[Cites 15, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Smt. Mala R vs The State Of Karnataka on 19 January, 2026

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 06.01.2026
R
Pronounced on : 19.01.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.1225 OF 2025

C/W

CRIMINAL PETITION No.2826 OF 2025

IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.1225 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX

... PETITIONER
(BY SRI ABHISHEK KUMAR., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BYADARAHALLI POLICE,
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT
2

BENGALURU - 560 001.

2 . XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
... RESPONDENTS

(BY MISS.ASMA KOUSER, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI AKSHAY R.HUDDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
BNSS, 2023, PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLAINT IN
CR.NO.789/2024, BY THE BYADARAHALLI POLICE, WHICH IS
PENDING BEFORE THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE (CJM)
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE, THE FIR ALLEGES
OFFENCES P/U/S 3(5), 318(2), 351(2), 69, 89, 64(2)(m) OF BNS,
2023.

IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.2826 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

1. SMT. MALA R.,
D/O RAJESH KUMAR
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS.

2. SRI MURTHY T.V.,
S/O LATE K.VENKATAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS

BOTH ARE R/AT
TARABANAHALLI VILLGE
CHIKKA JALA HOBLI
YELAHANKA TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 560 064.

... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI PUNITH C., ADVOCATE)
3

AND:

1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BYADARAHALLI POLICE
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.

2 . XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
... RESPONDENTS

(BY MISS.ASMA KOUSER, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI AKSHAY R.HUDDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
BNSS, PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.789/2024 FOR THE
OFFENCES P/U/S 3(5), 318(2), 351(2), 69, 89, 64(2)(m) OF BNS
ACT, 2023 AS PER ANNEXURE-A AND B BY THE RESPONDENT -
BYDARAHALLI POLICE, NOW PENDING ON THE FILE OF LEARNED
CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT AT
BANGALORE, BY ALLOWING THE ABOVE PETITION.

THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 06.01.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
4

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

Criminal Petition No.1225 of 2025 is filed by accused No.1

and the companion petition in Criminal Petition No.2826 of 2025 is

filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3. These petitioners challenge a

common crime in Crime No.789 of 2024. The complainant is

common. Therefore, these petitions are taken up together and

considered by this common order.

2. For the sake of convenience, the facts obtaining in Criminal

Petition No.1225 of 2025 would be narrated. In this order, accused

No.1 would be referred as the petitioner, for easy reference.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

3.1. The petitioner is said to be in relationship with the

complainant. Accused 2 and 3 in the companion petition are the

relatives of accused No.1. It is the averment in the petition that

the 2nd respondent/complainant is a resident of Anjananagara for
5

the last 4 to 5 years and her marriage had taken place 10 years ago

with a particular person and the complainant has a child born from

the said wedlock. In the year 2014, the averment in the petition is

that the complainant again married one Yathish Kumar T.R. and the

said marriage got dissolved in the year 2020 and from the said

wedlock she has a child of 4 years now. In the year 2020, it

appears that she gets acquainted with the present petitioner, a

practicing Advocate in a case pertaining to Negotiable Instruments

Act. The complainant alleges that during the conversation with the

petitioner, he took the telephone number of the complainant and

began conversation. The conversation turned into personal and the

petitioner thereafter in the year 2022 sent a friend request on

Instagram of the complainant and also made phone call to the

complainant requesting her to accept his request. Accordingly,

friendship between the complainant and the petitioner developed

and the friendship further blossomed into having physical

relationship as well.

3.2. The petition further narrates that in the month of July

2023 the petitioner came to the house of the complainant and
6

expressed that he is willing to marry her and on the pretext of

marriage has had physical relationship which continued thereafter

and on the breach of said promise of marriage, the complainant

registers a complaint before the jurisdictional Police on 09-12-2024

not only against the petitioner but also against relatives of the

petitioner. Registration of crime has driven the petitioners to this

Court in the subject petitions.

4. Heard Sri Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused No.1, Sri Punith C, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioners/accused 2 and 3; Ms. Asma Kouser, learned

Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 in

both the petitions and Sri Akshay R. Huddar, learned counsel

appearing for respondent No.2/complainant in both the petitions.

SUBMISSIONS:

PETITIONER'S:

5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would

vehemently contend that there is no physical relationship between

the petitioner and the 2nd respondent/complainant at all. It is all
7

concocted story which the complainant is used to. He would

contend that the complainant is already married not once but twice,

and a person who is already married cannot project physical

relationship on the promise of marriage. He would submit that the

complainant is in the habit of indulging in such acts of trapping

every man and registering crimes against them. He would submit

that if further proceedings are permitted to be continued, it would

become an abuse of the process of law. To buttress his

submissions, he takes this Court through the documents appended

to the petition to demonstrate marriage of the complainant with one

Yathish Kumar T. R. and proceedings of annulment of marriage with

Yathish Kumar T. R. and a crime being registered for offences

punishable under Section 363 of the IPC when the child that the

complainant had from the first marriage who was by then 13 years

old goes missing, only to contend that the complainant who was

married not once but twice, is wanting to project that the petitioner

has had physical relationship with the complainant on the promise

of marriage. He would submit that there is neither physical

relationship nor promise of marriage.
8

COMPLAINANT AND STATE:

6. Contrariwise, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd

respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions

in contending that the crime is registered only on 09-12-2024. The

investigation should be permitted to continue. It is only then the

truth will come out. The petitioner has had relationship with the

complainant as an Advocate and a client for the last 3 years prior to

registration of crime. The physical relationship have happened

between the two on the pretext of promise of marriage. The

complainant, though is married, came in contact with the petitioner

on divorce. In the light of her being single, all possibilities of

physical relationship on the pretext of marriage can spring. It

cannot be said that the crime should be nipped in the bud.

7. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Ms. Asma

Kouser would toe the lines of the learned counsel for the

complainant in contending that the crime must not be obliterated

and at the outset investigation should be permitted in the case at

hand.
9

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would now join issue

to contend that divorce between Yatish Kumar.T.R. and the

complainant though has happened in the year 2020, they are still

living together. He would take this Court through the documents

and the photographs to demonstrate that they are living together.

Therefore, he would submit that all the narration of physical

relationship on pretext of marriage is a figment of imagination of

the complainant.

9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.

CONSIDERATION:

10. The relationship of the parties to the lis are as narrated

hereinabove covering both these petitions. The facts, dates and link

in the chain of events are again not in dispute. It would suffice if

the narration would commence from the complainant getting

married to one Yathish Kumar T. R. The marriage between the

complainant and Yathish Kumar T. R. happens on 30-05-2014. The
10

certificate of marriage is appended to the petition. It appears that

the complainant's relationship with the said Yathish Kumar T. R.

flounders and floundering of the relationship leads the complainant

seeking annulment of marriage in M.C.No.3017 of 2015. The said

matrimonial case is disposed of on account of settlement and the

marriage got dissolved on 22-10-2016. The petitioner was nowhere

in the picture till the said date. According to the complainant after

the grant of decree of divorce, a child is born from the wedlock in

the year 2020. In the year 2023, for legal assistance in a case

concerning Negotiable Instruments Act, the petitioner and the

complainant come to know each other. It is here, the petitioner

comes into the picture. Two years pass by. The complainant then

seeks to register a complaint before the jurisdictional Police on

09-12-2024. Since the subject issue is triggered from the

registration of complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the

complaint. It reads as follows:

"ರವ ೆ,
ೕ ೕ ಇ ೆಕ .
ಾ ಡರಹ ೕ ೕ ಾ ೆ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ.

ಇಂದ.
11

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>ಾ?: ಒಕA ಗ, B ೈD ಸಂEೆ :9686382940
Email Id: [email protected]

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ಸ•ಳ: ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ. Sd/-
Nagarathna N."

The narration in the complaint is with regard to certain sexual

escapades of the petitioner with the complainant. At the

penultimate paragraph, the complainant narrates that the attitude

of the petitioner suddenly changed and began to ignore the calls of

the complainant. Later it is the narration that she comes to know

that the parents of the petitioner are searching for a girl to get

accused No.1 married. Therefore, the complaint comes to be

registered as the petitioner has, on several occasions committed

the offence of rape for two years, on the pretext of marriage, but

he is wanting to get married with someone else. She further
14

narrates that due to the acts of the petitioner in the year 2024 she

had even become pregnant and the petitioner told the complainant

to get the pregnancy terminated. Immediately after registration of

the complaint, these petitions are preferred.

11. A perusal at the complaint would indicate that even if it is

taken on its face value, they were consensual acts for two years

whether on the pretext of marriage or otherwise. Jurisprudence is

replete with the judgments rendered by the Apex Court from time

to time, which has intertwined the concept of rape and consensual

sex and how consensual sex on the promise of marriage cannot

amount to rape. I deem it appropriate to notice the said

judgments.

JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:

12.1. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM

MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1 has

held as follows:

".... .... ....

1
(2019) 18 SCC 191
15

11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under
Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as
under : (SCC p. 94, para 6)

"6. ... It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto."
... ... ...
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his
lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If
the accused has not made the promise with the sole
intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual
acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
16

intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear
case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical
relationship between the parties would not constitute an
offence under Section 376 IPC.

24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the
appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health
Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse
in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was
alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a
married man and that he has differences with his wife.
Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also
alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get
their marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a
companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that
"as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I
agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair
and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside
sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home". Thus,
they were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a
relationship with each other for quite some time and
enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they
had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married
some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not
her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She
had taken a conscious decision after active application of
mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since the complainant has failed
to prima facie show the commission of rape, the
complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be
sustained."
(Emphasis supplied)
17

12.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU

KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2 has held as follows:

".... .... ....

9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of
Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench
of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud,
J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021)
18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod SuryabhanPawar
case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019)
9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620,
paras 12, 14, 16 & 18)

"12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent
with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual who
makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various
alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various
possible consequences flowing from such action or
inaction, consents to such action. ...

***

14. ... Specifically in the context of a
promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise
given on the understanding by the maker that it
will be broken, and the breach of a promise which
is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. ...
***
16. Where the promise to marry is false and
the intention of the maker at the time of making
the promise itself was not to abide by it but to
deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact"
that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a
false promise. To establish a false promise, the

2
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032
18

maker of the promise should have had no intention
of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
"consent" of a woman under Section 375 is
vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact"
where such misconception was the basis for her
choosing to engage in the said act. ...
***
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges
from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
"misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to
marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise,
given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered
to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must
be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

(emphasis supplied)
... ... ...

11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the
FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an
offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is
to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that
the appellant had given a promise to the second
respondent to marry which at the inception was false and
on the basis of which the second respondent was induced
into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the
FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are
absent. The relationship between the parties was purely
of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above,
was in existence prior to the marriage of the second
respondent and continued to subsist during the term of
the marriage and after the second respondent was
granted a divorce by mutual consent.

12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has
merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which
19

cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC.
As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand,
which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of
the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The
High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application
under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis."

(Emphasis supplied)

12.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH3 the Apex

Court holds as follows:

".... .... ....

9. While getting her statement recorded under Section
164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017.
On account of dispute with her husband, she was living with her
parents. As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in
love. In 2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job.
However, he used to visit her home and take care of the
complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant
assured the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes
divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For
this reason, she divorced her husband and solemnised marriage
with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter, they
started living together with her daughter born from the previous
marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did not solemnise
court marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple,
treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading
a married life having physical relations from January 2019 till
June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as his wife.
Thereafter, the appellant refused to respond to her calls and
even marry her.
... ... ...
11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she
got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12-2018. In the
statement under Section 164CrPC, she stated that marriage
between the appellant and the complainant was solemnised in a

3
(2024) 3 SCC 496
20

temple in January 2019. However, the date of divorce as
claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of the
decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce
by mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her
husband vide judgment dated 13-1-2021. The aforesaid fact
could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant
besides the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under
Section 164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier
marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with the
appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.

12. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis
of which FIR was got registered and the statement got
recorded by the complainant, it is evident that there was
no promise to marry initially when the relations between
the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on
the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties
had physical relations, she was already married. She
falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage
took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains
that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1-2021. It
is not a case where the complainant was of an immature
age who could not foresee her welfare and take right
decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder
to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough
to understand the consequences of the moral and
immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence
of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying
her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix
that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for
his job, he used to come and stay with the family and
they were living as husband and wife. It was also the
stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan
of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking
channel which was not returned back."

(Emphasis supplied)
21

12.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF

DELHI4 the Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble
Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly,
the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual
relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an
assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a
married woman having three children, had continued to
have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at
least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In
the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had
observed as under : (SCC pp. 398-99, paras 21-22)

"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of
the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship under the misconception
of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to
marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and
therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the
law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section
375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there
is a difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of
false promise, the accused right from the beginning
would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix
and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by
giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to
satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise,
one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might
have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her,
and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of
promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a
person for the offence under Section 376. As stated

4
(2025) 5 SCC 756
22

earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts
before the court.

22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who
herself was a married woman having three
children, could not be said to have acted under the
alleged false promise given by the appellant or
under the misconception of fact while giving the
consent to have sexual relationship with the
appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have
such relationship with him at least for about five
years till she gave complaint in the year 2015.
Even if the allegations made by her in her
deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as
"rape" by the appellant, would be stretching the
case too far. The prosecutrix being a married
woman and the mother of three children was
mature and intelligent enough to understand the
significance and the consequences of the moral or
immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even
otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course
of such relationship with the accused, is closely
seen, it appears that she had betrayed her
husband and three children by having relationship
with the accused, for whom she had developed
liking for him. She had gone to stay with him
during the subsistence of her marriage with her
husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till
the time she was impregnated by the accused in
the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child
through the loin of the accused, she did not have
any complaint against the accused of he having
given false promise to marry her or having
cheated her. She also visited the native place of
the accused in the year 2012 and came to know
that he was a married man having children also,
still she continued to live with the accused at
another premises without any grievance. She even
obtained divorce from her husband by mutual
consent in 2014, leaving her three children with
her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when
some disputes must have taken place between
them, that she filed the present complaint. The
accused in his further statement recorded under
Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the
complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay
23

her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case, it could not be said
by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for the sexual relationship
with the appellant under the misconception of
fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section
375IPC."

(emphasis supplied)

14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] is
squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It
has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court,
that the mere fact that physical relations were
established pursuant to a promise to marry will not
amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section
375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage
was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain
consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that
such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on
the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.
[Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11
SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471]

15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet,
the following facts are clearly established:

15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and
Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and
cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of
the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted,
there is no material on record to show that there was any
dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant."

15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an
offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against
the appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the
24

appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to
marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the
appellant had made a promise to marry Respondent 2 and was
acting accordingly. The mangalsutra being prepared with the
initials of the name of Respondent 2 complainant does reflect his
intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a
fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the
promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct
dishonest.

15.3. There is also no element of criminality that
can be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own
case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship
with the appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage.
It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have
sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period
of five years [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5
SCC 764] , while being in a subsisting marriage, and even
subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the
relationship. The prolonged period of the relationship,
during which the sexual relations continued between the
parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an
element of force or deceit in the relationship. [Mahesh
Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus,
conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her
actions, and had given her consent after an active and
reasoned deliberation. [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC
(Cri) 903]"

(Emphasis supplied)

12.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA5 the

Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528
25

28. We find that the present case is not a case
where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for
physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship
continued for a period of three long years, which is a
considerable period of time. They remained close and
emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy
that occurred during the course of a functioning
relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as
instances of offence of rape merely because the
relationship failed to culminate in marriage.

29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken
note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken
relationships are given the colour of criminality. The
offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be
invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual
violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts
upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in
this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for
condemnation.

30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.)
observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a
marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:

"20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR
and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC
are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's
statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication
that any promise of marriage was extended at the
outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if
the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it
26

cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a
sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account
of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The
relationship between the parties was cordial and also
consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship
between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation
of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual
relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said
relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.
Further, both parties are now married to someone else
and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our
view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present
case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of
law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution."
(underlining by us)

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in
which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage
holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not
uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner
and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such
a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially
recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of
marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering
it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that
such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the
promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The
law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust
has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective
scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality
for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of
this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete
facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral
conjecture.

... .... ...

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during
the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation
was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of
27

consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the
appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum
of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to
be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to
have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however,
the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three
months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor
does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or
inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence
there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that
respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the
appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record
that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage,
respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such
circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the
physical relationship between the parties was premised upon
any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit
and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this
Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC
197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly
engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully
aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show
that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception,
the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of
the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:

"33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006
onwards, the complainant and the appellant were
residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever
upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the
sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. On
many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the
28

wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation
that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it
was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet
the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence
of any element of deceit or misconception.

35. Further, the application filed by the
complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022,
makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual
relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged
in the complaint that when she had proposed that they
should marry and live together, the appellant physically
abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of
truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident. However, it is
only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant
that the appellant was getting married to another
woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed
aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she
also admitted that she was equally guilty as the
appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not
liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully
agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also
recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused."
(underlining by us)

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High
Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No.
2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was
made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of
consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed
by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated
29

that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual
relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.

37. The said finding of the High Court, however,
fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in
question itself reveals that the relationship between the
parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent
No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire
to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a
major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on
her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even
upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is
manifest that the relationship between the parties was
consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as
emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held
against the appellant when the same can be otherwise
clearly discerned.

38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations
were made:

"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be
a false promise to amount to misconception of fact
within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such
consent was given under a misconception of fact, the
said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this
regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7
SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held
as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)

"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
30

between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this,
the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling
a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There
may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion
for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where
an accused on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every intention
to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused
was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

xxx

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e.
at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance'.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her."
(underlining by us)"
(Emphasis supplied)
31

12.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG

v. STATE OF TELANGANA6 the Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

25. In the chats which have been placed on record along
with the additional documents, the de-facto complainant, who is
referred to by the name 'Muffin', has admitted that she was
manipulative and was trying to "get a green card holder". At one
point of time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for
her to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she mentions
that she would not waste time with the accused appellant and
needs to "invest on the next victim". She also mentions that she
would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and
she could happily start with the next one. She also stated that
she was using the accused appellant.

26. These chats depict the stark reality about the
behavioral pattern of the de-facto complainant who
appears to be having manipulative and vindictive
tendency.

27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused appellant was
absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the
proposed marriage upon coming to know of the
aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of
the de-facto complainant.

28. Hence, even assuming that the accused
appellant retracted from his promise to marry the
complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged in sexual
intercourse with the de-facto complainant under a false
promise of marriage or that the offence was committed
by him with the de-facto complainant on the ground that
she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
community.

29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR No. 751
of 2021, the de-facto complainant has not even made a whisper

6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1258
32

about the accused appellant dumping her on the ground of her
caste. Thus, apparently this allegation which has been set out in
the subsequent FIR No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven
months is nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be
discarded.

30. Having considered the entirety of facts and
circumstances as available on record, we are of the firm
opinion that allowing prosecution of the accused
appellant to continue in the impugned FIR No. 103 of
2022 would be nothing short of a travesty of justice in
addition to being a gross abuse of the process of Court.
The impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a
bundle of lies full of fabricated and malicious
unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the complainant.
The facts on record clearly establish the vindictive and
manipulative tendencies of the complainant and these
aspects have a great bearing on the controversy."

(Emphasis supplied)

12.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA7 the Apex Court has held as follows:

".... .... ....

8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully
considering the material on record, the following attributes
come to the fore:

(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and
correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear
from the record that the consent of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her
will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant
and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted
since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they
interacted frequently and fell in love. The

7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230
33

Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical
relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so
without her consent, however she not only sustained her
relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit
him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate
with her conduct.

(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said
to have been obtained under a misconception of
fact. There is no material to substantiate
"inducement or misrepresentation" on the part of
the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations
without having any intention of fulfilling said
promise. Investigation has also revealed that
the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained
from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties
were already in a relationship and the alleged
incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable
that the Complainant had engaged in a physical
relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of
marriage, while she was already married to
someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to
begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the
Appellant.

(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury
to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an
offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that
there was any threat caused to the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant
when all along the relationship was cordial, and it
was only when the Appellant graduated and left for
his hometown to Ahmednagar, the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated.
We also cannot ignore the conduct of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the
native village of the Appellant without any
intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects
the agitated and unnerved state of mind of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same
34

reason, the criminal prosecution against the
Appellant herein is probably with an underlying
motive and disgruntled state of mind.

(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being
married before and having a child of four years,
would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or
maintain a prolonged association or physical
relationship with an individual who has sexually
assaulted and exploited her.

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case
where there was a false promise to marry to begin with.
A consensual relationship turning sour or partners
becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking
criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only
burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual
accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time
and again warned against the misuse of the provisions,
and has termed it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise
to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an
offence under section 376 IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)

13.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM

MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, draws with unmistakable clarity, the

doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual intimacy,

where two adults of their own volition, engage in consensual

sexual relation over a sustained period, the subsequent

refusal of the man to marry the woman, howsoever

regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute such intimacy
35

into the offence of rape as punishable under Section 376 of

the IPC.

13.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU KHARWAR

supra where the Apex Court interdicted the criminal process at

the threshold holding that the relationship between the

parties was purely consensual and accordingly quashed the

crime as well as the charge sheet.

13.3. Likewise, in NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF

DELHI) [(2023) 15 SCC 385], the Apex Court addressed an

identical factual complexion, where the complainant had

even become pregnant on account of the relationship, and

yet held that such circumstance, by itself cannot clothe the

relationship with criminality, for pregnancy arising out of

consensual intimacy.

13.4. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a note

of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of coloring

failed relationships, with the hue of heinous crimes. The
36

Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a relationship

between the consenting adults, cannot constitute rape nor

can the criminal law be set into motion as a retaliatory

instrument, merely because the relationship did not

ultimately culminate in marriage.

13.5. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex Court

observes that where the complainant is already married, the

allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of

marriage stands on infirm grounds, for a promise which is

ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be

elevated into a foundation of imputing criminality.

13.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG

supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a perusal of

contemporaneous chats, it found that the complainant had

exhibited manipulative and vindictive tendencies and held

that man backing out of marriage, even assuming such

promise existed, cannot automatically attract the offence of

rape. Holding the prosecution to be malicious and
37

fabricated, the Apex Court obliterates the proceedings

against the accused.

13.7. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such

decisions, the Apex Court has exercised its Constitutional and

inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even at

the stage of registration of the crime, where the allegation

taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond a consensual

relationship subsequently turning sore.

APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:

14. In the case at hand, the relationship between the

complainant and the petitioner, at its inception, was plainly

that of a client and a counsel. Yet to determine whether the

complaint is a bonafide invocation of criminal law or an

endeavour covered by manipulation and vendetta, it

becomes necessary to notice certain antecedent facts, which

emerge not from conjecture, but from documents placed on

record.
38

Manipulation and Malafides of the complainant:

A brief chronology bears mention:

14.2. The complainant is said to have married one Yathish

Kumar T. R. in the year 2014. The said marriage, by an order

dated 22-10-2016, was annulled. However in the year 2020, it

appears that a child was born to the complainant, the date of birth

being 21-08-2020. The birth certificate is placed on record. The

birth certificate depicts the date of birth of the child born to Yathish

Kumar T. R. and the complainant is as follows:
39

The birth certificate placed on record is not without

significance. It indicates two distinct and telling

circumstances; first, that notwithstanding the annulment

decree dated 22-10-2016 in M.C.No.3017 of 2015, a child is

born on 21-08-2020 to the complainant and the very same

Yathish Kumar T. R. and second, that the complainant

appears to have continued association with the said Yathish

Kumar T. R. even long after the severance of the marital tie.

Photographs are also produced to demonstrate that the child now

about 4 years of age, has been living with the complainant and

Yathish Kumar T. R., as a family.

The matter does not rest there:

14.3. The petitioner has also produced another birth

certificate evidencing the birth of a child on 15-12-2008 where the

father's name is shown as Nagaraju and the mother, the

complainant. The said birth certificate is as follows:
40

The inevitable inference is that the complainant has two children,

the first born on 15-12-2008 from Nagaraju and the second born on

21-08-2020 from Yathish Kumar T. R., long after the annulment of

marriage dated 22-10-2016. These circumstances do not float

in isolation. They connect with yet another material episode.

14.4. A crime comes to be registered on 28-11-2022 and on

the basis of the said complainant a crime in Crime No.602 of 2022
41

for offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC is alleged. The

gravamen of the complaint is that the child born from their earlier

relationship, went missing on 25-11-2022. The child was about 13

years at that point in time. In the complaint, the complainant

narrates that she is married and settled with another person. The

gist of the complaint is as follows:

"‚Wಾ+Tಯು ಾ ೆ ೆ oಾಜ(ಾK €ೕ=ದ ದೂ ನ 9ಾ(ಾಂಶ,ೇ#ೆಂದ(ೆ ‚Wಾ+Tಯು
ಸು<ಾರು 4 ವಷ+ಗ ಂದ ಾ= ೆ ಮ#ೆಯ / ಕುಟುಂಬ ಸMೕತ ,ಾಸ,ಾKದುIJೊಂಡು
ಗೃUeWಾKರುPಾ:(ೆ, ‚Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ ಹ•+• (ಾh-13ವಷ+ ಈತನು ಅಂಜ#ಾನಗರದ /ರುವ
34ೕ5#ಾಯಕ ಸೂAಲ% / 9#ೇ ತರಗ?ಯ / ,ಾ 9ಾಂಗ <ಾಡು?:ರುPಾ:#ೆ. ‚Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ ಈ UಂSೆ
ಸು<ಾರು 2 ವಷ+ಗ ಂದ 4-5 ಾ ಮ#ೆ 'ಟು oೋK ೇ(ೆಯವರ ಮುEಾಂತರ ೕ <ಾ=O
,ಾಪಸು ಮ#ೆ ೆ ಬಂTರುPಾ:#ೆ. T#ಾಂಕ:25/11/2022 ರಂದು (ಾ?4: 08-00 ಗಂwೆ ೆ ಮ#ೆ'ಂದ
oೊರಗ[ೆ oೋದವನು ,ಾಪಸು ಮ#ೆ ೆ ಬಂTರುವRT8ಾ/, ‚Wಾ+Tಯ 9ೆ%ೕUPೆ ಪke+ಮ ರವರು
ಮಂಡ ದ / ,ಾಸ,ಾKದುI, ಇವರ >ೊPೆ ‚Wಾ+Tಯ ಮಗ oೆಚುt ಒಡ#ಾಟ5ಟು Jೊಂ=ದುI, ಪkeೕ+ಮ
ರವರನು% ಕ(ೆO 5Xಾರ ೆ <ಾಡ ೇJೆಂದು JೋರುPೆ:ೕ#ೆ. ನಂತರ ‚Wಾ+Tಯು ಸಂಬಂNಕರು ಮತು:
9ೆ%ೕUತರ ಬ 5Xಾರ <ಾಡ8ಾK WಾವRSೇ ಉಪಯುಕ: <ಾU? Sೊ(ೆ?ರುವRT8ಾ/, ಆದI ಂದ
Jಾ ೆWಾKರುವ ಹ•+• (ಾh-13ವಷ+ ರವರನು% ಪPೆ: <ಾ=Jೊಡ ೇJೆಂದು Jೊಟ ದೂರು ಇPಾ T.."

14.5. Yet another record is placed before this Court; the

complainant filed Crl.Misc.No.1467 of 2023 invoking Section 13(3)

of the Karnataka Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and in

the cause title therein, in the year 2023, the complainant describes

herself to be the wife of Yathish Kumar. The cause title reads as

follows:
42

"IN THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE.
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU

Present:- Sri. SUNIL.R., B.COM., LL.B.,
CJM., Bengaluru Rural District,
Bengaluru.

Dated this the 20th day of January, 2024.

Crl. Misc. No. 1467/2023

PETITIONER: Smt. Nagarathna,
W/o. Sri. Yathish Kumar,
31 years, R/at No.458,
Muddinapalya Main Road,
Anjananahara, Bengaluru North,
Bengaluru-560 061.

(By Sri.B.L.Jayarama, Adv)

- V/S -

RESPONDENT: The Chief Registrar,
Births and Deaths,
Office of the Tahsildar,
Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru.

(Respondent placed exparte)

*************"

The prayer sought therein is follows:

"The petitioner has filed the petition under Section 13(3)
of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 seeking
direction of this Court to direct the respondent to enter the date
of death of Renukamma, W/o Late Nagaraja, as 19.07.2011 in
the death register."
43

When all these facts, borne out from official records, are

considered cumulatively, it becomes difficult to comprehend,

far less accept, how the complainant could credibly assert

that she consented to sexual relationship on a "promise of

marriage", when she appears to have been in a subsisting

marital relationship or at the very least, in a continuing

domestic association, and is also mother of 2 children, one

about 13 years old and the other about 4 years.

14.6. What is more disturbing is the disquieting fashion in

which the complainant has sought to implicate other members of

the family of the petitioner. They are arraigned on a tenuous

allegation that they did not cooperate or support the petitioner's

marriage with the complainant, thereby attempting to create a

narrative of cheating. Criminal law cannot be permitted to

be expanded by such facile insinuation.

15. The offences alleged included Section 69 of the BNS.

Section 69 of BNS reads as follows:
44

"69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful
means, etc.--Whoever, by deceitful means or by making
promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling
the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual
intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.--"deceitful means" shall include inducement
for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying
by suppressing identity."

Section 69 criminalizes sexual intercourse by employing deceitful

means including a promise of marriage, without intention of

fulfilment. The provision though newly introduced, cannot be

interpreted, in a manner that allows it to become an instrument of

retroactive criminalization of consensual relationships upon the

mere recital of "promise". The statute punishes deceit, not

disappointment; fraud, not failed affection; and exploitation,

not the collapse of relationship. On the facts presented, it is

difficult to discern where from the offence under Section 69 could

even spring. The complainant on her own showing and on

admitted records, appears to have been married/associated

in other relationships, and to have children. In such

circumstances, the allegation of sexual intercourse, induced

solely on promise of marriage is inherently implausible and
45

legally unsustainable, consequently, neither Section 96 BNS

nor Section 64 BNS (Section 376 of the earlier regime, the

IPC) can be attracted.

16. The offence under Section 89 of the BNS (Section 313 of

the earlier regime) is also not made out. In view of the principle

enunciated by the Apex Court in NAIM AHAMED supra, consensual

sexual acts, do not by themselves, invite such provision, in the

absence of essential legal ingredients.

17. What then remains is, Section 318(2) of the BNS (Section

420 of the earlier regime, the IPC), even that cannot be invoked

merely because a relationship did not culminate in marriage.

The settle position of law is that, breach of a marriage to

marry, howsoever morally questionable, is not per se

cheating in the criminal sense, unless dishonest intention at

the inception is established, which is conspicuously absent

in the case at hand.
46

18. The petitions are at the stage of registration of crime. The

question whether this Court should interfere at the stage of

registration of crime is no longer res integra. The Apex Court in

MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH8 has held as

follows:

".... .... ....

10. The entire case put up by the first informant on the
face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage,
we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for
quashing of an FIR in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters are : (SCC pp. 378-
79, para 102)

"102. ... (1) Where the allegations made in the
first information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order

8
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
47

of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."

We are of the view that the case of the present appellants falls
within Parameters 1, 5 and 7, respectively, of Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri)
426: AIR 1992 SC 604].

11. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or
vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a
duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.

12. We say so because once the complainant decides
to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure
that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the
averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they
48

disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or
not.

13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court
owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case over
and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account
the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance
the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a
period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances
the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance,
thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of
private or personal grudge as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1805], a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of
materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court
drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were
tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such
material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can
be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda
Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004)
6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)

"5. ... Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court
has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse
of the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation
or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
49

court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed
by the complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is
made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR
1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories
of cases where inherent power can and should be
exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC
para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a
legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want
of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted
in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence,
but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between
a case where there is no legal evidence or where
there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with
the accusations made, and a case where there is
legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the
High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process, no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and
judicious in exercising discretion and should take
all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would
be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any
50

person needlessly. At the same time the section is
not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its
sudden death."
(emphasis supplied)"

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court reiterates with crystalline clarity that where the

proceedings are manifestly frivolous, vexatious, inherently

improbable or maliciously instituted to wreak vengeance, the High

Court should not hold itself looking into artful drafting of the

complaint, but should travel to consider the antecedent

circumstances that led to registration of the crime, and obliterate

the same if it finds any of the aforesaid factors.

19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand, the

documents and events noticed hereinabove unmistakably disclose,

that the complaint is not a genuine criminal grievance, but bears a

strong imprint of manipulation and of an attempt to convert