Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 4342 Ker
Judgement Date : 6 February, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. GIRISH
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 17TH MAGHA, 1945
RCREV. NO.27 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.11.2023 IN RCA NO.184 OF 2019
OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT COURT),
THALASSERY AND THE ORDER DATED 29.08.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.67 OF
2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF COURT), THALASSERY
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:
C. AJITHA, AGED 57 YEARS
W/O AJITH.P.K, RESIDING AT CHAMERI HOUSE, P.O PARAL,
THALASSERY TALUK,KANNUR, PIN - 670671
BY ADVS.ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH
K.R.AVINASH (KUNNATH)
E.MOHAMMED SHAFI
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
K. ABDUL WAHAB
AGED 69 YEARS
S/O MAMMU, RESIDING AT WINGS, CHALAKKARA, P.O NEW
MAHE, THALASSERY TALUK, KANNUR, PIN - 673311
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 06.02.2024, ALONG WITH RCRev.NO.28/2024 AND
32/2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. GIRISH
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 17TH MAGHA, 1945
RCREV. NO.28 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.11.2023 IN RCA NO.173 OF 2019
OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT COURT),
THALASSERY AND THE ORDER DATED 29.08.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.66 OF
2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF COURT), THALASSERY
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:
P.C RAKESH KUMAR
AGED 56 YEARS
S/O RAGHAVAN, RESIDING AT NHALIKKARAMMAL HOUSE,
THIRUVANGAD AMSOM DESOM, THALASSEY TALUK, KANNUR,
PIN - 670103
BY ADVS.ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH
K.R.AVINASH (KUNNATH)
E.MOHAMMED SHAFI
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
K. ABDUL WAHAB
AGED 69 YEARS
S/O MAMMU, RESIDING AT WINGS, CHALAKKARA, P.O NEW
MAHE, THALASSERY TALUK, KANNUR, PIN - 673311
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 06.02.2024, ALONG WITH RCRev.NO.27/2024 AND
CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
3
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.GIRISH
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 17TH MAGHA, 1945
RCREV. NO.32 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.11.2023 IN RCA NO.3 OF 2020
OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT COURT),
THALASSERY AND THE ORDER DATED 29.08.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.65 OF
2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF COURT), THALASSERY
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:
VAYALAMBRON SANIL KUMAR
AGED 55 YEARS
S/O GOVINDAN, LIC AGENT, RESIDING AT KUTTIKATTIL
HOUSE, ERUVATTY AMSOM, UMMANCHIRA DESOM, P.O
UMMENCHIRA, THLASASSERY TALUK KANNUR, PIN - 670649
BY ADVS.ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH
K.R.AVINASH (KUNNATH)
E.MOHAMMED SHAFI
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
K. ABDUL WAHAB
S/O MAMMU, RESIDING AT WINGS, CHALAKKARA, P.O NEW
MAHE, THALASSERY TALUK, KANNUR, PIN - 673311
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 06.02.2024, ALONG WITH RCRev.NO.27/2024 AND
CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
4
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
ORDER
Anil K. Narendran, J.
These Rent Control Revisions filed under Section 20 of the
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, arise out of
the common order dated 29.08.2019 of the Rent Control Court
(Munsiff), Thalassery in R.C.P.Nos.65, 66 and 67 of 2016 and
connected matters and the common judgment dated 29.11.2023
of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge),
Thalassery in R.C.A.Nos.173 and 184 of 2019 and 3 of 2020 and
connected matters. The respondent herein-landlord filed
R.C.P.Nos.65, 66 and 67 of 2016, invoking the provisions under
Section 11(3) of the Act, seeking eviction of the tenant from the
petition scheduled shop rooms, which form part of a three-
storied commercial building - 'Mammu Shopping Complex', for
the bona fide need of the landlord to use the ground floor and
first floor of that shopping complex for conducting hotel
business. In R.C.P.Nos.65 and 66 of 2016 order of eviction was
sought for under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act as well, on the
ground that the tenant ceased to occupy the petition schedule
building for the last one and a half years. The tenants in
R.C.P.No.65 of 2016 and 66 of 2016 are conducting LIC Premium
Collection Agency in the petition schedule shop rooms on the
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
first floor of the shopping complex and the tenant in R.C.P.No.67
of 2016 is conducting a tailoring shop in the petition schedule
shop room on the ground floor of that shopping complex. Before
the Rent Control Court, the tenant in the respective Rent Control
Petitions entered appearance and filed counter. R.C.P.Nos.65, 66
and 67 of 2016 along with connected matters, i.e., R.C.P.Nos.68,
70 and 71 of 2016 were tried together. On the side of the
landlord, he was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A24 were
marked. On the side of the tenants, RWs.1 to 5 were examined
and Exts.B1 to B7 were marked. After considering the pleadings
and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court granted an order
of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act on a finding that the
need projected by the landlord for seeking an order of eviction is
bona fide and that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act
has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case and
that the tenant in the respective Rent Control Petitions is not
entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the tenant in the respective Rent
Control Petitions is directed to give vacant possession of the
petition schedule shop rooms to the landlord, within two months
from the date of that order. The order of eviction sought for
under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act in R.C.P.Nos.65, 66, 68 and 71
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
of 2016 was declined.
2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent
Control Court, the tenant in R.C.P.Nos.67, 66 and 65 of 2016
filed R.C.A.Nos.184 of 2019, 173 of 2019 and 3 of 2020 before
the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thalassery. Those appeals,
along with the connected matters, i.e., R.C.A.Nos.182 and 183 of
2029 and 4 of 2020 were dismissed by the common judgment
dated 29.11.2023 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority,
whereby the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court
under Section 11(3) of the Act stands confirmed.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the common order dated
29.08.2019 of the Rent Control Court, Thalassery in
R.C.P.Nos.67, 66 and 65 of 2016 and the common judgment
dated 29.11.2023 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority,
Thalassery in R.C.A.Nos.184 and 173 of 2019 and 3 of 2020,
grating an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, the
tenant in the respective Rent Control Petitions is before this
Court in these Rent Control Revisions, invoking the provisions
under Section 20 of the Act.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant in
the respective Rent Control Revisions and also the learned
counsel for the respondent-landlord.
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
5. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel
for the petitioner-tenant would confine the challenge made in
these Rent Control Revisions against the finding of the Rent
Control Court as well as the Rent Control Appellate Authority on
the applicability of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would
point out that the landlord has vacant possession of two shop
rooms on the ground floor and two shop rooms on the first floor
of the shopping complex. In addition to this, the landlord has
vacant possession of two rooms on the second floor of the
shopping complex. In the Rent Control Petition, the landlord has
not disclosed the availability of those shop rooms, which are
suitable for conducting hotel business. In the absence of any
special reasons, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate
Authority ought to have held that the first proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act has application in the facts and circumstances of
the case and hence the landlord is not entitled to an order of
eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
respondent-landlord would submit that, when the need projected
by the landlord for seeking an order of eviction under Section
11(3) of the Act is for using the entire ground floor and first floor
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
of that shopping complex for conducting hotel business, the fact
that the landlord is in vacant possession of a few shop rooms in
the ground floor, first floor or second floor of the three-storied
shopping complex will not attract the 1st proviso to Section 11(3)
of the Act.
8. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3)
of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation
or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on
him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control
Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has
another building of his own in his possession in the same city,
town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied
that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and
proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the
Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put
the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his
livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or
business carried on in such building and there is no other
suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
on such trade or business.
9. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent
Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has
another building of his own in his possession in the same city,
town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied
that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and
proper to do so.
10. In M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC
355] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction
on the ground of bona fide requirement was sought for under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said
decision, the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in Ram
Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141], wherein it
was held that the question as to whether the landlord has any
other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a
question which is intermixed with the question regarding bona
fide requirement. Whether the landlord has any other reasonably
suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant.
Whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit
premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non-
disclosure by the landlord. The landlord having another
accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
both the parties understood the case and placed materials before
the court, and the case of neither party was prejudiced. On the
facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found that even
though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two
premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was
placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High
Court, thus no prejudice has been caused, and the parties have
squarely dealt with this question.
11. In Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique
[2020 (1) KHC 21] the question that arose before a Division
Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead
under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability
of a vacant building in his possession and seek to explain the
special reason for non-occupation of such premises, in a
proceeding initiated for eviction of the tenant under Section
11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench held that the initial burden
to prove that the landlord is in possession of the vacant building,
if any, is only upon the tenant unless the landlord himself admits
any such vacant building to be in his possession. Only when the
primary burden of proof in this behalf is discharged by the
tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord to show otherwise or
that the vacant premises are not suited to his needs. He can
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
successfully discharge his part of the burden by adducing
evidence either through his own testimony or others or in any
other legal manner. Law does not require the landlord to plead
that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special
reasons for its non-occupation. It is up to the tenant alone to
take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant
possession of premises.
12. In Vasantha Mallan, relying on the law laid down by
the Apex Court in M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355], the
Division Bench held that it is not incumbent on the landlord to
disclose in his pleading availability of a vacant building in his
possession. The non-disclosure of vacant premises cannot be
picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of
the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the
Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for
the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant
buildings available in his possession. Nor does the first proviso to
Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the
buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his
requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than
pleadings. Failure of the landlord to disclose the availability of
buildings in his possession and plead special reasons for not
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
occupying them, cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for
rejecting the claim of the landlord as not bona fide. What could,
at the most, be said is that it might be a fair and reasonable
conduct if the landlord disclosed in his pleadings the details of
buildings in his possession and simultaneously explained the
reason for the non-occupation of the premises for his alleged
needs.
13. In Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose [2019
(3) KHC 206] a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a
case in which one of the contentions of the tenant was that the
landlord has several other vacant buildings of his own in his
possession to start the proposed business. The Division Bench
noticed that the pleadings are very vague with respect to the
first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. It is stated that the
landlord has several other buildings. No particular vacant room
has been identified or pointed out in the pleadings. The Division
Bench opined that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to
plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in the
possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings,
disclosing the identity of the vacant building in the possession of
the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has not discharged
the initial burden of proof under the first Proviso to Section 11(3)
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
of the Act.
14. In the instant case, the need projected in the Rent
Control Petitions for seeking an order of eviction under Section
11(3) of the Act is that of the landlord, who was examined as
PW1, to use the ground floor and first floor of a three-storied
commercial complex by name 'Mammu Shopping Complex' for
conducting hotel business. In the proof affidavit, the landlord has
stated that he requires all rooms on the ground floor and first
floor of the building to start the hotel business. The rooms on the
second floor are not suitable for the proposed business. PW1 has
admitted that he is in possession of two rooms on the ground
floor and one room on the first floor. When the requirement of
the landlord to start the hotel business in the entire rooms on
the ground floor and first floor of the building, i.e., six rooms on
the ground floor and six rooms on the first floor, the possession
of two rooms on the ground floor and one room on the first floor
by the landlord will not attract the provisions under the first
proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. After considering the
pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court and
the Appellate Authority arrived at a conclusion that the
provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has
no application to the facts and circumstances of the case. Viewed
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra
and that relied on by the authorities below, it cannot be said that
the reasoning in the impugned order/judgment on the above
aspect is either perverse or patently illegal, warranting
interference by this Court.
15. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of
Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered
under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and
in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the
application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the
records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under
this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings,
and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As
per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and
incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court
under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion.
16. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499], the scope of revisional
powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court.
While considering whether the High Court could have re-
appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the
wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High
Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the
distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get
obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-
appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the
light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled
far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of
the word 'propriety' it cannot mean that there could be a re-
appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can
come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of
evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality,
regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.
17. In T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari
[(1999) 7 SCC 275] the Apex Court held that the words 'to
satisfy itself' employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of
superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere
with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in
agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of
the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the
evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding
recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by
the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would
be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the
courts below.
18. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645] the
Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the
High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether
the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged
that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional
fact. Relying on the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma it
was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the
revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot
have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its
own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate
authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power
under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with
the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression
'propriety' in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not
be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own
conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority.
On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the
light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence
and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-
tenant did not exist.
19. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v.
Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78] a Five-Judge Bench of the
Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court
under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to
the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex
Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of
the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not
enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of
appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the
Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the
word 'propriety' does not confer power upon the High Court to
re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its
consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality,
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.
20. In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR
2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412] considering the matter in
the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma,
Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh the Apex Court held that the
findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by
evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in
any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the
evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts
below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court
while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
21. In Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592],
a Division Bench of this Court held that, even though in the
decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, it has been held that,
in revisional jurisdiction there cannot be a re-appreciation of
evidence in order to come to a different conclusion on the same
set of facts, it has been held in those decisions itself that, if the
view taken is perverse and the statutory scheme has not been
kept in mind and if it requires correction, then Court can re-
appreciate the evidence. When the argument is that, the
approach made by the authorities are perverse, it cannot be said
that this Court cannot look into the pleadings and scan through
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
the evidence to find out whether the conclusions have been
arrived at properly on the pleadings and evidence.
22. In Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016
(2) KLJ 164], a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High
Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control
Court on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For
that limited purpose, it may enter into reappraisal of evidence
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at
by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that
no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached
on the material available.
23. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the
decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the
reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority
in the impugned order/judgment that the first proviso to Section
11(3) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the
case is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting
interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 20 of the Act. In such circumstances, these Rent
Control Revisions fail and the same are accordingly dismissed.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would
submit that the tenant in the respective revisions is conducting
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
business in the petition schedule shop rooms. They may be
granted at least six months' time to vacate the premises.
25. In such circumstances, these Rent Control Revisions
are dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment
of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the order of the Rent
Control Court; however, by granting five months' time to the
petitioner-tenant in the respective revisions, to surrender vacant
possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the
respondent-landlord, subject to the following conditions:
(i) The respondent-tenant in the respective Rent Control Petitions shall file affidavits before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that they will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the petitioner-
landlord within five months from the date of this order and that, they shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop rooms and further they shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop rooms only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities;
(ii) The respondent-tenant in the respective Rent Control Petitions shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks
R.C.R.Nos.27, 28 & 32 of 2024
from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default;
(iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the respective Rent Control Petitions failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner- landlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
G. GIRISH, JUDGE
AV/7/2
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