[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri Byrappa vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer on 28 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION No.21594/2021 (LA-KIADB)
BETWEEN:
SRI BYRAPPA
S/O DODDABACHHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 88 YEARS,
R/AT SIDDAPURA VILLAGE,
VARTHUR HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI R. HEMANTH RAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
KANIJA BHAVAN, RACE COURSE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REVENUE,
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
M.S.BUILDING, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560 001.
3. THE TAHSILDAR,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
KRISHNARAJAPURA,
BENGALURU-560 016.
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4. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY,
1ST FLOOR, VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU-560 001.
5. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI P.V. CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 & R-5;
SRI HARISHA A.S., AGA FOR R-2 TO R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT
RESPONDENT NOS.1, 4 AND 5 TO PAY THE COMPENSATION /
AWARD AMOUNT TO THE PETITIONER ALONG WITH 18 PERCENT
INTEREST FOR ACQUISITION OF PETITIONER SCHEDULE LAND AS
PER RIGHT TO FAIR AND COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN
LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT
2013 IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS SCHEDULE LAND IS
CONCERNED.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 28/10/2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
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CAV O R D E R
The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following
reliefs:
"a. To Issue a Writ in the nature of Mandamus
directing Respondents No.1, 4 and 5 to pay the
compensation/award amount to the Petitioner along
with 18% interest for acquisition of petitioner schedule
land as per Right to fair and compensation and
Transparency in land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act 2013 in so for as the Petitioners
schedule land is concerned.
b. To directed to initiate departmental enquiry
against the Respondent No.1 and 5 for dereliction of
duty, inaction and willfully failed to pay the
compensation amount to the Petitioner for acquisition
his of schedule land.
c. To issue mandamus directing the 2nd
Respondent and 1st Respondent to consider the
Representation given by the Petitioner on
25.04.2011 and final representation 25.10.2021
as per the Annexure-D & H.
d. To Issue any other writ or order as this Hon'ble
court deems fir under the facts and circumstances of
the case in the interest of justice and equity."
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2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, learned AGA for respondent Nos.2 to 4 and
learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 5. Perused the
material on record.
3. The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of
land measuring 4 acres 38 guntas in Survey No.80, B Block,
Nellorahalli Village, Krishnarajapura Hobli, Bengaluru Urban
District, which was granted to him under Order No.LND SR
3028/1968-69 dated 15.10.1968 by the Deputy
Commissioner, Bengaluru District. The Saguvali chit was
issued on 17.09.1971, and the petitioner's name was duly
entered in the mutation register (MR No.7/72-73) and
revenue records. The petitioner, along with three others,
namely, Ramaiah Reddy, Narayana Reddy and Narayanappa,
owned the adjacent portions in the same survey number
each measuring 4 acres 38 guntas. In 1993, 1994, and
1995, the Village Accountant failed to issue RTC extracts and
the lands were wrongly shown as 'Sarkari Gomal'. The
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petitioner and other three approached this Court in the writ
petition and this Court allowed it, setting aside the Assistant
Commissioner's rejection order and remanded the matter for
reconsideration.
4. While the proceedings were pending, the Special
Deputy Commissioner addressed a letter to the Assistant
Commissioner, Bengaluru dated 30.10.1999, stating that the
lands had already been transferred to the Karnataka
Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB). Thereafter, by
order dated 06.07.2000, the Assistant Commissioner
rejected the petitioner's claim, treating the lands as a
Government property.
5. Challenging the Assistant Commissioner's order,
the petitioner and others filed W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000.
This Court by order dated 12.09.2001, granted liberty to the
petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court seeking
declaration of ownership and observed that if the petitioner
succeeds, they would be entitled to compensation under the
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Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ('LA Act' for short)
notwithstanding that no acquisition proceedings were
initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development
Act, 1966 ('KIAD Act' for short) or the LA Act, 1894.
6. Pursuant to the said liberty, the petitioner
instituted O.S. No.298/2002 which was decreed on
06.06.2009, declaring him the absolute owner in possession
of the schedule property and restraining the defendants
(Government) from interference. The decree has attained
finality.
7. The State Government vide order dated
30.06.2000, had ordered transfer of 15 acres 16 ½ guntas in
Survey No.80 of Nellorahalli Village and the adjacent lands to
the KIADB. Pursuant to the Official Memorandum dated
17.04.2004, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB has
deposited `1,03,91,779/- into the treasury on 18.05.2004
and possession was handed over to KIADB on 27.05.2004.
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8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the Civil Court's decree in O.S. No.298/2002
conclusively declares the petitioner's ownership and
possession. That the decree passed in pursuance of the
liberty granted by this Court in W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000
has attained finality and is binding on the respondents. It is
submitted that the respondents have taken possession of the
schedule property and transferred it to KIADB for industrial
use without issuing any notification under Section 3 of the
KIAD Act, or under the LA Act amounting to deprivation of
property without authority of law, in violation of Article 300A
of the Constitution of India.
9. The KIADB has already deposited `1,03,91,779/-
with the State Treasury. The said deposit represents the
value of the land transferred, including the petitioner's
property. Despite the deposit and the acknowledgment of the
petitioner's entitlement, the State and the Revenue
Authorities have failed to release the amount to the
petitioner, showing gross inaction and dereliction of duty.
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The petitioner, thus seeks for a compensation along with
interest @ 18% for the acquisition of the petitioner's
schedule land as per the provisions of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act' for
short).
10. Per contra, learned AGA for the State and learned
counsel for the respondents-KIADB submit that the land in
Survey No.80 was classified as Government land and
transferred to the KIADB under the order dated 30.06.2000
for industrial purposes. Since the land is a Government land,
no acquisition proceedings or award was required to be
passed in respect of the petitioner's claim, and the petitioner
cannot claim compensation as if there had been a statutory
acquisition. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB has
already deposited the amount of `1,03,91,779/- in the State
Treasury on 18.05.2004 and the possession was delivered to
the KIADB on 27.05.2004.
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11. It is submitted that the decree dated 06.06.2009
in O.S. No.298/2002 is an executable decree and the
petitioner must work out his remedy in the execution
proceedings against the judgment debtor. It is submitted
that the KIADB was not made a party to the suit despite a
specific order in the writ petition to implead all the parties, as
such, the suit in O.S. No.298/2002 is not binding upon the
KIADB.
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for
the parties, the question that falls for consideration is:
"Whether in the absence of any statutory notification
under Section 3 of the KIAD Act and in light of the
order in W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000 and decree in O.S.
No.298/2002, this Court ought to direct the
respondents to initiate acquisition proceedings and
determine compensation in accordance with law?
13. It is an admitted fact that no preliminary
notification under Section 3 (1) or final notification under
Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act has been issued in respect of
the petitioner's land. The record discloses only a Government
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order dated 30.06.2000 administratively transferring about
15 acres 16 ½ guntas of land in Survey No.30 of Nellorahalli
Village to the KIADB. In W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000, this
Court at paragraph Nos.12, 13 and 14 held as under:
"12. If the petitioners institute such original
suits, the competent civil Court will take up the
original suits and dispose of the same as expeditiously
as possible, notwithstanding the fact the order
dt.30.6.2000, at Annexure which is impugned in these
petitions. Further the trial Court after affording
opportunity shall conduct the trial and record a finding
on the contentions that would be raised by the parties.
If the petitioners establish their claim that there was a
valid grant made by the competent revenue authority
under the Land Grant Rules in their favour in respect
of the lands in question, then an appropriate judgment
and decree may be passed in their favour. If the
plaintiffs succeed in the original suits, that would be
filed availing the liberty given to their order, the
plaintiffs are entitled to have their rights for getting
the compensation determined under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, notwithstanding the fact that
the acquisition has not been made by following the
procedures either under the Karnataka Land
Acquisition Act and Rules or under the Land
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Acquisition Act, 1984 or under the provisions of
Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board Act,
1966.
13. It is needless to make an observation in
this order that the land granted in favour of
respondent No.6 by the KIADB and issuance of
notification u/s.3 by the respondent No.5 in respect of
the lands in question and impugned order challenged
in these petitions at Ann-A will not be come in the way
for determining the rights of the parties before the
competent civil Court, in the event, if the petitioners
file the original suits as per the liberty given to them
in this order.
14. It is further made clear that the liberty
given to the petitioners to approach the competent
civil Court to get their ownership rights declared in
respect of the lands in question shall be only for the
limited purpose of getting their compensation, if they
establish their claim of ownership rights and title in
respect of the lands in question before the competent
civil Court."
(emphasis supplied)
14. This Court held that if the petitioner succeeded in
establishing ownership before the Civil Court, he would be
entitled to claim compensation under the Land Acquisition
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Act, 1894, 'notwithstanding that the acquisition had not been
made either under the KIAD Act or under the Land
Acquisition Act'. The order nowhere restrains or prohibits the
Government from initiating acquisition proceedings. On the
contrary, it recognizes that no lawful acquisition existed and
leaves it open to the State to regularize the situation.
15. The petitioner by availing the liberty granted, filed
O.S No.298/2002 against the State and by the decree dated
06.06.2009, the Civil Court declared him to be the absolute
owner in possession. That decree has attained finality and
conclusively establishes the petitioner's ownership.
16. The respondents have taken possession and
utilised the petitioner's land for industrial purpose without
following any statutory procedure. Such deprivation,
unsupported by notification or award, amounts to a violation
of Article 300A of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that
Section 30 of the KIAD Act was amended after the
enforcement of the 2013 Act. By virtue of this amendment,
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the KIAD Act expressly adopted the provisions of 2013 Act in
respect of the determination of compensation, solatium,
rehabilitation and resettlement benefits.
17. Section 30 (2) of the KIAD Act, as amended, now
provides that the amount of compensation payable for lands
acquired under the KIAD Act shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the LA Act, for the time
being in force. Since the LA Act has been repealed by 2013
Act, and 2013 Act is now the law in force, the compensation
under the KIAD Act must be determined strictly in terms of
2013 Act, including Sections 26 to 30 and Section 80 along
with Schedules I, II and III concerning rehabilitation and
resettlement entitlements, for the acquisition that take place
under the KIAD Act after 01.01.2014.
18. In addition, by notification dated 28.08.2015
issued under Section 105(3) of the 2013 Act, the Central
Government extended the compensation and rehabilitation
framework of the 2013 Act to 13 special enactments,
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including the KIAD Act, thereby placing the matter beyond
doubt. Consequently, all the acquisitions undertaken by the
KIADB after 01.01.2014, whether initiated afresh or pursuant
to the direction of this Court, must mandatorily comply with
the compensation regime prescribed under the 2013 Act.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on series of binding precedents which unequivocally
establish that the State cannot retain private land without
lawful acquisition and is constitutionally obliged under Article
300A to pay just and fair and timely compensation.
20. In Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
and others1 (Vidya Devi), the Apex Court has held at
paragraph Nos.12 and 13 as under:
"12. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.
12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of
her property in 1967, when the right to property was
a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part
III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right
1
(2020) 2 SCC 569
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to private property, which could not be deprived
without due process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a
human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional
right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article
300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law. The
obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his
private property, without following due process of law,
would be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634,
para 6)
"6. ... Having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the
State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain"
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may interfere with the right of property of a
person by acquiring the same but the same must
be for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation Iecognize must be paid."
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy,
this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)
"21. If the right of property is a human right
as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be
taken away except in accordance with law. Article
300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The
provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A
of the Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed."
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P., this Court Iecognized the right to property as a
basic human right in the following words: (SCC p.
379, para 30)
"30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and
by different political thinkers that some amount of
property right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the support of
property. "Property must be secured, else liberty
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cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams.
Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-
bed which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish, is the
consensus among political thinkers and jurists."
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para
48)
"48. ... In other words, Article 300-A only
limits the powers of the State that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of
law. There has to be no deprivation without any
sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is
not acquisition or taking possession under Article
300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is
no deprivation."
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have
been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any
legal sanction, and without following due process of
law, and depriving her payment of just compensation,
being a fundamental right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the
appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented
to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find
complete lack of authority and legal sanction in
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compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by
the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the
rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen
of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance
is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC wherein it was held that the State
must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.
The State being a welfare State governed by the rule
of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what
is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory
right, but also a human right. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as
right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc.
Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by
the State before the High Court, that since it has been
in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years,
it would tantamount to "adverse" possession. The
State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to
take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a
trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a
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crime, to gain legal title over such property for over
12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its
title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse
possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as
has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court
is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot
be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or
if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of
the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It
will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction
to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is
so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, this
Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held
as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11)
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"11. There are authorities which state that
delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to
service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of
statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and
other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it
is true that there are a few authorities that lay
down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has
been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. The functionaries of
the State took over possession of the land
belonging to the appellants without any sanction
of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for
grant of the benefit of compensation. The State
must either comply with the procedure laid down
for acquisition, or requisition, or any other
permissible statutory mode.
13. In the present case, the appellant being an
illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural
area has been deprived of her private property by the
State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by
law. The appellant has been divested of her right to
property without being paid any compensation
whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of
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action in the present case is a continuing one, since
the appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her
property in 1967 without legal sanction or following
due process of law. The present case is one where the
demand for justice is so compelling since the State
has admitted that the land was taken over without
initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure
known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the
Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation
to the appellant."
21. The Apex Court held that taking possession of
land without initiating acquisition proceedings or payment of
compensation is a constitutional wrong, and delay or
ignorance on the part of the land owner cannot defeat the
right to compensation. In the recent decision, the Apex
Court in the case of Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz and
others Vs. Government of Karnataka and others2
(Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz), held at paragraph Nos.49 and
54 as under:
2
(2025) 7 SCC 580
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"49. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants
herein have been deprived of their legitimate dues for
almost 22 years ago. It can also not be controverted
that money is what money buys. The value of money
is based on the idea that money can be invested to
earn a return, and that the purchasing power of
money decreases over time due to inflation. What the
appellants herein could have bought with the
compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is,
therefore, of utmost importance that the
determination of the award and disbursal of
compensation in case of acquisition of land should be
made with promptitude.
X x x
54. In that view of the matter, we find that it
is a fit case wherein this Court in exercise of its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution should
direct shifting of the date for determination of the
market value of the land in question of the
appellants."
22. The Apex Court held that inordinate and
unexplained delay by the State in passing the award and
disbursing compensation cannot prejudice the land owner
and that to ensure fairness under Article 300A, the date of
valuation may be shifted to a later date.
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23. The judgments relied by the petitioner's counsel
establish that where no lawful acquisition has been
undertaken, the State has to either restore possession or
initiate fresh acquisition under the KIAD Act and determine
compensation strictly in accordance with law.
24. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Division Bench in the case
of The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board
(KIADB) and another Vs. Sri V. Srinivas and others3.
This Court framed the following points for consideration at
paragraph No.25, which reads thus:
"25. We notice that the appellants have raised
several pertinent questions before this Court in this
batch of Writ Appeals. They contend that many of
those questions already stand answered in favour of
the acquiring authorities and the beneficiaries by
binding judgments of the Apex Court or by Bench
decisions of this Court which have been affirmed by
the Apex Court. From the pleadings and contentions
raised, we find that the legal points which arise for
3
W.A. No.1071/2022 & connect matters D.D. 21.02.2025
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consideration in this batch of appeals and petitions are
as follows:-
(i) Whether Section 30 of the KIAD Act prior to
amendment, which makes the provisions of the
1894 Act applicable for particular purposes, is a
legislation by reference or a legislation by
incorporation?
(ii) Whether the KIAD Act is a self contained Code?
(iii) Whether the other provisions of the 1894 Act
except in respect of passing of the award and
payment of compensation are applicable to an
acquisition under the KIAD Act?
(iv) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act are
applicable to a acquisition under the KIAD Act
prior to the amending Act 20 of 2022?
(v) What is the effect of the amending Act of 20 of
2022 on acquisitions under the KIAD Act?
(vi) Whether the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of
the 2013 Act are applicable to an acquisition
under the KIAD Act?"
(emphasis supplied)
25. The Division Bench formulated the core legal
questions arising for consideration, noting at the outset that
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the appellants had relied on several decisions of the Apex
Court and earlier Division Bench of this Court, affirmed by
the Apex Court to contend that 2013 Act has no application
to the acquisition made under the KIAD Act prior to
01.01.2014. The Division Bench was concerned with the
acquisition which had been lawfully initiated prior to
01.01.2014 by issuance of notifications under Sections 28(1)
and 28(4) of the KIAD Act, and the challenge in relation to
the questions of whether the compensation for such pre-
2014 acquisitions should be determined under the provisions
of 2013 Act. The Division Bench held that the issue regarding
applicability of 2013 Act to the acquisitions initiated prior to
01.01.2014 already stood concluded by binding precedents
and allowed the writ appeal filed by the KIADB, leaving it
open to the land owner to pursue appropriate statutory
remedies under the KIAD Act for enhancement of
compensation. Thus, the ratio in W.A. No.1071/2021 is
confined to the acquisition where the process of acquisition
was already in motion prior to 01.01.2014.
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26. The present case stands on an entirely different
footing. Here it is an admitted position that no acquisition
whatsoever was initiated under KIAD Act, no preliminary
notification under Section 3(1), no declaration under Section
28(4) and no lawful award prior to 01.01.2014. The only
award passed is one rendered after the coming into force of
the Act, 2013, but compensation was nevertheless
determined by applying the repealed provisions of the LA
Act. This action is contrary to the Amendment Section 30 of
the KIAD Act, which mandates that the compensation shall
be determined in accordance with the land acquisition law,
'for the time being in force', which, after 01.01.2014 is the
2013 Act.
27. In this context, the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz, clearly comes to
the aid of the petitioner. The Apex Court has held that the
State delays or fails to initiate acquisition proceedings and
proceeds to take possession or determine compensation
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improperly, the valuation must be aligned with the law in
force and constitutional mandate of the Article 300A, and the
compensation cannot be pegged to outdated or repealed
statutory frameworks. Thus, the reliance of the respondents
on W.A. No.1071/2021 is misplaced, as that decision
pertains exclusively to the acquisition which had commenced
prior to 01.01.2014, whereas the present case concerns a
situation where no acquisition was initiated and only an
award was passed.
28. This Court, as stated supra in W.P. Nos.26883-
886/2000, held that the petitioner may seek a declaration of
ownership before the Civil Court. The suit filed in O.S.
No.298/2002 was decreed in his favour on 06.06.2009. This
Court also observed, as stated supra, the petitioner is
entitled to have his rights for getting the compensation
determined under the LA Act. However, despite the decree in
favour of the petitioner in 2009, the respondent-State has
not initiated any acquisition proceedings for determination of
compensation. Mere deposit of compensation by the KIADB
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in the year 2004 would not hold the award valid in the
absence of any lawful acquisition proceedings. Accordingly,
the point framed for consideration is answered in favour of
the petitioner, holding that the respondents are required to
initiate acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act. The
petitioner is entitled for fresh acquisition proceedings and
compensation under the 2013 Act and thus, this Court pass
the following:
ORDER
i. The writ petition is allowed in part. It is hereby
declared that no lawful acquisition has ever been
initiated in respect of the petitioner's land.
ii. The purported transfer to KIADB and the award
passed under the repealed LA Act do not constitute
acquisition in law.
iii. The respondents are directed to initiate fresh
acquisition proceedings in accordance with the KIAD
Act by issuing preliminary notification under Section
3(1) followed by a final declaration under Section
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28(4), and to complete all consequential steps
strictly in accordance with law.
iv. Compensation shall be determined strictly in
accordance with the 2013 Act, in terms of amended
Section 30 of the KIAD Act.
v. The entire process shall be completed within six
months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this order.
vi. Any amount already deposited by KIADB shall be
duly accounted for in the fresh award and differential
amount shall be paid forthwith.
Sd/-
________________________
JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
MBM
