Meethal Saseendran vs Tharayil Peedikayil Abdurahiman ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 7681 Ker

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                                PRESENT
               THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
        TUESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF JUNE 2022 / 7TH ASHADHA, 1944
                           RSA NO. 351 OF 2020
 AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OS 207/2013 OF PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF
                             COURT ,KANNUR
                   AS 84/2016 OF SUB COURT, KANNUR
APPELLANT/1st DEFENDANT:

            MEETHAL SASEENDRAN
            AGED 57 YEARS
            S/O.GOPALAN, VISHAK NIVAS, MAKRERI AMSOM, MUNDALORE
            DESOM, P.O.MUNDALORE, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 622.
            BY ADVS.
            T.KRISHNANUNNI (SR.)
            SRI.VINOD RAVINDRANATH
            SMT.MEENA.A.
            SRI.K.C.KIRAN
            SMT.M.R.MINI
            SHRI.ANISH ANTONY ANATHAZHATH


RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS 2 AND 3:

    1       THARAYIL PEEDIKAYIL ABDURAHIMAN HAJI,
            AGED 76 YEARS
            S/O.KUNHAMMED, BUSINESS, RESIDING AT ROSHINI MANZIL,
            CHIRAKKALKULAM WARD, KANNUR-670 003.
    2       K.P.JYITHISH,
            AGED 52 YEARS
            S/O.BHASKARAN, BUSINESS, RESIDING AT KRISHNA KRIPA,
            SOUTH BAZAR, KANNUR, PIN-670 001.
    3       P.P.VENU,
            FATHER'S NAME AND AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT,
            ADVOCATE, YOGASALA ROAD, KANNUR, PIN-670 001.
            BY ADVS.
            SRI.K.BABU
            SMT.C.LEENA
            SRI.SHAJI THOMAS

     THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
14.06.2022, THE COURT ON 28.06.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 R.S.A.No.351/2020                         2




                              M.R.ANITHA, J
                           ******************
                          R.S.A.No.351 of 2020
                 -------------------------------------------
                  Dated this the 28th day of June, 2022



                              JUDGMENT

This Regular Second Appeal has been directed against the

judgment and decree in A.S.No.84/2016 on the file of

Subordinate Judges' Court, Kannur, which concurred with the

judgment and decree in O.S.No.207/2013 on the file of Munsiff's

Court, Kannur. O.S.No.207/2013 has been filed for declaration

and recovery possession and permanent prohibitory injunction.

Parties would be referred hereinafter as per the status before the

trial court.

2. O.S.No.207/2013 was tried along with

O.S.No.358/2013, a suit for injunction, which was filed by the

plaintiff against the Kannur Municipality and its Secretary and the

appellant herein as defendants 1, 2 and 3.

3. Plaint schedule property absolutely belongs to the

plaintiff and it was let out to the second defendant on a monthly

rent of Rs.2,500/- as per the rent deed dated 02.04.2005. When

the second defendant committed default in payment of rent,

R.C.P.No.14/2011 was filed before the Additional Rent Control

Court, Kannur. The petition was allowed and the building was

delivered to the plaintiff as per order dated 06.03.2013 in

E.P.No.26/2013. In 2011, second defendant had filed

O.S.No.138/2011 before Sub Court, Thalassery making the

plaintiff and defendant No.1 as defendants for declaring the sale

deed No.4519/2006 as void. That suit was subsequently

transferred to Sub Court, Kannur and was re-numbered as

O.S.No.230/2012, which ultimately ended in dismissal for default

on 07.07.2012. In O.S.No.138/2011 second defendant had

specifically pleaded that he had not executed any document in

favour of first defendant and had not obtained any power of

attorney from the plaintiff. In that suit, plaintiff filed written

statement denying the execution of power of attorney. On

19.05.2013, when plaintiff was conducting some repair works in

the shop room, first defendant tried to obstruct him in carrying

out the repairs claiming title over the schedule property.

Existence of document No.4519/2006 creates cloud upon the title

of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property. Hence suit has

been filed seeking for a declaration that document No.4519/2006

is void and for perpetual injunction. On 08.01.2014 first

defendant broke open the door of the building situated in the

plaint schedule property and trespassed into the building and

took possession of the building. So recovery of plaint schedule

building on the strength of title was further sought. Against

defendants 2 and 3, no relief has been sought.

4. First defendant filed written statement contending that

the suit is not maintainable. O.S.No.138/2011 was a collusive

suit between the plaintiff and the second defendant. After the

dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 the plaintiff did not opt to

transpose him as plaintiff in that case. Only after a lapse of ten

months, this suit has been filed with the same cause of action.

Hence the suit is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') as well as by the principles

of estoppal by judgment. Plaintiff assigned the plaint schedule

property in favour of this defendant through his power of

attorney holder, the second defendant. After execution of

document No.4519/2006, 2nd defendant is the absolute title

holder in possession of the property.

5. R.C.P.No.14/2011 has been filed in collusion between

the plaintiff and defendant No.2. Defendant No.1 is using the

ground-floor of the building for real estate business and upstair

room and stair case are in possession of tenants by name Abdul

Shukkoor and K.P. Sumanth. Amin has not delivered physical

possession of the building as per the order in R.C.P. The second

defendant is a business partner of the plaintiff and power of

attorney was executed before Advocate P.P. Venu who is a notary.

No incident as alleged occurred on 19.05.2013. During 2010, the

original title deed as well as power of attorney were lost while

defendant was travelling from Thalasseri to Kannur.

6. Second defendant remained ex parte. Third defendant

filed written statement contending that he was not a party in

O.S.No.138/2011. As per the Notarial Register maintained by

him, power of attorney has been executed by Abdul Rahiman Haji

on 07.11.2005 appointing one K.P.Jyothish as the power of

attorney for the sale of property of Abdul Rahiman Haji in Kannur

village. Third defendant attested the execution of the power of

attorney. So plaintiff has no cause of action as against 3 rd

defendant.

7. PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A25 series

and Ext.C1 marked from the side of the plaintiff. Exts.B1 to B12

marked, DWs 1 and 2 examined from the side of first defendant.

Exts.B4, B6 and B11 are said to have been rejected. 2 nd

defendant remained ex parte.

8. After hearing both sides, the learned Munsiff found

that first defendant failed to establish the execution of power of

attorney by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant and

hence the Sale Deed alleged to have been executed by the

second defendant in favour of the first defendant is held to be

void ab initio. Since the first defendant was found to be in

possession of the plaint schedule property, recovery of

possession was ordered on the strength of title and consequently

prohibitory injunction also granted against the first defendant.

9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the

learned Munsiff, A.S.No.84/2016 was filed before the Subordinate

Judge's Court, Kannur. Appeal was dismissed confirming the

judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff.

10. Having lost the case in both the forums, the appellant

approaches this Court in this Regular Second Appeal contending

that the trial court as well as the first appellate court have not

correctly understood the contentions of the parties and it ought

to have been found that the appellant/first defendant has

discharged the burden with respect to the proof of the power of

attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the second

defendant. R.C.P.No.14/2011 was filed in collusion between the

plaintiff and the second defendant. O.S.No.138/2011 was also a

collusive suit. It ought to have been found that the Sale Deed

No.4519/2006 of S.R.O Kannur is a true and valid document.

First defendant discharged the burden with respect to proof of

execution of power of attorney.

11. Notice was issued to the respondents and all the

respondents were duly served.

12. Heard Smt.Meena A., learned counsel for the appellant

and Adv.Shaji Thomas, learned counsel for the first respondent

and Adv.C.Leena for the third respondent. For 2 nd respondent/2nd

defendant, there was no appearance. Lower court records were

called for and perused. Heard both sides.

13. Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule

property and he acquired right over the same as per Partition

Deed No.1026/1958 of Sub Registrar's office, Kannur certified

copy of which is marked as Ext.A1. He let out the building

attached to the plaint schedule property to the 2 nd defendant.

When 2nd defendant kept rent in arrears, R.C.P.No.14/2011 was

filed before the Rent Control Court, Kannur. That petition was

allowed, Ext.A2 is the certified copy of order of the Rent Control

Court in R.C.P.No.14/2011 and Ext.A3 is the delivery warrant in

E.P.No.26/2013 in R.C.P.No.14/2011; Ext.A4 is the delivery

report; Ext.A5 is the certified copy of delivery receipt executed

by the plaintiff.

14. The second defendant filed O.S.No.138/2011 against

the first defendant and plaintiff for declaring sale deed

No.4519/06 as void abinitio and consequential reliefs. The

plaintiff filed written statement, copy of which is produced as

Ext.A8, wherein he stoutly denied execution of any power of

attorney in favour of the second defendant for the purpose of

selling the plaint schedule property and also contended that the

alleged power of attorney as well as Document No.4519/06 of

Kannur S.R.O are liable to be set aside and the second defendant

as well as the first defendant has to be dealt with in accordance

with law for fabricating documents. He also vehemently

contended that the property is well in his possession and is not

parted with the possession to the first defendant. Subsequently,

that suit happened to be dismissed for default on 07.07.2012.

Thereafter, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff.

15. So, the first question is with regard to the bar under

Order II Rule 2 of the Code.

16. Bar under Order II Rule 2 was raised in view of

dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 on 07.07.2012 which was filed by

the second defendant, the tenant of the plaintiff. It would be

apposite in this context to quote Order II Rule 2 which reads

thus :

"Suits to include the whole claim: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court ."

(2)Relinquishment of part of claim.- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

(3)Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

17. On going through the above it could be seen that the

bar under Order II Rule 2 is mandatory and plaintiff is bound to

claim the entire relief so as to afford ground for final decisions

upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation

between the parties. Sub Rule 2 further provides that where the

plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes

any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of

the portion so omitted or relinquished. So, on a bare reading of

the provision, it would be clear that the express bar of Order II

Rule 2 is against the plaintiff in filing a subsequent suit in respect

of the portions omitted or relinquished. Here, admittedly, the suit

O.S.No.138/2011 has been filed by the 2 nd defendant who is the

tenant of the plaintiff against the first defendant and the plaintiff

as 2nd defendant.

18. It is relevant in this context to quote P. Rama Aiyar

v. T. Bagavathimuthu Pillai and Ors MANU/TN/0202/1935

AIR 1936 Madras 473 wherein a Division Bench of Madras High

Court held that warrant of Order II Rule 2 will not preclude a

defendant from relying upon his rights in a subsequent

proceeding when he was only a defendant in the earlier suit. The

plaintiff in this case was the defendant in the earlier suit.

19. So, relinquishment of the claim by the second

defendant in the earlier suit will not in any way operate as a bar

under Order II Rule 2 as against the plaintiff who had filed

written statement stoutly denying the execution of the power of

attorney and the transfer of property by him to the first

defendant.

20. In the appeal memorandum, bar of res judicata also

raised due to non-filing of the appeal against the decree in

O.S.No.358/2013. Raghavan Nambiar v. Sumathi Amma :

1991 (1) KLJ 61 was placed before the first appellate court in

this regard wherein it has been held that where two or more suits

are jointly heard and disposed of by a common judgment

entering findings on issues in them, all the findings will bind the

parties separately and they will operate as res judicata, if not

challenged and corrected in appeal. But, in the present case,

O.S.No.358/2013 has been filed by the plaintiff against the

Municipality and Secretary as well as the first defendant against

grant of licence to the first defendant herein for conducting the

business and to restrain the first defendant herein from getting

the licence. That suit was dismissed by the learned Munsiff on

the ground of bar of jurisdiction of civil court by special

procedures established by special statute with respect to the

grant of licence. So, the issue in O.S.No.358/2013 and the

present case are not similar or substantially the same. It has

also been found by the learned Munsiff that if the plaintiff is

entitled for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property

in O.S.No.207/2013 by declaring Ext.D3 title deed as void, relief

in O.S.No.358/2013 will become infructuous also. Hence

dismissal of O.S.No.358/2013 will not operate as res judicata

against the plaintiff in contesting the appeal against the

judgment in O.S.No.207/2013 (A.S.No.84/2016) since issues

decided in both suits are not similar or substantially the same.

21. Next question is with regard to power of attorney

alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff. Execution of

power of attorney has been stoutly denied by the plaintiff. The

first defendant claims right over the property covered by Ext.B3

document alleged to have been executed by 2 nd defendant under

the authority of power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in

favour of the 2nd defendant. It has come out that the second

defendant had already filed O.S.No.138/2011 for setting aside

the document as well as denying the execution of such power of

attorney by the plaintiff in favour of him, though the suit was

ultimately dismissed for default. It is after about ten months of

the dismissal of that suit, the present suit has been filed by the

plaintiff. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contends

about the delay in filing the suit inspite of the dismissal of

O.S.No.138/2011 on 07.07.2012, since it is within the period of

limitation the fact that the suit has been filed after about ten

months of the dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 is of no avail to the

appellant. Since the execution of power of attorney has been

emphatically denied by the plaintiff and the first defendant

asserts to have the existence of such a power of attorney as per

Section 101 Illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, the

burden is upon him to prove the existence of such a power of

attorney. First defendant relies upon the written statement filed

by the 3rd defendant the Notary Public before whom the power of

attorney alleged to have been executed. Third defendant

contended in the written statement that the power of attorney

has been executed by Abdul Rahiman Haji on 07.11.2005

appointing one K.P.Jyothish as the power of attorney for the sale

of property of Abdul Rahiman Haji in Kannur village and the

execution of the power of attorney has been attested by him.

But the 3rd defendant has not been examined and it is not proved

that the Abdul Rahiman Haji referred to in the written statement

of third defendant is the plaintiff herein. No attempt was also

made at the instance of the first defendant to get the register

concerned produced from the custody of the third defendant.

The pleadings in the written statement of 3 rd defendant will not

constitute evidence. So, the written statement filed by the third

defendant cannot be relied on by the first defendant as proof of

execution of power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of the

second defendant.

22. It is also pertinent to note that either the sale deed

alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in original or the

power of attorney could be produced before the court by the first

defendant. The first defendant has got a specific contention that

the sale deed as well as the power of attorney has been lost in

transit. To substantiate that contention he produced Ext.B12

newspaper advertisement regarding the loss of power of attorney

as well as the sale deed. But, in Ext.B12 there is reference only

with regard to the sale deed and there is no mention regarding

the power of attorney. Ext.B13 is copy of the original petition

filed by the first defendant before this Court against an order in

I.A.No.689/2014 filed in the suit for calling documents from the

Municipality. That application was dismissed by the trial court and

in that the contention of the first defendant was that documents

are to be called from the Municipality to compare the signature in

the power of attorney with the admitted signatures. So, it was

concluded by the learned Munsiff as well as the first appellate

court that it would lead to an inference that the first defendant

was in possession of the power of attorney even during 2014.

That was also taken as a circumstance to conclude that the

contention of the first defendant that the power of attorney was

lost during 2010 in transit is a false story. That may be the

reason why there is no reference in Ext.B12 about the loss of

power of attorney and only the loss of sale deed has been

referred there. Apart from the oral evidence of first defendant

there is no evidence with regard to the existence of power of

attorney. Section 63(5) of the Indian Evidence At, 1872 says that

Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some

person who has himself seen it is a secondary evidence. But

none of the contingencies stipulated in Section 65 of the

Evidence Act is satisfied to permit the plaintiff to give secondary

evidence relating to power of attorney. Learned counsel for the

plaintiff in this context placed reliance on Abraham K.J and

Another v. Mariamma Itty and Others : 2016 (3) KHC 718.

23. Admittedly, the power of attorney could not be

produced before the court and in the previous paragraphs it has

been found that the contention of the first defendant that the

power of attorney has been lost in transit is not believable and it

has also been found that the facts and circumstances would only

leads to a conclusion that the alleged power of attorney was with

the first defendant which is probabilised by Ext.A13, the O.P. filed

by the first defendant before this Court.

24. In Abraham K.J. And Anr. v. Mariamma Itty and

Ors. :2016 (3) KHC 718 (D.B.) relied on by the counsel a

Division Bench of this Court had made a detailed probe into the

validity of the power of attorney and non-production of the same

before the court etc. That was a case in which plaintiffs alleged

that first plaintiff executed a power of attorney in favour of the

5th defendant only for the purpose of facilitating building

construction and he never authorised the 5 th defendant to sell

any portion of his property. Second plaintiff had executed another

power of attorney in favour of the 5th defendant even before

purchase of the property intending to enable him to develop the

property and none has a case that the 2 nd plaintiff's property had

been sold by the 5th defendant using the power of attorney

executed by her. The case of the plaintiffs is that 5 th defendant

has no authority to deal with the 2 nd plaintiff's property and it has

been contended by either side that the other side has the

responsibility to produce materials to show that the 5 th defendant

had no power to execute either Ext.A2 or Ext. A5 so as to bind

the respective plaintiffs. The suit was filed when plaintiffs found

on enquiry that 5th defendant executed Ext.A2 Sale Deed in

favour of 4th defendant in respect of a portion of plaint B

Schedule property using the power of attorney and the suit has

been filed for declaring the Sale Deed ab initio void and not

binding on the plaintiffs or their right in the properties or for

recovery of possession. Defendant contended that the property

was sold to him by a registered Sale Deed. In that context it was

held that mere registration of the document will not amount to

conclusive proof and the fact that the executant had valid power

and authority for executing the Sale Deed through the power of

attorney will have to be proved by adducing cogent evidence. It

is also held that it is incumbent as per Section 101 of the

Evidence Act on the purchaser of property to prove that the 5 th

defendant had the requisite authority to execute the Sale Deed

by using the power of attorney. It is also held that when the

purchaser of property fails to produce the power of attorney in

court an adverse inference can be drawn against the purchaser.

In that case the recitals in the document showed that a copy of

the challenged power of attorney had been given to the assignee

(4th defendant). Fourth defendant has no valid reason for not

producing the copy of the impugned power of attorney which is

handed over to him at the time of sale. So in the absence of

production of the copy of the said power of attorney by the 4 th

defendant an adverse inference has been drawn that he

intentionally withheld power of attorney in the name of 5 th

defendant as it was unfavourable to him.

25. In the present case, the situation is more dangerous.

The first defendant had got a specific case that the power of

attorney as well as the original sale deed alleged to have been

executed in his favour has been lost in transit. According to him,

he had made an advertisement in the newspaper also about the

missing of document i.e. power of attorney as well as the original

sale deed. But the paper publication, Ext.B12, only speaks about

the sale deed. It is also to be noted that though the first

defendant has got a specific case that the said documents were

lost in the year 2010, Ext.B12 paper publication was effected

only in the year 2011 after the filing of O.S.No.138/2011 by the

second defendant. So all those factors would speak in volumes

that first defendant wilfully suppressed the power of attorney

from the court. It may only be due to the fact that it would not

have given any such authorisation to the second defendant by

the plaintiff. So non-production of the power of attorney cuts the

roots of the defence of the first defendant regarding the authority

of the second defendant who is only a tenant of the plaintiff to

execute a sale deed with respect to the tenanted premises in

favour of him.

26. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would also bring

to my attention the fact that inspite of the alleged execution of

sale deed in favour of the first defendant the plaintiff had been

paying tax, both land tax and building tax, with respect to the

plaint schedule building and property and Ext.24 series are the

tax receipts issued by the Village Officer relating to the period

2009-2011 as well as building tax receipts Ext.A25 series relating

to the period 2007-2013. First defendant also produced the

building tax receipts relating to the period 2011-2013, possession

certificate and property tax receipts issued by Village Officer

relating to the period 2009-2012 (Exts.B6 to B7 series). But, it is

well settled that entry in revenue records will not confer any title

(See Suraj Bhan and Others v. Financial Commissioner and

Others : (2007) 6 SCC 186).

27. It is also brought out that along with the filing of this

case, Commissioner visited the property and Ext.C1 commission

report was filed and plaintiff is found in possession of the building

at the time of inspection on 28.05.2013. So also, the delivery

receipt in R.C.P which is produced as Ext.A3 delivery report in E.P

26/13 and A4 certified copy of Amin's account in E.P. 26/2013

and Ext.A5, certified copy of the receipt in E.P.No.26/2013, would

conclusively prove that at the time of delivery in execution of the

order in RCP 14/2011 first defendant was not in possession of the

building and the building was actually lying locked and the Amin

break opened the key and effected delivery and the plaintiff was

given actual delivery of possession of the building. It is pending

the proceedings in this suit that first defendant took forceful

possession of the building and the plaintiff has got a specific

contention that first defendant was a convict in a murder case

and fearing him actually his unlawful acts were not resisted by

him. Whatever it be the documents produced from the side of the

plaintiff would conclusively establish that he got delivery of the

property through the court as per Order in RCP 14/2011 (Ext.A2

order). Ext.A1 is the certified copy of partition deed by which the

plaintiff obtained the plaint schedule property. It would

conclusively establish the plaintiff's right and title over the plaint

schedule property. Ext.A24 (series) and A25 (series) prove his

possession of the property even after the execution of Ext.B3

sale deed (Ext.A9).

28. It is true that the learned counsel for the appellant/

first defendant, would also contend that actually this is a case of

collusion between the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff and first

defendant actually lost the amount by purchasing the property

and now he has been left without any remedy. Collusion between

plaintiff and second defendant is not so explicit. It is true that he

had filed O.S.No.138/2011 for declaring the sale deed and power

of attorney as null and void and that suit was subsequently

dismissed for default. He did not contest the suit also. If at all he

was actually sailing with plaintiff nothing prevented him from

contesting this case supporting the plaint allegations. But that

has not been done.

29. As per Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (in short 'the Code'), the High Court on satisfaction of

involvement of a substantial question of law can entertain an

appeal from every decree passed in appeal by any court

subordinate to it. In Govinda Raju v. Mariamman : AIR 2005

SC 1008 it has been held that the existing substantial question

of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 100 of the Code. In K.N.Nagarajappa vs H.Narasimha

Reddy : (2021 (5) KLT Online 1137 (SC) the circumstances

under which High Court can interfere with findings of lower court

on concurrent findings of facts has been explained. Paragraph 14

of the said decision is relevant to be extracted which reads thus:

"Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction which a High Court derives under Section 100 is based upon its framing of a substantial question of law. As a matter of law, it is axiomatic that the findings of the first appellate court are final. However, the rule that sans a substantial question of law, the High Courts cannot interfere with findings of the

lower Court or concurrent findings of fact, is subject to two important caveats. The first is that, if the findings of fact are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the court; in other words, it flies on the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference would be justified. The other is where the findings of fact may call for examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section 103 CPC."

30. So, this Court can interfere with the concurrent

findings of facts of the courts below only on satisfaction of

existence of a substantial question of law.

31. In the present case, the plaintiff could establish as has

been found by the trial court as well as the first appellant court

that the sale deed No.4519/2006 of Sub Registry office, Kannur

is null and void and is not binding on the plaintiff and the plaint

schedule property. Recovery of possession was also ordered

along with consequential prohibitory order of injunction. The

concurrent findings so entered into by the courts below are

perfectly legal and proper and I do not find any substantive

question of law for enabling this Court to make any interference

in this R.S.A and accordingly it is dismissed.

                      (sd/-)              M.R.ANITHA, JUDGE

jsr/shg



                      True Copy

                                          P.S to Judge