[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Bhimappa Pandappa Ragha vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer on 23 January, 2026
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MFA No.104803 of 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
®
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.104803 OF 2019 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. BHIMAPPA PANDAPPA RAGHA
(SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS)
1.A PANDAPPA BHIMAPPA RAGHA,
AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.B TIMMANNA BHIMAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.C VENKAPPA BHIMAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.D SUSILA SANGAPPA TIPPARADDY
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
MOHANKUMAR
B SHELAR
1.E TAYAWWA ERANNA TIPPARADDY
Digitally signed by
MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR
Location: High Court of
Karnataka, Dharwad Bench
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
Date: 2026.01.27 16:48:10
+0530
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.F GEETA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.G SNEHA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 20 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
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MFA No.104803 of 2019
1.H RASHMI BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 18 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.I KRISHNA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 17 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. BASAVARAJ S. BYAKOD, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT, BILAGI,
TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. ABHISHEK MALIPATIL, HCGP)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 54(1) OF LAND
ACQUISITION ACT, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL BY
MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 22.06.2006
PASSED BY THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) BAGALKOT IN LAC
NO.908/2005 AND ENHANCE THE COMPENSATION AMOUNT
FROM RS.1,84,000 PER ACRES TO 2,34,000 PER ACRES, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS MFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 07.01.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
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MFA No.104803 of 2019
CAV JUDGMENT
The present appeal is filed by the appellants-private
parties to allow the present appeal and modify the
judgment and award dated 22.06.2006, passed in LAC
No.908/2005 and enhance the compensation amount from
Rs.1,84,000/- per acres to Rs.2,34,000/- per acres on the
file of the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Bilagi (herein after referred
to as 'the Reference Court' for short).
2. The appellants/respondent herein is
claimants/respondent before the Reference Court.
3. For convenience of reference, the parties herein
are referred to as arrayed before the before this Court.
4. I.A.No.1/2020 is filed by the appellants with the
accompanying affidavit to condone the delay of 4828 days
in filing the present appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
5. Shri Pandappa Bhimappa Ragha states that he is
the appellant in the present appeal and is swearing this
affidavit on his own behalf and on behalf of the other
appellants, being conversant with the facts of the case.
6. The appellant submits that he is poor and
uneducated, and the acquired land was the sole source of
livelihood for his family, having potential for sugarcane
cultivation. Due to acquisition, the family was displaced and
forced to migrate to different places, including Goa, for
labour work. Though compensation was received, the same
was exhausted towards family needs and internal disputes,
leaving the appellants without financial means and stability.
7. He further submits that after returning to his
parental home, he contacted his counsel and was advised to
file an appeal before this Court for enhancement. However,
due to poverty, illiteracy, displacement, and continuous
struggle for livelihood after acquisition, the appeal could not
be filed within the prescribed period. The delay is bona fide,
unintentional, and caused by circumstances beyond the
control of the appellants.
8. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for
the appellants placed reliance on the following judgments:-
• Ningappa Thotappa Angadi through LR's v.
The Special Land acquisition Officer reported
in (2020) 19 SCC 599;
"7. We find that the issue raised in this appeal is
no longer res integra. This Court in Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana [Dhiraj Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 127: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ)
236] held that : (SCC p. 131, paras 14-15)
"14. The appellants are identically situated and
there is no reason to meet out a different
treatment to them. We also note that, while in
these cases, the High Court had refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the LPAs of the
appellants, other LPAs were allowed by the High
Court itself by condoning the delay of the same
magnitude in the same circumstances.
15. Equities can be balanced by denying the
appellants' interest for the period for which they
did not approach the court. The substantive rights
of the appellants should not be allowed to be
defeated on technical grounds by taking
hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In
the matter of compensation for land acquisition,
we are of the view that approach of the court has
to be pragmatic and not pedantic."
(emphasis supplied)
8. xxx
9. It is undeniable that this Court vide judgment
dated 11-11-2016 passed in Ningappa Thotappa
Angadi v. LAO [Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. LAO,
2016 SCC OnLine SC 1864] has set aside the order
of the High Court and restored the compensation as
was awarded by the Reference Court. In the cited
case, this Court held as follows : (SCC OnLine SC
para 4)
"4. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties to some length and carefully perused the
material on record. We are of the considered
opinion that the impugned judgment
[LAO v. Veerabhadrappa Marithammappa, 2008
SCC OnLine Kar 833] and order of the High Court
deserves to be set aside and judgment and order
passed by the Reference Court restored. We say
so because, this Court has in a similar appeal
directed against the very same order set aside the
impugned judgment and restored the
enhancement granted by the Reference Court. We
see no reason to take a different view in the
present case. We, accordingly, allow this appeal
and while setting aside the impugned judgment
insofar as the same relates to the appellant,
restore the judgment and order passed by the
Reference Court. The parties shall, however, bear
their own costs."
• Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana and others
by order dated 23.04.2025 passed in SLP
No.670/2020; and
"12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech
Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Anr.10, with
reference to Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v.
Commission of Commercial Tax Karnataka¹¹ that while
the State has the power of eminent domain, the owner
of a land can only be divested thereof in accordance with
the procedure established by law after appropriately
compensating them. This is in view of Article 300 A and
31A of the Constitution of India."
• Bhag Singh & Others v. Union Territory of
Chandigarh through the Land Acquisition
Collector, Chandigarh reported in AIR 1985 SC
1576.
"3. We are of the view that when the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench took the view
that the claimants whose land was acquired by
the State of Punjab under the notifications issued
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled
to enhanced compensation and the case of the
appellants stood on the same footing, the
appellants should have been given an opportunity
of paying up the deficit court fee so that, like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced
compensation at the same rate as the others. The
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
should not have, in our opinion, adopted a
technical approach and denied the benefit of
enhanced compensation to the appellants merely
because they had not initially paid the proper
amount of court fee. It must be remembered that
this was not a dispute between two private
citizens where it would be quite just and
legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim
made by him and not to award him any higher
amount than that claimed though even in such a
case there may be situations where an amount
higher than that claimed can be awarded to the
claimant as for instance where an amount is
claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here
was a claim made by the appellants against the
State Government for compensation for
acquisition of their land and under the law, the
State was bound to pay to the appellants
compensation on the basis of the market value of
the land acquired and if according to the
judgments of the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench, the market value of the land
acquired was higher than that awarded by the
Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional
District Judge, there is no reason why the
appellants should have been denied the benefit of
payment of the market value so determined. To
deny this benefit to the appellants would
tantamount to permitting the State Government
to acquire the land of the appellants on payment
of less than the true market value. There may be
cases where, as for instance, under agrarian
reform legislation, the holder of land may,
legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a
view to eliminating concentration of land in the
hands of a few and bringing about its equitable
distribution, be deprived of land which is not
being personally cultivated by him or which is in
excess of the ceiling area with payment of little
compensation or no compensation at all, but
where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive
the holder of his land without payment of the true
market value when the law, in so many terms,
declares that he shall be paid such market value.
The State Government must do what is fair and
just to the citizen and should not, as far as
possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is
received or recovered without protest or where
the State Government would otherwise be
irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical
plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the
citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the
present case, the Division Bench as well as the
learned Single Judge should have allowed the
appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and
awarded to them compensation at the higher rate
or rates determined by them."
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent-State:-
9. The respondent-State opposes the application for
condonation of delay and contends that admittedly, the
appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 4828
days, for which no sufficient or acceptable explanation has
been offered.
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10. It is well settled that every day's delay must be
explained by showing sufficient cause. The reasons assigned
in the affidavit, namely that, after acquisition the appellants
went to Goa for labour work. Hence, the averments made
by the appellants for condonation of delay are vague, bald,
and do not satisfactorily explain the enormous delay as
mandated under law.
11. The respondent submits that the appellants have
failed to show any diligence or bona fide effort in
prosecuting their remedy within the prescribed period. If
such inordinate delay is condoned, it would cause serious
hardship and prejudice to the respondent, whereas no
prejudice would be caused to the appellants if the
application is dismissed. In support of his contention, the
learned counsel for the respondent-State placed reliance on
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma
(Dead) by her LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board and
Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein
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it has been held that no litigant should be permitted to be
lethargic or apathetic and misuse the process of law.
12. Further, reliance was placed on the decisions of
the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition
v. Katiji reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 and Basawaraj
and another v. Special Land Acquisition officer
reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein it has been held
that the expressions "liberal approach", "justice-oriented
approach" or "advancement of substantial justice" cannot
be invoked to defeat the law of limitation or to revive stale
and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, and that Courts are not justified in condoning
inordinate delay even by imposing conditions. All averments
not specifically traversed are denied and the appellants are
put to strict proof thereof.
13. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for
the respondent-State placed reliance on the following
judgments:-
• Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board,
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969;
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264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law.
• Prakash and others v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer by order dated 12.06.2024
passed in MFA No.8540/2015(LAC)
14. Heard learned counsel appearing on either side
and perused the judgment relied upon by the counsel for
the parties.
15. Having considered the contentions advanced, it is
observed that the Apex Court and the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the
respondent-State held that the approach of the Courts in
condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient
cause is shown. However, in the instant case, the appellants
failed to establish sufficient cause to condone such
enormous delay of more than 13 years.
16. Further, the aforesaid judgments of the Apex
Court in Katiji's case (supra), Basawaraj's case (supra),
and Shivamma's case (supra), on law of limitation is well
settled, wherein it has been consistently held that
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expressions such as "liberal approach", "justice-oriented
approach" or "advancement of substantial justice" cannot
be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to revive
stale and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. It has further been held that Courts would
not be justified in condoning inordinate delay by imposing
conditions; as such an approach would undermine the
object and sanctity of the law of limitation.
17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this
Court finds that the appellants have failed to show sufficient
cause to condone the enormous delay of 4828 days i.e.,
more than 13 years, in filing the present appeal. The
averments made in the affidavit accompanying the
application are vague, general, and unsupported by any
cogent material. Further, reasons stated in the affidavit
such as migration for labour work, displacement after
acquisition, receipt and utilisation of compensation and
subsequent discussion with the advocate do not constitute a
satisfactory or acceptable explanation for condoning such an
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inordinate delay. Entertaining such applications would
amount to revival of a dead and settled right, which is
impermissible under law.
18. If such enormous delay is condoned without
sufficient cause, it would confer an undue advantage on
litigants who are fence sitters, lack diligence, and approach
the Court at their convenience, thereby defeating the very
object of the law of limitation. It would also unsettle rights
of the parties that have attained finality by the reference
Court long ago and cause serious prejudice to the
respondent, besides opening floodgates for similarly placed
persons to reopen concluded proceedings. The concept of
finality of litigation and public policy underlying limitation
laws cannot be ignored. In the absence of sufficient cause,
the appellants are not entitled for condonation of delay, and
the application is liable to be dismissed.
19. In view of the aforementioned discussions, this
Court proceeds to pass the following:
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ORDER
(i) IA No.1/2020 is hereby dismissed.
(ii) In view of inordinate delay of 4828 days
in filing the present appeal, the present appeal shall
not survive for consideration. Hence, the present
appeal is dismissed.
Accordingly, the appeal and other pending
applications, if any shall stand dismissed.
Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO)
JUDGE
KGK,CT:VP
