[Cites 24, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri. K N Shanth Kumar vs Electoral Officer on 29 November, 2025
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE R
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 35584 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN
SRI. K N SHANTH KUMAR
SON OF LATE K.A. NETTAKALLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.298/A, 1ST MAIN, 8TH BLOCK,
JAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU 560 070.
.... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. S.S. NAGANAND, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. S. RAJENDRA., ADVOCATE)
AND
1. ELECTORAL OFFICER
KARNATAKA STATE CRICKET ASSOCIATION,
DR. B. BASAVARAAJU, I.A.S. (RETD.),
1ST FLOOR, M. CHINNASWAMY STADIUM,
Digitally signed CUBBON ROAD, BANGALORE - 560001.
by SHWETHA
RAGHAVENDRA
2. KARNATAKA STATE CRICKET ASSOCIATION,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AN ASSOCIATION REGISTERED UNDER
KARNATAKA THE KARNATAKA SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT,
1960,
NO. 1, M. CHINNASWAMY STADIUM,
CUBBON ROAD, SHIVAJI NAGAR,
BANGALORE 560001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS CEO.
3. SRI. B. K. VENKATESH PRASAD,
SON OF SRI. BAPU KRISHNARAMA RAO,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.83, 3RD MAIN, 1ST CROSS,
DEFENCE COLONY, INDIRANAGAR,
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BENGALURU -560038
4. KALPANA VENKATACHAR,
DAUGHTER OF SRI. VENKATACHAR,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.1667, 16TH MAIN, 32ND CROSS,
BSK II STAGE, BENGALURU 560 070
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. AVYAN RAO., ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. UDAYA HOLLA., SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. SURAJ SAMPATH., ADVOCATE FOR C/R2;
SRI. A.S. VISHWAJITH., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. KARN GUPTA., ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SMT. LAKSHMI MENON., &
SMT. TANIA DAS.K., ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION
QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 24.11.2025 PASSED BY THE R1
(ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.11.2025, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
CAV ORDER
1. The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs;
a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other Writ, Order or
Direction quashing the order dated 24.11.2025 passed
by the Respondent No.1 (Annexure A).
b) Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ, Order
or Direction directing the Respondent No.1 to declare
the Petitioner as a valid candidate for the purpose of
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contesting the elections of the Respondent No.2
Association and carry on the Election process of the
Petitioner in terms of the duly published Election
Calendar.
c) Declare that the provisions of clause 3B(D) (b) are
not applicable to individuals contesting the election for
the post of office bearers in accordance with rule 6(A)
(i) with its proviso.
d) Issue such other Writs, Directions or Orders, which
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the
facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of
justice and equity.
2. The Petitioner claims to be the president of M/s
Deccan Herald and Prajavani Sports Club for more
than two decades. He also claims to be a
philanthropist and avid sportsman, past president of
the Karnataka Olympics Association and Trustee of
M/s.Netkalappa Centre for Sports.
3. The Petitioner filed his nomination for the post of
President of the respondent No.2-Karnataka State
Cricket Association (for short hereinafter referred to
as "KSCA"). His nomination was scrutinised on
24.11.2025, when it was rejected on the ground that
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M/s Deccan Herald and Prajavani Sports Club, which
is an Institutional Member of the KSCA, was in
arrears to the KSCA. It is in that background that the
Petitioner is before this Court seeking the aforesaid
reliefs.
4. Sri.S.S.Naganand, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner, submitted that;
4.1. At the time when the nomination papers of the
Petitioner was taken up for scrutiny, there were
no arrears even though when at the time of
submitting the nomination papers there were
arrears, the said arrears had been paid at 3.06
pm before the nomination was taken up for
scrutiny at 5:30 pm and as such, there being
no arrears at that particular point of time, the
nomination Form of the Petitioner could not
have been rejected on account of there being
arrears.
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4.2. In this regard he relies upon Rule 3B(D)(b),
which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
3B GENERAL PROVISIONS ON
MEMBERS/ASSOCIATES:
(D) ARREARS:
(b) In case of a Life Member whose any payment
of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears and a Founder
Institutional member whose subscription or
payment of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears, such
Life members or Founder Institutional Members
shall not be allowed to attend/contest or vote at
any meeting or be allowed to enjoy the privileges
of the Association as long as they are in arrears.
4.3. His submission is that in case of a life member
whose any payment of more than Rs.100/- is in
arrears and the founder Institutional Member,
whose subscription or payment of more than
Rs.100/- is in arrears, such life member or
founder Institutional Member shall not be
allowed to attend/contest or vote at any
meeting or be allowed to enjoy the privileges of
the Association as long as they are in
arrears, would only mean that the embargo
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thereunder is as long as they are in arrears and
if arrears had been paid, the embargo under
Rule 3B(D)(b) would not apply, hence the
embargo for contesting would be only so long
as they are in arrears would not apply to the
Petitioner, who has made payment of the
arrears prior to the scrutiny.
4.4. The embargo under Rule 3B(D)(b) is not a
disqualification, there being a separate
provision for disqualification under By-law (6).
Bylaw (6) not having any disqualification
insofar as arrears are concerned. Thus, the
nomination form could not have been rejected
on the grounds of disqualification as done by
the Electoral Officer. In this regard, he relies
upon the decision of the Constitutional Bench of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Prabhakaran v.
P. Jayarajan1 more particularly, para 1, 2, 41,
1
(2005)1 SCC 754
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61 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder
easy reference;
1. Election to 14, Kuthuparamba Assembly Constituency
was held in the months of April-May 2001. There were
three candidates, including the appellant K. Prabhakaran
and the respondent P. Jayarajan contesting the election.
Nominations were filed on 24-4-2001. The poll was held on
10-5-2001. The result of the election was declared on 13-
5-2001. The respondent was declared as elected.
2. In connection with an incident dated 9-12-1991, the
respondent was facing trial charged with several offences.
On 9-4-1997, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Kuthuparamba held the respondent guilty of the offences
and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment as under:
Offences Sentence
Under Section 143 read with RI for a period
Section 149 IPC of one month
Under Section 148 read with RI for six
Section 149 IPC months
Under Section 447 read with RI for one
Section 149 IPC month
Under Section 353 read with RI for six
Section 149 IPC months
Under Section 427 read with RI for three
Section 149 IPC months
Under Section 3(2)(e) under RI for one year
the PDPP Act
read with Section 149 IPC
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41. The correct position of law is that nomination of a
person disqualified within the meaning of sub-section
(3) of Section 8 of RPA on the date of scrutiny of
nominations under Section 36(2)(a) shall be liable to
be rejected as invalid and such decision of the
returning Officer cannot be held to be illegal or
ignored merely because the conviction is set aside or
so altered as to go out of the ambit of Section 8(3) of
RPA consequent upon a decision of a subsequent date
in a criminal appeal or revision.
61. To sum up, our findings on the questions arising
for decision in these appeals are as under:
1. The question of qualification or disqualification of a
returned candidate within the meaning of Section
100(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (RPA for short) has to be determined by
reference to the date of his election which date, as
defined in Section 67-A of the Act, shall be the date
on which the candidate is declared by the returning
Officer to be elected. Whether a nomination was
improperly accepted shall have to be determined for
the purpose of Section 100(1)(d)(i) by reference to
the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination, the
expression, as occurring in Section 36(2)(a) of the
Act. Such dates are the focal point for the purpose of
determining whether the candidate is not qualified or
is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat in a
House. It is by reference to such focal point dates
that the question of disqualification under sub-
sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 shall have to be
determined. The factum of pendency of an appeal
against conviction is irrelevant and inconsequential.
So also a subsequent decision in appeal or revision
setting aside the conviction or sentence or reduction
in sentence would not have the effect of wiping out
the disqualification which did exist on the focal point
dates referred to hereinabove. The decisive dates are
the date of election and the date of scrutiny of
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nomination and not the date of judgment in an
election petition or in appeal thereagainst.
2. For the purpose of attracting applicability of
disqualification within the meaning of "a person
convicted of any offence and sentenced to
imprisonment for not less than two years", -- the
expression as occurring in Section 8(3) of RPA, what
has to be seen is the total length of time for which a
person has been ordered to remain in prison
consequent upon the conviction and sentence
pronounced at a trial. The word "any" qualifying the
word "offence" should be understood as meaning the
nature of offence and not the number of
offence/offences.
3. Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of RPA is an exception
carved out from sub-sections (1), (2) and (3). The
saving from disqualification is preconditioned by the
person convicted being a member of a House on the
date of the conviction. The benefit of such saving is
available only so long as the House continues to exist
and the person continues to be a member of a House.
The saving ceases to apply if the House is dissolved
or the person ceases to be a member of the House.
4.5. By relying on K.Prabhakaran's case, his
submission is that the question of qualification
or disqualification of a returned candidate is
required to be considered on the decisive date,
that is, the date of scrutiny of nomination,
which he submits is a time of scrutiny of the
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nomination paper and applying the
Constitutional Bench judgment in
K.Prabhakaran's case he submits that the
Electoral Officer ought to have taken into
consideration that by time scrutiny was taken
up or completed, the alleged embargo or
disqualification was not in existence.
4.6. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Bombay Court in Ramesh Rajaram Patil -v-
Addl. Commissioner, Aurangabad Division
and Others2 more particularly, para 4, 5, 11,
17 and 20 thereof, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
4. The Petitioner is a producer member of respondent No.
3 Karkhana which is a specified society for the purposes of
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The
elections for the managing committee were declared on
16-6-1994 and the last date for filing the nomination
papers was 22-6-1994. The date fixed for scrutiny was 23-
6-1994.
5. At the time of the scrutiny, respondent No. 4 filed an
objection (vide Exhibit A-, page 12) that the Petitioner was
a defaulter inasmuch as an amount of Rs. 3,427.25 was
due to the Karkhana from him. The scrutiny was,
2
1995 (1) Maharashtra law journal 208
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therefore, adjourned under proviso to rule 23(5) of the
Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to Committees
Rules, 1971 by the Returning Officer to 24-6-1994 on
application. On that day, the Petitioner tendered before the
Returning Officer a challan from A.D.C.C. Bank,
Aurangabad, showing the deposit of amount of Rs. 3,000/-
in the account of the respondent No. 3 Karkhana on 24-6-
1994, i.e. the adjourned date of scrutiny. The Returning
Officer took a view that the relevant date for determining
the disqualification on account of default under section 73-
FF of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960
was 16-6-1994 and as the Petitioner was a defaulter on
that date, though the amount was paid on a subsequent
date, he was disqualified for being elected to the managing
committee. He, therefore, rejected the nomination paper
filed by the Petitioner.
11. There is one more angle with which the facts in this
case may be viewed. The date on which the Petitioner had
purchased seeds from the Karkhana was not before the
Returning Officer. In order to constitute a default under
explanation (c) (ii) to section 73-FF(1)(i), "a member who
has purchased any goods or commodities on credit.......
and fails........to pay the price of such goods or
commodities........after receipt of notice of demand by him
from the concerned society or within thirty days......or
from the date of delivery of goods to him....., whichever is
earlier;" will be a defaulter. In this case, there was no
evidence before the Returning Officer from which it could
either be held that the payment was not made within thirty
days of service of notice of demand (because such a notice
was not proved to have been served much less, the date of
service) or that the payment was not made within thirty
days of delivery of goods. The Returning Officer does not
appear to have required the objector or the Karkhana to
adduce any evidence on those points. Under rule 23(2) of
the Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to
Committees Rules, he was duty bound to hold such
summary inquiry as he thought necessary and under rule
23(5) he should have allowed an opportunity to the
Petitioner to rebut the objection. True it is that he had
adjourned the matter for inquiry to the following day; but,
he had not taken suitable steps to satisfy himself that the
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Petitioner did really fall within the scope of the definition of
the expression "defaulter", the relevant portion of which is
quoted above. The finding of the Returning Officer that the
Petitioner was a defaulter and the consequent rejection of
nomination paper were, therefore, not warranted by law.
Both must be quashed and set aside.
17. If that disqualification is a curable disqualification,
there is no reason to suppose that a person, who has, with
awareness or with unawareness, remained in arrears of
the dues to the society till the date on which he filed the
nomination should not be allowed to mend his mistake and
do away with the temporary curable disqualification that
he had earned. If this is so, there is no reason to suppose
that the Returning Officer has to consider the question of
disqualification with reference to the date on which the
nomination paper was filed and not with reference to the
date on which the decision of the scrutiny was to be
recorded.
20. It may be noted that in any event, permitting an
eligible member to context the election does not mean
injustice to the other contestants or the body of members
in general. Likewise, permitting a member, otherwise
eligible, to contest the election to remove the curable
disqualification before the date of the decision to be
recorded by the Returning Officer does not necessarily
mean any injustice to the rival contestants or to the
general body of the members. Again, if a person, having
an alleged disqualification, is wrongly allowed to context
the election, and if he is elected, the aggrieved party is not
left by the Statute without any remedy. The Act does
provide an adequate remedy in that behalf. Therefore, we
do not see any legal hurdle in holding that a member, who
was temporarily disqualified on account of a curable
disqualification, could be allowed to mend the matters and
to get wiped the temporary curable disqualification before
the decision to be recorded by the Returning Officer.
4.7. By relying on Ramesh Rajaram Patil's case,
he submits that the facts in the said matter are
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more or less identical to that in the present
matter, wherein the date of scrutiny had been
fixed on 23.06.1994, the nomination having
been rejected on the ground that as on the
date of filing of the nomination, the candidate
was a defaulter, was rejected has been set
aside by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court by
holding that the disqualification has to be
considered on the date on which the decision of
scrutiny was recorded.
4.8. His submission is that there being a curable
defect in the nomination form, if the defect
were to be cured before the scrutiny was
completed, the Electoral Officer ought not to
have rejected the nomination form on account
of arrears of dues.
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4.9. He relies upon the decision in
L.Ramakrishnappa -v- Presiding Officer3,
more particularly para 20 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for reference;
20. To sum up, our conclusions on the two questions of law
arising for consideration, are as follows:
(1) Under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court has the
jurisdiction to interfere with the illegality committed in the
course of holding election to the offices of any
authority/body which is regulated by statutory provisions
(other than election to the Parliament and State
Legislature), notwithstanding the existence of an alternative
remedy, by way of filing Election Petition, if violation of law
is established. In other words, such a Writ Petition is
maintainable.
(2) However, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
being an extraordinary one, this Court as a general rule,
will not and should not entertain a Petition in matters
connected with such elections even if any illegality is shown
to have been committed, if the law provides an effective
alternative remedy and the illegality is such in respect of
which adequate relief could be granted in an Election
Petition. In other words, this Court will not and should not
entertain Writ Petition lightly, as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Muthuswamy [(1988) 1 SCC 572 : AIR 1988
SC 616.] .
(3) In exceptional cases in which the illegality committed is
patent and does not depend upon the investigation of
disputed questions of fact and interference is called for to
prevent, abuse of power and the taking of advantage of
such illegality by its beneficiaries for some time, waste of
public time and money and to avoid inconvenience to the
public institution concerned, this Court has not only the
3
ILR 1991 KAR 4421
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power but also under a duty to interfere provided the party
aggrieved approaches this Court forthwith and in good time.
4.10. By relying on L.Ramakrishnappa's case, his
submission is that while exercising powers
under Article 226 the Constitutional Court
would have the jurisdiction to interfere with the
illegality committed in the course of holding
election to the office of any Authorities/Body
notwithstanding the existence of an alternate
remedy by way of filing of Election Petition or a
Suit and as such, a writ petition would be
maintainable.
4.11. Though the Division Bench of this Court in
Ramakrishnappa's case has held that the
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 being
extraordinary one, should be exercised if the
circumstances so demand, his submission is
that this particular fact situation will come
within the said exception inasmuch as the
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Electoral Officer has applied a wrong date for
considering disqualification, inasmuch as the
Electoral Officer has considered the date of
nomination, whereas it is the date of scrutiny
which is required to be taken into
consideration.
4.12. He relies upon the decision of this Court in
D.L.Suresh Babu and another -v- The
Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India and another4, more particularly para
20, 21, 34 and 42 thereof, which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
20. In Muddamallappa's case, that being one of the
earliest cases, a Division Bench of this Court speaking
through Somnath Iyer, J. (as he then was) examining the
power of a High Court to interfere with rejection of a
nomination paper under the Mysore Village Panchayats and
Local Boards Act, 1959 and the Rules before the
completion of elections in the light of the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ponnuswami's case
observed thus:
"The principle that there should be no interruption of an
election while it is in progress and that no attack should be
made on the validity of any proceeding relating to such
election until its completion, is, as I understand it, a sound
4
1982 SCC OnLine Kar 148
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principle of election law which, ordinarily justifies the
refusal of the exercise of such jurisdiction. But, to say that
is not the same thing as saying that even in a case where
the impugned order of an Election Officer is so plainly
absurd or where the order made by him cannot but be
regarded as one which it was impossible for him to make
under the statutory provisions under which he was
functioning, we should, nevertheless, even in such a case,
decline to exercise our jurisdiction. In cases falling within
that exceptional category, it is clear that it would be our
plain duty to correct at the earliest stage such egregious
errors which, if the election is allowed to continue
unimpeded, would inevitably result in wasteful expenditure
of public time and money."
21. In Fakirappa Yellappa Kali's case, Rama Jois, J. in the
context of the bar created by sub-article (3) of Article 226
of the Constitution, substituted by the 42nd Amendment of
the Constitution, that was then in force, reviewing all the
earlier cases of the Supreme Court and this Court ruled
that it was open to this Court to interfere with the rejection
of a nomination in exceptional circumstances. With the
Amendment of Article 226 by the 44th Amendment of the
Constitution, that part of the discussion in Fakirappa
Yellappa Kali's case, dealing with the existence of an
alternative remedy is no longer relevant and the position is
that the law as it stood prior to 1st February 1977 or prior
to the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution stands
restored.
34. An Act must be read as a whole and effect must be
given to every part of the statute is elementary. As I
apprehend, the mandate of Explanation-I of Regulation
67(10) borrowed from similar provisions found in other
election laws of the country, directs the panel or the
returning Officer to ignore technical defects in a
nomination paper and reject it only for defects of a
substantial character only. But, unfortunately, the panel
has made a mountain out of a mole and has rejected them
on extremely technical considerations contrary to the
specific and clear mandate of Explanation-I of Regulation
No. 67(10) of the Regulations. Without any doubt, the
panel, if it had kept before it the said provision was bound
to hold that the nomination papers of the petitioners did
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not suffer from a defect of a substantial character and
accepted them, which would have been in accord with the
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Karnail Singh
v. Election Tribunal Hissar [10, E.L.R. 189.] , Pratap Singh
v. Shri Krishna Gupta [A.I.R. 1956 Supreme Court 140.] ;
and the Division Bench ruling of the Patna High Court in
Dahu Sao v. Rangalal Chaudhary (22 E.L.R. 299). With all
respect to the panel, I am constrained to say that the
rejection of the nomination papers of the petitioners was
for a plainly absurd and egregious reason and, therefore,
calls for my interference.
42. In the light of my above discussion, I make the
following orders and directions:
(a) I quash the impugned orders (Annexure-D in Writ
Petition No. 20488 1982 and Annexure-B in W.P. No.
20743 of 1982).
(b) I declare that the nomination papers of the petitioners
in Writ Petitions Nos. 20488 and 20743 of 1982 to the
Central and Regional Councils respectively are valid and
direct respondent No. 1 to include them as valid
nomination papers to the Central and Regional Councils
respectively and complete the elections on the basis of the
calendar of events already issued (Annexure-R2) in
accordance with the Act and the Regulations.
4.13. By relying on D.L. Suresh Babu's case, he
submits that the principle that there should be
no interruption of an election while it is in
progress, though is a sound principle of election
law justifying the refusal of the exercise of writ
jurisdiction, in a case where the impugned
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order of an election officer is so plainly absurd
or where the order made by him cannot but be
regarded as one which it was impossible for him
to make, this Court ought to exercise
jurisdiction. If the rejection of the nomination
paper was for reasons which were plainly
absurd or egregious, this Court ought to
exercise jurisdiction and on that basis, he
submits that the order of the Electoral Officer-
respondent No.1 is required to be quashed.
5. Sri.K.N.Phanindra., learned Senior Counsel appearing
for respondent No.1-Electoral Officer, who had been
called upon to obtain instructions and make his
submission, submits that,
5.1. When the nomination form of the Petitioner had
been taken up for scrutiny, necessary
documents not being available with the Chief
Executive Officer of the KSCA, he was called
upon to secure the same, and in the
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meanwhile, the scrutiny of the other
nomination forms for the post of Vice President,
etc., was taken up.
5.2. When the nomination form for the post of
president was taken up, more particularly that
of the Petitioner at 5.30 pm, the payment
receipt of the arrears was made available.
However, the nomination form was rejected on
the ground that as on the date of the
submission of the nomination form, the
Institutional Member of which the Petitioner is
the president was in arrears of Rs.200/-.
5.3. His submission is that since the elections are
being carried out under the supervision of this
Court and this Court had appointed the
supervising Officer, the supervising Officer and
the Electoral Officer will abide by any direction
or order passed by this Court.
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6. Sri.Udaya Holla., learned Senior Counsel appearing
for Respondent No.2-KSCA submits that;
6.1. There is a mistake on part of KSCA inasmuch as
the KSCA has not informed of any arrears on
part of the members or Institutional Members,
though there is a system to inform individual
members of arrears, there is no system put in
place by KSCA to inform the Institutional
members of arears or defualt.
6.2. Shri Udaya Holla, however submits that the
Petitioner had made payment of the arrears at
3.06 pm on 24.11.2025 and in that regard, has
filed a memo of documents today enclosing the
printout of the transaction details and the
ledger entry which has been passed by the
KSCA. The transaction details indicate that a
sum of Rs.500/- has been paid under
transaction ID.546515299, on 24.11.2025 at
3.06.29 PM and has been accounted for in the
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ledger on the very same date in the software
used by the KSCA, viz., Tally.
6.3. His submission is that the payments by the
institution member, namely Deccan Herald and
Prajavani, was made prior to the nomination
form of the Petitioner being taken up for
scrutiny.
7. Sri A.S.Vishwajith, the Counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3, submits that;
7.1. What is required to be considered is the date of
the nomination and not the scrutiny of papers
and in that regard, he relies upon the decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mangoo Singh v.
Election Tribunal, Bareilly and Ors 5 more
particularly para 5, 6, 7 and 10 thereof, which
are reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
5. The first contention of learned Counsel for the
appellant relates to and arises out of the expression "for
5
1957 SCC online 36,
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being chosen as" occurring in the section. The argument
is this. It is submitted that a person is "chosen as a
member of a board" when the poll takes place and a
majority of voters vote for him as their chosen candidate;
therefore the relevant date for the operation of the
disqualification is the date of the poll, and inasmuch as on
October 10, 1953, which was several days before the date
of the poll, the appellant was no longer in arrears of
municipal tax in excess of one year's demand by reason
of the payment made on that date, the disqualification did
not attach to him on the date of the poll. We are unable
to accept this argument. It is worthy of note that an
identical expression "shall be disqualified for being chosen
as" occurs in Article 102 of the Constitution and Section 7
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This
expression occurring in Section 7 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 was considered by this Court in
Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram
[(1954) SCR 817] . In that case the question was when
the disqualification mentioned in clause (d) of Section 7 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 arose and it
was held that the date for putting in the nominations was
one of the crucial dates. On this point, the following
observations made in that case are apposite:
"Now the words of the section are 'shall be disqualified for
being chosen'. The choice is made by a series of steps
starting with the nomination and ending with the
announcement of the election. It follows that if a
disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of
these stages, he cannot be chosen."
It was pointed out in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning
Officer Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem Dist
[(1952) 1 SCC 94 : (1952) SCR 218] that "election" is a
continuous process consisting of several stages and
embracing many steps of which nomination is one;
nomination is the foundation of a candidate's right to go
to the polls and must be treated as an integral part of the
election. If a person is disqualified on the date of
nomination, he cannot be chosen as a candidate because
the disqualification mentioned in Section 13-D attaches to
him on that date.
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6. This is also clear from para 22(2) of the U.P.
Municipalities (Conduct of Election of Members) Order,
1953. That sub-para states--
"22.(2) The Returning Officer shall then examine the
nomination papers and shall decide all objections which
may be made to any nomination, and may, either on such
objection or on his own motion, after such summary
inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, refuse any
nomination on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the candidate is not qualified to be chosen to fill
the seat under the Act; or
(b) that the candidate is disqualified for being chosen to
fill the seat under the Act; or
(c) that there has been any failure to comply with any of
the provisions of paras 16 and 17; or
(d) that the signature of the candidate or any proposer or
seconder is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud."
If the disqualification of clause (g) of Section 13-D of the
Act is to come into operation only on the day of the poll,
then it is quite unnecessary for the Returning Officer to
consider that disqualification at the time of scrutiny; and
indeed it will be improper for him to refuse nomination on
the ground of such disqualification. Clause (b) of para
22(2) uses the same expression "disqualified for being
chosen" -- showing clearly enough that the starting point
of the act of choosing is not on the date of the poll only.
The process of choosing commences on the date of filing
nominations.
7. We now turn to the second proviso to Section 13-D.
The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is
that, as stated in the proviso, the disqualification is
transient and ceases to operate as soon as the arrears are
paid; on October 10, 1953, the appellant was no longer
disqualified and therefore, he could be chosen on the date
of the poll, that is, on October 26, 1953. The argument is
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that in the case of such a transient disqualification, the
second proviso must be so read as to mean that a
disqualification subsisting on the day of nomination can be
wiped off completely by subsequent payment of arrears of
tax; otherwise a disqualification at the time of nomination
will disentitle a person to stand for election; even though
it ceases to operate before the day of the poll. This
argument also we cannot accept as correct; it is really the
first argument in a different form. The wiping off of the
disqualification under the second proviso has no
retrospective effect, and the disqualification which
subsisted on the day of filing nominations did not cease to
subsist on that day by reason of a subsequent payment of
the arrears of municipal tax. On this point we accept as
correct the view expressed in Ahmed Hossain v. Aswini
Kumar [AIR (1953) Cal 542] , where a similar question
under the Bengal Municipal Act (Ben. 15 of 1932), fell for
consideration. The question was if a person disqualified on
the date of nomination could shake off his pre-existing
disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date
of nomination and the date of scrutiny. What happened in
that case was this : on the material date, that is, the last
date for submission of nominations, a person was in
arrears for more than three months in payment of the tax
which he was liable to pay, and he came within the
mischief of clause (g) of amended Section 22(1) of the
Bengal Municipal Act. The contention was that the name
of the press of which the candidate was the proprietor and
not his name was recorded in the books of the
municipality as the assessee and that the name of the
candidate was in the electoral roll by reason of his
educational qualifications. This contention was repelled
and it was observed that if a person was disqualified on
the date of the nomination, he could not shake off his
pre-existing disqualification by acquiring a new right
between the date of nomination and the date of scrutiny.
There is also other judicial authority which supports the
same view. In Harford v. Linskey [(1899) 1 QB 852, 858]
a similar question arose for decision under the Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882, Section 12 whereof enacted that
"a person shall be disqualified for being elected and for
being a councillor" if and while he is interested in
contracts with the corporation. The Petitioner in that case
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admitted that at the time of his nomination he was
interested in contracts with the corporation, but
contended that he could and would have got rid of his
disqualification before the day fixed for the poll, and was
therefore not disqualified for nomination. The question
was whether he was so disqualified. Wright, J., delivering
the judgment of the Court observed--
"In the absence of any guide, we think it safest to hold
that in cases of elections under the Municipal Corporations
Acts a person, who at the time of the nomination is
disqualified for election in the manner in which this
Petitioner was disqualified, is disqualified also for
nomination. The nomination is for this purpose an
essential part of the election, and if there are no
competitors it of itself constitutes the election by virtue of
the express words of Section 56. A different construction
might produce much confusion. On the nomination day no
one could know whether the persons nominated will at the
poll be effective candidates or not. It is true that in the
case put the disqualification may be removed before the
election is completed; but what is to be the effect if the
disqualification continues until the poll begins, or until the
middle of the polling day, or until the close of the poll?
Will votes given before the removal of the disqualification
be valid? If not, how is the number of them to be
ascertained? It seems to us unreasonable to hold that the
Act means to leave the matter in such a state of
uncertainty, and for these reasons we think that this
Petitioner was disqualified for nomination or election."
The same state of uncertainty and confusion, to which a
reference has been made in the aforesaid observations,
will arise if the construction which learned Counsel for the
appellant has pressed for our acceptance is adopted in the
case before us.
10. Nor do we think that the word "demand" attracts the
operation of Section 168. It may be readily conceded that
the word "demand" ordinarily means something more
than what is due; it means something which has been
demanded, called for or asked for. But the meaning of a
word must take colour from the context in which it is
used. In clause (g) the context in which the word
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"demand" is used has a very obvious and clear reference
to the amount of arrears or dues on which the
disqualification depends; therefore, the expression used is
-- 'arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues
in excess of one year's demand'. The word "demand" in
that context and in the collocation of words in which it has
been used can only mean 'in excess of one year's
municipal tax or other dues'. We have been referred to
several meanings of the word "demand" in standard
English dictionaries and Law lexicons. When the context
makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes
unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning
out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of,
according to lexicographers. It it sufficient for our purpose
to state that even in standard dictionaries and law
lexicons, it is well recognised that the word "demand"
may mean simply a 'claim' or 'due', without importing any
further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay
the claim or due.
7.2. By relying on Mangoo Singh's case, he
submits that election is a continuous process
consisting of several stages and embracing
many steps of which nomination is one.
Nomination being the foundation of a
candidate's right to go to the polls is required to
be treated as an integral part of the election. If
a person is disqualified on the date of
nomination, he cannot be chosen as a
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candidate because the disqualification attached
to him as on the date of nomination.
7.3. In the present case, the Petitioner being
disqualified on account of arrears of
subscription charges as on the date of
nomination, the same would continue to apply.
The same would have to be taken into
consideration, which has been rightly done by
the Electoral Officer.
7.4. He relies upon the decision of the Full Bench of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pashupati Nath
Singh -v- Harihar Prasad Singh6, more
particularly para 3, 4, 12, 13 and 16 thereof,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
3. The High Court held that the nomination of the
Petitioner was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer on
the ground that he was not qualified to be chosen to fill a
seat in the State legislature since he had not made and
subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined by
clause (a) of Article 173 of the Constitution, either before
6
1968, SCC online, SC 143
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the scrutiny of nominations or even subsequently on the
date of scrutiny.
4. The short question which arises in this appeal is
whether it is necessary for a candidate to make and
subscribe the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined by
clause (a) of Article 173 of the Constitution before the
date fixed for scrutiny of nomination paper. In other
words, is a candidate entitled to make and subscribe the
requisite oath when objection is taken before the
Returning Officer or must he have made and subscribed
the requisite oath or affirmation before the scrutiny of
nomination commenced? The answer to this question
mainly depends on the interpretation of Section 36(2) of
the Act. It will, however, be necessary to refer to some
other sections of the Act in order to fully appreciate the
effect of the words used in that section. Section 32 of the
Act provides for nomination of candidates for election,
thus:
"Any person may be nominated as a candidate for election
to fill a seat if he is qualified to be chosen to fill that seat
under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act or
under the provisions of the Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963, as the case may be."
12. Mr Gokhale, who appears for the Petitioner, contends
that on objection being taken under Section 36(2) that
the Petitioner had not made and subscribed an oath or
affirmation according to the form set out above, he was
entitled to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation
immediately before the objection was considered by the
Returning Officer. He says that as soon as a candidate
takes the oath or makes and subscribes the oath or
affirmation he would become qualified within the terms of
Article 173 of the Constitution, and this qualification
would exist "on the date fixed for the scrutiny" because
the date of scrutiny of nomination paper -- in this case
January 21, 1967 -- would not have passed away by the
time the oath or affirmation is taken or subscribed.
13. It seems to us that the expression "on the date fixed
for scrutiny" in Section 36(2)(a) means "on the whole of
the day on which the scrutiny of nomination has to take
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place". In other words, the qualification must exist from
the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny. It will be
noticed that on this date the Returning Officer has to
decide the objections and the objections have to be made
by the other candidates after examining the nomination
papers and in the light of Section 36(2) of the Act and
other provisions. On the date of the scrutiny the other
candidates should be in a position to raise all possible
objections before the scrutiny of a particular nomination
paper starts. In a particular case, an objection may be
taken to the form of the oath; the form of the oath may
have been modified or the oath may not have been sworn
before the person authorised in this behalf by the Election
Commission. It is not necessary under Article 173 that the
person authorised by the Election Commission should be
the Returning Officer.
16. In this connection it must also be borne in mind that
law disregards, as far as possible, fractions of the day. It
would lead to great confusion if it were held that a
candidate would be entitled to qualify for being chosen to
fill a seat till the very end of the date fixed for scrutiny of
nominations. If the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is
right, the candidate could ask the Returning Officer to
wait till 11.55 p.m. on the date fixed for the scrutiny to
enable him to take the oath.
7.5. By relying on Pashupati Nath Singh's case,
his submission is that the date fixed for scrutiny
would be the beginning of the day, i.e., on the
whole of the day on which the scrutiny or
nomination has to take place and that the
qualification should exist from the earliest
moment of the day of scrutiny and if at any
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point of time during that day, there is a
disqualification, the candidate would have to be
disqualified since law does not recognise and or
disregards fractions of the day. The
interpretation that has to be given to the day of
scrutiny is the beginning of the day of scrutiny.
7.6. He relies on the decision in V.Narayanachari -
v- The Commissioner and the Returning
Officer, Corporation of the City of
Bangalore and others7 , more particularly
para one [unnumbered] and 54, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
The Petitioner was one of the candidates for election to
the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation from the 43rd
Division. He presented his nomination paper on the 21st
of November, 1970, According to the calendar of events
relating to the election, the last date for presentation of
nomination papers was the 23rd November, 1970 and the
date fixed for scrutiny of the nomination papers was the
25th of November, 1970. At the scrutiny M. Obanna Raju,
another candidate for election from the same Division
(Impleaded as the 8th respondent in this Writ petition)
raised an objection to the reception of the nomination
paper of the Petitioner on the ground that the Petitioner
had not paid the property tax payable to the Corporation
by him in respect of his property in Division No. 43. The
7
1970 SCC OnLine Kar 220
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Petitioner produced a receipt for payment of taxes made
by him at 3.30 P.M. on the same day, viz., the 25th of
November, 1970. According to the receipt, payment made
was of taxes for the years 1968-1969, 1969-1970 and
1970-1971. Thereupon, the Returning Officer (the first
respondent) rejected the nomination paper recording his
decision in that regard as follows:
"It is clear from the receipt produced by Sri
Narayanachari that he has paid on 25-11-1970 and so
there were arrears to Corporation on the day he filed
nomination on 23-11-1970. Hence objection is upheld and
nomination of Sri Narayanchari is rejected."
54. Now on the facts of this case it is clear that upto 3-30
P.M. on the 25th of November, 1970, the Petitioner had
not paid the property tax in respect of his property
payable for the years 1968-1969, 1969-1970 and 1970-
1971. Under Section 104 of the City of Bangalore
Municipal Corporation Act, property tax shall be paid by
the person primarily liable (owner of the premises is one
of the persons so liable) within 30 days after the
commencement of every half year; by an amendment
under Act XIII of 1970 which came into force on the 8th
of June 1970, sixty days are substituted for thirty days.
There can be no doubt therefore that property tax payable
by the Petitioner for 1968-1969, 1969-1970 and for the
first half year of 1970-1971 was in arrears on the date he
presented his nomination paper, viz., 21-11-1970.
7.7. By referring to the Division Bench Judgment of
this Court in V.Narayanachari's case his
submission is that in that case, the arrears of
property tax was paid on the date of the
scrutiny that is, 25.11.1970 at 3.30 pm and as
such, as on the date of the presentation of the
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nomination paper, there being a
disqualification, the payment prior to scrutiny
cannot be taken into consideration.
7.8. He relies upon the decision of the Division
Bench of this Court in Jayamuthu -v- State
Election Commissioner for Cooperative
Housing Federation8, more particularly 23
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
23. Taking up the first contention, at the outset, it is
held that there can be no distinction between a case
of improper rejection of a nomination of a candidate
in an election and improper acceptance of a
nomination in the context of filing of a writ petition in
order to assail the same though there is a vital
difference between the two, in that, in the former
case, the aggrieved party cannot participate in the
election process and in the latter case the aggrieved
party would be entitled to participate in the election.
However, on getting the election of the successful
party-whose nomination was illegally accepted-being
set aside in a properly constituted election petition,
the aggrieved party would get the relief. But the
point is, whether, because of the aforesaid difference,
it can be held that in the case of an improper
rejection of nomination, a writ petition could be filed
by the aggrieved party and not at the instance of an
aggrieved party, when it is a case of improper or
8
WA 3482 of 2015 & connected matters DD 21.04.2017
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illegal acceptance of a nomination. We do not think
that such distinction could be made for the purpose
of Article 226 of the Constitution. In either case,
whether it is a case of improper acceptance of a
nomination or improper rejection of a nomination, the
same would require proof of facts which cannot be
adjudicated upon in a writ petition, merely on the
basis of affidavit and counter affidavits. As the
reasons for improper rejection or improper
acceptance of nomination could be for myriad
reasons and merely because in a particular case proof
of disputed question of facts would not arise, it
cannot be held that the writ petition could be
maintained. Therefore, when once the election
process has commenced, courts ought not to
interfere in the election process and particularly the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
should not interfere with an election process. While
saying so, we rely upon an early decision and time
tested precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of N.P.Ponnuswami, which case arose precisely
on the question of improper rejection of nomination
of a candidate therein. Though in that case Article
329(b) of the Constitution applied, nevertheless the
principles propounded therein would apply with all
force to all elections.
7.9. By relying on Jayamuthu's case, his
submission is that there is no distinction
between improper acceptance of nomination or
improper rejection of a nomination, both of
which would require proof of facts which cannot
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be adjudicated upon in a writ petition, merely
on the basis of affidavits and counter-affidavits.
The rejection or acceptance could be for myriad
reasons which give rise to disputed questions of
fact, since this Court would be required to
examine the date and time on which the
arrears were paid, same is an inquiry into
disputed question of fact, which cannot be done
in a proceeding under Article 226 and 227,
there being an alternative efficacious remedy in
filing of an Election Petition or a Suit, the
Petitioner would be required to be relegated to
such an alternate remedy.
7.10. His submission is that the Institutional Member
having defaulted and having been in arrears of
though a meagre sum of Rs.200/-, the fact
remains that there are arrears as on the date of
nomination and as on the date on which the
scrutiny of nomination was fixed, the payment
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made even if it were to be prior to scrutiny
being completed would result in disqualification
and as such, the order passed by the Electoral
Officer is proper and correct and does not
require interference.
7.11. Though there are several other judgments
produced, he does not rely upon them. On the
basis of the above contentions, he submits that
the petition is to be dismissed.
8. Sri.Karan Gupta, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of Ms.Lakshmi Menon, learned Counsel for
Respondent No.4 would reiterate the submission of
Sri.A.S.Vishwajith, learned Counsel and further
submits that;
8.1. Respondent No.4 has withdrawn her nomination
post the rejection of the nomination of the
Petitioner. Her nomination has been accepted
for one other post and if the nomination of the
Petitioner were to be accepted and Respondent
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No.4 wanting to withdraw her nomination, there
would be a domino effect inasmuch as a
member can only contest for one post and as
such, the acceptance of her nomination for the
one other post would also continue.
8.2. On specific enquiry as to whether Respondent
No.4 wishes to withdraw the withdrawal of the
nomination made by Respondent No.4, he
categorically submits that Respondent No.4
does not wish to withdraw her withdrawal of
nomination. He also submits that the petition is
required to be dismissed.
9. Heard, Sri.S.S.Naganand, Learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, Sri.K.N.Panindra, Learned Senior
Counsel for Respondent No.1, Sri.Udaya Holla,
Learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.2,
Sri.A.S.Vishwajith, Learned Counsel for Respondent
No.3, Sri.Karan Gupta, learned Counsel for
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Respondent No.4 on behalf of Ms. Lakshmi Menon,
learned Counsel. Perused papers.
10. The points that would arise for determination are;
1. Whether the disqualification of a candidate
is required to be considered as on the date
of filing of the nomination or as on the
date on which the scrutiny of the
nomination is made? If on the date of
scrutiny of nomination, is it at any point of
the day of the date of scrutiny of
nomination or at the beginning of the day
fixed for scrutiny of nomination?
2. Whether this Court is required to exercise
its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India as regards the
rejection of a nomination of the Petitioner
in the present case?
3. What order?
11. Before I answer any of the points above, it would
required to place on record the context in which the
above elections are being held, inasmuch as the
Electoral Officer having earlier postponed the
election, the postponement having been challenged
by the KSCA, this Court vide order dated
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21.11.2025, had set aside the postponement and
directed the elections to be held as per the modified
calendar of events stated therein. For the purpose of
inspiring confidence in all stakeholders and to
facilitate the expeditious completion of the electoral
process, this Court had also appointed a former
Judge of this Court to oversee and supervise the
conduct of the elections. It was directed that after
completion of the electoral process, the Electoral
Officer shall file a concise report before this Court,
recording compliance with the directions issued, and
confirming that the election has been conducted in a
free, fair and transparent manner. In that
background, I am of the considered opinion that the
elections are being conducted under the supervision
of this Court, it would also be the duty of this Court
to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free,
fair, and transparent manner.
12. ANSWER TO POINT NO.1: Whether the
disqualification of a candidate is required to be
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considered as on the date of filing of the
nomination or as on the date on which the
scrutiny of the nomination is made? If on the
date of scrutiny of nomination, is it at any point
of the day of the date of scrutiny of nomination
or at the beginning of the day fixed for scrutiny
of nomination?
12.1. Much has been sought to be made out by
Counsel for the Petitioner and Counsel for
Respondents No.3 and 4 as regards the date
which is to be considered for disqualification.
The Petitioner contending that at the time when
scrutiny is made, there should be no
disqualification, whereas Counsel for
Respondents No.3 and 4, though initially
contended that it is the date of nomination,
subsequently have contended that it is the date
on which the scrutiny is fixed, but however
submit that that date has to be considered as
the beginning of the day fixed for scrutiny.
12.2. What is required to be considered by this Court
is that the Electoral Officer has disqualified the
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Petitioner on the ground that the Petitioner was
disqualified as on the date of filing of the
nomination and not on the ground that, as on
the date the nomination forms were taken up
for scrutiny, he was disqualified. That is to say,
the contentions of the Respondents No.3 and 4
are not in support of the order of the Electoral
Officer, but are an alternative argument to
contend that even if the date of scrutiny were
to be taken into consideration, it is the
beginning of that day which is to be considered.
Essentially, the said argument is an alternative
argument or a hypothetical argument inasmuch
as what this Court would have to consider is the
order passed by the Electoral Officer.
12.3. The order of the Electoral Officer, which has
been produced along with the memo dated
26.11.2025 is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
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Scrutiny of nomination paper of Sri K.N.Shantha
Kumar, post of President.
The scrutiny is conducted under the supervision of
the Hon'ble Justice Subhash Adi, Format Judge of the
High Court of Karnataka as per the Hon'ble High
Court of Karnataka Order in W.P.No.34890/2025(GM-
KSR) C/W W.P.no.34902/2025(GM-KSR) and the
order is passed and pronounced after the scrutiny
accordingly.
Since the candidate sought the assistance of an
Advocate, I requested the Supervisory Authority for
an assistance in drafting the order. At my request
Supervisory Authority prepared the draft and gave
the same for my consideration and I considered the
same and passed this order.
At the time of scrutiny of the nomination of Mr.
K.N.Shanthakumar to the post of Hon. President
another candidate contesting to the same post
namely Sri.B.K.Venkateshprasad raised an objection
as to the declaration and the nomination form filed by
Mr. K.N.Shanthakumar inter-alia stating that the
nomination is defective as under the prescribed form
for the nomination at note no. 3 it is mentioned that
"Only Life members and authorized representative of
founder institutional members will have the right to
participate and vote at the above meeting provided
they are not in arrears of any fees".
By referring to the said clause submitted that
Mr.K.N.Shantha Kumar representing Institutional
Member is in arrears and is ineligible to contest the
election.
The CEO, KSCA submitted that, the said institution
for which Mr.K.N.Shanthakumar represents is in
arrears of Rs.200/- i.e. IM 120 "Deccan Herald and
Prajavani SC".
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Mr.K.N.Shanthakumar representative by Mr.Rajendra
Advocate submitted that, under the byelaw No.
3B(D)(a) that in the event of any arrears more than
Rs.100 from any founder institution members or
associate (as the case may be) remain unpaid for
more than two months. Managing Committee may at
its discretion remove the name of such member or
Associate from the list of members or Associates as
defaulter after due notice of 30 days. Referring to this
clause submitted that, there is no list of defaulter
published and as such the institution to which Mr.
K.N. Shanthakumar represents has a right to contest,
vote as long as the institution is removed from the
list.
Whereas Clause specifically states that in case of life
member whose any payment of more than Rs.100 is
in arrears and Founder Institutional Member whose
subscription or payment of more than Rs. 100 is in
arrear, such an LM and founder Institutional Members
shall not be allowed to contest or vote or allowed to
enjoy the privileges of association as long as they are
in arrears.
The form prescribed for the nomination specifically
states candidates not to be in arrears. Candidate
knew as on the date of nomination the institution he
was representing was in arrears. Neither the
candidate nor the lawyer advocate representing the
candidate dispute that it was in arrears at the time
filing of nomination.
Clause 3B (D) (b) of byelaw also states for contesting
election to the post of office bearer or Managing
Committee not to be in arrears.
As an Electoral Officer I am bound to consider
the nomination in consonance with the byelaws
and as per the prescribed nomination form. Both
in the byelaw as well as in the form there is a
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bar for contesting or attending meeting or
casting vote if an institution is in arrears.
In view of the same the nomination of
K.N.Shantha Kumar cannot be accepted and
same is rejected.
The rejection order is placed in the presence of
candidate and the learned counsels representing
the Counsels K.N.Shantha Kumar.
12.4. A perusal of the above indicates that order of
rejection of the nomination form of the
Petitioner was made exclusively taking into
consideration that the Institutional Member of
which the Petitioner is the president/nominee
was in default as on the date of filing of the
nomination and not that, it was in default as on
the date on which the scrutiny of nomination
was fixed. Ex-facie, the order passed by the
Electoral Officer is contrary to the applicable
law and the judgment of the constitutional
Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
K.Prabhakaran's case (supra), wherein the
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Constitutional Bench has categorically held that
the disqualification is to be considered as on
the date of scrutiny.
12.5. If that were to be taken into consideration, the
order passed by the Electoral Officer is contrary
to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of
the Apex Court in K.Prabhakaran's case.
12.6. Coming to the alternative argument, the
submission of Sri.A.S.Vishwajith, learned
Counsel for Respondent No.3 by relying on
Pashupatinath Singh's case is that the date
of scrutiny would be the commencement of the
day of scrutiny and not during the day of
scrutiny and so long as the disqualification was
persisting as at the beginning of the day of
scrutiny, the nomination paper is required to be
rejected.
12.7. In Pashupatinath Singh's case, the date of
scrutiny of nomination papers was fixed as
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21.01.1967 without the starting or ending time
having been fixed and the disqualification was
on the ground that the oath, in the prescribed
format, had not been taken by the candidate,
since the candidate had not made and
subscribed to the requisite oath or affirmation
as enjoined by clause (a) of Article 173 of the
Constitution either before the scrutiny of
nomination or even subsequently on the date of
scrutiny, which fact is detailed in para 3 of the
said judgment which has been extracted supra.
12.8. Though the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pashupati
Nath Singh's case has dealt with what is the
date of scrutiny, but the fact remains that in
that matter the concerned candidate had not
subscribed to the requisite oath either before
the scrutiny of nomination or even
subsequently on the date of scrutiny and in that
background, Sub-section (2) of Section 36 of
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the Representation of People Act 1951, was
referred to and the Hon'ble Apex Court came to
a conclusion that on the date of scrutiny under
Section 36 (2)(a) would mean on the whole of
the day on which the scrutiny or nomination
has to take place.
12.9. The facts in the present matter are different,
inasmuch as not only the date of scrutiny of
nomination has been fixed, but the time also
has been fixed as between 11 am to 4.00 PM. It
is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that
the institution of which the Petitioner is a
member had made payment of the arrears at
3.06 PM on 24.11.2025, i.e. before the period
of scrutiny got over. Insofar as this aspect is
concerned, the submission of the independent
authority like the Electoral Officer would be
relevant inasmuch as upon instruction Shri K. N
Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel has
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categorically stated that when scrutiny of the
nomination paper of the Petitioner was taken
up, the receipt for having made payment of the
areas was available on record, but however, the
Electoral Officer had passed the impugned
order, taking into consideration that as on the
date of nomination, there was a disqualification
attached to the Petitioner.
12.10. The receipt which has been placed on record by
the Petitioner, when compared to the
transaction details produced by the KSCA,
would indicate that the payment was made at
3.06 pm. As per the submission of learned
Counsel for the Electoral Officer that though the
scrutiny of the nomination for the post of
president had been taken up earlier, since all
documents were not available, the same was
postponed and was only taken up at 5.30 pm.
In view of the categorical submission which has
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been made, it is clear that at the time when the
nomination form had been taken up for
scrutiny, there were no arrears on part of the
Institutional Member, which the Petitioner
represents.
12.11. This would also have to be seen with reference
to byelaw 3B(D)(b), which imposes an embargo
on a representative on an Institutional Member
or a representative of the institution member
contesting the election so long as the arrears
are due i.e., the embargo stood lifted
immediately on payment of the arrears as
aforesaid, which payment occurred prior to the
scrutiny of the nomination form being taken up,
let alone being completed. Byelaw 3B(D)(b) is
an embargo and not a disqualification, which is
separately dealt with in Bye Law 6. Hence, the
effect of byelaw 3B(D)(b) as an embargo would
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only apply as long as there is/are arrears and
would stand lifted once arrears are paid.
12.12. In my considered opinion, the endeavour of all
stakeholders in the electoral process, including
this Court, must always be to facilitate and not
frustrate the widest possible participation of
candidates in any election. The democratic
legitimacy of an elective office is premised on
the electorate, in this case, the members of the
KSCA, having the fullest range of choices, and
the law must therefore be interpreted in a
manner that advances, rather than restricts,
the right to contest.
12.13. It is in this backdrop that the objection
regarding the alleged arrears assumes
significance. Admittedly, the arrears that were
due as on the date of filing of the nomination
were fully discharged before the nomination
paper was actually taken up for scrutiny. The
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only contention is that the payment was made
during the day of scrutiny rather than prior to
the beginning of the day of scrutiny. In my
considered opinion, such an objection is hyper-
technical, elevating form over substance, and is
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment
to free and fair elections under the Constitution,
which would equally aply to an association like
the KSCA.
12.14. Defects that do not go to the root of the
candidate's eligibility and that are capable of
being remedied before the completion of
scrutiny are to be treated as curable defects.
The right to contest is a statutory right that
must be applied in a manner consistent with
democratic values and electoral fairness;
exclusion of candidates should not be based on
technical or procedural trivialities like arrears of
Rs. 200 which defect was also cured.
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12.15. Where the defect in a nomination paper does
not affect a substantial requirement of the law
and is capable of being corrected, the Returning
Officer must provide an opportunity to cure the
defect, in my considered opinion, election laws,
while mandatory in essential aspects, ought not
to be applied in such a manner as to defeat
substantive justice.
12.16. A liberal interpretation has to be resorted to in
such matters; procedural requirements should
not operate as instruments of
disenfranchisement or exclusion. Unless a
defect is incurable or affects the core statutory
preconditions for candidacy, the Returning
Officer must adopt a facilitative approach.
12.17. In the present case, the essential statutory
requirement is the clearing of arrears before
the scrutiny is concluded, since the embargo is
applicable so long as there are arrears. That
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requirement was satisfied on payment of
arrears before the nomination form was taken
up for scrutiny. The payment of arrears during
the day of scrutiny, prior to the Returning
Officer taking up the nomination for actual
examination, achieves the very object that the
byelaws intends to secure. To insist on payment
before the commencement of the calendar day
of scrutiny, as opposed to before the act of
scrutiny itself, would be to import a rigidity that
the byelaw does not require/mandate nor does
the calendar of events impose.
12.18. In light of the above discussion, the defect
alleged by the Returning Officer is clearly a
curable defect that was duly cured within the
permissible window. This Court ought,
therefore, to lean in favour of permitting the
candidate to contest rather than excluding him
on a hyper-technical ground. The electoral
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Officer ought to have favoured an interpretation
that advances electoral participation, upholds
the substantive will of the electorate, and
avoids technical disenfranchisement. A contrary
interpretation would not only undermine settled
principles but also impede the democratic
function of allowing voters to choose from the
broadest permissible field of candidates.
12.19. Hence, I answer point No.1 by holding that
the disqualification of a candidate is
required to be considered as on the date
on which the scrutiny of the nomination is
made and not on the date of filing of the
nomination. On the date of scrutiny, the
defect would have to be cured before the
nomination papers are taken up for
scrutiny.
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13. ANSWER TO POINT NO.2: Whether this Court is
required to exercise its powers under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as
regards the rejection of a nomination of the
Petitioner in the present case?
13.1. Much has been sought to be made out by
Counsel for Respondent No.3 Sri.Vishwajith and
Sri.Karan Gupta, learned counsel that this
Court ought not to exercise the jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 in an election
matter and in that regard, reliance has been
placed on the decisions indicated supra.
13.2. There can be no dispute as regards the
proposition the law laid down in those
decisions, but what this Court would also have
to consider is that there is no absolute bar
which has been imposed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in those matters or by
judgements passed by this Court. What has
been held is that the powers under Articles 226
and 227 have to be sparingly used. The same
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would be left to the discretion of this Court, and
in the event of this Court being of the
considered opinion that reasons exist for the
exercise of such extraordinary power, this Court
can do so. In that background, what I have to
examine is whether there are any such
extraordinary grounds or facts available for this
Court to exercise such jurisdiction.
13.3. The facts are not in dispute. Nomination Forms
having been filed, scrutiny was to be conducted
between 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. on 24.11.2025, as
on the date of filing of the nomination, the
Institutional Member of which the Petitioner is a
representative was in arrears; however, by
3.06 p.m. on 24.11.2025 the arrears were
cleared, before the scrutiny of the nomination
form was taken up at 5.30 p.m.
13.4. The submission of learned Counsel for
Respondents No.3 and 4 being that there being
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arrears of Rs.200/- the Petitioner ought not to
be permitted to contest and the disqualification
is valid. This aspect I have already dealt with in
my answer to point No.1.
13.5. Coming back to the extraordinary
circumstances, I am of the considered opinion
that firstly, the Electoral Officer has rejected
the nomination paper on the ground that, as on
the date of filing of the nomination, the
Institutional Member was in arrears and not on
the ground that, as on the date of scrutiny, the
Institutional Member was in arrears. Even if the
test of on the date of scrutiny is applied, before
the scrutiny was taken up the arrears had been
cleared.
13.6. The submission of Sri.Udaya Holla., learned
Senior Counsel for KSCA, being that the KSCA
had not notified the arrears of Institutional
Members and called upon the said Institutional
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Member to make payment of the amounts, is
relevant. Inasmuch as it is the duty of the
Association/Society to keep informed of all
members of such arrears, disqualification or
breach of a member. The KSCA is therefore
directed to devise a methodology to do so and
implement the same within 60 days from the
date of receipt of this order.
13.7. As indicated supra, this Court would essentially
have to lean towards allowing the maximum
number of candidates to participate in an
election. The interest of the members of the
Association will always be protected by
permitting the maximum number of candidates
to participate.
13.8. In the present case, the facts as they stand
clearly indicating that the order of the Electoral
Officer is exfacie wrong. The same is more than
likely to be set aside in any Suit or Election
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Petition filed before the ombudsman. That is
only for the purpose of fulfilling that formality, I
am of the considered opinion that I do not have
to restrain myself from exercising powers under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This
Court, also being a court of equity, is required
to wholistically examine the matter and pass
orders as would render justice in the
circumstances.
13.9. 'A stitch in time saves nine' is what would be
applicable in the present matter, inasmuch as
relegating the Petitioner to a civil suit or an
electionpetition before the Ombudsman would
only delay the matter and achieve no
substantial aspect, inasmuch as the elections
would have to be once again held, the order of
the Electoral Officer, as indicated Supra, being
ex-facie, contrary to law. The same would also
result in waste of money and resources of the
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KSCA, which can well be avoided, since once
the order of the Electoral Officer is set aside,
fresh elections would have to be held by
inviting fresh nomination at which point of time
there is no disqualification which the Petitioner
would suffer payments already having been
made.
13.10. Taking the entire conspectus of facts into
consideration, the facts not being in dispute,
there is no serious trial which is required to be
conducted to ascertain the truth of the matter,
the payments having been made before the
scrutiny of the nomination paper was taken up
and completed, I am the considered opinion
that, technicalities cannot be resorted to by the
Respondents to deprive the Petitioner of
contesting in the election.
13.11. In that view of the matter, I answer point
No.2 by holding that this Court is required
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to exercise its powers under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India as
regards the rejection of a nomination of
the Petitioner in the present case.
14. Answer to point No.3: What order?
14.1. In view of my answers to point No.1 and 2, I
pass the following;
ORDER
i. The writ petition is allowed.
ii. A certiorari is issued, the order dated
24.11.2025 passed by respondent No.1 is
quashed.
iii. A mandamus is issued directing respondent
No.1 to declare the petitioner to be a valid
candidate for the purpose of contesting the
elections of Respondent No.2-Association.
iv. The elections are to be carried out as per the
calendar of events, which has been fixed.
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v. The petitioner nor Respondent No.3, intending
to withdraw, Respondent No.4 having already
withdrawn and not intending to withdraw the
withdrawal, the date of announcing the list of
eligible candidates is postponed to 3 PM today,
i.e. on 29.11.2025.
vi. May the best candidate be successful.
vii. Hand delivery of operative portion of the order
is ordered.
SD/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
LN
