(5) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under
this section that the accused has been released on his bond or
bail bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the
discharge of such bond or bail bond or otherwise as he thinks
fit.
(9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude
further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under sub-section (3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the
police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he
shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the form as the State Government
may, by rules, provide; and the provisions of sub-sections (3) to
(8) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or
reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under
sub-section (3):
Provided that further investigation during the trial may be
conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and
the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days
which may be extended with the permission of the Court."
Section 193(2), though couched in mandatory language, operates
in a distinct domain. It is a legislative exhortation to ensure
alacrity in investigation, particularly in heinous offences - in relation
to an offence under Sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 and 71 of the
BNS or Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act. Yet, it does not,
in its text or spirit, confer upon the accused a right to default bail
upon its breach. To construe it otherwise, would render Section 187
nugatory - a consequence that must be eschewed.
11. The offences alleged against the petitioner, one is under
Section 64 of the BNS, which is rape punishable for life and the
other is, Section 108 of BNS, abatement to suicide which is
punishable up to 10 years. The offences under the POCSO Act are
under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, sexual assault and penetrative sexual
assault on a child which is punishable with 20 years or life.
Therefore, one factor is clear that the offences alleged against the
petitioner are all punishable with imprisonment beyond 10 years
and in such circumstances, the mandate of sub-section (3) of
Section 187 is that the charge sheet should be filed within 90 days.
The charge sheet was filed on 84th day of the petitioner being taken
into custody. Therefore, it is in complete compliance with the
mandate of sub-section (3) of Section 187 of the BNSS. The
petitioner cannot claim that the charge sheet was filed on 84th day
and, therefore, he is entitled to the grant of statutory bail, owing to
the analogous provision under Section 193 of BNSS.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
on the judgment of the coordinate Bench in the case of MOULALI
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA1. The reliance placed is entirely
misplaced as the coordinate Bench holds as follows:
".... .... ....
26. In the light of the above disputed fact of date of filing
of the charge sheet, this Court bestowed it's best attention to
the material placed on record. As could be seen from the
endorsement made by the learned Special Judge on charge
sheet, charge sheet is received by the learned Special Judge and
he has made an endorsement 'check and then put up', the said
endorsement is dated 24.01.2025.
27. After the charge sheet is field, the power to remand
exists in the Court till the ministerial act of verification of the
Crl.R.P.No.100051 of 2025 decided on 04-03-2025
charge sheet papers are carried out and till the date of taking of
the cognizance is under Section 346 of the BNSS (Section 309
of Cr.P.C.).
28. In other words, power to remand in the interregnum
of filing of the charge sheet and actual date of taking the
cognizance is inherent in the trial Court.
29. View of this Court in this regard is supported by the
judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suresh Kumar
Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and another
reported in (2013) 1 S.C.R 1037. Relevant paragraphs of the
said decision are culled out hereunder for ready reference:
1.2. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. is that once the
investigation stage is completed, the court proceeds to
the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and
trial. An accused has to remain in custody of some
court. Once cognizance is taken, the power to remand
shifts to the provisions of s.309 Cr.P.C., under which
the trial court is empowered to postpone or adjourn
proceedings and, for the said purpose, to extend the
period of detention from time to time. However, the
provisions of s.309 Cr.P.C. have no application to the
facts of the instant case. [para 15 and 18] [1047 G-H;
1048-B; 1052-A]
1.2. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. is that once the
investigation stage is completed, the court proceeds to
the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and
trial. An accused has to remain in custody of some
court. Once cognizance is taken, the power to remand
shifts to the provisions of s.309 Cr.P.C., under which
the trial court is empowered to postpone or adjourn
proceedings and, for the said purpose, to extend the
period of detention from time to time. However, the
provisions of s.309 Cr.P.C. have no application to the
facts of the instant case. [para 15 and 18] [1047 G-H;
1048-B; 1052-A]
30. Applying the principles of law enunciated in the
aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied on
by the parties as referred supra, there cannot be any iota
of doubt in the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Udaya Mohanlal Acharya and Anupam
J. Kulkarni supra, that accused enjoys indefeasible right
to seek for grant of statutory bail if there is no filing of
the charge sheet within the prescribed period. It is also
to be noted that filing of Charge Sheet subsequently
would not take away the right already accrued.
31. As already observed supra, filing of the charge
sheet as is contemplated under Section 193(2) of Cr.P.C.
could be treated as mandatory even in case where the
accused is not arrested is to be discussed in an
appropriate case.
32. For the purpose of disposing of the present
case, since the accused-petitioner is arrested on the very
next day on 26.11.2024, filing of the charge sheet on
24.01.2025 is well within the ambit of Section 193(2)of
the BNSS in the case on hand which is sufficient
compliance of the said provision.
33. It is needless to emphasise that once the
charge sheet is filed ticking of the clock with regarding to
statutory right which is carved out in the Statute would
automatically stop. As could be seen from the material on
records, in the charge sheet dated 24.01.2025 and actual
cognizance has been taken on 29.01.2025 as referred
supra and thereafter necessary endorsements has been
carried out in the relevant registers wherein, the pending
FIR is culminated in filing a charge sheet and a special
case came to be registered.
34. In view of the principles of law enunciated in
the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain supra, this
Court is of the considered opinion that rejection of the
petitioner seeking grant of statutory bail is justified
though not the order of the learned Special Judge is not
happily worded.
35. In view of the foregoing discussion, following order is
passed:
ORDER
Petition is merit less, and is hereby dismissed. However,
dismissal of the present petition would not come in the way of
petitioner seeking regular bail in accordance with law."
The coordinate Bench holds that the charge sheet was filed within
60 days though the investigation could have gone on up to 90 days.
In the light filing of the charge sheet within 60 days, the discussion
of the interplay between Sections 187 and 193(2) is not elaborated.
Therefore, the said judgment on the face of it, is inapplicable to the
case at hand. In the case at hand, the charge sheet is filed on the
84th day. The mandate of Section 193(2) is for benefit of the victim
and not to be taken as benefit to the accused for statutory bail.
Statutory bail/default bail can be sought only under Section 187 of
the BNSS and non-filing of the charge sheet under Section 193(2)
cannot mean that the accused would be entitled to seek statutory
bail, even for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of
10 years or more and the prosecution's period of investigation is 90
days.
13. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in HANUMANTHA MOGAVEERA v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY WOMEN POLICE STATION2 wherein
the Division Bench holds that the provision for completion of
investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the POCSO Act
is to the benefit of the victim and cannot be taken as shield for the
accused to seek his release on bail or otherwise. The Division Bench
holds as follows:
".... .... .....
SUBMISSIONS:
5. It was the submission of petitioner/accused No. 1 that,
in the instant cases, the charge-sheet has already been filed and
accused No. 1 is in custody. That cognizance of offences was
taken by the Trial Court on 13.05.2019. As per Section 35(1) of
POCSO Act evidence of the child had to be recorded within a
period of thirty days of taking cognizance of the offence by the
Trial Court. If the same is not so recorded, the reasons for the
delay has also to be recorded by the said Court. Further, as per
Section 35(2) of the POCSO Act, the Trial Court, having not
completed the trial within a period of one year from the date of
taking cognizance of the offences, petitioner/accused No. 1 was
entitled to be released on bail.
... ... ...
7. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the decision
in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (Nct of Delhi) [2020 SCC OnLine SC
98.], (Sushila Aggarwal). It was also submitted that liberty of
the petitioner/accused No. 1 had to be protected and if he was
not going to be released on bail, his personal liberty was under
jeopardy and his fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of
ILR 2021 KAR 3469
the Constitution was in violation. It was contended that if the
petitioner/accused No. 1 was released on bail on certain
conditions being imposed, the same would be complied with and
he would abide by the same.
... ... ...
9. Learned Single Judge on considering Idnayrelied upon
by the petitioner/accused No. 1 has observed that the
expression "as far as possible" used in Section 35 (2) of the
POCSO Act has to be borne in mind and hence, doubting the
order of this Court in Vinay, the Reference has been made in the
aforesaid terms. However,Learned Single Judge on merits held
that no case was made out to release petitioner/accused No. 1
on bail and hence, the petition was dismissed. Nevertheless, in
order to answer the Reference, a Special Bench has been
constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
... ... ...
16. ... ... ...
d) Section 35 of the POCSO Act consists of two
parts :firstiy, it deals with the period for recording of
evidence of the child and disposal of case. Sub-Section
(1) of Section 35 states that the evidence of the child
shall be recorded within a period of thirty days of the
Special Court taking cognizance of the offence and
reasons for delay, if any, shall be recorded by the Special
Court. Secondly, sub-Section (2) prescribes the period of
one year from the date of taking cognizance of the
offence for the purpose of completion of the trial. Of
course, the said period prescribed is to be complied with,
as far as possible, by the Special Court.
... ... ...
SECOND POINT:
39. As far as the second point of reference is
concerned, the same relates to sub-Section (2) of Section
35 of the POCSO Act which mandates that the Special
Court shall complete the trial, as far as possible, within a
period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of
the offence. The reasons for prescribing a period of one
year for completion of the trial are not far to see. The
main reason being, the victim child must not only be
rendered speedy justice but, at the same time, it is
necessary to get over the legal proceeding at the earliest,
so that the child could concentrate on rehabilitation and
get on with his or her life. Prolonging the trial before the
Special Court for years together, like any other sessions
case, would be futile and frustrate the intention of the
parliament as well as the object of POCSO Act. It must be
remembered that the object and purpose of the said Act
being child-centric, all efforts must be made by all stake-
holders under the said Act, including the Special Court, to
complete the trial within a period of one year from the
date of taking cognizance of the offence under the said
Act. But, the Parliament, while having such a noble
intention, at the same time, has not lost sight of the
reality and technical difficulties faced by Criminal Courts
including the Special Courts, in particular and criminal
justice system, in general. Therefore, the use of the
expression, "as far as possible" in the provision. But, the
said expression does not in any way permit any
recalcitrant attitude, nor does it countenance a slow and
tardy trial or envisage a re-living of the trauma by the
victim child for years together. The expression "as far as
possible", is used by the Parliament, having regard to the
genuine difficulties faced in the conclusion of a trial
concerning a victim child under the provisions of the
POCSO Act. If the evidence of the child is to be recorded
within a period of thirty days from the date of taking
cognizance of the offence, the trial under the provisions
of the POCSO Act being a sessions trial, would mean that
all provisions of Cr.P.C., which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the POCSO Act would apply and hence,
there may be reasons beyond the control of the Special
Court, for not being able to complete the trial under the
POCSO Act within a period of one year from the date of
taking cognizance of the offence.
... ... ...
41. Be that as it may. The second point of reference is,
whether, the accused is entitled to be released on bail if the
evidence of the child has not been recorded within a period of
thirty days of taking cognizance of the offence or if the Special
Court does not complete the trial within a period of one year
from the date of taking cognizance. Such an interpretation
would be an additional clause under the said provision and
giving an additional right to the accused. Even under Section
309 of Cr.P.C., the trial of the proceedings has to be continued
from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been
examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same
beyond the following day to be necessary for the reasons to be
recorded. The proviso thereto has been amended with effect
from 03.02.2013 and the proviso thereto deals with trial relating
to offence under Section 376 and related Sections of the Penal
Code, 1860, wherein the trial has to be completed within a
period of two months from the date of filing of the charge-sheet,
as far as possible. Thus, the expression 'as far as possible' is
also found in proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 309 of
Cr.P.C. Section 309 of Cr.P.C., also speaks about the
circumstances under which no adjournment could be granted.
The use of the expression "as far as possible" is also on account
of the fact that under Section 37 of the POCSO Act, the trial has
to be conducted in camera and in the presence of the parents of
the child or any other person in whom the child has trust or
confidence. But, if the Special Court is of the opinion that the
child needs to be examined at the place other than the Court, it
shall proceed to issue a commission in accordance with the
provisions of Section 284 of Cr.P.C. In such a case, the
circumstances under which commission for examination of
witness is issued under Section 284 of Cr.P.C., would apply,
namely that if the child cannot be procured without an amount
of delay, expense or inconvenience, but in the circumstances of
the case, would be unreasonable, then the Special Court may
dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission for
the examination of witness in a place other than the Court. The
provisions dealing with Commission for the examination
of witness mutatis mutandis apply when the Special
Court orders examination of the child at a place other
than the Court. Therefore, in such circumstances, there
may be delay in recording the evidence of the child within
a period of thirty days of taking cognizance of the offence
by the Special Court or even delay in completion of trial
within a period of one year from the date of taking
cognizance of the offence. In such an event, it cannot be
treated to be a default, which would enure to the benefit
of the accused so as to give the accused a right to be
released on bail.
42. It is observed that the object and purpose of
Section 35 of the POCSO Act is for the benefit of the
child victim and is not to be considered as an additional
clause for the purpose of granting bail to the alleged
perpetrator or the accused.
43. As discussed above, there may be various
reasons and circumstances beyond the control of the
Special Court under which the conclusion of the
proceedings within a period of one year may not happen.
As already noted, the reasons for the same have been
discussed above. Under such circumstances, the accused
cannot enforce the right to be released on bail. No such
right is envisaged under the said provisions of the Act
and the same cannot be read into it by way of an
interpretation which may go against the interest of the
child victim. If the aforesaid interpretation is to be made
then, there would be every attempt made to delay the
proceedings before the Special Court beyond the period
of one year and seek release of accused on bail. Such a
position cannot be encouraged nor is it envisaged under
the POCSO Act.
... ... ...
49. If for reasons beyond the control of the
Special Court, the evidence of the child is not recorded
within the period of thirty days of the Special Court
taking cognizance of the offence, or if the trial itself is
not completed within a period of one year from the date
of cognizance of the offence, the same cannot lead to
the accused being released on bail. The object and
purpose of Section 35 of the POCSO Act is to ensure that
the victim child is secured from the trauma of trial of
the case at the earliest so that she or he could be
rehabilitated and reintegrated into society at the
earliest. The said provision is not to be interpreted in
favour of the accused so as to mandate release of the
accused, if for any reason, evidence is not recorded
within a period of thirty days of taking cognizance of the
offence or the Special Court not completing the trial
within a period of one year from the date of taking
cognizance of the offence.
50. In our view, non-compliance of Section 35 of
the POCSO Act cannot be the basis for releasing the
accused on bail as that would be a misreading of the
provision. One has to bear in mind the fact that the docket
explosion under the POCSO Act is not commensurate with the
sufficient number of Special Courts being constituted with the
requisite human resources as well as infrastructure. It may be
practically impossible for the Trial Court to conclude the trial
within one year from the date of cognizance by the said Court
in a majority of the cases. But, that does not give a right to
the accused to seek bail for the reason that the mandate
under Section 35 of the POCSO Act has not been completed."
The Division Bench clearly holds that no right is envisaged under
the provisions of the Act - POCSO Act and it is not only in the
interest of the accused for completion of investigation within a time
frame, but is in the interest of the victim child also. The accused
cannot enforce the right to be released on bail.
14. If the observations of the Division Bench are paraphrased
to the case at hand as well, what would unmistakably emerge is,
that the petitioner cannot place reliance upon Section 193(2) of the
BNSS to contend that he is entitled to a statutory bail, if the
investigation is not complete within 60 days as obtaining under
Section 193(2). The jurisprudence consistently underscores
that timelines under special statutes like the POCSO Act, are
victim centric, intended to ensure swift justice, not to
furnish escape routes for the accused. Thus, the issue must be
answered in the negative. The petitioner cannot draw
sustenance from Section 193(2) of the BNSS to claim
statutory bail.
ISSUE NO.2:
Whether the filing of an allegedly incomplete charge
sheet can clothe the accused with such a right - grant of
statutory bail?
15. The second contention, though ingeniously
advanced, cannot withstand the weight of settled law. The
Apex Court interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the
Cr.P.C. which is now Section 187(3) of the BNSS, has in CENTRAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. KAPIL WADHAWAN3 held as
follows:
(2024) 3 SCC 734
"21. In our opinion, the Constitution Bench in K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India [K. Veeraswami v. Union of
India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] has aptly
explained the scope of Section 173(2) : (SCC p. 716, para 76)
"76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of
police officer under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. The
Section 173(2) provides that on completion of the
investigation the police officer investigating into a
cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must
be in the form prescribed by the State Government and
stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the
nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons
who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of
the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been
committed and, if so, by whom (e) whether the accused
has been arrested; (f) whether he had been released on
his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;
and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under
Section 170. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain
Musadi v. State of Bihar [Satya Narain Musadi v. State of
Bihar, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 660] that the
statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2)
would be complied with if the various details prescribed
therein are included in the report. This report is an
intimation to the magistrate that upon investigation into
a cognizable offence the Investigating Officer has been
able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to
inquire into the offence and the necessary information is
being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section
173(2) purports to be an opinion of the Investigating
Officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to
procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by
the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied
with all the documents and statements of witnesses as
required by Section 175(5). Nothing more need be stated
in the report of the Investigating Officer. It is also not
necessary that all the details of the offence must be
stated. The details of the offence are required to be
proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at a later
stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by
adducing acceptable evidence."
(emphasis supplied)
22. In view of the above settled legal position, there
remains no shadow of doubt that the statutory requirement of
the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the
various details prescribed therein are included in the report. The
report under Section 173 is an intimation to the court
that upon investigation into the cognizable offence, the
investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient
evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the
necessary information is being sent to the court. The
report is complete if it is accompanied with all the
documents and statements of witnesses as required by
Section 175(5). As settled in the aforestated case, it is
not necessary that all the details of the offence must be
stated.
23. The benefit of proviso appended to sub-section
(2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to the
offender only when a charge-sheet is not filed and the
investigation is kept pending against him. Once however,
a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases. It may be
noted that the right of the investigating officer to pray for
further investigation in terms of sub-section (8) of
Section 173 is not taken away only because a charge-
sheet is filed under sub-section (2) thereof against the
accused. Though ordinarily all documents relied upon by
the prosecution should accompany the charge-sheet,
nonetheless for some reasons, if all the documents are
not filed along with the charge-sheet, that reason by
itself would not invalidate or vitiate the charge-sheet.It is
also well settled that the court takes cognizance of the
offence and not the offender. Once from the material
produced along with the charge-sheet, the court is
satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes
cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the
accused, it is immaterial whether the further
investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or
not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the
other accused or for production of some documents not
available at the time of filing of charge-sheet would
neither vitiate the charge-sheet, nor would it entitle the
accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground
that the charge-sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet or
that the charge-sheet was not filed in terms of Section
173(2)CrPC."
16. In a later judgment in DABLU KUJUR v. STATE OF
JHARKHAND4 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
"14. It may be noted that though there are various
reports required to be submitted by the police in charge of the
police station before, during and after the investigation as
contemplated in Chapter XII CrPC, it is only the report
forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under
sub-section (2) of Section 173CrPC that can form the
basis for the competent court for taking cognizance
thereupon. A charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of
the police officer under Section 173(2)CrPC It is an
opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the
court concerned that on the material collected during the
course of investigation, an offence appears to have been
committed by the particular person or persons, or that no
offence appears to have been committed.
15. When such a police report concludes that an offence
appears to have been committed by a particular person or
persons, the Magistrate has three options:
(i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the
offence and issue process,
(ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section
(3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a
further report, or
(iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the
accused or drop the proceedings.
(2024) 6 SCC 758
If such police report concludes that no offence appears
to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three
options:
(i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings,
or
(ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further,
take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or
(iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by
the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156
[Bhagwant Singh v. CBI, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985
SCC (Cri) 267] .
16. The issues with regard to the compliance of Section
173(2)CrPC, may also arise, when the investigating officer
submits police report only qua some of the persons-accused
named in the FIR, keeping open the investigation qua the other
persons-accused, or when all the documents as required under
Section 173(5) are not submitted. In such a situation, the
question that is often posed before the court is whether such a
police report could be said to have been submitted in
compliance with sub-section (2) of Section 173CrPC.
17. In this regard, it may be noted that in Satya Narain
Musadi v. State of Bihar [Satya Narain Musadi v. State of
Bihar, (1980) 3 SCC 152 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 660] , this Court
has observed that statutory requirement of the report
under Section 173(2) would be complied with if various
details prescribed therein are included in the report. The
report is complete if it is accompanied with all the
documents and statements of witnesses as required by
Section 175(5). In Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI [Dinesh Dalmia
v. CBI, (2007) 8 SCC 770 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 36] ,
however, it has been held that even if all the documents
are not filed, by reason thereof the submission of the
charge-sheet itself would not be vitiated in law.
18. Such issues often arise when the accused would
make his claim for default bail under Section 167(2)CrPC
and contend that all the documents having not been
submitted as required under Section 173(5), or the
investigation qua some of the persons having been kept
open while submitting police report under Section
173(2), the requirements under Section 173(2) could not
be said to have been complied with. In this regard, this
Court recently held in CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan [CBI v.
Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 3 SCC 734 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri)
300] that : (SCC p. 748, para 23)
"23. ... Once from the material produced along with
the charge-sheet, the court is satisfied about the
commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the
offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is
immaterial whether the further investigation in terms
of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of
the further investigation qua the other accused or for
production of some documents not available at the time
of filing of charge-sheet would neither vitiate the
charge-sheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim
right to get default bail on the ground that the charge-
sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet or that the
charge-sheet was not filed in terms of Section
173(2)CrPC."."
17. In NAGARAJ v. STATE OF KARNATAKA5 wherein an
identical contention was projected, this Bench following the Full
Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court has held as follows:
".... .... ...
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. They, in
fact, lie in a narrow compass. What requires consideration is,
whether the petitioner/accused No.1 could be enlarged on bail,
when an application is filed under sub-section (2) of Section 167
of the Cr.P.C. Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
Crl.P.No.102126 of 2023 decided on 20-12-2023
"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be
completed in twenty-four hours.-- (1) Whenever any
person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that
the investigation cannot be completed within the period of
twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds
for believing that the accusation or information is well founded,
the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer
making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-
inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial
Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter
prescribed relating; to the case, and shall at the same time
forward the accused to such Magistrate.
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is
forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has
no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time,
authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as
such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding
fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to
try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further
detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be
forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:
Provided that--
(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention
of the accused person, otherwise than in
custody of the police, beyond the period of
fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate
grounds exist for doing so, but no
Magistrate shall authorise the detention of
the accused person in custody under this
paragraph for a total period exceeding -
(i) ninety days, where the investigation
relates to an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less
than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation
relates to any other offence, and, on
the expiry of the said period of ninety
days, or sixty days, as the case may
be, the accused person shall be
released on bail if he is prepared to
and does furnish bail, and every
person released on bail under this
sub-section shall be deemed to be so
released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of
that Chapter;
(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the
accused in custody of the police under this section
unless the accused is produced before him in person
for the first time and subsequently every time till the
accused remains in the custody of the police, but the
Magistrate may extend further detention injudicial
custody on production of the accused either in
person or through the medium of electronic video
linkage;
(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially
empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall
authorise detention in the custody of the police.
Explanation I. --For the avoidance of doubts,
it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry
of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused
shall be detained in custody so long as he does not
furnish bail.
Explanation II.--If any question arises
whether an accused person was produced before the
Magistrate as required under clause (b), the
production of the accused person may be proved by
his signature on the order authorising detention or
by the order certified by the Magistrate as to
production of the accused person through the
medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may
be.
Provided further that in case of a woman
under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be
authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or
recognised social institution."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In terms of Section 167(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C., an
accused will be entitled to bail in the event the final report is not
filed within 90 days from the date on which the accused was
sent to judicial custody. Filing of charge sheet is dealt with
under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:
"173. Report of police officer on completion of
investigation.--(1) Every investigation under this Chapter
shall be completed without unnecessary delay
(1A) The investigation in relation to rape of a child may
be completed within three months from the date on which the
information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police
station.
(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in
charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police
report, a report in the form prescribed by the State
Government, stating--
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be
acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been
committed and, if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and,
if so, whether with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody
under section 170.
(h) whether the report of medical examination of
the woman has been attached where
investigation relates to an offence under
section 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D or
section 376E of the Penal Code, 1860.
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner
as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action
taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information
relating to the commission of the offence was first given.
(3) Where a superior officer of police has been
appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any case in
which the State Government by general or special order so
directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending
the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the
police station to make further investigation.
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under
this section that the accused has been released on his bond,
the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such
bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to
which section 170 applies, the police officer shall
forward to the Magistrate along with the report--
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on
which the prosecution proposes to rely other
than those already sent to the Magistrate
during investigation;
(b) the statements recorded under section 161 of
all the persons whom the prosecution proposes
to examine as its witnesses.
(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any
such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the
proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential
in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public
interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and
append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part
from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his
reasons for making such request.
(7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds
it convenient so to do, he may furnish
to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to
in sub-section (5).
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
preclude further investigation in respect of an offence
after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded
to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation,
the officer in charge of the police station obtains further
evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the
Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such
evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of
sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in
relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2)."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (supra) deals with filing of
final report by the Police after investigation. Section 173(2) of
the Cr.P.C. mandates that once investigation is completed the
officer in-charge of a Police Station shall forward the report to
the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on
the final report, indicating the factors that are narrated in sub-
Section (2) of Section 173. Section 173(5) mandates that when
such report is in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies,
the Police Officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the
report all documents or relevant extract thereof on which the
prosecution proposes to rely on, other than those already sent
to the Magistrate during investigation and the statements
recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the
prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. deals with power of the Magistrate
to direct further investigation to be conducted in a given case.
Therefore, it is open for the Police to conduct further
investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. This is
the frame work on which release on bail of an accused and filing
of charge sheet are dealt with. It is these that are germane to
be noticed in the case at hand.
10. It is an admitted fact that FSL report was not
accompanying with the charge sheet when the prosecution filed
its final report before the Court on 08-01-2023. The issue
whether the petitioner would get a right to get himself enlarged
on bail in the absence of a FSL report in the charge sheet need
not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. A
Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of MANAS
KRISHNA T.K. v. STATE6 was answering a reference to the
Division Bench in view of conflicting views of two Learned Single
Judges on the very issue of an accused becoming entitled to
enlargement on default bail on the ground that FSL report did
not accompany the final report. The Division Bench answering
the question holds as follows:
"2. The main issue which falls for determination in this
reference is whether, in a case under the NDPS Act, the
investigation can be said to be complete within the period
prescribed under Section 167 (2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code (Cr.PC), when a police report under Section 173 (2)
2021 SCC OnLine Bom.2955
is filed before the Special Court without any CA/FSL
report along. If, based upon such a police report, an
investigation is held as incomplete, then, the accused
will be entitled to default bail. However, if the
investigation is held as complete, no question of default
bail would arise.
3. This reference arose on the account of the
following:--
(a) On 07.01.2020, FIR No. 5/2020 was registered at the
Anjuna Police Station against the applicant/accused
alleging commission of an offense under section 20
(C) of the NDPS Act, 1985. The FIR alleged that the
accused was found in possession of a commercial
quantity (0.5 gms) of L.S.D. contraband under the NDPS
Act. The accused was arrested on the same date i.e.
07.01.2020. The accused's bail application No. 76/2020
was rejected by the Special Court 29.06.2020.
(b) The Investigating Officer (10) filed a report under
Section 173 (2) Cr. P.C. (Charge-sheet) before the
Special Court on 04.07.2020. This was the 179th day
since the arrest of the first remand. This means that the
charge-sheet was filed within the 180 days time limit
provided in Section 167 (2) Cr. P.C. r/w
Section 36(A)(4) of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
Substances Act (NDPS Act).
(c) Along with the charge-sheet, the 10 also filed
before the Special Court on 04.07.2020 itself
several documents in terms of Section 173
(5) of Cr. P.C. This included a Panchanama in
which it was recorded that a field test was
conducted at the spot where the accused was
apprehended and that the results suggested that
the substance recovered from the shoulder bag
carried by the accused, was indeed L.S.D.
However, the 10, along with the charge sheet, did
not file any Chemical Analyser (CA)/FSL report
concerning the sample attached and sent to the
laboratory. Such CA/FSL report was ultimately
filed beyond the period prescribed in
section 167(2) Cr. P.C. confirming that the
substance recovered was indeed L.S.D.
(d) The accused had applied for bail before this Court on
07.07.2020 but withdrew this application on 07.08.2020
with liberty to apply before the Special Court. Such bail
application was filed on 22.09.2020 but was rejected on
21.11.2020. The accused then applied for bail before
this Court vide Criminal Misc. Application (Bail) (Filing)
no. 88 of 2021 (the present application).
(e) Mr. Poulekar relied on the following set of decisions
which according to him, support the aforesaid position
urged by him: (i) Sunil Vasantrao Phulbande v. State of
Maharashtra, (2002) 3 Mah LJ 689,
(ii) Punjaram v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cri LJ 4658,
(iii) Ranjeet Manohar Machrekar v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Bail Application No. 509/2014
(Bombay), (iv) Manik Sahebrao Chaugule v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Bail Application No. 241/2017
(Bombay), (v) Seema Raju Panchariya v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Bail Application No. 65/2018
(Aurangabad), (vi) SagarParshuram Joshi v. State of
Maharashtra, Bail Application (ST) No. 4761/2020
(Bombay).
(f) On the other hand, the Learned Public Prosecutor (PP)
pointed out to the Learned Single Judge, a set of
judgments that might invite a finding that the decisions
relied on by Mr. Poulekar are either 'per incuriam 'or at
any rate, in direct conflict. The decisions relied on by the
learned Public Prosecutor included the following :
(i) Balaji Vasantrao Suwarnkar v. State of Maharashtra,
1992 Mah LJ 159, (ii) State of
Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995)
1 SCC 42, (iii) Babu s/o Rakhmanji Khamkar v. State of
Maharashtra, (1995) 4 Bom CR 335, (iv) Rohini Mahavir
Godse v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 2 Mah LJ 492,
(v) Rafael Palafox Garcia v. Union of India, 2008 All M.R.
(Cri) 3031, (vi) Sheikh Shabbirs/o Mohd Shafi v. State
of Maharashtra, Criminal Application no. 143/2011
(Nagpur Bench), (vii) Srihari Mahadu Valse v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Bail Application No. 3284/2018,
(viii) Dheeraj Wadhawan v. C.B.I. - 2020 SCC OnLine
Bom 9461.
(g) Confronted with the rival sets of judgments, the Learned
Single Judge, by her order dated 07.07.2021 opined that
the following questions arise and can be more
advantageously considered by the Division Bench of this
Court:--
i. Whether the presentation of a report under
Section 173(2) Cr. P.C. by the police without the
report of Chemical Analyser/FSL amounts to
incomplete challan and in the absence of any
extension of time under Section 36-A (4) of
the NDPS Act, whether the accused is entitled to bail
under Section 167(2) Cr. P.C.?
ii. Whether, in a charge-sheet under NDPS Act,
accompanied by a field testing report which is a part
of the record, can be labelled as an incomplete
report, simply because it is not accompanied by a
report of Chemical Analyser/FSL
iii. What is the legal efficacy of "Drug Law Enforcement,
Field Officers 'Handbook' issued by the Narcotics
Control Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India?
(h) Based on the above opinion, the Registrar (Judicial-I) at
Bombay, vide letter dated 22.07.2021 informed the
Registrar (Judicial) at Goa that the Hon 'ble the Chief
Justice has been pleased to approve the constitution of
Division Bench for answering the questions raised by the
Hon 'ble Court (Coram : M.S. Jawalkar, J.) in Criminal
Miscellaneous Application (Bail) (Filing) No. 88/2021 and
to place the same before this Division Bench for
consideration.
.... .... ....
42. Therefore, on the analysis of the statutory
provisions, as also the decisions that have analyzed
various shades of such statutory provisions, we believe
that a police report or a charge sheet containing the
details specified in Section 173(2), if filed within the
period prescribed under Section 167(2) is not vitiated or
incomplete simply because the same was not
accompanied by a CA/FSL report and, based thereon,
there is no question of the accused insisting on default
bail.
.... .... ....
61. In the precise context of cases under the NDPS Act,
there is a long line of decisions delivered by the learned Single
Judges of our Court in Suwarnkar (supra), Rafael Palafox
Garcia (supra), Aleksander Kurganov (supra), Shrihari
Valse (supra), and Sheikh Shabbir (supra) that have taken the
view that a charge-sheet unaccompanied by a CA/FSL report is
not incomplete and therefore, where the same is filed within
the prescribed period, the accused, cannot insist on default bail.
These decisions according to us, reflect the legal position
correctly, and therefore, we endorse them.
62. The contention similar to what is now raised was
rejected in Rafael Palafox Garcia (supra). Besides, there can
be no general rule that the Magistrate or the Special
Court can never take cognizance of any offense under
the NDPS Act in the absence of a CA/FSL report.
Ultimately, that will be a matter which will have to be
decided on the facts of each case by the Magistrate or
the Special Court as the case may be.
63. Further, the contention that a Magistrate or
the Special Court, in any NDPS case, is not even
competent to take cognizance of any offense based only
on a field testing report as reflected in the Panchanama
or otherwise in the absence of CA/FSL report is again,
too wide a proposition to commend acceptance.
Ultimately a Magistrate or the Special Court will have to
assess the charge sheet and, if necessary, the documents
and the statements produced under Section 173(5) and
thereafter decide whether any case is made out for
taking cognizance of the offense.
64. For example, in Jagdish Purohit v. State of
Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 270, the Hon 'ble Supreme
Court after rejecting the CA/FSL report sustained the
conviction by accepting the evidence of the members of
the raiding party to prove that the powder which was
found from the factory was methaqualone. The witnesses
had stated that they had carried a kit to the field and had
received sufficient training and had sufficient knowledge
of narcotic substances and methods of testing them. This
evidence was found sufficient to sustain a conviction
even after ignoring CA/FSL report. Therefore, if a
conviction could be sustained on such evidence, surely,
cognizance of the offense can also be taken based on
such material produced along with the charge sheet. All
this will have to be assessed on a case-to-case basis and
therefore, the general proposition as urged on behalf of
the accused cannot be accepted.
65. There is and there can perhaps never be any dispute
with the proposition that the right of a default bail in terms of
Section 167(2) is a very valuable right that is now even
elevated to the status of a fundamental right under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. The several decisions like M.
Ravindran (supra), Rakesh Paul (supra), relied on behalf of the
accused, in this regard, therefore, need not even be discussed
because there is and there can be no quarrel with the
proposition laid down therein. However, as was explained by
the Hon 'ble Supreme Court itself in Dinesh Dalmiya (supra),
such a right of default bail, although is a valuable right, the
same is a conditional one. The condition precedent being
pendency of the investigation. Therefore, once the investigation
is complete with the filing of a police report containing the
details specified under Section 173(2), the question of a claim
or grant for default bail does not arise.
66. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the
presentation of a police report under Section 173(2)
unaccompanied by a CA/FSL report does not amount to
any incomplete police report or any incomplete charge
sheet/challan even in the absence of an extension of
time under Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act. Based
thereon therefore the accused cannot insist upon a
default bail.
67. Similarly, we hold that a police report under
Section 173(2) or a charge sheet/challan accompanied
by field testing reports as reflected in the Panchanama
or otherwise also cannot be labeled as an incomplete
police report/charge sheet/challan simply because the
same was not accompanied by a CA/FSL report.
68. Question no. (i) and (ii) in this reference are
answered accordingly.
.... .... ....
80. For all the aforesaid reasons we hold that the Drug
Law Enforcement Field Officers' Handbook issued by the NCB
has no legal efficacy, in the sense that the handbook has no
statutory flavor or the handbook is not a set of executive
instructions issued by the Central Government as contended by
Mr. Gaonkar. Question No. (iii) is answered accordingly.
81. Resultantly, we answer this reference by
holding the following:
(a) Question no. (i) is answered by holding that even
in an NDPS case a police report containing the
details prescribed under Section 173(2) Cr. P.C. is
a complete police report or a charge sheet or a
challan even if it is unaccompanied by a CA/FSL
report. If such police report is filed within the
period stipulated under Section 167(2) Cr.
P.C. r/w. Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, the
accused cannot insist upon a default bail.
(b) Question no. (ii) is answered by holding that in an
NDPS case, a charge sheet accompanied by a Geld
testing report as reflected in the Panchanama or
otherwise also cannot be labelled as an incomplete
police report/charge sheet/challan simply because
the same was not accompanied by a CA/FSL
report.
(c) Question no. (iii) is answered by holding that the
Drug Law Enforcement Field Officers' Handbook
issued by the NCB has no legal efficacy, in the
sense that the handbook has no statutory flavour
or the handbook is not a set of executive
instructions issued by the Central Government. "
(Emphasis Supplied)
The Division Bench in the afore-mentioned judgment has
delineated inter-play between Section 167(2) and
Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. and has finally held that even
if the charge sheet is not accompanied by a field testing
report it cannot be labeled as incomplete police report
simply because it was not accompanied by FSL report.
Resultantly, the accused would not become entitled to
default bail for the reason that it was not accompanied by
FSL report.
11. The afore-quoted judgment of the Division
Bench of Bombay High Court was concerning a case of
offences punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The allegations in the
case at hand are for the offences as afore-quoted. But,
the stream of law that is laid down is that mere non-filing
of FSL report would not vitiate the final report nor the
accused would get entitlement of seeking enlargement on
statutory/default bail. To the charge sheet in the case at
hand, except the FSL report, every other trait has
accompanied. It has accompanied the statement of
prosecutrix, her father, the birth certificate, clothes,
other medical reports of the victim as well as other
incriminating material. Though FSL report is not yet
received it would not lead to the petitioner becoming
entitled to seek and be granted default bail under Section
167 of the Cr.P.C., The FSL report can be used only to
corroborate the version of the prosecution. The Court can
take cognizance of the offence on the final report filed by
the Police. Therefore, there is no gainsaying that non-
filing of FSL report has resulted in defective charge sheet
and the defective charge sheet is no charge sheet in the
eye of law and, therefore, he would become entitled to
default bail. No fault can be found with the well reasoned
order passed by the learned Sessions Judge browsing
through entire spectrum of law laid down by the Apex
Court and several other High Courts. The order does not
warrant any interference, as the petitioner does not have
any right to get himself enlarged on default bail for the
reason of non-filing of FSL report."
18. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court and this
Bench as quoted supra, mere filing of an incomplete charge sheet
or the post-script in a charge sheet by reserving a right to file
supplementary charge sheet, cannot mean that the accused can be
released on grant of statutory bail. The High Court of Delhi, in a
later judgment, in YASH MISHRA v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI7
2025 SCC OnLine Del.5684
considers the issue regarding whether further investigation under
Section 193(9) of the BNSS camouflages the right of the accused to
statutory bail and holds as follows:
".... .... ....
12. As per the afore-quoted provision of BNSS
2023, further investigation in respect of an offence is
permissible even after a report under Section 193(3) is
filed before the Magistrate. The provision further
provides that if, on further investigation, any further
evidence is to be obtained, the same is to be forwarded to
the Magistrate with further report/reports regarding such
evidence.
13. The proviso appended to sub-section 9 of
Section 193 of the BNSS 2023, provides for further
investigation that may be conducted during trial with the
permission of the Court trying the case and that such
further investigation is to be completed within 90 days,
which may further be extended with the permission of
the Court. Thus, what we find is that the power to
conduct further investigation as conferred on the
investigating agencies under Section 193(9) is not
unfettered; the proviso appended thereto contains
adequate safeguards on the arbitrary use of the power
for further investigation, for the reason that further
investigation during trial can be conducted only with the
permission of the Court. We may also note that such
further investigation to be conducted with the permission
of the Court is to be completed within 90 days, which,
though, is extendable; however, such extension is
permissible only with leave of the Court. Thus, it is
difficult to hold that Section 193(9) of BNSS
2023 contains a provision which is unfettered and,
therefore, it is arbitrary.
14. So far as the submission that provision of
'further investigation' as contained in Section 193(9) is
camouflage to defeat the right of the accused person to
seek 'default bail' under Section 187(3) of BNSS 2023, we
may only observe that the provision contained in Section
193(9) and those of Section 187(3), operate in different
fields and further that Section 193(9) does not in any
manner acts as a camouflage to such right.
15. So far as the submission of the petitioner that
Section 193(9) does not contain any time period for
completion of further investigation is concerned, we may
indicate that Section 193(1) mandates that investigation
shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and as
already pointed out above the proviso clearly stipulates
90 days period for completion of further investigation
that too with the permission of the Court, which is
extendable only if the Court permits such extension.
16. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with the
submission of the petitioner that adequate safeguards
have not been provided to the accused persons to make
them realise their right of seeking a 'default bail' in a
situation where further investigation is undertaken by
the investigating agencies. Even otherwise, any possible
potential misuse of a statutory provision is not a ground
available to challenge the same and to term it
unconstitutional."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
19. On a blend of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court,
this Court and the High Court of Delhi what would unmistakably
emerge is, that in the absence of certain reports or the pendency of
further investigation, does not vitiate the charge sheet, nor does it
resurrect the right of default bail. Once a charge sheet is filed
within the stipulated period, with all material barring the reports,
the right to statutory bail stands extinguished. The criminal
process is not a ritual of perfection at its inception; it is an
evolving inquiry where additional evidence may surface in
the fullness of time. To insist upon absolute completeness,
at the stage of filing of the charge sheet, would be to impose
an impracticable burden upon the investigative machinery, a
caveat, this would be qua the facts obtaining in each of the cases.
CONCLUSION:
In the final analysis, the petitioner's plea fails to find
anchorage in law. The statutory framework read
harmoniously leaves no room for ambiguity. The charge
sheet having been filed within 90 days and its alleged
incompleteness being of no legal consequence to the claim
of default bail, the petitioner cannot be enlarged or set at
liberty on the said ground.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
(i) The statutory architecture of BNSS reveals with
unmistakable clarity, that Section 187 (3) of the BNSS
stands as the sole fountainhead from which the right to
default or statutory bail flows. This right, though
indefeasible in its nature, is circumscribed by the
temporal boundaries ordained therein - 60 days in
cases where alleged offences are punishable with
imprisonment up to 10 years and 90 days while the
punishment extends to 10 years or beyond. Only upon
the prosecution's failure to present the final report
within these statutory prescribed intervals does the
accused acquire the right to seek liberty on this ground.
(ii) Section 193(2) of the BNSS which mandates filing of
charge sheet within 60 days for certain offences cannot
mean that it can be made use of by the accused
seeking statutory/default bail. It is for the purpose of
completion of investigation in offences of rape and
POCSO. It is at best for the benefit of the victim and
cannot mean the accused can take benefit to seek
enlargement on bail.
(iii) The filing of charge sheet without accompanying reports
as those from the FSL or the CDR does not denude it of
its character as a final report in the eye of law nor does
it revive or confer upon the accused, a right to claim
statutory bail.
20. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no merit in the petition,
the petition stands rejected.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ
