Karnataka High Court
Smt Vijaya Gopinath vs Rajendra Savanur on 11 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.371 OF 2024 (PAR)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. VIJAYA GOPINATH
W/O GOPINATH
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/AT FLAT NO.B-1-1204
12TH FLOOR, RNS SHANTHI NIVASA
YESHWANTHPUR,
TUMKUR ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 002.
2. SMT. BHARATHI BALAKRISHNA
W/O K.BALAKRISHNA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
R/AT FLAT NO.404,
4TH FLOOR
EMINANCE GARDENIA,
VIJAYANAGAR 4TH STAGE,
VIJAYANAGAR,
BOGADI LINK ROAD
MYSURU - 570 017.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI SRINIVASA MURTHY S.R., ADV.)
AND:
1. RAJENDRA SAVANUR
S/O LATE B.B.SAVANUR
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT NO.330, 11TH CROSS
-
2
MAHALAKSHMI LAYOUT
BENGALURU - 560 086.
AND ALSO R/AT:
ARGE URBAN BLOOM
NEXT TO MODERN BREAD
FACTORY NO.30/A
C-402, (LOTUS) 4TH FLOOR
INDUSTRIAL SUBURB
YESHWANTHPUR
BENGALURU - 560 072.
2. K.MANJU DEEPAK
S/O K. KRISHNAMURTHY
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT NO.165/2
MANJUNATHA ROAD
T.R.NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 028.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAVI PRAKASH V., ADV. FOR R1;
SRI T.P. VIVEKANANDA, ADV. FOR R2)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 02.01.2024,
PASSED ON IA NO.2 IN OS NO.316/2023 ON THE FILE OF X
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU
(CCH-26) ALLOWING THE IA NO.2 FILED U/O VII RULE 11(A) &
(D) OF CPC FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 28.10.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
-
3
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This Regular First Appeal is filed aggrieved by the
Order on I.A.No.II passed by the X Additional City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-26) ('trial Court' for short)
dated 02.01.2024 in O.S.No.316/2023.
2. We have heard Shri. Srinivasa Murthy S.R,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Shri. Ravi
Prakash V, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1
and Shri. T.P Vivekananda, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2.
3. The father of plaintiffs/appellants and defendant
No.1/respondent No.1-Late Shri. B.B Savanur, was allotted
constructed house/suit schedule property by the Mysore
Housing Board (now the Karnataka Housing Board) for a
consideration of Rs.19,143/- and was given possession vide
Possession Certificate dated 08.05.1969. Upon his demise,
the property's Khata was transferred to his wife and
following her death on 12.03.1995, the plaintiffs and
-
defendant No.1 became the sole surviving legal heirs of the
property.
4. A Release Deed was executed on 07.12.1995 by
Srikanth B Savanur (brother of defendant No.1) in favour of
defendant No.1, transferring his rights over the suit schedule
property. The document was duly registered with the
plaintiffs signing as consenting witnesses. Defendant No.1
transferred the Khata of the property to his name and began
enjoying it as the absolute owner. Although defendant No.1
claimed ownership under the Release Deed, there was an
understanding that he would compensate the plaintiffs for
their share in the property. Despite repeated requests,
defendant No.1 failed to pay their share and continued to
evade the issue. Defendant No.1, without the knowledge of
the plaintiffs, sold the suit schedule property to defendant
No.2 on 10.11.2022 for a sum of Rs.1,10,00,000/- though
the actual market value exceeded Rs.2,60,00,000/-. The
plaintiffs demanded their 1/3rd share of the sale
consideration and defendant No.1 refused to comply.
Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs approached the trial
-
Court by filing a suit for partition, separate possession and
for declaration with regard to release deed dated
07.12.1995 and sale deed dated 10.01.2022.
5. Defendant No.1 filed I.A.No.II under Order VII
Rule 11(a) and (d) for rejection of the plaint. It was the
contention of the defendant No.1 that the suit was filed after
an inordinate delay of 27 years from the execution of the
release deed and is hopelessly barred by limitation. The
release deed is a 'Deed of Conveyance' under Section 6(1) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and that any alienation
made prior to 20.12.2004 cannot be challenged in a
partition suit. It was further contended that as the plaintiffs
themselves were witnesses to the release deed and had full
knowledge of its execution, their challenge after 27 years is
untenable, barred by limitation and the suit requires to be
rejected.
6. The plaintiffs contended that the Release Deed
was obtained by false promise and coercion, making the
plaintiffs to sign the deed under misrepresentation. It was
alleged that defendant No.1 misused their signatures given
-
as consenting witnesses to wrongfully deprive them of their
share in the property. It was further contended that the
legality or validity of the transaction cannot be determined
at the preliminary stage without adducing evidence. It was
emphasized that while considering an interlocutory
application of this nature; only the plaint averments should
be examined and not the defendant's defence.
7. The trial Court allowed I.A.No.II and held that
since the plaintiffs were parties to the release deed had full
knowledge of its execution and had signed it with their
consent, the suit after a lapse of 27 years was clearly barred
by limitation and barred under the amended provisions of
the Hindu Succession Act, 2005.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants
contends that the trial Court failed to consider the legal
principles established in the precedents cited by the
appellants. The cause of action stated in the plaint must be
examined and tried during the trial and cannot be dismissed
at the preliminary stage. The trial Court overlooked this
-
aspect while allowing the interlocutory application filed by
defendant No.1. It is further submitted that the issue of
delay and limitation should be determined based on
evidence during the trial, not at the pre-trial stage. The trial
Court erred in concluding that the suit lacked a valid cause
of action. It was emphasized that limitation and the
existence of a cause of action are matters that require
detailed examination during trial, and therefore, the
rejection of the plaint on these grounds was contrary to law.
9. It is further contended that they had sought
annulment of the release deed and partition of the suit
property, as the deed was allegedly obtained by respondent
No.1 through fraud to deprive them of their rightful share. It
was argued before the trial Court that this issue required a
detailed examination during trial but was not properly
considered by the trial Court while passing the impugned
order. The trial Court erred in applying Section 6 of the
amended Hindu Succession Act, by holding that any
disposition of property prior to 20.12.2004 could not be
challenged. The trial Court failed to analyze the scope and
-
applicability of the amendment which could not be
determined without a full-trial. The rejection of a plaint
should be exercised only after examining the rights and
obligations of the parties, which the trial Court failed to, do
so. In partition suits, limitation is generally not a bar, but
this principle was overlooked. It is submitted that the
impugned order suffers from legal infirmities, reflects a
misapplication of law, lacks proper reasoning and has
unjustly deprived them of the opportunity to establish their
rights over the property.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants
places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Daliben Valjibhai and Ors v. Prajapati
Kodarbhai Kachrabhai and Anr reported in 2024 INSC
1049, where the Court reaffirmed the principles in the case
of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy reported
in (2015) 8 SCC 331. The Apex Court held while
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, only the averments in the plaint
must be examined to determine whether it discloses a cause
-
of action or is barred by law. The defendant's stand or
written statement is irrelevant at this stage, unless the
plaint on its face fails to disclose a cause of action or is
barred by any law, it cannot be rejected and all other issues
must be adjudicated during trial. In Chhotanben v.
Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thankkar reported in (2018) 6
SCC 422, the Apex Court held that where a triable issue is
raised, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, on the other hand, contends that it was on
considering the plaint averments itself that the plaint came
to be rejected. It is submitted that it was the specific
averment in the plaint that a Release Deed was executed on
07.12.1995 in favour of defendant No.1 and that the
plaintiffs are the consenting witnesses to the said document.
It is submitted that thereafter, defendant No.1 was enjoying
the property as the sole and absolute owner and the
appellants were perfectly well aware of the said fact. It is
submitted that since the suit was filed seeking a declaration
-
that the Release Deed dated 07.12.1995 is not binding on
the appellants. The trial Court was fully justified in holding
that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. It is further
contended that the Release Deed was not acted upon and
that the plaintiffs were assured that they would be paid the
value of the suit schedule property, is only a clever pleading
on the part of the plaintiffs. It is submitted that the findings
of the Court at the first instance are perfectly legal and
valid.
12. We have considered the contentions advanced.
The plaint allegations were specifically as under:-
"3. The plaintiffs further submits that, on
07.12.1995 a release deed/disclaimer had been
executed between the brother of the first defendant
executed by Srikanth B Savnur in favour of the first
defendant and the said documents was registered in the
office of the sub registrar, Rajajinagar, Bengaluru for
the said documents the plaintiffs are the consenting
witnesses. Thereby the first defendant claims to be the
absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of the suit
schedule property. The release dated 07.12.1995 is
produced at Annexure-A.
4. The plaintiffs further submits that, After the
demise of the father and mother of the plaintiffs and
first defendant, the first defendant got the katha of the
-
schedule property in his name basing on the instrument
at Annexure-A and enjoyed the schedule property and
absolute owner B.B Savanur succeeded to the deceased
estate along with the plaintiff and first defendant. After
demise of the plaintiffs and first defendant father and
mother, the release dated 07.12.1995 was not acted
upon by the first defendant, with a confidence that the
first defendant shall pay the value of the suit schedule
property on the guise the plaintiffs are the consenting
witness for the release deed at Annexure-A."
13. The Release Deed dated 07.12.1995 as well as
the Sale Deed dated 10.11.2022 were produced as
documents along with the plaint. It is, therefore, an
admitted fact that the plaintiffs were consenting witnesses
to the Release Deed dated 07.12.1995. We notice from the
order under appeal that the trial Court has considered the
pleadings in the plaint as well as the recitals in the Release
Deed and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were
perfectly well aware of the execution of the Release Deed
and the declaratory relief as sought for by them with regard
to the Release Deed which was executed in the year 1995
was hopelessly time-barred. Further, it is clear that after
the execution of the Release Deed, the property was
-
mutated in the name of defendant No.1, which is also a
plaint averment. It was after considering these contentions
that the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaint is
a vexatious one and is liable to be rejected.
14. In the case of Daliben Valjibhai's case (supra),
it was held that where fraud is alleged, the limitation starts
to run only from the date when the fraud is discovered. We
are of the opinion that the contention of the appellant that
the Release Deed of the year 1995 was vitiated by fraud is
completely unsubstantiated. That also is not the plaint
averment.
15. Having considered the contentions advanced on
either side and the decisions relied on by the learned
counsel for the appellants, we are of the opinion that there
is no error in the adjudication made by the trial Court. The
main relief sought for in the suit, being for a declaration that
the Release Deed dated 07.12.1995 is not binding on the
plaintiffs and the second relief being only consequential to
the first one, we are of the opinion that the view taken by
-
the trial Court was perfectly legal and valid. The appeal fails
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
All pending interlocutory applications shall stand
dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
cp*
