Kerala High Court
P.Radhakrishnan vs State Of Kerala on 16 April, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.G.ARUN
FRIDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF APRIL 2021 / 26TH CHAITHRA, 1943
WP(C).No.7641 OF 2021(E)
PETITIONER/S:
P.RADHAKRISHNAN
AGED 51 YEARS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR,ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, KOCHI ZONAL
OFFICE, AK SESHADRI ROAD, COCHIN 682 011
BY ADVS.
SRI.M.T.SURESHKUMAR
SRI.R.RENJITH
SMT.SREELAKSHMI SABU
SHRI.RAFEEZ NOOH
TUSHAR MEHTA (SR.)
S.V.RAJU (SR.)
ZOHEB HOSSAIN (SR.)
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REP.BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HOME,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PIN 695
001.
2 DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, VELLAYAMBALAM, CITY
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PIN 695 010.
3 JEEJI N.
DY. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, ADMN AND SHO, CRIME
BRANCH POLICE STATION, CRIME BRANCH HEAD
HEADQUARTERS, VELLAYAMBALAM, CITY THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
PIN 695 010
4 DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
KOCHI ZONAL OFFICE, AK SESHADRI ROAD, COCHIN-682 011
REP.BY DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTORATE 6TH FLOOR, LN BHAVAN, KHAN MARKET, NEW
DELHI 110 003
5 CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
REP.BY ITS DIRECTOR, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD NEW
DELHI 110 003
WP(C).7641 & 8920/21 2
R1-2 BY SRI.SUMAN CHAKRAVARTHY, SENIOR GOVT.PLEADER
R1-2 BY SRI.V.MANU, SENIOR GOVT. PLEADER
R1-2 BY SRI.P.NARAYANAN, SENIOR GOVT. PLEADER
R4 BY ADV. T.A.UNNIKRISHNAN, CGC
R4-5 BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA FOR
CBI, REPRESENTED BY ADV.SRI.SUVIN R.MENON
R4 BY ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL. K.M.NATARAJ
OTHER PRESENT:
ADV. TUSHAR MEHTA SGI AND ADV.S.V.RAJU(SR) ASST.SGI
FOR THE PETNRS;ADV. HARIN P.RAVAL WITH SR.GP.SUMAN
CHAKRAVARTHY
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 09-
04-2021, ALONG WITH WP(C).8920/2021(L), THE COURT ON 16-04-2021
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).7641 & 8920/21 3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.G.ARUN
FRIDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF APRIL 2021 / 26TH CHAITHRA, 1943
WP(C).No.8920 OF 2021(L)
PETITIONER/S:
MR.P.RADHAKRISHNAN
AGED 51 YEARS
S/O.PAUL RAJ, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTORATE, KOCHI ZONAL OFFICE, AK SESHADRI ROAD,
COCHIN-682011, RESIDING AT 4L, DD NEST,
KATHRIKKADAVU, KALOOR P.O., COCHIN-17.
BY ADVS.
SRI.M.T.SURESHKUMAR
SRI.R.RENJITH
SMT.SMITHA PHILIPOSE
SMT.SREELAKSHMI SABU
SHRI.RAFEEZ NOOH
TUSHAR MEHTA (SR)
S.V.RAJU (SR)
ZOHEB HOSSAIN (SR)
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOME, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN-695001.
2 DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, VELLAYAMBALAM, CITY-
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PINCODE-695010.
3 DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES,
PRISONS HEAD QUARTERS, POOJAPPURA,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN-695012.
4 ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE,
CRIME BRANCH, STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
VELLAYAMBALAM, CITY-THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PINCODE-
695010.
WP(C).7641 & 8920/21 4
5 DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
CRIME BRANCH, CIVIL STATION WARD, ALAPPUZHA
DISTRICT, PIN-688001.
6 DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
KOCHI ZONAL OFFICE, AK SESHADRI ROAD, COCHIN-
682011, REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE 6TH FLOOR, LN BHAVAN, KHAN
MARKET, NEW DELHI-110003.
7 CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI
ROAD, NEW DELHI-110003.
8 R.SUNIL KUMAR,
ADVOCATE, A2 FLAT, CRYSTAL VALLEY, KOLLAKKUDIMUGAL,
THRIKKAKKARA, P.O., ERNAKULAM, KERALA, PIN-682021.
R4 BY SRI.SUMAN CHAKRAVARTHY, SENIOR GOVT.PLEADER
R6 BY ADV. T.A.UNNIKRISHNAN, CGC
R6 BY ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL. K.M.NATARAJ
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 09-
04-2021, ALONG WITH WP(C).7641/2021(E), THE COURT ON 16-04-2021
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).7641 & 8920/21 5
'C.R'
V.G.ARUN, J.
-----------------------------------------------
W.P(C).Nos. 7641 and 8920 of 2021
-----------------------------------------------
Dated this the 16th day of April, 2021
JUDGMENT
W.P(C).No.7641 of 2021
The instant writ petition is filed by the Deputy Director,
Enforcement Directorate, Kochi Zonal Office, aggrieved by the
registration of Exhibit P1 FIR by the Crime Branch wing of the State
Police. The essential facts leading to the writ petition, are as under:
On 06.07.2020, O.R.No.7 of 2020 was registered at the Customs
Commissionerate (Preventive), Kochi, consequent to seizure of 30 Kgs
of gold worth Rs.14.82 Crores at the Thiruvananthapuram International
Airport. The seizure was effected while the gold was being smuggled,
camouflaging it as diplomatic baggage to the UAE Consulate. During
the course of investigation it was revealed that the accused had
committed offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (UAPA) also. This resulted in the National Investigation Agency
(NIA) registering a case against the very same accused, alleging
commission of offences under Sections 17 and 18 of the UAPA. As the
investigation progressed further, commission of the offence punishable
under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
(PMLA) also came to light. Thereupon, ECIR/KCZO0/31/2020 was
registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) on 13.07.2020
arraigning three persons as accused, one Smt. Swapna Suresh being
the second accused and Sri. Sandeep Nair, the fourth accused. After
registration of the case, the ED filed Exhibit P5 complaint before the
Special Court for PMLA cases (Principal Sessions Court, Ernakulam.
Later, two more persons were arraigned as accused, the fifth accused
being the then Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister of Kerala. On
the request of the Investigating Officer, custody of the second accused
was given to the ED for seven days from 05.08.2020. The custody
period was extended up to 14.08.2020 and thereafter, till 17.08.2020.
During this period the accused were questioned and their statements
under Section 50 of the PMLA recorded.
2. On 18.11.2020, an audio clip, purported to be that of Smt.
Swapna Suresh, was aired by an online media channel, wherein she
alleged that the ED officials had made her sign the Section 50
statements without allowing her to read its contents and that, she had
been compelled by the officials to implicate the Chief Minister of the
State. On 20.11.2020, the Deputy Director of ED sent the Exhibit R1(a)
letter to the Director General of Prisons and Correctional Services,
requesting for a detailed enquiry about the circumstances under which
the alleged audio recording took place and to take appropriate action
against the culprits. The Director General of Prisons forwarded the
letter to the State Police Chief, who in turn directed a special
investigation team to be constituted for conducting preliminary
enquiry. During the course of such enquiry, two Women Police
Constables, who had been assigned protection duty of Smt. Swapna
Suresh, while she was questioned by the ED officials, stated that, on
12.8.2020 and 13.8.2020, they had overheard the ED officials coercing
and cajoling the accused to give statements implicating the Chief
Minister and others. The allegation being serious, legal opinion was
obtained and Exhibit P1 FIR registered against the ED officials for
offences under Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.
3. The challenge against registration of the FIR and legality of the
Crime Branch investigation is led by Sri.Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor
General of India, supported by Sri. S.V.Raju and Sri.K.M.Nataraj,
learned Additional Solicitors General appearing for the Enforcement
Directorate and Central Bureau of Investigation. Sri. Harin P. Raval,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Kerala countered
their contentions and justified the action of the Crime Branch.
4. According to the learned Solicitor General, registration of the
crime by the Crime Branch wing of the State Police, against the officers
of a Central Agency alleging flaws and excesses during their
investigation, militates against the very concept of cooperative
federalism enshrined in the Constitution. Further, such action, if
permitted, will impair the conduct of free, fair and impartial
investigation by the Central Agencies. It is contended that the Special
Court having taken cognizance of the offences, based on the complaint
filed by the ED, only the Special Court alone empowered to consider
the complaint of the accused and that, parallel investigation by the
Crime Branch would impinge the credibility of the investigation so far
conducted by the ED and would result in an incredulous situation of a
Magistrate deciding upon the authenticity and genuineness of the
statements given by the accused, in a case under consideration before
a Sessions Judge (Special Judge). It is contended that the allegations
based on which the crime is registered, even if accepted in their
entirety, do not make out any cognizable offence. That, in view of the
bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C, the very registration of the
crime is illegal. Attention is drawn to the decision in Patel Laljibhai
Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, [(1971) 2 SCC 376], wherein the
Honourable Supreme Court has exposited on the purpose behind the
enactment of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.
5. Sri.S.V.Raju contended that abetment of an offence punishable
with imprisonment under Section 116 of the IPC would apply only on
the ingredients of Section 107 being satisfied, which, as far as the
instant case is concerned, are completely absent. It is contended that,
in order to attract Section 167 of the IPC, a public servant charged with
the preparation or translation of any document or electronic record
should have framed, prepared or translated that document or
electronic document in a manner which he knows or believes to be
incorrect. Further, such framing, preparation or translation should be
with intention to cause or knowing that his action is likely to cause
injury to any person. That, in the absence of any allegation of the ED
officials having framed or prepared any document or electronic
document, the offence under Section 167 of the IPC is not attracted. It
is contended that none of the ingredients necessary to constitute the
offence of fabricating false evidence under Section 192 of the IPC are
made out and even in cases where the ingredients are made out, the
prohibition under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C would apply. As regards the
offence under Section 195A of the IPC, it is contended that only a
witness or any other person can file a complaint in relation to the
offence and the words "any other person" should be read ejusdem
generis. Hence, a person totally unconnected to the witness and the
case cannot file the complaint. Reference is made to the statement of
the second accused dated 13.08.2020 wherein, to a query as to
whether the Chief Minister of Kerala or his wife had called her
personally and whether they were close to her, the second accused
had answered that they were neither close to her nor had they called
her personally and that all her conversations with the Chief Minister
had been for official purposes only. It is contended that if the intention
of the investigating officer was to implicate the Chief Minister, that
answer would not have been recorded. According to the learned
Counsel, falsity of the allegations is evident from the fact that, in spite
of the repeated opportunities available to appraise the jurisdictional
court of the attempt to coerce her, the second accused had never
raised such a complaint. Reference is made to Exhibits P15 and P16
remand orders dated 11.08.2020 and 14.08.2020, wherein the Special
Judge, after interacting with accused Nos.1, 2 and 4, had observed that
the accused appeared to be in sound health and mind and had no
complaints. Particular emphasis is laid on paragraph 7 of Exhibit P17
order, wherein the learned counsel for Smt. Swapna Suresh had
alleged that his client was tortured during questioning by the
Enforcement Officials, without the presence of a woman officer. It is
hence contended that the unbelievable narrative about the presence
of women civil police officers while Smt. Swapna Suresh was
questioned by ED officials, is nothing but a cooked up story.
6. Sri. K.M.Nataraj focused on the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i)
of the Cr.P.C and contended that the very purpose of that provision is
to prevent instances like the one under consideration. That, the
alleged act of coercing the third accused to name innocent persons as
her accomplices being in relation to a proceeding pending before the
Special Court, registration of the crime and investigation into such
allegation is barred. The distinction between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and
195(1)(b)(ii) is pointed out by emphasising on the import of the words
"in relation to any proceeding in any court" in the former, as against
the words "in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in
a proceeding in any court" in the latter. It is contended that the former
expression is of much wider amplitude than the latter, as held in
Bhima Razu Prasad v. State [2021 SCC OnLine 210]. It is argued
that the offence under Section 195A of the IPC would be attracted only
if a person is threatened to give false evidence in court and not
otherwise. In support of the proposition, attention is drawn to the latter
part of Section 195A, dealing with the conviction of an innocent person
in consequence of "such false evidence" and the definition of the word
'evidence' under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.
7. Sri.Harin P. Raval countered the arguments and questioned the
maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of an officer of the
ED, without even mentioning whether the petition is filed in his
individual capacity or as per the decision of the ED. Learned Senior
Counsel took strong exception to the production of documents
pertaining to the ongoing ED investigation along with the writ petition
and later as additional documents. It is contended that the documents
are produced without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Rule
147 of the High Court Rules and moreover, they have nothing to do
with the issue raised in the writ petition. The purpose behind
production of documents, it is submitted, is more to tarnish the name
of certain highly placed personalities in the State Government, rather
than substantiating the contentions in the writ petition. According to
the learned Senior Counsel, the attempt of the learned Solicitor
General and other counsel is to divert the attention of the Court from
the cardinal issue, by raising a rhetorical contention that investigation
by the Crime Branch would impinge the investigation of the ED case
and the authenticity of the statements recorded under Section 50 of
the PMLA. It is contended that the court should see through the smoke
screen attempted to be created and address the real issue involved.
The real issue being the authority, or rather the duty, of the Police to
register a crime when commission of cognizable offences are brought
to its notice. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the
decision of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir
Ahmad [AIR 1945 PC 18] and of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan
Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra [(1967) 3 SCR 668], State of
Bihar and Another v. J.A.C.Saldanha and Others [(1980) 1 SCC
554] and the Constitutional Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v.
Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others [(2014) 2 SCC 1]. It is
contended that the bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C is only against
taking cognizance and does not interdict investigation by the Police.
Support for this argument is garnered from the decisions in State of
Punjab v. Raj Singh and Another [(1998) 2 SCC 391],
M.Narayandas v. State of Karnataka and Others [(2003) 11 SCC
251], Shafi @ Kozhi Shafi v. Abdul Salam and Others [2017 (4)
KHC 929] and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal
and Another [(1973) 3 SCC 753]. It is submitted that the attempt of
the petitioner is to somehow thwart the investigation and prevent the
truth from coming out, which is evident from the undue haste with
which the writ petition has been filed. That, the petitioner and other
officials of the ED had compelled and coerced the accused to give
statements implicating highly placed personalities in the State
Government, which is a heinous offence that needs to be unearthed
and the culprits brought to book. It is also contended the the
statements of the accused, recorded while they were in ED custody,
cannot be termed as statements under Section 50(3) of PMLA. The
circumspection required while exercising the inherent power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C and the well settled position of the High Court
being not expected to sift the evidence for deciding factual issues
involved, while exercising such power, is reiterated with the aid of
authorities.
W.P(C).No.8920 of 2021
8. The challenge in this writ petition is against the registration of
Crime No.98/CD/ALP/D/2021 at the Crime Branch Police Station,
Ernakulam, vide Exhibit P1 FIR dated 27.03.2021. The short facts,
leading to the registration of the crime are as under:
Sri.Sandeep Nair, presently the fourth accused in
ECIR/ACZO/31/2020 registered by the Enforcement Directorate, had
sent Exhibit P2 letter dated 05.03.2021 to the Special Judge, alleging
that he was compelled by the petitioner to name the Chief Minister
and certain others as accomplices to the crime. News about the letter
published in the visual media was noticed by Advocate R.Sunil Kumar,
a practising lawyer. Being of opinion that the deliberate attempt to
drag the State's Chief Minister and others into the crime should be
investigated, Advocate Sunil Kumar sent a complaint to the Additional
Director General of Police (Crime Branch). Thereupon, Exhibit P1 FIR
(Crime No. 98 of 2021) was registered for offences under Sections 116,
167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC. During the course of investigation of
the crime, the Crime Branch sought permission to question and record
the statement of Sri. Sandeep Nair from the Central Prison,
Thiruvananthapuram and the request was allowed by the Special Court
as per Exhibit P3 order. The challenge in this writ petition is against
Exhibit P1 FIR and Exhibit P3 order and is founded on the same
grounds as in W.P(C).No.7641 of 2021. The additional ground of
challenge is that registration of a second crime, based on the very
same allegations as in the first crime, is barred. In support of this
challenge, reference is made to the statement in the first crime (Crime
No. 94 of 2021), of another accused in the case, Sri.Sandeep Nair,
having also written a similar complaint to the District and Sessions
Judge, Ernakulam alleging threat and coercion to give false evidence
against the Chief Minister and that the entire matter require an in-
depth investigation by registering an FIR. Countering the challenge,
learned counsel for the respondent State highlighted the marked
differences between the incidents and the allegations in the two
crimes, which, according to the learned counsel, can, by any stretch of
imagination, be treated to be the same or even similar. Elaborate legal
contentions are put forth by both sides, relying on the decisions of the
Apex Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration)
[(1979) 2 SCC 322], State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha
and Others [(1982) 1 SCC 561], T.T.Antony v. State of Kerala and
Others [(2001) 6 SCC 181], Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and
Others [(2004) 13 SCC 292], etc.
9. The legal issues arising for consideration in both writ petitions,
except the challenge on the ground that Exhibit P1 in W.P(C).8920 of
2021 is the second FIR, being common, both writ petitions are being
considered together.
10. The challenge against maintainability of the writ petition on
the premise that the petitioner has filed the case in his individual
capacity cannot hold good. Undoubtedly, the writ petition is filed by
the petitioner in his capacity as the Investigating Officer in
ECIR/ACZO/31/2020. The fact that, the writ petition is filed with official
sanction is evident from the appearance of the learned Solicitor
General. At the same time, I find substance in the objection raised by
the Sri. Raval against the manner in which the documents pertaining
to the ED case is produced and persons, who are not made parties,
named in the writ petition. The explanation offered for production of
the documents is that they form part of Exhibit P5 complaint. If that be
so, the petitioner ought to have produced the entire set of documents
appended to Exhibit P5 complaint, rather than producing the
documents of his choice. Even though the petitioner's action is liable
to be deprecated, that does not warrant dismissal of the writ petition.
11. Moving on to the merits of the contentions urged, the first
and foremost is the contention based on the prohibition under Section
195 of the Cr.P.C. Needless to say that the finding on that contention
will have an impact on the other legal points. Indisputably, the crimes
are registered for offences punishable under Sections 116, 120B, 167,
192, 193 and 195A of the IPC of which, Section 193 is an offence
falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. In order to
understand the scope and ambit of Section 195 of Cr.P.C, it is
necessary to analyse and understand the provision.
"195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority
of public servants, for offences against public justice
and for offences relating to documents given in
evidence.--
(1) No Court shall take cognizance--
(a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188
(both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or
(ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such
offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence,
except on the complaint in writing of the public servant
concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate;
(b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following
sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely,
Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211
(both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to
have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding
in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable
under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the
said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been
committed in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to
commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-
clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),
except on the complaint in writing of that Court 115[or by such
officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in
this behalf], or of some other Court to which that Court is
subordinate.
(2) Where a complaint has been made by a public
servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to
which he is administratively subordinate may order the
withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to
the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further
proceedings shall be taken on the complaint:
Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in
the Court of first instance has been concluded.
(3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court"
means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a
tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State
Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of
this section.
(4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a
Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which
appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences
of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose
decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having
ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction
such Civil Court is situate:
Provided that--
(a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the
Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court
to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate;
(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue
Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to
the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the
case or proceeding in connection with which the offence
is alleged to have been committed."
12. The purpose of enacting Section 195 (Criminal Procedure
Code 1898, which is in pari materia with Section 195 of the 1973 Code)
was considered by the Apex Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v.
State of Gujarat, [(1971) 2 SCC 376]. The relevant portion of the
said judgment reads as under:
"The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195(1)(b)
and (c) and Section 476, seems to be to control the
temptation on the part of the private parties considering
themselves aggrieved by the offences mentioned in those
sections to start criminal prosecutions on frivolous, vexatious
or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to
harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been
selected for the court's control because of their direct impact
on the judicial process. It is the judicial process, in other
words the administration of public justice, which is the direct
and immediate object or victim of those offence and it is only
by misleading the courts and thereby perverting the due
course of law and justice that the ultimate object of harming
the private party is designed to be realised. As the purity of
the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime,
the Court is considered to be the only party entitled to
consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty
party. The private party designed ultimately to be injured
through the offence against the administration of public
justice is undoubtedly entitled to move the court for
persuading it to file the complaint. But such party is deprived
of the general right recognized by Section 190 CrPC, of the
aggrieved parties directly initiating the criminal proceedings.
The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of
the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to
complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be
only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in
that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close
nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can,
without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh
inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its
records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It,
therefore, appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the
strict construction of confining the prohibition contained in
Section 196(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences
specified therein were committed by a party to the
proceeding in the character as such party."
The reason behind bringing certain specified offences under the
purview of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C is because the commission of
those offences have direct impact on an ongoing judicial proceeding
and thereby, on the administration of justice. Section 193 of the IPC
being one such offence, the prohibition under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C
will apply.
13. The next question is whether the prohibition under Section
195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C is from taking cognizance only or whether the
Police is interdicted from conducting investigation of the offences
enumerated in the section. Senior Counsel Shri.Harin P. Rawal argued
with the aid of precedents that Section 195(1)(b) does not prohibit
registration of crimes and investigation by the police. This argument is
countered by Senior Counsel Sri. K.M. Nataraj, by drawing a distinction
between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii). It is contended that all
the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(i) are non-cognizable and
hence the Police cannot register crime without following the procedure
under Section 155 of the Cr.P.C and that the provision considered in
the decisions cited by Mr.Raval was Section 195(1)(b)(ii), wherein the
offences are cognisable. In order to address the contention, it is
necessary to consider the cited decisions.
14. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC
753, the offences were under Sections 463, 471, 475, 476 of the IPC
and hence the Apex Court held that police authorities have a statutory
right under Sections 154 and 156 of the Code to investigate into a
cognizable offence, without requiring any sanction from a judicial
authority and even the High Court has no inherent power under
Section 561-A of the Code (Section 482 of the new Code) to interfere
with the exercise of that statutory power.
15. In State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391], the
appeal had arisen from the order by which the High Court had quashed
an FIR, registered during the course of a civil suit, alleging commission
of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC. The FIR
was quashed on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.PC
prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the offences by the
police. While interfering with that judgment the Honourable Supreme
Court held that from a plain reading of Section 195 Cr.PC, it is manifest
that the prohibition comes into operation only at the stage when the
court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)
Cr.PC, and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to
investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, even if
the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in court. The Apex Court further held that the statutory
power of the police to investigate under the Code is in no way
controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 of the Cr.PC. That, upon the
charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation
into such an offence the court would not be competent to take
cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) of the
Cr.PC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for
the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private
party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it
forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in
Section 340 of the Cr.PC.
16. The distinction between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1(b)(ii)
has been succinctly laid down in Narendra Kumar Srivastava v.
State of Bihar, [(2019) 3 SCC 318] in the following words;
"13. It is clear from sub-section (1)(b) of Section 195
CrPC that the section deals with two separate set of offences:
(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 193 to 196
(both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228
IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in,
or in relation to, any proceeding in any court; [Section 195(1)
(b)(i)]
(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or
punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC,
when such offence is alleged to have been committed in
respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court. [Section 195(1)(b)(ii)].
14. On the reading of these sections, it can be easily
seen that the offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section
195(1)(b)(ii) are clearly distinct. The first category of offences
refers to offences of false evidence and offences against
public justice, whereas, the second category of offences
relates to offences in respect of a document produced or given
in evidence in a proceeding in any court.
xx xx xx
21. As already mentioned, clauses under Section 195(1)
(b) CrPC i.e. sub-section 195(1)(b)(i) and sub-section 195(1)(b)
(ii) cater to separate offences. Though Section 340 CrPC is a
generic section for offences committed under Section 195(1)
(b), the same has different and exclusive application to
clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC.
xx xx xx
23. In Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State
of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] , this Court
had dealt with Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC unlike the present
case which is covered by the preceding clause of the section.
The category of offences which fall under Section 195(1)(b)(i)
CrPC refer to the offence of giving false evidence and offences
against public justice which is distinctly different from those
offences under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, where a dispute
could arise whether the offence of forging a document was
committed outside the court or when it was in the custody of
the court. Hence, this decision has no application to the facts of
the present case.
24. The case in hand squarely falls within the category of
cases falling under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC as the offence is
punishable under Section 193 IPC. Therefore, the Magistrate
has erred in taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of a
private complaint. The High Court, in our view, has rightly set
aside the order of the Magistrate. However, having regard to
the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it proper to
set aside the costs imposed by the High Court."
17. The Honourable Supreme Court had occasion to consider this
question in Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd and Anr v Prasad
Vasudev Keni etc. [2020 SCC OnLine SC 707], the relevant portion of
which is extracted hereunder;
"19. At this stage, it is important to understand the
difference between the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)
(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. Where the facts
mentioned in a complaint attracts the provisions of Section 191
to 193 of the IPC, Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC applies. What
is important is that once these sections of the IPC are
attracted, the offence should be alleged to have been
committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court.
Thus, what is clear is that the offence punishable under these
sections does not have to be committed only in any proceeding
in any Court but can also be an offence alleged to have been
committed in relation to any proceeding in any Court.
xx xx xx
22. Contrasted with Section 195(1)(b)(i), Section 195(1)
(b)(ii) of the CrPC speaks of offences described in Section 463,
and punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 of the IPC,
when such offences are alleged to have been committed in
respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any Court. What is conspicuous by its absence in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are the words "or in relation to", making it
clear that if the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are
attracted, then the offence alleged to have been committed
must be committed in respect of a document that is custodia
legis, and not an offence that may have occurred prior to the
document being introduced in court proceedings. Indeed, it is
this distinction that is vital in understanding the sheet anchor
of the Appellant's case namely, this Court's judgment in Iqbal
Singh Marwah (supra).
xx xx xx
33. The aforesaid judgments clearly lay down that when
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC is attracted, the ratio of Iqbal
Singh Marwah (supra), which approved Sachida Nand Singh v.
State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493, is not attracted, and that
therefore, if false evidence is created outside the Court
premises attracting Sections 191/192 of the IPC, the aforesaid
ratio would not apply so as to validate a private complaint filed
for offences made out under these sections."
18. Recently, in Bhima Razu Prasad v. State [2021 SCC OnLine
210], the Apex Court had occasion to consider the import of the words
"in relation to" in Section 195(1)(b)(i). Paragraph 51 therein, which is
contextually relevant, reads as under:
"51. The purpose of Explanation 2 to Section 193, IPC is
evidently to ensure that a person who fabricates false
evidence before an investigating or inquiring authority prior to
the trial of the case does not escape penalty. This
encompasses all nature of proceedings, whether civil or
criminal. However, whether the commission of such offence
would require the complaint of a Court under Section 195(1)(b)
(i) would depend upon the authority before whom such false
evidence is given. For example, if a person gives false
evidence in an inquiry before the Magistrate under Section
200, CrPC, that would undoubtedly be an offence committed
before a Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. However, this
would not be the case where false evidence is led before an
investigating officer prior to the Court having taken
cognizance of the offence or the case being committed for
trial."
19. It may be pertinent to note that as far as the instant cases
are concerned, the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offences
under the PMLA on 12.10.2020. As such, recording of the accused's
statements would undoubtedly fall within the import of the words "in
relation to any proceeding in any court" mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)
(i).
20. The next question to be considered is whether the prohibition
under Section 195(1)(b)(i) could be made applicable to all the offences
or should be confined to the offences enumerated therein. The
purpose behind the enactment of Section 195 being to ensure that the
proceedings of the court are not sullied, nor the administration of
justice not meddled with, if the other offences are interwoven and
inseparable from the offences within ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(i),
necessarily, the prohibition will have to be extended to the other
offences also. This question was considered in Bandekar Brothers'
case (supra) and answered at paragraph 44 of the judgment, as
under:
"44. Equally important to remember is that if in the
course of the same transaction two separate offences are
made out, for one of which Section 195 of the CrPC is not
attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of
Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.PC must be followed."
Basir-ul-Huq v. State of W.B. [AIR 1953 SC 293] is yet another
precedent which had considered the question of distinct offences
disclosed by the same facts being clubbed along with offences falling
within the ambit of Section 195. After holding that the bar would not
apply to distinct offences, the Apex Court clarified the position as
under;
"14. Though, in our judgment, Section 195 does not bar
the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence
disclosed by the same facts and which is not included
within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne
in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be
evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test
whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether
the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for
which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is
required. In other words, the provisions of the section
cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person
with an offence to which that section does not apply and
then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon
the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of
the same character, or by describing the offence as
being one punishable under some other section of the
Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the
offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in
Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by
changing the garb or label of an offence which is
essentially an offence covered by the provisions of
Section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be
taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a
wrong label on it."
21. The above discussion leads to the only possible conclusion of
the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C being applicable to the
offences mentioned in the two FIRs, the allegations being to the effect
that attempts were made to fabricate false evidence and to coerce and
threaten the accused to give false statements. It may be pertinent to
note that, if such attempts had fructified, it would have definitely
sullied the proceedings of the court and impacted administration of
justice. Therefore, even though the other offences alleged are under
Section 167 and 195A of IPC, they are undoubtedly interwoven with
and inseparable from the offence under Section 193 and therefore
susceptible to the prohibition under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.PC.
Adopting the same reasoning, it has to be held that the offence under
Section 193 IPC being a non-cognisable offence, the Crime Branch
could not have registered the crimes without following the procedure
under Section 155(1) Cr.P.C, despite the deeming clause under Section
155(4). Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved persons was to approach
the Special Court. Having held so, it will be apposite to have a look at
Section 340 of Cr.PC.
"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section
195.--(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf
or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the
interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any
offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section
195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation
to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in
respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such
preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,--
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having
jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the
accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is
non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send
the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence
before such Magistrate."
22. From a reading of the Section it is evident that any aggrieved
person can alert the court about commission of a crime committed
with intent to mislead the court or to scuttle the proceedings pending
before it and that, even in the absence of any complaint, the court is
at liberty to take action, on receiving information regarding
commission of offences enumerated under Section 195(1)(b). In N.
Natarajan v. B.K. Subba Rao [(2003) 2 SCC 76], the Apex Court has
upheld the right of any aggrieved citizen to approach the jurisdictional
court under Section 340 in the following words:
"8. In our view it is not necessary to pursue the approach
of either of the parties. It is well settled that in criminal law a
complaint can be lodged by anyone who has become aware of
a crime having been committed and thereby set the law into
motion. In respect of offences adverted to in Section 195 CrPC
there is a restriction that the same cannot be entertained
unless a complaint is made by a court because the offence is
stated to have been committed in relation to the proceedings
in that court. Section 340 CrPC is invoked to get over the bar
imposed under Section 195 CrPC. In ordinary crimes not
adverted to under Section 195 CrPC, if in respect of any
offence, law can be set into motion by any citizen of this
country, we fail to see how any citizen of this country cannot
approach even under Section 340 CrPC. For that matter, the
wording of Section 340 CrPC is significant. The court will have
to act in the interest of justice on a complaint or otherwise.
Assuming that the complaint may have to be made at the
instance of a party having an interest in the matter, still the
court can take action in the matter otherwise than on a
complaint, that is, when it has received information as to a
crime having been committed, covered by the said provision.
Therefore, it is wholly unnecessary to examine this aspect of
the matter. We proceed on the basis that the respondent has
locus standi to present the complaint before the Designated
Judge."
The point that emerges is that, either on being alerted through an
application or on getting information regarding the commission of the
offence under Section 195(1)(b), the jurisdictional court can conduct a
preliminary enquiry and form the opinion whether it is expedient to
conduct an enquiry. Further, if convinced about the need for an
enquiry, the court can record its finding to that effect and make a
complaint in writing and send it to the magistrate of first class having
jurisdiction.
23. As far as the instant cases are concerned, the Special Court
has already received a complaint from Sri.Sandeep Nair and has
allowed the application submitted by the Crime Branch to question him
in jail. The 161 statement of Sri.Sandeep Nair recorded thereafter was
made available to me in a sealed cover. In my considered opinion,
while interdicting the Police from continuing the investigation, interest
of justice requires that the Special Judge be permitted to look into the
materials collected by the Crime Branch, treating it as the information
mentioned in Section 340(1), so as to decide whether it is expedient to
conduct an enquiry.
In the result, the FIR and further proceedings in Crime Nos. 94 of
2021 and 98 of 2021 of Crime Branch Police Station are quashed. The
Investigating Officers shall forthwith submit all records pertaining to
the crimes before the Special Court in a sealed cover. The learned
Special Judge can look into those records and other materials, if any
available, while deciding whether it is expedient to conduct an enquiry.
The writ petitions are disposed of as above.
Sd/-
V.G.ARUN, JUDGE
vgs
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 7641/2021
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO.0094/2021 DATED
17.3.2021 OF CRIME BRANCH POLICE STATION,
JFCM -II, ERNAKULAM
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 25.1.2021
PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN B A
NO.7878/2020
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 5.3.2021
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN SLP
(CRL) 1403/2021
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 21.8.2020 IN
CRL.MC NO.1576/2020 OF THE COURT OF
SESSIONS, ERNAKULAM.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED UNDER S.
44 AND 45 AND PMLA BEFORE THE SPECIAL
COURT, ERNAKULAM DATED 6.10.2020
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 15.10. 2020
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE SPECIAL COURT FOR
PMLA CASES, ERNAKULAM IN CRL. M. C
NO.1920/2020
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29.10.2020
GRANTING CUSTODY OF SIVASANKAR IN
CRL.M.P.NO.1588 OF 2020
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT GIVEN BY MS.
SWAPNA SURESH U/S.50 OF PMLA DATED
10.11.2020
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS. SWAPNA
SURESH DATED 14.12.2020
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS. SWAPNA
SURESH DATED 15.12.2020
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF SANDEEP NAIR
DATED 7.8.2020
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF SANDEEP NAIR
DATED 7.8.2020
EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF
SANDEEP NAIR DATED 10.8.2020
EXHIBIT P13 (A) TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF
SANDEEP NAIR DATED 16.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR.PS SARITH
DATED 7.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (A) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 7.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (B) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 10.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (C) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 13.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (D) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 15.8.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (E) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 15.12.2020
EXHIBIT P14 (F) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENTS OF MR. PS
SARITH DATED 16.12.2020
EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE REMAND ORDER DATED
5.8.2020 OF THE COURT OF SESSIONS,
ERNAKULAM. (SPECIAL COURT PMLA)
EXHIBIT P16 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 11.8.2020
EXTENDING CUSTODY OF ACCUSED 1,2, AND 4 FOR
5 DAYS COURT OF SESSIONS, ERNAKULAM.
(SPECIAL COURT PMLA)
EXHIBIT P17 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 14.8.2020
EXTENDING CUSTODY OF ACCUSED 1, 2 AND 4 FOR
5 MORE DAYS COURT OF SESSIONS, ERNAKULAM.
(SPECIAL COURT PMLA)
EXHIBIT P18 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17.8.2020
COURT OF SESSIONS, ERNAKULAM, (SPECIAL
COURT PMLA) REMANDING TO JUDICIAL CUSTODY
OF ACCOUSED 1,2 AND 4.
EXHIBIT P19 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA
SURESH DATED 13.8.2020
EXHIBIT P20 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 15/10/2020
PASSED BY THE SPECIAL COURT PMLA IN CRL. MC
NO.1920/2020 REJECTING BAIL APPLICATION OF
A4.
EXHIBIT P21 TRUE COPY OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY COMPLAINT
DATED 24.12.2020 SUBMITTED BEFORE THE
SPECIAL COURT OF PMLA UNDER S. 44 AND 45 OF
PMLA
EXHIBIT P22 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.10.2020
PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN B.A.NO.6752
OF 2020
EXHIBIT P23 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17.11.2020
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE SPECIAL COURT FOR
PMLA CASES AT ERNAKULAM-REJECTING BAIL
APPLICATION OF M.SIVASANKAR.
EXHIBIT P24 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT DATED 11.12.2020
OF SMT. SIJIVIJAYAN, CIVIL POLICE OFFICER
(9692) PALARIVATTOM POLICE STATION, COCHIN
CITY ATTACHED WITH READABLE COPY OF THE
SAME AND THE TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
EXHIBIT P25 TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION DATED 5.3.2021 OF
SH. SANDEEP NAIR FILED BEFORE THE HON'BLE
SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM (SPECIAL COURT
PMLA FORWARDED THROUGH SUPERINTENDENT OF
CENTRAL PRISON AND CORRECTIONAL HOME,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
EXHIBIT P26 A TRUE COPY OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
EXHIBIT P1 FIR DATED 17.3.2021
EXHIBIT P27 TRUE COPY OF THE STATMENT FILED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) DATED
4.3.2021 BEFORE THIS HON'BLE COURT CRL MC
5743 OF 2020
EXHIBIT P28 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS
SWAPNAPRABHASURESH DATED 5.8.2020 RECORD BY
THE ENFORCEMMENT DIRECTORATE U/S 50 OF THE
PMLA
EXHIBIT P29 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS. SWAPNA
PRABHA SURESH DATED 6-8-2020 RECORDED BY
THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECOTORATE US 50 OF THE
PMLA
EXHIBIT P30 TRUE COPY OF THE STATMENT F MS SWAPANA
PRABHA SURESH DATED 7.8.2020 RECORDED BY
THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S 50 OF THE
PMLA
EXHIBIT P31 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS SWAPNA
PRABHA SURESH DATED 8.8.2020 RECORDED BY
THE ENFORMEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S 50 OF THE
PMLA
EXHIBIT P32 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS
SWAPNAPRABHA SURESH DATED 10.8.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S
50 OF THE PMLA
EXHIBIT P33 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS
SWAPNAPRABHA SURESH DATED 13.8.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECOTRATE U/S
50 OF THE PMLA
EXHIBIT P34 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF MS
SWAPNAPRABHA SURESH DATED 15.8.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S
50 OF THE PMLA
EXHIBIT P35: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 16.8.2020
EXHIBIT P36: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 3.11.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S.50 OF THE PMLA.
EXHIBIT P37: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 10.11.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S.50 OF THE PMLA.
EXHIBIT P38: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 14.12.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S.50 OF THE PMLA.
EXHIBIT P39: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 15.12.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S.50 OF THE PMLA.
EXHIBIT P40: COPY OF STATEMENT OF MS.SWAPNA PRABHA SURESH DATED 16.12.2020
RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE U/S.50 OF THE PMLA.
EXHIBIT P41: COPY OF CRL.MC.1576 OF 2020 OF THE PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT,
ERNAKULAM DATED 13.8.2020.
EXHIBIT P42: COPY OF ORDER DATED 21.8.2020 IN CRL.MC.NO.1576 OF 2020 OF THE
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
EXHIBIT P43: COPY OF CRL.MC.NO.1899 OF 2020 OF THE PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT,
ERNAKULAM DATED 5.10.2020.
EXHIBIT P44: COPY OF ORDER DATED 13.10.2020 IN CRL.MC.1899 OF 2020 OF THE
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
EXHIBIT P45: COPY OF CRL.MC.NO.1920 OF 2020 OF THE SESSIONS AND SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL FOR PMLA DATED 7.10.2020.
EXHIBIT P46: COPY OF ORDER DATED 15.10.2020 IN CRL.MC.NO.1920 OF 2020 OF THE
SESSIONS AND SPECIAL COURT FOR PMLA CASES.
EXHIBIT P47: COPY OF REGULAR BAIL APPLICATION IN CRL.M.P.NO.221/2021 IN
SC.NO.610 OF 2020 OF SESSIONS COURT DATED 27.1.2021.
EXHIBIT P48: COPY OF ORDER DATED 2.11.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.1593 OF 2020 OF THE
SESSIONS AND SPECIAL COURT FOR PMLA.
EXHIBIT P49: COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.NO.1640 OF 2020 OF THE PRINCIPAL
SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM DATED 9.11.2020.
EXHIBIT P50: COPY OF ORDER DATED 14.12.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.1808 OF 2020 OF THE
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
RESPONDENT'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT R1A A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 20.11.2020
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 8920/2021
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO.98/CB/ALP/D/2021
DATED 27.03.2021 WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION DATED 05.03.2021
SUBMITTED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 31.03.2021 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.731/2021 IN SC NO.610/2020 OF
SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM.
EXHIBIT P4: COPY OF APPLICATION DATED 31.3.2021 IN CRL.M.P.NO.731 OF 2021 IN
SC.NO.610 OF 2020 ON THE FILES OF THE DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDG, ERNAKULAM
WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
EXHIBIT P5: COPY OF PETITION DATED 3.4.2021 SEEKING RECORDING OF S.164 CRPC,
FILED BEFORE THE CJM, ENRNAKULAM WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
RESPONDENT'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT R1(a): COPY OF LETTER DATED 20.11.2020.
EXHIBIT R4(a): FORWARDING LETTER DATED 05/03/2021 BY THE
SUPERINTENDENT CENTRAL PRISON, ADDRESSED TO
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT ERNAKULAM.
