Kerala High Court
Santhosh N.K vs The Inspector Of Police/Station ... on 21 December, 2022
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 1:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1801 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32272/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ASHOK KUMAR M.R.
AGED 58 YEARS
S/O.RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR, MARACHERI PUTHANPURA HOUSE,
METHALA P.O., ASAMANNUR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 683545
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR,
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673101
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH W.A. Nos. 1802, 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1828, 1838, 1844, 1845,
1846, 1848, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1874, 1879, 1883, 1885, 1888, 1900,
1901, 1903 & 1916 of 2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 2:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1802 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 36137/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
NOORUDHEEN
AGED 48 YEARS
S/O.SAINUDHEEN,
KIZHAKKEPEEDIYEKKAL HOUSE, TRIPRANGODE,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 108.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
TALUK OFFICE, TIRUR,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 676101
2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER
THIRUNAVAYA VILLAGE,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 676301
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 3:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1803 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35788/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
SHAIBU P
AGED 43 YEARS
S/O.P. KRISHNAN,
P.K. INFRASTRUCTURE, 5/3403,
C311, SPACE MALL, JAFARKHAN COLONY ROAD,
KOZHIKKODE, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT.
PIN - 673 001.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
TALUK OFFICE, KOZHIKKODE, PIN - 673 001.
2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER
KOTTOOLI VILLAGE,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 004
BY ADV SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 4:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1804 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35613/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
JALEEL P.K.
AGED 42 YEARS
S/O.AHAMMED, PERUVANKUZHIYIL HOUSE,
VALAKKULAM P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 508.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
TIRURANGADI POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 306.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
TIRURANGADI POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 676 306.
BY ADV GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 5:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1816 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35601/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
MUHAMMED YASIR P
AGED 30 YEARS
S/O.SAIDALI, 49/18, KURURAMBATHOOR P.O.,
TIRUR, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 301.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
MALAPPURAM POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
, PIN - 676 505
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
MALAPPURAM POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 505.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 6:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1817 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34381/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
MUHAMMED RASHID P
AGED 29 YEARS
S/O.ABOOBACKER P., ELEDATH HOUSE,
PULIKKAL P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 637.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673 638
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 638
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 7:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1828 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33874/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
SUDHEER T
AGED 43 YEARS
S/O.NARAYANAN T., THEEYATH HOUSE,
VALIYAPARAMBIL, FEROKE P.O.,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 631.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:-
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 638.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673638.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 8:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1838 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34680/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
RAJITH K.V.
AGED 41 YEARS
S/O.RAJAN K.V.,
KARAKKEPURATH THAZHAM, KODAKKATTUMURI,
MUCHUKUNNU P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
, PIN - 673307
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
PAYYOLI POLICE STATION,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 523.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
PAYYOLI POLICE STATION,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 523.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 9:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1844 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33865/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ARUNJITH C
AGED 35 YEARS
S/O.CHERUNNI C., THAYYIL HOUSE, PULIKKAL,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 638.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 638.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 10:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1845 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33861/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
SANTHOSH N.K.
AGED 45 YEARS
S/O.DASAN, THAZHE ELENTHANGATTU HOUSE,
RAMANATTUKARA P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 633.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDNETS;
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 638.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 638.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 11:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1846 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29973/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ASHOK KUMAR
AGED 52 YEARS
S/O.RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR,
MARANCHERI PUTHANPURA HOUSE, ASAMANNUR,
PERUMBAVOOR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 683 549.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 12:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1848 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34133/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONER:
1 VIJEESH P
AGED 34 YEARS
S/O.VIJAYAN, 12/478, PAZHAMKANDATHIL HOUSE,
SUKAPURAM P.O., EDAPPAL,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 679 576.
2 SHAJEER N.P.
AGED 30 YEARS
S/O.N.P. ABBAS, NEDUMOOLI HOUSE,
POTTAMMAL, FAROOK COLLEGE P.O.,
RAMANATTUKARA, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 632
BY ADV SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:
THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 636.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 13:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1855 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 31585/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
SUBHADRA C.K.
AGED 65 YEARS
W/O.KUTTIKRISHNAN, POOPARAMBIL HOUSE,
VARAVOOR P.O., THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 585.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
WADAKKANCHERY POLICE STATION,
WADAKKANCHERY, THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 582.
2 THE DISTRICT GEOLOGIST
DISTRICT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, MINI
CIVIL STATION, CHEMBUKKAVU,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 020.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 14:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1856 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29847/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
MUHAMMED RASHIK A
AGED 26 YEARS
S/O.ASSANKOYA A., ARAMBACHALIL HOUSE,
PAYADITHAZHAM, PANTHEERANKAVU,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 019.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
VAZHAKKAD POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 640.
2 THE GEOLOGIST
DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY,
DISTRICT OFFICE, MANJERI,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 676 121.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 15:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1857 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33673/2002 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS:
1 MUHAMMED RASHIK A
AGED 31 YEARS
S/O.ASSANKOYA A., ARAMBACHALIL HOUSE,
PAYADITHAZHAM, PANTHEERANKAVU,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 019.
2 ANAS C.K.
AGED 33 YEARS
S/O.VEERANKUTTY,
THEERKULATH HOUSE, CHEMMANGOTTUKUTTIYIL,
CHELEMBRA P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 631.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 638.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KONDOTTY POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 638.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 16:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1863 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32240/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ANNIE ISSAC,
AGED 61 YEARS
W/O.PAILY ISSAC,
KAVANAMATTOM HOUSE, ASAMANNOOR,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT
PIN - 683 543.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR,
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 101.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 17:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1874 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34952/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
MUHAMMED
AGED 52 YEARS
S/O.MOIDEEN,
POOLATT HOUSE, KARIPUR P.O.,
PALLIKKAL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 647.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 636.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE
THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
PIN - 673 636.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 18:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1879 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29827/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONER:
1 SAJEESH P.B.
AGED 42 YEARS
S/O.BALAN P.K.,
PUTHANPURAKKAL HOUSE, KANJIRAKKODE,
KUMARANALLUR, THRISSUR DISTRICT - 680 590.
PIN - 680 590.
2 KANNAN P.G.
AGED 33 YEARS
S/O.GOPALAN,
PISANTHI PUNCHAYIL HOUSE, MANGAD,
KOTTUPURAM, THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 667.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
ERUMAPETTY POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 584.
2 THE GEOLOGIST
DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY,
DISTRICT OFFICE, THRISSUR,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 001.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 19:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1883 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32252/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
JITHESH T.P.
AGED 47 YEARS
S/O.KRISHNAN,
THAVARAPARAMBATH HOUSE, MAYYANNUR P.O,
VILLYAPPALLI, KOZHIKKODE - 673 542.
, PIN - 673542
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 20:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1885 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29586/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
JAMSHID P
AGED 32 YEARS
S/O.MAMU,
PARAKOTTU HOUSE, ILLATHUTHAZHAM,
PANTHEERANKAVU P.O., PERUMANNA,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 019.
BY ADV SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
KOZHIKKODE TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673 001.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR
KOZHIKKODE TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 001.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 21:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1888 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33515/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
SHIBILAL N
AGED 36 YEARS
S/O.SIVADASAN, PUNNATHUVAYALIL HOUSE,
MOODADI, MUCHUKUNNU,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673 307.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
KOYILANDI TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER
KEEZHARIYUR VILLAGE,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 307.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 22:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1900 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 36995/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
SAJEESH P.B.
AGED 43 YEARS
S/O.BALAN P.K., PUTHANPURAKKAL HOUSE,
KANJIRAKKODE, KUMARANALLUR,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 680 590.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
CHERUTHURUTHI POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 679 531.
2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
CHERUTHURUTHI POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR DISTRICT
PIN - 679 531.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 23:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1901 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34485/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONER:
1 SHAMEER ALI N
AGED 36 YEARS
S/O.ABDUL AZEEZ N., MATTUMMAL HOUSE,
KOZHIPPURAM, PALLIKKAL,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
, PIN - 673 634.
2 SUBHA
AGED 41 YEARS
W/O.SHAJI,
MUTHIRAKALLU NILATHUKUNI, THIKKODI P.O.,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 529.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE TAHSILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
2 THE DEPUTY TAHSDILDAR
VATAKARA TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 101.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE
SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 24:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1903 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 20520/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS:
1 ABDUL SALAM P
AGED 46 YEARS
S/O.AMMED P., PURAPPILATT HOUSE,
MUYIPOTH, MEPPAYUR, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT,
PIN - 673 524.
2 ABHIJITH P.M.
AGED 26 YEARS
S/O.ASHOKAN,
KARAYATTUVALAPPIL HOUSE, NARAKKODE,
KEEZHARIYOOR P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 307.
BY ADV BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE GEOLOGIST
DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY,
DISTRICT OFFICE, KOZHIKKODE,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673 001.
2 THE SPECIAL DEPUTY TAHSILDAR
H SECTION, TALUK OFFICE, KOYILANDI,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 305.
3 THE TAHSILDAR
KOYILANDI TALUK,
KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT
PIN - 673 305.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 25:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944
WA NO. 1916 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 17394/2022 OF HIGH
COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
RAHUL P.U.
AGED 29 YEARS
S/O.UNNIKRISHNAN P.V., PADINJARE HOUSE,
THENOOR, PARLI, PALAKKAD DISTRICT
PIN - 678 612.
BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR
RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE GEOLOGIST
DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY,
DISTRICT OFFICE, TOWN BUS STAND COMPLEX,
PALAKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT
PIN - 678 001.
2 THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER
REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICE,
PALAKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT
PIN - 678 001.
BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 26:
S. MANIKUMAR, CJ & SHAJI P. CHALY, J.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
W.A. Nos. 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1828, 1838,
1844, 1845, 1846, 1848, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1874,
1879, 1883, 1885, 1888, 1900, 1901, 1903 & 1916 of 2022
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 21st day of December 2022.
JUDGMENT
SHAJI P. CHALY, J.
The captioned appeals are filed by the petitioners in W.P.(C)
Nos. 32272, 36137, 35788, 35613, 35601, 34381, 33874, 34680,
33865, 33861, 29973, 34133, 31585, 29847, 33673, 32240,
34952, 29827, 32252, 29586, 33515, 36995, 34485, 20520 and
17394 of 2022 challenging the common judgment of the learned
single Judge dated 30.11.2022 dismissing the writ petitions.
2. The subject issue arises under the provisions of the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 ('Act, 1957'
for short) vis-a-vis seizure of vehicles belonging to the appellants
allegedly for violation of the provisions of the Act, 1957; the
primary reliefs sought for in the writ petitions are: (i) to issue a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the
Excavator/JCB/other vehicles to the petitioners; and (ii) declare that
the seizure of the vehicle under the provisions of the Act, 1957 by
the Tahsildar/Deputy Tahsildar are per se illegal, in view of Section
21(4) of the Act, 1957, as he is not an officer specially empowered
to seize the vehicle.
3. The pleadings, material and contentions raised in the writ
appeals are substantially typical in nature and therefore, separate
narration of facts are not required.
4. The vehicles belonging to the appellants were seized by
the Revenue Authority concerned, alleging violation of the
provisions of the Act, 1957. The case projected by the appellants is
that after the seizure of vehicles, they were kept in custody of the
respondents depriving the appellants of their valuable property
without proceeding further. According to the appellants, they have
no other option than to approach the writ court seeking the release
of their vehicles, as the respondents cannot further initiate any
proceedings under the Act, 1957, for the reason that the
confiscating authority under the Act is the court competent to take
cognizance upon a complaint filed under Section 22 of the Act,
which the State Government does not designate
5. Apparently, during the pendency of the writ petitions, the
vehicles were directed to be released on interim custody by
imposing appropriate conditions; and we are informed that the
vehicles were released to the appellants, accordingly.
6. The paramount contention raised by the appellants is that
the seizure effected under Section 21(4) of the Act, 1957 is on the
basis of the commission or violation of offences under Sections
4(1) and 4(1A) of the Act, 1957. It is submitted that under the
unamended Act, 1957, the punishment prescribed was
imprisonment for two years and fine, and the procedure for the
disposal of the property seized is under Section 21(4A) of the Act,
which stipulates that it can be confiscated by the order of the court
competent to take cognizance of the offence under sub-Section (1)
of the said provision. Therefore, according to the appellants as the
law originally stood, under the provisions of Section 26(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, every Judicial Magistrate of First
Class was competent to take cognizance of the offence on the cases
instituted under the Act, 1957, and there was no confusion as
regarding the procedure under the unamended provisions of the Act
1957.
7. It is further pointed out that the State of Kerala had
notified the officers who are empowered to file a complaint before
the Magistrates under Section 22 of the Act, 1957. The paramount
contention of the appellants is that the Act, 1957 had undergone
an amendment in the year 2015, whereby Sections 30B and 30C
have been incorporated, which provides for the constitution of
Special courts, and that the special courts constituted shall be
presided over by a District and Sessions Judge. The said provision
is incorporated under the Act, 1957 on and with effect from
12.01.2015, which was published in the gazette on 27.03.2015.
8. The grievance is that even though the said provision came
into force with effect from 12.01.2015, the Government of Kerala
has not constituted any special courts in the State of Kerala. The
further contention of the appellants is that insofar as Section 21 of
the Act, 1957 is concerned, there is no amendment to the
provisions regarding the seizure and confiscation; whereas, in sub-
Section (1) of Section 21 of Act, 1957, imposition of punishment
was enhanced from 2 years to 5 years and the fine is enhanced up
to Rs.5,00,000/-.
9. In sum and substance, the contention advanced by the
appellants is that only a special court constituted under Section
30B of the Act, 1957 alone has the power to confiscate and give
interim custody of the vehicle, and in the absence of special courts,
the authorities cannot detain the vehicle as they cannot proceed
further. It is further contended that unlike other special enactments,
both Central and State, the power of confiscation of the properties
under the Act, 1957 is given to the court itself and such confiscation
is depending upon the conclusion in the trial or in other words; a
successful prosecution is sine qua non for confiscation of properties
under the Act, 1957.
10. Therefore, it is contended that when there is no complaint
and when there is no special court to try the offence, and there are
no other authorities or modes prescribed under the Act, 1957 in
regard to the confiscation of the vehicles, the authorities cannot
detain the vehicles. The appellants have also submitted that in all
other special enactments, the prosecution, adjudication and
confiscation of the properties seized are separate, distinct and
parallel, which makes the provisions under the Act, 1957 distinct.
It is further pointed out that when the prosecuting authority and
confiscating authority are one and the same and when a trial is
required before the competent court for ordering confiscation, in
the absence of such a court, no proceeding can be initiated against
any of the properties involved in the offences under the Act, 1957.
Therefore, it is contended that the learned single Judge had gone in
a totally different tangent and has arrived at erroneous conclusions.
11. Above all, it is contended that since Section 30B is
incorporated under the Act, 1957, no other procedure as
contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially
Sections 4 r/w Section 26(b) of the Cr. P. C., can be resorted to, in
view of the legal proposition "generalia specialibus non derogant".
Other contentions are also advanced on the basis of Sections 4 and
26(b) of Cr. P. C.
12. It is further argued that when a statute prescribes that a
particular thing is to be done in a particular manner, it can be done
in that manner alone and in no other manner. In that regard, the
appellants have relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Sing and others [AIR 1964
SC 358], Babu Varghese v. Bar Council of Kerala [(1999) 3 SCC
422], Chandrakishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad & others [(1999)
8 SCC 266] and State of Jarkhand v. Ambay Cements [2005 (1)
SCC 368]. It is also contended that the judgment of the Apex Court
in Pradeed S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka [2021 (14) SCALE
303] relied upon by the learned single Judge has no relevance in
order to sort out the issue raised by the appellants.
13. It is also submitted that the appellants have not
challenged any procedure with respect to the committal to be made
by the Magistrate to a special court. Other contentions are also
raised to substantiate the legal position stated above. The learned
counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P [2000 (1) KLT 609 (SC)]
to assert how cognizance is to be taken by the special court.
Learned counsel has also relied on the decision in India Cement
Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 1990 SC 85], dealing with Cess
on royalty on mineral rights under the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act (67 of 1967) vis-a-vis the State
Legislation; judgment of the Apex Court in Hardeep Singh and
others v. State of Punjab and others [2014 (1) KHC 170], which
considered the power to be exercised by the criminal courts under
Section 319 of the Cr. P. C at the inquiry stage; and a Division
Bench judgment of this court in Abdul Majeed Kallathil v.
District Collector, Malappuram and others [2009 (3) KHC 637
(DB) in regard to the constitutional validity of Section 17 of the Anti
Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 and also the restriction
contained under Section 17; and held to be violative of Articles
19(1)(g), 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
14. The learned Senior Government Pleader, on the other
hand, advanced arguments supporting the findings rendered by the
learned single Judge. It is the basic contention of the State
Government that Section 30B of Act, 1957 grants sufficient leverage
and option to the State Government to go for constitution of special
courts for the speedy trial of offences in contravention of the
provisions of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 of the
Act, 1957, since the expression 'may' is employed in the said
provision.
15. It is also pointed out that if and when the State
Government constitutes special court or special courts for such area
or areas as specified in the notification issued, the special court so
constituted shall have all the powers of a District and Sessions
Court to try the offence under the Act, 1957. It is further pointed
out that since the State has not constituted any special court, the
procedure prescribed under Sections 4 and 26 of Cr.P.C would
apply in the instant case and therefore, there is no confusion at all
with regard to the release of the vehicles and trialability of the
offences under the Act, 1957.
16. It is further submitted that though, as per Section 21 of
the Act, 1957, whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-Section
(1) or sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with
fine which may extend to five lakh rupees per hectare of the area,
by virtue of part II of the First Schedule of Cr. P. C, dealing with
classification of offences, the Judicial First Class Magistrate is vested
with ample powers to try offences punishable upto 7 years of
imprisonment. It is further pointed out that, even though the
Judicial First Class Magistrate is vested with powers to impose
punishment only upto 3 years as per Section 29 (2) of the code, by
virtue of sub-Section (1) of Section 325 of C.R.P.C dealing with the
procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence sufficiently
severe; whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the
evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is
guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind
from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is
empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of the second class, is
of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond
under Section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his
proceedings, and forward the accused to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate to whom he is subordinate, who is vested with powers to
punish as provided under Section 29 of the code.
17. Therefore, it is contended that even if as per the penal
provision of Section 21 of the Act, 1957, the maximum punishment
imposed is 5 years, it is an offence triable by virtue of the powers
conferred under Sections 4(2) and 26(b) of Cr.P.C., and if at all the
Magistrate feels that a severe punishment is to be imposed, the
mechanism provided under Section 325 of Cr.P.C would take care
of every situation so as to cope up with Section 21(1) of the Act,
1957. It is further pointed out by the learned Senior Government
Pleader that since the Central Government has left the liberty to the
State Government to constitute a special court, merely because a
special court is not constituted, that would not take away the
regular procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure
to institute a complaint and prosecute the perpetrators of the crime
under the provisions of the Act, 1957.
18. The learned Senior Government Pleader has also
produced the notification issued by the State Government bearing
No. 6/2019 dated 19.02.2019 authorising the officers for instituting
complaints in various districts in contemplation of the provisions of
the Act, 1957, which is in supersession of the notification issued
under G.O.(P) No. 77/2015/ID dated 05.06.2015, from where it is
clear that certain officers are given power to file complaints in the
entire State of Kerala, district wise, area wise, and all the District
Collectors to deal with any complaints within the 14 districts. So
also, the State Government has issued an order dated 21.06.2017
for compounding offences under the Act 1957, which are made part
of the record.
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants Sri.
Babu S. Nair and the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Tek
Chand appearing for the respondents, and perused the pleadings
and material on record.
20. In order to consider the issues raised by the rival parties,
a reference to some of the provisions of the Act, 1957 and the Code
of Criminal Procedure is required. Section 4 of the Act, 1957 deals
with prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease,
and sub-Section (1) thereto specifies that no person shall undertake
any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area,
except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a
reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting licence or, as the case
may be, of a mining lease, granted under the Act and the rules
made thereunder.
21. Sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 stipulates that no person
shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any
mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act
and the rules made thereunder. Apparently, it is for violation of the
provisions of Sections 4(1) and 4(1A) of the Act, 1957, seizure of
the vehicles of the appellants were effected by the Tahsildar
concerned. Section 21 of the Act, 1957, as it stands after the
amendment, deals with penalties, and sub-Section (1) stipulates
that whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-
section (1A) of section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may
extend to five lakh rupees per hectare of the area.
22. In fact, sub-Section (1) was substituted by Act 10 of
2015 and prior to the amendment, sub-Section (1) specifies that
whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-
section (1A) of Section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend
to twenty-five thousand rupees, or with both.
23. The predominant contention advanced by the appellants
revolves around Sections 30B and 30C of the Act, 1957, and they
read thus:
"30B. Constitution of Special Courts.―(1) The State
Government may, for the purposes of providing speedy trial of
offences for contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) or
sub-section (1A) of section 4, constitute, by notification, as many
Special Courts as may be necessary for such area or areas, as may
be specified in the notification.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of a Judge who shall be appointed
by the State Government with the concurrence of the High Court.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of a
Special Court unless he is or has been a District and Sessions
Judge.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Special Court may
prefer an appeal to the High Court within a period of sixty days
from the date of such order.
30C. Special Courts to have powers of Court of Session.―Save
as otherwise provided in this Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply to the proceedings before the Special
Court and for the purpose of the provisions of this Act, the Special
Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and shall have all
powers of a Court of Session and the person conducting a
prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a
public prosecutor."
24. Therefore, it is argued that since a special court is
envisaged under the Act, 1957, the State Government is duty
bound to constitute a special court or such number of special courts
in contemplation of the provisions of Section 30B in order to deal
with the offences prescribed under the Act, 1957, which alone has
the power to try any offences. It is also pointed out that a person
shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Special
Court, unless he is or has been a District and Sessions Judge.
25. Relying upon the provisions of Section 30B of Act, 1957,
the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the procedure
prescribed under Section 4 r/w 26(b) of the Cr.P.C will not come
into operation. The said contention is raised on the basis that, when
a court is mentioned in a statute, irrespective of whether the
Government constitutes a special court or not, the regular
procedure contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure Code
empowering the Magistrate to entertain a complaint would stand
eliminated. That apart, it is also submitted that from sub-Section 4
of Section 30B of the Act, 1957, it is clear that any person
aggrieved by the order of the Special Court may prefer an appeal to
the High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of such
order and therefore, the State Government has no option than to
constitute a special court.
26. Relying upon Section 30C of Act, 1957, it is stated that
special courts shall have all the powers of a Court of Session and
the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall
be deemed to be a public prosecutor. In order to have a proper
appreciation of Sections 4 and 26 of Cr.P.C, they are extracted
hereunder:
"4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other
laws.--
(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with
according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired
into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same
provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force
regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying
or otherwise dealing with such offences.
26. Courts by which offences are triable.--Subject to the other
provisions of this Code,--
(a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be
tried by
(i) the High Court, or
(ii) the Court of Session, or
(iii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in
the First Schedule to be triable:
[Provided that any [offence under section 376, section 376A, section
376B, section 376C, section 376D, Section 376DA, Section 376DB or
section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)] shall be tried as
far as practicable by a Court presided over by a woman.]
(b) any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is
mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and
when no Court is so mentioned, may be tried by--
(i) the High Court, or
(ii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First
Schedule to be triable:"
27. On a reference to Section 4(1) of the Act, 1973, it is clear
that all offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according
to the provisions contained thereunder. Therefore, sub-Section (1)
makes it clear that it is dealing with offences coming under the
Indian Penal Code.
28. The issue arises under sub-Section 2 of Section 4 of
Cr.P.C., which stipulates that all offences under any other law shall
be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with
according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for
the time being in force regulating the manner of place of
investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences.
29. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention
advanced by the appellants is that by virtue of sub-Section (2) of
Section 4 of Cr.P.C, if any enactment regulates the manner of place
of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences, the said provision would have supersession over Section
4(2) of Cr.P.C.
30. Clause (a) of Section 26 of Cr.P.C enumerates the courts
which are empowered to deal with any offences under the Indian
Penal Code. However, clause (b) of Section 26 stipulates that any
offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in
that behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no Court is
so mentioned, may be tried by (i) the High Court; or (ii) any other
Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be
triable.
31. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed heavy
reliance on the expression 'mentioned' contained in clause (b) of
Section 26 of the Code and contended that since Sections 30B and
30C of the Act, 1957 are provided under the Act, 1957 dealing with
the formation of special courts whereby a court is 'mentioned,' the
procedure prescribed thereunder has to be followed.
32. In sum and substance, the contention advanced is that if
the State Government has not constituted a special court by
appointing a person qualified to be a District and Sessions Court,
the Magistrate is not vested with any powers under the Code of
Criminal Procedure to take cognizance of the offence.
33. In our considered opinion, the word employed in Section
30B is 'may'. However, the contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellants is that the word 'may' employed
thereunder shall be treated as 'shall', since the rest of the
provisions of Sections 30B, and 30C of the Act, 1957 makes it clear
that by employing the word 'shall', Constitution of a special court is
indispensable .
34. It is also pointed out that since the punishment prescribed
under Section 21 of the Act, 1957 is 5 years and a fine of rupees
five lakhs, the Magistrate is not vested with powers to entertain a
complaint as is prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In
that regard, it is relevant to extract Part II of the First Schedule of
the Cr. P. C., dealing with classification of offences against other
laws, and it reads thus:
II.--CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS
Offence Cognizable or non- Bailable or By what
cognizable non-bailable court triable
If punishable with death, Cognizable Non-bailable Court of
imprisonment for life, or Session
imprisonment for more than
7 years
If punishable with Ditto Ditto Magistrate of
imprisonment for 3 years the First
and upwards but not more
than 7 years
Class
If punishable with Non-cognizable Bailable Any
imprisonment for less than Magistrate
3 years or with fine only.
35. Our attention is also drawn to Section 325 of Cr.P.C.,
wherein the procedure is prescribed when the Magistrate cannot
pass sentence sufficiently severe, and it reads thus:
"325. Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence
sufficiently severe.--(1) Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion,
after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused,
that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a
punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that
which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a
Magistrate of the second class, is of opinion that the accused
ought to be required to execute a bond under section 106, he
may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward
the accused, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is
subordinate.
(2) When more accused than one are being tried together, and
the Magistrate considers it necessary to proceed under sub-
section (1), in regard to any of such accused, he shall forward all
the accused, who are in his opinion guilty, to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate.
(3) The Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the proceedings are
submitted may, if he thinks fit, examine the parties and recall and
examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case
and may call for and take any further evidence and shall pass such
judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit, and is
according to law."
36. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention
advanced by the learned Senior Government Pleader is that merely
because a punishment exceeding three years is prescribed under
Section 21 of the Act, 1957, it cannot be said that the offence is
not triable by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.
37. Considering the rival submissions, we are inclined to, first
of all, consider the terminology 'may' used in Section 30A of Act,
1957. The term 'may' gives an implication that the Central
Government, by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act, 1957,
has given sufficient leverage or option to the State Government to
form a special court to try the offences under sub-Section (1) or
Section (1A) of Section 4 of the Act, 1957.
38. It is true, if and when a special court is constituted, a
person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the
Special Court, unless he is or has been a District and Sessions
Judge. It is also equally true that if and when a special court is
constituted and the offence is tried by the special court, the appeal
from the same shall only lies to the High Court. We are of the view
that once a special court is constituted by the State Government, it
has all the powers of a Court of Sessions and the person
conducting a prosecution before the special court shall be deemed
to be a public prosecutor. Therefore, in our opinion, the imperative
phraseology used in sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 30B of the
Act, 1957 is applicable only in the eventuality of the State
Government constituting a special court.
39. The employment of expression 'may' in different
enactments are considered by the Apex Court in various judgments.
Whatever that be, the learned counsel for the appellants have a
contention that whenever there is a special court mentioned under a
statute, it has to be guided by the provisions of the said statute. In
that regard, we have gone through the provisions of the Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, etc.,
wherein the expression employed is 'shall' and therefore, the State
Government has no other choice than to constitute special courts in
terms of the statute.
40. The term 'mention' is defined in the Chambers Concise
Dictionary to mean 'the occurrence or introduction of a name or
reference,-- to notice briefly; to remark; to name etc. In our view,
the word 'mention' employed in the said provision has to be given a
purposive interpretation to mean that 'mentioned specifically and
definitely for the purpose of trying an offence. If such an
interpretation is not adopted by us, the consequence is that no
offence can be tried by the Magistrate, if a special court is not
constituted by the State Government in accordance with Section
30B of the Act, 1957.
41. Even though the learned counsel for the appellants has
submitted that entry 54 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule
of Constitution of India being 'mines and minerals', whenever there
is a conflict, the creation of special courts under the Act, 1957 is a
mandatory requirement, for the reasons assigned above, we do not
think that the contentions so advanced has any force.
42. It is also significant to point out that Section 23A of the
Act, 1957 deals with compounding of offences, which reads thus:
"[23A. Compounding of offences.―(1) Any offence punishable
under this Act or any rule made thereunder may, either before or
after the institution of the prosecution, be compounded by the
person authorised under section 22 to make a complaint to the
court with respect to that offence, on payment to that person, for
credit to the Government, of such sum as that person may specify:
Provided that in the case of an offence punishable with fine
only, no such sum shall exceed the maximum amount of fine which
may be imposed for that offence.
(2) Where an offence is compounded under sub-section (1), no
proceeding or further proceeding, as the case may be, shall be
taken against the offender in respect of the offence so
compounded, and the offender, if in custody, shall be released
forthwith."
43. It is true the power to compound, will not grant any
liberty to the State Government to withhold filing of a complaint or
reporting seizure of the matter before the Magistrate concerned,
since both provisions are independent of each other.
44. The issue with respect to the usage of the term 'may' in
a special enactment was considered by the High Court of Bombay
in Kashinath Shetye v. State, through its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Bombay at Goa, Panaji, Goa and Another [2014
SCC Online Bombay 15] in the realm of the Electricity Act, 2003 and
the rules thereto, and it is held that under Rule 11 constituted
under the Electricity Act, 2003, the jurisdiction of Courts, other than
Special Courts, would not be barred under Section 154(1) of the Act
till the time the Special Court is constituted under that provision.
Therefore, it was held that if in any State, the State Government
has not constituted any Special Court, the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate's Court or the Court of Session would be as per general
law.
45. The contention of the petitioner in that case was that such
offences would have to be tried by the Sessions Court, consequent
upon Section 153(3) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which requires the
Judge who has been only an Additional District and Session Judge to
be appointed as the Judge of the Special Court and under Section
155 of the Electricity Act, 2003, under which the Special Court
would have the power of the Court of Session. After considering the
issues raised in the said writ petition, it was held at paragraph 9
thus:
"9. This would be only after the Special Courts are constituted
and not before. Hence, when the State Government has not
constituted the Special Courts, since the power and the duty of
the State Government is not mandatory as denoted by
expression 'may', under Rule 11 of the Electricity Rules, 2005,
the jurisdiction of the general Courts would not stand barred."
46. A reference to a few of the provisions of the Family Court
Act, 1984 in that regard would be appropriate. Section 3 deals with
'establishment of Family Courts' and sub-Section (1) stipulates that
for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred
on a Family Court by the Act, the State Government, after
consultation with the High Court, and by notification,-- (a) shall, as
soon as may be after the commencement of the Act, established for
every area in the State comprising of city or town whose population
exceeds one million, a Family Court; (b) may establish Family
Courts for such other areas in the State as it may deem necessary.
47. The Apex Court considered the effect of 'may' and 'shall'
in the Family Courts Act in M.P. Gangadharan v. State of Kerala,
(2006) 6 SCC 162, and it is held as follows:
"13. Dr. Dhavan, however, submitted that the emphasis should
be laid on the expression "every area" and not on "town having a
city whose population exceeds one million". We, with respect,
cannot subscribe to the said contention. Clauses (a) and (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act operate in two different
fields. Whereas in the area which would attract clause (a), the
State is bound to establish a Family Court, over areas which are
not covered by clause (a), the State has a discretion to establish
or not to establish a Family Court. In the case of the former, the
State may not have any power to shift the Family Court from the
city or town whose population exceeds one million; but we do
not find any reason why a Family Court established at a place
having jurisdiction over an area including more than one town or
village cannot be shifted from one place to another within that
area."
48. Section 28(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 deals with designation of special courts, which
stipulates that for the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the
State Government shall, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the
High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate for each
district, a Court of Session to be a special court to try the offences
under the Act.
49. Sub-Sections (2) and (3) also empowers the special court
so constituted to try offences other than the offence referred to in
sub-section (1), with which the accused may, under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial.
50. Section 14 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 deals with 'special court
and exclusive special court' and sub-Section (1) thereto stipulates
that for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State
Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the
High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an
Exclusive Special Court for one or more districts.
51. The proviso thereto specifies that in districts where less
number of cases under the Act is recorded, the State Government
shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by
notification in the official gazette, specify for such districts, the
court of session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the
Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 makes it clear that it shall be
the duty of the State Government to establish an adequate number
of courts to ensure that cases under the Act are disposed of within a
period of two months, as far as possible.
52. Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 deals
with the power to appoint special Judges and sub-Section (1)
thereto stipulates that the Central Government or the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, to appoint
as many special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas
or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the
notification to try any offence punishable under the Act etc.
Therein, it can be seen that the Central as well as the State
Governments are given the liberty to constitute special courts and
even though the expression employed is 'may', in the State of
Kerala, special courts are constituted to try the offences.
53. So also, the employment of the word 'may' was
considered by the Apex Court in Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd.
v. Axis Bank Ltd., (2022) 8 SCC 352, wherein it was held as
follows:
"64. Ordinarily the word "may" is directory. The expression "may
admit" confers discretion to admit. In contrast, the use of the
word "shall" postulates a mandatory requirement. The use of the
word "shall" raises a presumption that a provision is imperative.
However, it is well settled that the prima facie presumption
about the provision being imperative may be rebutted by other
considerations such as the scope of the enactment and the
consequences flowing from the construction."
54. In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216
the Apex Court has held thus:
"22. ...
In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost
rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have
to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the
provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the
legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other
rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction
of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intention
is not clear.
..."
55. In B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266,
it was held by the Apex Court thus:
"9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of
interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules
of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation,
etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are
ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would
nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute
are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to
the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide
Swedish Match AB v. SEBI [(2004) 11 SCC 641 : AIR 2004 SC 4219]."
56. In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of
India, (1997) 9 SCC 132, the Apex Court had occasion to consider
the distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the
language couched in the statute under consideration and its object,
purpose and effect, and it is held that the distinction reflected in
the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' depends on conferment of
power. Paragraphs 17, 18 and 26 of the judgment read thus:
"17. The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory
effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the
statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The
distinction reflected in the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' depends
on conferment of power. In the present context, 'may' does not
always mean may. May is a must for enabling compliance of
provision but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as soon
as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it
becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a
duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the
duty. In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.), it is stated that the court
will, as a general rule, presume that the appropriate remedy by
common law or mandamus for action was intended to apply.
General rule of law is that where a general obligation is created by
statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutory
remedy is mandatory. The scope and language of the statute and
consideration of policy at times may, however, create exception
showing that the legislature did not intend a remedy (generality)
to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The language
is the medium of expressing the intention and the object that
particular provision or the Act seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is
necessary to ascertain the intention. The word 'shall' is not always
decisive. Regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and
object of the statutory provision in question in determining
whether the same is mandatory or directory. No universal principle
of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular
provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory.
It is the duty of the court to try to get at the real intention of the
legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or
section or a phrase under consideration. As stated earlier, the
question as to whether the statute is mandatory or directory
depends upon the intent of the legislature and not always upon
the language in which the intent is couched. The meaning and
intention of the legislature would govern design and purpose the
Act seeks to achieve. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, (3rd
Edn.) Vol. 1 at p. 81 in para 316, it is stated that although the
problem of mandatory and directory legislation is a hazard to all
governmental activity, it is peculiarly hazardous to administrative
agencies because the validity of their action depends upon
exercise of authority in accordance with their charter of existence
-- the statute. If the directions of the statute are mandatory, then
strict compliance with the statutory terms is essential to the
validity of administrative action. But if the language of the statute
is directory only, then variation from its direction does not
invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if the statutory
direction is discretionary only, it may not provide an adequate
standard for legislative action and the delegation. In Crawford on
the Construction of Statutes, at p. 516, it is stated that:
"The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory
depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the
language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention
of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained,
not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by
considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which
would follow from construing it the one way or the other....
18. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn. at p.
381, it is stated thus:
"On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate to
the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts
done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience
or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted
with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the
legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as
mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on
whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only.
The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect
the validity of the act done in disregard of them."
"26. Thus, this Court, keeping in view the objects of the Act, had
considered whether the language in a particular section, clause
or sentence is directory or mandatory. The word 'shall', though
prima facie gives impression of being of mandatory character, it
requires to be considered in the light of the intention of the
legislature by carefully attending to the scope of the statute, its
nature and design and the consequences that would flow from
the construction thereof one way or the other. In that behalf,
the court is required to keep in view the impact on the
profession, necessity of its compliance; whether the statute, if
it is avoided, provides for any contingency for non-compliance;
if the word 'shall' is construed as having mandatory character,
the mischief that would ensue by such construction; whether
the public convenience would be subserved or public
inconvenience or the general inconvenience that may ensue if it
is held mandatory and all other relevant circumstances are
required to be taken into consideration in construing whether
the provision would be mandatory or directory. If an object of
the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it
should be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it
mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to
innocent persons of general public without much furthering the
object of enactment, the same should be construed as directory
but all the same, it would not mean that the language used
would be ignored altogether. Effect must be given to all the
provisions harmoniously to suppress public mischief and to
promote public justice."
57. In State of U.P and Ors. s v. Babu Ram Upadhya [AIR
1961 SC 751], it was held as follows:
"29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated
thus: When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is
mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the
legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the
statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the
Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the
design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other
provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions
in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute
provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the
provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial
consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the
object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered."
58. In Sarla Goel v. Kishan Chand, [(2009) 7 SCC 658], the
Apex Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, has held that it is well settled that where the
word "may" shall be used as "shall", would depend upon the
intention of the legislature.
59. In State (Delhi Admn.) v. I.K. Nangia, [(1980) 1 SCC
258], it was held that normally, the word "may" implies what is
optional, but for the reasons stated, it should in the context in
which it appears, mean "must", and that then, there is an element
of compulsion and it is a power coupled with a duty.
60. In Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, (1973) 3 SCC
889, the Apex Court had occasion to consider how to deal a
provision in a statute or a rule and to identify as to whether it is
mandatory or directory, and it is held thus:
"13. Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for
determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule
is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this
matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and
consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the
relation of that provision to the general object intended to be
secured.
..."
61. In Presidential Poll, In re, (1974) 2 SCC 33, it is held
as follows:
"13. In determining the question whether a provision is
mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the
provision, the relation of that provision to the general object
intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is
directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the Courts to get at the real
intention of the legislature by carefully attending the whole scope of
the provision to be construed. "The key to the opening of every law is
the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the
intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a
whole [Brett v. Brett, (1826) 3 Addam 210, 216]."
62. Therefore, on a consideration of the facts and
circumstances and the law discussed above, we are of the
undoubted opinion that the State Government is given the liberty
under the Act, 1957 to decide whether to constitute a special court
to try the offences under the said Act. This we say because, what is
essential, significant, and relevant is the prosecution of the
perpetrators of the crime under the provisions of the Act, 1957.
63. The Act, 1957 is constituted for the development and
regulation of mines and minerals under the control of the Union
Government and therefore, what is relevant is the action to be
taken against the person who violates the provisions of the Act,
1957. Therefore, irrespective of whether the State constitutes a
special court for the purpose or not, the State Government has to
ensure that the culprits under the Act, 1957 are dealt with under
the penal provisions of the Act, 1957 appropriately. An accused in a
crime has no right to say that he shall be tried before a special
court, when the law does not prescribe so.
64. It can be seen that by virtue of Section 4 r/w Section 26
of Cr.P.C., offences under other statutes, other than Indian Penal
Code, can be proceeded with, if no special courts are constituted as
per the provisions of any particular statute. To say otherwise,
under the statute, a court should be designated for the purpose of
one which shall be constituted as per the mandate of the
enactment. In this case, both are lacking, thus, enabling the State
to seek the regular remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
65. This will have to be read along with the finding rendered
by us in respect of Section 30B of the Act, 1957 and we are of the
view that since the word 'may' is employed in Section 30B of Act,
1957, the State Government is not compelled to constitute a special
court. If the State Government has not constituted any special
court as is desired by the Act, 1957, then there can be no doubt
that it has all the trappings of the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, especially when as per Part II of Schedule I of Cr.P.C,
the Judicial Magistrate of First Class is vested with powers to try any
offence exceeding three years and upto seven years, with a power
to refer the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate by virtue of the
powers conferred under Section 325 of Cr.P.C., to impose with more
severe punishment than the power for punishment prescribed for
the Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
66. It is true, as per Section 22 of the Act, 1957, cognizance
of offences can be taken by a court under the Act or any rules made
thereunder, except upon complaint in writing made by a person
authorised in that behalf by the Central Government or the State
Government.
67. The appellants have a contention that the seizure of the
vehicle is not reported by the officers competent to take action
under the Act, 1957 before the court concerned and therefore, the
aggrieved persons are unable to seek for any orders for the release
of the properties seized. However, Chapter XXXIV of Cr.P.C deals
with disposal of property and Section 451(1) therein clearly
stipulates that when any property is produced before any Criminal
Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as
it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the
conclusion of the inquiry or trial. Likewise, Section 457 Cr.P.C.,
which deals with the procedure by police upon seizure of property,
reads thus:
"457. Procedure by police upon seizure of property.--(1)
Whenever the seizure of property by any police
officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this
Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal
Court during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such
order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property
or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the
possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained,
respecting the custody and production of such property.
(2) the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate may order
the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any)
as the Magistrate thinks fit and if such person is unknown, the
Magistrate may detain it and shall, in such case, issue a
proclamation specifying the articles of which such property
consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim
thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within six
months from the date of such proclamation.'
Therefore, no manner of prejudice is caused to the aggrieved
persons to file suitable applications before the Magistrate concerned
seeking interim custody of any property.
68. Even though the learned counsel for the appellants has
relied upon various judgments referred to above, we are of the
considered opinion that the proposition of law laid down in those
cases may not apply to the facts of instant cases, especially to
decide the question raised by the appellants.
69. Considering the facts and the law as above, we have no
doubt in our mind to hold that the appellants have not made out
any case to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge,
there being no jurisdictional error or other legal infirmities justifying
our interference in an intra court appeal, though for our own
reasons.
Needless to say, writ appeals fail, and accordingly, they are
dismissed.
S. MANIKUMAR,
CHIEF JUSTICE.
SHAJI P. CHALY,
JUDGE.
Rv
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