Kerala High Court
Joji Joseph vs State Of Kerala on 13 June, 2024
"C.R."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF JUNE 2024 / 23RD JYAISHTA, 1946
CRL.APPEAL NO. 377 OF 2011
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.09.2010 IN CRA NO.472 OF
2003 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC)-II, KOTTAYAM
ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT DATED 01.10.2003 IN CC 209 OF
1997 OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF THEF IRST CLASS-II
(MOBILE), KOTTAYAM
APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:
JOJI JOSEPH
KARATHASSERIL, PRAVITHANAM P.O.
BY ADVS.
SRI.SHAJI THOMAS PORKKATTIL
SRI.BINU PAUL
SRI.N.NAGARESH
SRI.T.V.VINU
RESPONDENTS/STATE & ACCUSED 1 & 4:
1 STATE OF KERALA,
REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
2 AJAYAKUMAR
FORMERLY PROBATIONARY SUB INSPECTOR, PALA
POLICE STATION, PIN-686 575.
3 HARIDAS,
FORMERLY C.I. OF POLICE, PALA-686 575.
R1 BY SMT.SHEEBA THOMAS, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
R2 BY SRI.ALAN PAPALI
R2 BY SRI.SOJAN MICHEAL
R3 BY SRI.B.KRISHNA MANI
2
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL
HEARING ON 29.05.2024, ALONG WITH CRL.A.378/2011,
380/2011, THE COURT ON 13.06.2024 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
3
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF JUNE 2024 / 23RD JYAISHTA, 1946
CRL.APPEAL NO. 378 OF 2011
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.09.2010 IN CRA NO.474 OF
2003 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC)-II, KOTTAYAM
ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT DATED 01.10.2003 IN CC 209 OF
1997 OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-II
(MOBILE), KOTTAYAM
APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:
JOJI JOSEPH
KARATHASSERIL, PRAVITHANAM P.O.
BY ADVS.
SRI.SHAJI THOMAS PORKKATTIL
SRI.BINU PAUL
SRI.N.NAGARESH
SRI.T.V.VINU
RESPONDENTS/STATE & ACCUSED NO.3:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA,, ERNAKULAM-682 031.
2 RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
POLICE CONSTABLE, PALA POLICE STATION-686 575.
R1 BY SMT.SHEEBA THOMAS, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
R2 BY SRI.SUNIL CYRIAC
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL
HEARING ON 29.05.2024, ALONG WITH CRL.A.377/2011 AND
CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON 13.06.2024 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
4
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF JUNE 2024 / 23RD JYAISHTA, 1946
CRL.APPEAL NO. 380 OF 2011
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.09.2010 IN CRA NO.473 OF
2003 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC)-II, KOTTAYAM
ARISING FROM THE JUDGMENT DATED 01.10.2003 IN CC 209 OF
1997 OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF THE FIRST CLASS-II
(MOBILE), KOTTAYAM
APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:
JOJI JOSEPH
KARATHASSERIL, PRAVITHANAM P.O.
BY ADVS.
SRI.SHAJI THOMAS PORKKATTIL
SRI.BINU PAUL
SRI.N.NAGARESH
SRI.T.V.VINU
RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED NO.2:
1 STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,,
ERNAKULAM-682 031.
2 NAZEEM, SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
NOW WORKING AS S.I OF POLICE, EDATHUA-689 573.
R1 BY SMT.SHEEBA THOMAS, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
R2 BY SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
R2 BY SRI.P.K.SOYUZ
5
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL
HEARING ON 29.05.2024, ALONG WITH CRL.A.377/2011 AND
CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON 13.06.2024 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
6
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J. "C.R."
-----------------------------------------------------------
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 13th day of June, 2024
JUDGMENT
These appeals are at the instance of the complainant in
C.C.No.209 of 1997 on the files of the Judicial Magistrate of
the First Class-II (Mobile), Kottayam. The learned Magistrate
convicted accused Nos.1 to 4 for the offence under Sections
452, 341 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC). Accused Nos.1 and 4 preferred Crl.Appeal
No.472 of 2003, accused No.2 preferred Crl.Appeal No.473 of
2003 and accused No.3 preferred Crl.Appeal 474 of 2003
before the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc)-II, Kottayam.
The appellate court as per the common judgment dated
17.09.2010 allowed the appeals and acquitted all the accused.
Correctness and legality of the said judgment are under
challenge in these appeals filed under Section 378(4) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code).
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
2. Parties are referred to as they are positioned
before the trial court.
3. The alleged incident occurred at 7.00 p.m. on
03.09.1996. The complainant alleged that while he was sitting
in his house talking with his brother and a neighbour, accused
Nos.1 to 3 and an unidentified police constable came there in
a jeep and tried to take into custody the complainant. His wife
requested not to arrest him and children interrupted the
arrest. They were manhandled by the accused and the
complainant was taken forcibly into the jeep. While taking to
the jeep the 1st accused slapped the complainant on his left
face thrice and on the way to the police station, he was
physically tortured by others in the jeep. Only at 9.30 p.m. he
was released. The accused thereby committed the
aforementioned offences.
4. On the basis of the said allegations the trial was
held and the accused were found guilty, convicted and
sentenced. The appellate court, on accepting the contentions
of the accused held that they were prosecuted without
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
obtaining sanction under Section 197 of the Code, and
accordingly allowed the appeals and acquitted the accused.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, and
the learned Senior Counsel for the accused No.2, the learned
counsel appearing for accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 and the learned
Public Prosecutor.
6. As stated, the incident occurred on 03.09.1996.
The complainant was taken into custody and brought to the
Pala Police Station. The case of the complainant is that at the
instigation of one Jose he was illegally taken into custody,
detained in the police station and manhandled. Only when
Sri.Antony Plathottam, a local politician and Panchayat
Member came to the Police Station, he was released, which
was at about 9.30 p.m. Before that, he was subjected to
medical examination on the pretext of ascertaining whether or
not he was drunk. It is in evidence that accused Nos.1 and 2
were probationary Sub Inspectors attached to Pala Police
Station. The 3rd accused was the Head Constable there and
the 4th accused was the Circle Inspector of Police.
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
7. The complainant gave evidence as PW1 almost in
terms of the allegations in the complaint. PW2 is a neighbour
of PW1, to whom he was talking at the time of when was
taken into custody. PW6 is the brother of PW1. Both PWs 2
and 6 testified about the incident. PW3 is the wife of PW1.
She deposed that PW1 was taken into custody and in that
course himself, PW3 and children were manhandled. PW4,
Sri.Antony deposed that on getting information regarding
apprehension of the complainant, he went to the police
station. According to him, the complainant was taken for
medical examination by that time and thereafter he was
released by the Circle Inspector of Police on bail. PW5, who is a
neighbour of the complainant deposed that at about 7.00 p.m.
on 03.09.1996 he saw a few policemen taking to custody the
complainant from his house. He, however, denied having seen
the police manhandling the complainant. PW7 is the Doctor,
who examined the complainant at the Co-operative Hospital,
Thodupuzha. The examination was on 05.09.1996, two days
after the incident and the certificate he issued is Ext.P3.
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
8. The appellate court did not consider the evidence in
detail. But it was held that the complainant was taken into
custody in connection with a case initiated against him and
therefore the offence, if any, committed by the accused was
while they were acting or purporting to act in discharge of
their official duty. The appellate court, relying on the decisions
in Moosa Vallikkadan v. State of Kerala [2010 (3) KLT
437] held that sanction from the Government was necessary
for prosecuting the accused.
9. The learned counsel for the complainant would
submit that the arrest of the complainant was without any
legal sanction and even if he was involved in S.T.No.2059 of
1996, he could not have been arrested for, the offence
involved was one punishable under Section 51A of the Kerala
Police Act, 1960 (KP Act) alone. Further, himself, his wife and
children were manhandled in public and he was detained in
the police station illegally. Those acts did not have any
connection with the official duties of the accused and
therefore no sanction as enjoined in Section 197 of the Code
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
is required for the prosecution of the accused. It is also
submitted that even removal of a person committing an
offence under Section 51A of the KP Act is possible from the
place of occurrence alone for preventing continuation of the
offence, and never can such a person be taken into custody
from his house. Therefore, the act of the accused is smacked
by mala fides and apparently at the instance of one Jose, who
is highly influential.
10. The learned Senior Counsel and other counsel
appearing for the respective accused submitted that the
complainant was not arrested, but his presence was required
for the purpose of a medical examination in connection with
S.T.No.2059 of 1996. Other than that, nothing was done by
the accused and the alleged manhandling and detention are
false stories created by the complainant in order to retaliate
his taking to the police station for the purpose of medical
examination. It is the further submission that the evidence
tendered by the prosecution is totally contradictory and did
not establish commission of any criminal offence, and even if
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
the commission of the alleged offences is taken as proved, the
accused are entitled to get the protection under Section
197(2) of the Code.
11. Both sides placed reliance on various decisions in
order to fortify their respective contentions in regard to the
requirement of sanction. I shall consider that question first.
12. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 197 of the
Code are extracted below:
"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.- (1)
When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or
a public servant not removable from his office save by or
with the sanction of the Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction save as otherwise
provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of
the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of
a State, of the State Government:
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
Provided that where the alleged offence was committed
by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period
while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article
356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b)
will apply as if for the expression "State Government"
occurring therein, the expression "Central Government"
were substituted.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts it is hereby
declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a
public servant accused of any offence alleged to have
been committed under section 166A, section 166B,
section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C,
section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376,
section 376A, section 376AB, section 376C, section 376D,
section 376DA, section 376DB or section 509 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence
alleged to have been committed by any member of the
Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the
previous sanction of the Central Government.
(3) The State Government may, by notification, direct
that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such
class or category of the members of the Forces charged
with the maintenance of public order as may be specified
therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon
the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the
expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the
expression "State Government" were substituted."
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
Section 197 of the Code affords protection from false,
vexatious or mala fide prosecution to some categories of
public servants by insisting on the requirement of previous
sanction of the Government concerned. The members of the
armed forces of the union are so protected under Section
197(2) of the Code. The State Government considered that
members of the Kerala Police force who are charged with the
maintenance of public order should also be provided with
similar protection and therefore issued notification No.61135/
A2/77/Home dated 6.12.1977 invoking the provisions of
Section 197(3) of the Code.
13. There was no judicial certitude on the question
whether the protection under the aforesaid notification would
be available to members of the Kerala Police Force when they
were acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official
duties by way of law and order. That question was set at rest
by a Division Bench of this Court in Sarojini v. Prasannan
[1996 (2) KLT 859]. Subsequently the Apex Court in
Rizwan Ahammed Javed Shaikh v. Jammal Pattel
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
[(2001) 5 SCC 7] laid down a similar view as taken by the
Division Bench. It is now well settled that by virtue of the
aforesaid notification issued under Section 197(3) of the
Code the protection under Section 197(2) of the Code would
be available to a member of the Kerala Police force charged
with the maintenance of law and order duty also. Thus, if a
member of the Kerala Police committed an offence while
acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty,
the Court is precluded from taking cognizance of such
offence except with the previous sanction of the State
Government as enjoined by Section 197(2) read with Section
197(3) of the Code. The words 'Central Government'
occurring in Section 197(2) of the Code stand substituted by
'State Government'.
14. This aspect was dilated by a learned Single Judge
of this Court in Moosa Vallikadan v. State of Kerala and
another [2010 (3) KLT 437]. It was explained that every
police officer entitled to protection under Section 197(2) of
the Code need not be removable from his office by or with the
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
sanction of the Government. Sub Inspectors and other
members of the Kerala Police Force, though not persons
removable only by the Government, are covered by the
notification and are protected by Section 197(2) of the Code if
the offending act was committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in discharge of his official duty.
15. The question next arises is whether the accused
were at the relevant time acting or purporting to act in
discharge of their official duty. The interpretation placed on
the words 'while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty' came up for scrutiny before this Court and
the Apex Court in a long line of decisions. In B.Saha and
others v. M. S. Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177] a three Judge
Bench of the Apex Court observed as follows:
"18. The words "any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty" employed in Section
197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a
wide interpretation. If these words are construed too
narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile,
for it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence,
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
and never can be. In the wider sense, these words will
take under their umbrella every act constituting an
offence, committed in the course of the same
transaction in which the official duty is performed or
purports to be performed. The right approach to the
import of these words lies between these two extremes.
While on the one hand, it is not every offence
committed by a public servant while engaged in the
performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the
protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an
offence, directly and reasonably connected with his
official duty will require sanction for prosecution under
the said provision."
16. What was held in Baijnath v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [AIR 1966 SC 220] is that the quality of the act
that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of
his official duties, the protection contemplated by Section 197
of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. The sine qua
non for the applicability of the Section is that the offence
charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one
which has been committed by the public servant either in his
official capacity or under colour of the office held by him."
(emphasis supplied)
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
17. Therefore, the question whether an offence was
committed in the course of official duty or under the colour of
office, cannot be answered hypothetically, and depends on the
facts of each case. In the matter of grant of sanction under
Section 197 of the Code, the offence alleged to have been
committed by the accused must have something to do, or
must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official
duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act
and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such
relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable
claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in
the course of the performance of his duty.
18. The legal position was succinctly explained in
Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das and another [(2006) 4
SCC 584]. It was held that it is the quality of the act that is
important and if the act falls within the scope and range of his
official duties, then the protection contemplated by Section
197 of the Code would be available to him. It is not every
offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code; nor even
every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of
is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if
questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of
the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would
be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper
discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter
of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated
at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of
sanction, which must precede the institution of the
prosecution.
19. The Apex Court in P.P.Unnikrishnan v.
Puttiyottil Alikutty [(2000) 8 SCC 131] laid down down as
below:
"If a police officer dealing with law and order duty uses
force against unruly persons, either in his own defence
or in defence of others and exceeds such right it may
amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within
the amplitude of Section 197 of the Code as well as
Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act. But if a police officer
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot claim such
2023:KER:78019 6 Crl.R.P.No.588 of 2022 act to be
connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise
of his duty unless he establishes that he did such acts in
his defence or in defence of others or any property.
Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully confines a person
in the lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the
sanction of a magistrate or an order of a court it would
be an offence for which he cannot claim any protection
in the normal course, nor can he claim that such act was
done in exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping
a person in the lock-up for more than 24 hours without
authority is not merely abusing his duty but his act
would be quite outside the contours of his duty or
authority."
20. The learned counsel for the accused relied also on
the decision of the Apex Court in Devaraja D. v. Owais
[(2020) 7 SCC 695] in order to contend that from the
nature of the allegations in the complaint, it could only be said
that the alleged act has reasonable nexus with the discharge
of their official duty and therefore sanction under Section
197(1) of the Code is required for their prosecution. The Apex
Court in Devaraja (supra) observed regarding the purpose of
sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code as follows:
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
"68. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police
officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official
duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from
facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous
proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the
government, to prosecute would give an upright police
officer the confidence to discharge his official duties
efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by
initiation of criminal action, from which he would be
protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act. At the same time, if the policeman has
committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal
offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he can
be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate
government."
In that case, the complainant was allegedly ill-treated after
his arrest and manhandled during the period from 27.02.2013
till 04.03.2013. There were criminal cases registered against
the complainant. On the complainant filing a private
complaint, cognizance of the offences under Sections 120B,
220, 323, 330, 348 and 506 Part II, read with Section 34 of
the IPC was taken against the appellant, who was a police
officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police. In the said
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
factual scenario the Apex Court held that every offence
committed by a police officer does not attract Section 197(1)
of the Code. The protection given under Section 197(1) was
available only when the alleged act done by the police officer
was reasonably connected with the discharge of his official
duty. It was further observed that an offence committed
entirely outside the scope of the duty of the police officer
would not require sanction. However, if the act is connected
with the discharge of the official duty of investigation in a
criminal case, the act is certainly under the colour of duty, no
matter how illegal the act may be. The further observations
are that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is
whether the act is unconnected with official duty or whether
there is a reasonable nexus with the official duty. Suppose the
alleged act has reasonable nexus with the discharge of his
official duty. In that case, it does not matter whether the
policeman has exceeded the scope of his power and/or acted
beyond the four corners of law. In such a case, it was held
that sanction is required for the prosecution.
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
21. A similar view was taken by this Court in
Sunilkumar v. State of Kerala [2007 (3) KHC 765]. The
accused were a Sub Inspector of Police and a Police
Constable. They were chasing the complainant who was
suspected of carrying contraband arrack in a jerry can in an
autorickshaw. In an attempt to catch hold of the complainant
after overpowering him, the Sub Inspector of Police used a
towel around his neck and tightened the same. In the
prosecution of the Sub Inspector by means of a private
complaint, an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC
was alleged. A learned Judge of this Court held that on the
facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be held that
the alleged conduct of the Police Officer was alien to the
official act that he was performing to deprive him of the
protection under Section 197 of the Code.
22. Reverting to the facts of this case, initiation of a
prosecution as S.T.No.2059 of 1996 against the complainant is
proven from Ext.P1. The date of commission of the said
offence is 03.09.1996. The offence alleged in that case is
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
under Section 51A of the K.P.Act. The act that constitutes
such an offence is disorderly behaviour in a public street or
place, etc. If such a behaviour was after having drunk, the
same may amount to an offence under Section 51(a) of the
K.P.Act. When such a case was initiated against the
complainant, the police cannot be found at fault for subjecting
the complainant to a medical examination. The fact that the
complainant was subjected to medical examination after
bringing him to the police station is admitted by him. The
stand taken by accused Nos.1 to 3, who reached the house of
the complainant and took him to the police station in the
police jeep, is that as instructed by the Circle Inspector of
Police only they acted. That version is corroborated by the
evidence of PWs.1 and 4 inasmuch as they conceded that the
Circle Inspector told them about the case, and later, after the
medical examination, the Circle Inspector released PW1.
23. True, the complainant has a case that S.T.No.2059
of 1996 was a foisted case. The evidence on record is, however,
insufficient to hold that that case was a foisted one. What
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
emerges from the facts that the complainant after being
brought to the police station was subjected to medical
examination and he was arraigned as an accused in
S.T.No.2059 of 1996, is that the act of taking him to the police
station was as part of the official duty. No doubt, even in a case
where a person is taken into custody as part of duty and strictly
in accordance with law, police have no authority to manhandle
or detain him illegally. If manhandled or detained illegally, the
erring police personnel are liable for prosecution. That does not
mean that if such an act is done as part of official duty, no
sanction is required to prosecute the police personnel.
24. Here is such a case. Accused Nos.1 to 3 acted in
the matter of taking the complainant to the police station on
the instruction of the Circle Inspector. The same can be
termed only as part of their official duty. In the light of the
law laid down in the aforesaid decisions the accused are
entitled to get protection enjoined in Section 197(2) of the
Code. The view taken by the appellate court in that regard is
correct and legal. In the view of that finding, I do not
Crl.Appeal Nos.377, 378 & 380 of 2011
propose to deliberate upon the evidence in order to decide
whether the charge levelled against the accused has been
proved or not.
These appeals therefore fail and are dismissed.
Sd/-
P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE
dkr
