair and reasonable conduct if the landlord
disclosed in his pleadings the details of buildings in his possession
and simultaneously explained the reason for non-occupation of the
premises for his alleged needs.
12. In Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose [2019 (3)
KHC 206] a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case
in which one of the contentions of the tenant was that the landlord
has several other vacant buildings of his own in his possession to
start the proposed business. The Division Bench noticed that, the
pleadings are very vague with respect to the first proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act. It is stated that the landlord has several other
buildings. No particular vacant room has been identified or pointed
out in the pleadings. The Division Bench opined that it is obligatory
on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the
vacant building in the possession of the landlord. In the absence of
specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of the vacant building in
the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has
not discharged the initial burden of proof under the first Proviso to
Section 11(3) of the Act.
13. As already noticed hereinbefore, in the Rent Control
Petition, the landlady has stated that there is a small room near the
petition schedule shop room, which is lying vacant. Business cannot
be conducted in the said room alone. Besides, the entrance to the
said room is from the petition schedule shop room. As per Ext.C1(a)
rough sketch prepared by the Advocate Commissioner, who was
examined as PW2, a room is lying vacant on the eastern side of the
petition schedule shop room. Another room is lying vacant on the
upstairs. The petition schedule shop room is on the ground floor.
Regarding the room lying vacant on the eastern side of the petition
schedule shop room, the landlord contended that there is no
separate entrance for that room. On the above aspect, the tenant,
who was examined as RW1, has deposed that he did not notice any
door for the room lying on the eastern side of the petition schedule
shop room. RW1 has also deposed that the said room is on the rear
side of the petition schedule shop room, which has no shutter. As
per Ext.C1 report of the Advocate Commissioner the vacant room
on the eastern side of the petition schedule shop room is a small
room. The Advocate Commissioner, who was examined as PW2,
deposed that the said room has no windows. No one can enter that
room from outside. There is a door in the petition schedule shop
room through which one can enter that room. At the time of the
inspection the said door remained closed. As per the report, there
is another room lying vacant in the upstairs. As rightly noticed by
the Rent Control Court, the tenant cannot dictate that the proposed
business of the husband of the landlady in readymade dress should
be conducted in the room lying vacant in the upstair portion.
Though the tenant contended that a room lying on the northern
side of the petition schedule shop room is lying vacant, the
Advocate Commissioner has reported that the said room is owned
by a third party. It is after considering the pleadings and evidence
on record that the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate
Authority arrived at a conclusion that the provisions under the first
proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is not attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the case on hand. Viewed in the light of the law
laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be contended
that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate
Authority on the above aspect is either perverse or patently illegal.
It cannot also be contended that the Rent Control Court or the
Appellate Authority has committed a manifest error, while arriving
at such a conclusion on the above aspect, warranting an
interference of this Court in this Rent Control Revision.
14. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act,
the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to
put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his
livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business
carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building
available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or
business.
15. In Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another
[2019 (2) KHC 465] a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is
trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3)
of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive
and the burden of proof is on the tenant. Thus, the legal position
has been settled by a long line of decisions and the courts below
have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide:
Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430], Prasannan v.
Haris [2005 (2) KLT 365], Vineethan v. Fathima and others
[2016 (1) KHC 631]. In view of the legal position well settled by
the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or
prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is
a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of each person
only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income.
Merely on the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant
has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon
the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises,
for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape
from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the
second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory
provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to
the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of
the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section 11(3)
is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the
tenant. When the second proviso itself imposes the burden of proof
on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or
proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and
irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will
not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is
an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the
landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the
burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and
unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged
satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the
said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
16. Though the evidence of PW1, the husband of the
landlady, was that the tenant has another establishment by name
Aljo Bakers, no reliable materials were placed before the Rent
Control Court to substantiate that fact. After considering the
evidence of the tenant, who was examined as RW1, the Rent
Control Court found that there is no other source of income for the
tenant, though the tenant has not chosen to produce any materials
to show that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income
derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule shop
room. However, the Rent Control Court, after considering Ext.C1
report of the Advocate Commissioner and his oral testimony as PW2,
has arrived at a conclusion that other suitable buildings are
available in the locality for the tenant to carry on his business
conducted in the petition schedule shop room. The Rent Control
Court as well as the Appellate Authority noticed in the impugned
order/judgment that the Advocate Commissioner has reported the
availability of many rooms adjacent to the petition schedule shop
rooms, which were found closed. After considering the pleadings
and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court as well as the
Appellate Authority concurrently found that the tenant failed to
prove the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the
Act. When both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of
the Act are conjunctive and the tenant failed to prove the second
limb of that proviso, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate
Authority rightly found that the tenant is not entitled to the
protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to
supra, it cannot be contended that the reasoning of the Rent
Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority on the above aspect
is either perverse or patently illegal. It cannot also be contended
that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority has
committed a manifest error, while arriving at such a conclusion on
the above aspect, warranting an interference of this Court in this
Rent Control Revision.
17. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section
20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under
Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other
cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any
aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any
order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or
propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in
reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section
20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before
the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its
discretion.
18. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499], the scope of revisional powers
of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the
Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether
the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex
Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act
cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of
appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional
jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right
in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in
the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled
far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the
word 'propriety' it cannot mean that there could be a re-
appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come
to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence;
on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and
propriety of the order impugned before it.
19. In T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999)
7 SCC 275] the Apex Court held that, the words 'to satisfy itself'
employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the
High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely
because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the
courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High
Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to
reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding
contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a
finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the
High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding
recorded by the courts below.
20. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645] the
Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High
Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the
relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that
whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact.
Relying on the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma it was
contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional
court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction
to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding
upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex
Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of
the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second
appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code.
Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression 'propriety' in
Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-
appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place
of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the
impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid
ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the
conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist.
21. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v.
Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78] a Five-Judge Bench of the
Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court
under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the
law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court
reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the
High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The
Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench
in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word 'propriety' does not
confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to
come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is
confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order
impugned before it.
22. In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019
SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412] considering the matter in the
backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma,
Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh the Apex Court held that the findings
rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on
record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The
High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the
concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have
been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional
jurisdiction.
23. In Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592], a
Division Bench of this Court held that, even though in the decisions
of the Apex Court and this Court, it has been held that, in revisional
jurisdiction there cannot be a re-appreciation of evidence in order
to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts, it has
been held in those decisions itself that, if the view taken is perverse
and the statutory scheme has not been kept in mind and if it
requires correction, then Court can re-appreciate the evidence.
When the argument is that, the approach made by the authorities
are perverse, it cannot be said that this Court cannot look into the
pleadings and scan through the evidence to find out whether the
conclusions have been arrived at properly on the pleadings and
evidence.
24. In Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016 (2)
KLJ 164], a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High Court
(in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court
on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For that limited
purpose, it may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent
Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable
person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material
available.
25. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions
referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the
Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority on the applicability
of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act is neither
perverse nor patently illegal. It cannot also be said that, while
ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act, the
Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority has committed a
manifest error, warranting interference of this Court, in exercise of
the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore,
we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction passed by
the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under Section
11(3) of the Act.
26. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would
submit that the tenant is doing business in the petition schedule
shop room. The tenant may be granted at least ten months' time
to vacate the petition schedule shop room. The tenant is prepared
to clear the entire dues, if any, towards arrears of rent, within a
time limit that may be fixed by this Court, and he shall continue to
pay monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till
he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to
the landlady.
27. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is
dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment/order
of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the Rent Control Court;
however, by granting four months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to
surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to
the respondent-landlady, subject to the following conditions:
(i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall
file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the
Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks
from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order,
expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will
surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule
shop room to the petitioner-landlady within four months
from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct
third parties into possession of the petition schedule
shop room and further he shall conduct any business in
the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of
a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local
authority/statutory authorities;
(ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall
deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any,
before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as
the case may be, within two weeks from the date of
receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall
continue to pay rent for every succeeding months,
without any default;
(iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant
in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any
one of the conditions stated above, the time limit
granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of
the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled
automatically and the petitioner-landlady will be at
liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of
eviction.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
G. GIRISH, JUDGE
MIN
