Smt. Narayanamma vs The Special Deputy Commissioner
2025 Latest Caselaw 5644 Kant

Karnataka High Court

Smt. Narayanamma vs The Special Deputy Commissioner on 28 March, 2025

                               1



    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

        DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025

                          PRESENT
        THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO
                              AND
            THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF


           WRIT APPEAL NO.22 OF 2023 (SC-ST)

BETWEEN:

   VENKATASWAMY
   DEAD BY HIS LRS

1 . SMT. NARAYANAMMA
    W/O LATE YELLAPPA
    DAUGHTER IN LAW OF
    LATE VENKATASWAMY
    AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS

2 . MR. SANJAY
    S/O LATE YELLAPPA
    GRAND SON OF VENKATASWAMY
    AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS

3 . MR. DEEPU
    S/O LATE YELLAPPA
    GRAND SON OF VENKATASWAMY
    AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS

4 . SMT. VARALAKSHMI
    W/O LATE PRAKASH
    D/LAW OF LATE VENKATASWAMY
    AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS

5 . MR PRAKASH
    S/O LATE PRAKASH
    G/S/O LATE VENKATASWAMY
    MINOR
                                2




   REPRESENTED BY GUARDIAN
   SMT. VARALAKSHMI (MOTHER)

   ALL ARE R/A SAMPIGENAGARA
   VADDARAPALYA, HEBAGODI
   POST ATTIBELE HOBLI
   ANEKAL TALUK - 562 107

                                       ...   APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.K.R KRISHNAMURTHY, ADVOCATE)

AND

1 . THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
    BENGALURU DISTRICT
    BENGALURU - 560 009

2 . THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
    BENGALURU SOUTH SUB DIVISION
    BENGALURU - 560 009

3 . THE TAHSILDAR
    ANEKAL TALUK
    BENGALURU DISTRICT - 562 107

4 . T SUDHAKAR
    S/O SANJEEVARAYUDU
    MAJOR
    NERALURU VILLAGE
    ATTIBELE HOBLI
    ANEKAL TALUK
    BENGALURU DISTRICT - 562 107

5 . SRI.C.VENKATESH
    S/O MR CHINNAPPA
    AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
    R/O NO.956, 8TH CROSS
    27TH MAIN, 1ST SECTOR
    HSR LAYOUT
    BENGALURU - 560 102

6 . SRI THIPPAIAH
    S/O KARIYAPPA
    AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
    R/O NO.16, BHIRESHWAR NILAYA
                                   3




    9TH CROSS, RBI LAYOUT
    BENGALURU - 560 024
                                                 ...     RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R1-R3;
 VIDE ORDER DATED 27.02.2025,
 NOTICE TO R4 & R5 DISPENSED WITH;
 SRI. JAYAKUMAR S PATIL, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
 SRI. CHANDRAKANTH R PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R6)


     THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER            SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURTS ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED 07/09/2022 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN
W.P.NO.24438/2009, ETC



     THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 27.02.2025 AND COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT' THIS DAY, T.M. NADAF J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:


CORAM:    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO
          AND
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF

                          CAV JUDGMENT

( PER: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF )

This case resembles a situation, wherein a party/litigant

disentitles himself from getting any relief under the provisions of a

Beneficial Enactment, for the delay and latches and the conduct as

well, attributable to him/her.

2. This appeal is by the descendants in interest of the

grantee, calling in question the order dated 07.09.2022, passed by

the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition No.24438/2009.

3. The facts leading to the case are as under:

The land bearing old survey No.57, New Survey No.209

measuring 1 acre, situated at Singena Agrahara Village, Sarjapura

Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru District was granted in favour of

Smt.Chikkavenkatamma @ Venkatamma, who belonged to

Scheduled Caste in LNDSR 19/80-81, dated 30.01.1982. The

original grantee Smt.Chikkavenkatama @ Venkatamma conveyed

the subject land in favour of respondent No.4 through a registered

sale deed dated 16.11.1996, which was registered on 15.06.1998.

In the interregnum, permission was obtained as contemplated under

Section-4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes And Scheduled Tribes

(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter

referred to as 'PTCL Act' for brevity) for conveying the property.

Respondent No.4 in turn sold the property in favour of respondent

No.6 herein by executing a registered sale deed dated 15.03.2004.

4. Original grantee - mother of Sri.Venkataswamy -

respondent No.4 in the writ petition, filed an application, under

Section-4 of PTCL Act, before the Respondent No.2 - Assistant

Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, in the year 2005. The

said application was registered as KSC/SC/2005-2006. The

respondent No.6 herein was not made as a party and he got

impleaded as a party - respondent No.4 before respondent No.2. On

contest, respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner by an order

dated 25.02.2007 rejected the petition filed by the mother of

Sri.Venkataswamy (father of the appellants herein). During the

pendency of the proceedings before respondent No.2, original

grantee Smt.ChikkaVenkatamma expired and the father of the

appellants herein Sri.Venkataswamy was brought on record as legal

representative. Aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.2

- Assistant Commissioner, father of the appellants viz.,

Sri.Venkataswamy preferred an appeal before the Respondent No.1

- Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Rural District. The

respondent No.1 by an order dated 03.07.2009 set-aside the order

passed by respondent No.2 and allowed the application filed by the

original grantee i.e., mother of Sri.Venkataswamy for resumption

and restoration of the subject land, on the premise that, when the

sale deed was executed on 16.11.1996, there was no permission as

per Section-4(2) of PTCL Act. Further, there was a direction to

respondent No.2 and respondent No.3 -Tahsildar, Anekal Taluk to

take necessary action, as well as make necessary entries in the

revenue records.

5. Aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.1,

respondent No.6 - Sri.Thippaiah the subsequent purchaser from

respondent No.4 - T.Sudhakar, knocked the doors of this Court in

W.P.No.24438/2009. During the pendency of the writ petition, son

of original grantee Sri.Venkataswamy expired and his legal

representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.4(a) to

4(e). Respondent Nos.4(a) to 4(d) were represented through their

GPA Holder i.e., Respondent No.5 herein. Subsequently, respondent

No.5, Sri.C.Venkatesh has been impleaded as a party respondent

No.6 by the petitioner before the learned Single Judge.

6. The learned Single Judge after hearing the learned

counsel for the parties allowed the writ petition, reasoning that,

though the document was presented for registration on 16.11.1996,

however, as there was an objection raised by the Sub-Registrar to

register the document for short of permission to convey the land,

the sale deed ultimately was registered on 15.06.1998 i.e., after

obtaining a valid permission from the Government as contemplated

under Section - 4(2) of PTCL Act. The reasons for the order in the

writ petition commences from paragraph No.6 onwards, which reads

as follows:

"6. It is undisputed that the sale deed which was executed in favour of respondent No.5 was presented before the Sub- Registrar concerned on 15.11.1996. The sale deed was not registered in view of the objection raised by the Sub-Registrar stating that the sale deed cannot be registered in the absence of permission granted by the Competent Authority under Section-4 of the Act. Thereafter, on an application submitted by respondent Nos.4 and 5 jointly, the Competent Authority passed an order granting the permission to respondent No.4 to convey the subject property in favour of respondent No.5. Thereafter, the sale deed was registered in favour of respondent No.5 on 15.06.1998. Respondent No.5 in turn conveyed subject land in favour of the petitioner through a registered sale deed on 15.03.2004. The mother of respondent No.4 filed an application under Section-5 of the Act for resumption and restoration of the subject land alleging that the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent No.5 was in contravention of Section-4(2) of the Act.

7. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the application. However, in the appeal, the Deputy Commissioner concerned allowed the application filed under Section 5 of the Act. The Apex Court in the case of 'GHANSHYAM' (supra) at paragraph No.19 has held as follows:

"19. The document dated 04.04.2013 did not by itself create any interest nor did the title pass upon execution of such document on 04.04.2013 but it was only after the registration on 02.07.2014 that the title in Katihar

property passed from the Company in favour of the transferee. The submission of the contemnors however, is that by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, the document in question would operate from 04.04.2013. In our view, the principle embodied in Section 47 of the Registration Act is completely for different purposes. In so far as the issue of transfer is concerned, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is the governing principle, which is quite clear. It is the date of registration of document which is crucial inasmuch as the transfer is effected and the title passes only upon registration. Viewed thus, it is clear that Katihar property was transferred in the teeth of the Order of 08.05.2014 and ex facie there has been violation of the Order passed by this Court. It is crucial to note that on 08.05.2014, the company had appeared on caveat before this Court and certainly had express knowledge about the Order of 08.05.2014. It was party to the proceedings and was bound by the order passed by this Court in every respect."

8. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has categorically held that any interest nor did the title will pass upon the execution of such document, but it was only after the registration that the title shall pass to the transferee.

9. In the present case, the sale deed was executed on 16.11.1996 and in view of the objections raised by the Sub- Registrar concerned, the parties approached the competent authority seeking permission to convey the land as specified under Section 4 of the Act. After obtaining the permission, the

sale deed was registered in favour of respondent No.5 on 15.06.1998.

10. In view of the ratio enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'GHANSHYAM' (supra), it is held that the subject property was conveyed to respondent No.5 on 15.06.1998 and in view of the same, the sale deed which was registered in favour of respondent No.5 after obtaining permission cannot be held to be in contravention of Section 4(2) of the Act.

11. Even accepting the submissions of the learned counsel for respondent No.4 that title in favour of respondent No.5 was transferred on execution of the sale deed, the application under Section 5 of the Act was filed in the year 2005, that is after inordinate delay of more than 7 years from the date of execution of the sale deed.

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'NINGAPPA' supra has held that the application seeking for resumption where there was a considerable delay in filing the same, application seeking for resumption should have been rejected on the ground of delay alone.

13. In the present case, there was an unexplained delay of nearly 7 years in filing the application and the respondent No.4 having sought permission to alienate the land in respect of respondent No.5 was fully aware that the subject land was conveyed to respondent No.5 and thereafter filed the application. Hence, in the absence of any plausible explanation for the delay in filing the application nearly 7 years from the date of execution of sale deed, respondent No.4 is not entitled for the resumption and restoration of the subject land.

14. For the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner concerned, is not sustainable in law. Hence, I pass the following order:

     1)     The writ petition is allowed.

     2)     The impugned order dated 03.07.2009 passed by the

respondent No.1 at Annexure-H is hereby quashed."

7. Assailing the same, the appellants who are the legal

representatives of Sri.Venkataswamy, son of the original grantee

Smt.Chikkavenkatamma, are before this Court in this intra-court

appeal.

8. We have heard Sri.K.R.Krishnamurthy, learned counsel

for appellants, Smt.Savitha Kulkarni, learned AGA for respondent

Nos.1 to 3, and Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for respondent No.6 and have given our anxious thoughts

to the arguments advanced, pleadings submitted, documents on

record and the judgments relied.

9. The main limb of argument as advanced by the learned

counsel for appellants is, the sale deed was presented on

16.11.1996. The contents of the sale deed shows, that there was

passing of consideration and transfer of ownership, title and interest

in the property. Though the registration of the document has taken

place on 15.06.1998, after obtaining the permission, but as on the

date of the execution of the document in the year 1996, there was

no permission as contemplated under Section-4(2) of PTCL Act and

the sale deed is void ab-initio and hit by Section-47 of the Indian

Registration Act 1908. He further asserts that as per Section-47 of

the Registration Act 1908, it is the time of the execution of

document is to be taken into consideration and not the time of

registration, to give effect to the document. Admittedly, though the

sale deed was registered in 1998, but it was executed in 1996,

hence as per Section-47 of the Registration Act, the time of

execution of the document being 1996, the sale deed is hit by

operation of Section-4(2) of PTCL Act, read with Section-47 of the

Registration Act, as the sale deed relates back to the date of

presentation and execution but not the date of registration.

10. He further submits that the said sale deed was also hit by

Section-6 of the PTCL Act, in as much as, the said section

contemplates with a non-obstante clause, that the jurisdictional

Sub-Registrar shall not accept for registration any document

relating to transfer, or for creation of any interest, in any granted

land included in the list of 'granted lands' furnished to the said Sub-

Registrar, with an exception that where such transfer is in

accordance with the provisions of PTCL Act. The learned counsel

submits that the execution of the sale deed being 1996, the

subsequent permission during the year 1997, would not cure the

sale deed registered in the year 1998. He further submits that the

learned Single Judge erred in holding that there is an inordinate

delay of more than seven years in initiating the proceedings, relying

on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in NINGAPPA VS.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER1, contending that in the said case the

Hon'ble Apex Court noticed that there was a delay of 15 years in

initiating the proceedings.

11. To buttress his arguments, the learned counsel for the

appellants relies on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of (i) DHARMA NAIKA VS. RAMA NAIKA & ANOTHER2 and

(ii) SATYAN VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS3. The

learned counsel, stresses upon paragraph No.24 of the former

judgment and urges that the sale deed executed without permission

is void ab-initio. Paragraph No.24 of the judgment in the case of

Dharma Naika, referred supra, reads as follows:

(2020) 14 SCC 236

(2008) 2 S.C.R. 451

(2020) 14 SCC 210

"24. Let us, therefore, consider whether any of the conditions is satisfied in the present case and thereby, whether, the transfer shall be null and void conveying or deeming ever to have conveyed no right, title or interest of such land by such transfer. So far as the first condition, namely, transfer in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land is concerned, it cannot be disputed in the facts of this case that there was no contravention of the terms of the grant of such land as the transfer was admittedly made after 15 years of the date of certificate, which was the only condition regarding prohibition of transfer in the grant. It is also not in dispute that there is no contravention of any law providing for such grant. Therefore, so far as these two conditions are concerned, it cannot be disputed that they are not satisfied.

Now, let us take into consideration the third condition i.e. transfer made in contravention of sub- section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. In respect of this condition, a transfer of any granted land made after the commencement of the Act in contravention of sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer. Sub-section to of section 4 clearly says that:

"4.(2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government."

Therefore, Sub- Section(2) of Section 4 prohibits transfer or acquisition by transfer, either by the transferor or by the transferee of any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Therefore , after the commencement of this act, if any transfer is effected or any

person acquires any granted land by transfer, without the previous permission of the Government, such transfer shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.

12. In the latter judgment i.e., in the case of SATYAN

referred supra, the learned counsel relies on paragraph Nos.27 and

29 and contends that, the permission obtained subsequently will not

cure the voidness of the sale deed. Paragraph Nos.27 and 29 of

SATYAN's case referred supra reads as follows:

"27. If we analyze the aforesaid plea also, we find no merit in the same. We cannot lose sight of the objective with which the said Act was enacted. The non-alienation clause existing in the said Rules, and incorporated in the grants, was found to be inadequate to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who were given land owing to their ignorance and poverty. Influential and powerful sections of society were stated to be obtaining sales and mortgages for consideration, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes became victims of circumstances. The objective of the State Government in enacting the said Act was to prevent such misuse and, therefore, in categorical terms, transfer with permission was prescribed. This would be de hors the terms of the grant or the said Rules. Thus, whether it was a case where it was within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15)

years, or the period beyond fifteen (15) years, such permission would be required.

28. xxx

29. The reason for the competent authority to arrive at a decision whether to grant permission or not after the period of fifteen (15) years may or may not be coloured by such considerations. But certainly, he may satisfy himself that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only, who have been allotted the land, are not taken for a ride, and it is possibly in their best interest for recorded reasons that such permission should be granted. The wordings of Section 4(2) of the said Act are quite clear in its terms."

13. The sum and substance of the arguments of the learned

counsel for the appellants is, though the sale deed was registered in

1998 after necessary permission but was executed in 1996. The

time to be reckoned is the date of execution in terms of Section-47

of the Registration Act, 1908. As such, the permission obtained

subsequently will not cure the prohibition imposed by the law and

the sale deed was hit by sub-section-(2) of Section-4, as well as

Section-6 of PTCL Act, which prohibits the Registering Officer to

accept for registration any document relating to any granted land

covered under the provisions of the PTCL Act.

14. Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for

respondent No.6 would submit that the contentions urged by the

learned counsel for the appellants have been turned down by the

learned Single Judge at paragraph Nos.7 to 10 of his order and has

rightly held that the transfer and conveyance completes only on the

registration of the document and the document being registered in

the year 1998, subsequent to the permission of the Government is

valid and cannot be held in contravention of the Section-4(2) of the

PTCL Act. He further submits that, the father of the appellants

expired during the pendency of the writ petition and the appellants

herein were brought on record. They were represented in the writ

petition through their GPA holder-Respondent No.6-Sri.C.Venkatesh,

as they have entered into a registered agreement of sale, dated

09.03.2015, in his favour. He further asserts that, the petitioner

(Respondent No.6 herein) after noticing the same filed an

application to implead Sri.C.Venkatesh as a party - respondent No.6

to the petition and produced copy of the agreement as Annexure-J

in the writ petition. However, the appellants for the reasons best

known to them have not whispered anything about the same in the

writ appeal; this fact has an impact on the bonafides of the

appellants and disentitles them from claiming any equity even if

any, at the hands of this Court, on the delay in invoking the

proceedings under the provisions of the PTCL Act and seeks to

dismiss the appeal.

15. Before adverting to the contentions laid by the respective

counsel, it is profitable to extract Sections-4 and 6 of PTCL Act and

Section-47 of Registration Act 1908, for easy reference:

"4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.

(2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government.

(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority.

5. xxx

"6. Prohibition of registration of transfer of granted lands.-Notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 on or after the commencement of this Act, no registering officer shall accept for registration any document relating to

the transfer of, or to the creation of any interest in, any granted land included in a list of granted lands furnished to the registering officer except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act or the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant."

16. Section-47 of Indian Registration Act, reads as

follows:

"47. Time from which registered document operates.--A registered document shall operate from the time which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."

17. Section-4(1) of PTCL Act imposes an absolute bar on

transfer of any land within the prohibited period contained in the

grant order. Section-4(2) of PTCL Act, however creates an

exception, though it starts with a negative word 'no person shall'

but postulates that any land granted may be transferred with a valid

previous permission obtained from the Government. It is no doubt

clear that as per sub-section-2 of Section-4 of PTCL Act, lifting of

prohibition is not automatic after the period of prohibition imposed

while granting the land ends, but requires a previous permission to

transfer the land granted by way of a reasoned order in terms of the

Provisions enumerated especially under Rule-9 of Karnataka Land

Grant Rules, 1969, after thoughtful deliberations at the Government

end.

18. Section-6 of PTCL Act supra, starts with a non-obstante

clause, imposes a duty on the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar that, he

shall not accept for registration any document relating to the

transfer of or to the creation of any interest in any granted land

included in a list of 'granted lands' furnished to the said Officer, with

an exception where such transfer is in accordance with the Act or

the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such

grant. A reading of the said Provision clarifies that the Sub-Registrar

is provided with a list of 'granted lands' within his jurisdiction and he

is duty bound to adhere to the provision especially Section-6 of the

PTCL Act.

19. Section-47 of Registration Act, 1908 contemplates the

time of execution of the document. The legal position on

interpretation of Section-47 of Registration Act, 1908 is no more

res-integra. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court way

back in the year 1961, in the case of RAM SARAN LAL Vs.

DOMINI KUER4, by the majority of 3:2, interpreted Section-47 of

AIR 1961 SC 1747

Registration Act, at paragraph No.8 that it is for the priority among

two documents executed in respect of two different persons, the

time of execution be taken for consideration. Paragraph No.8 reads

as follows:

"8. We do not think that the learned Attorney- General's contention is well founded. We will assume that the learned Attorney-General's construction of the instrument of sale that the property was intended to pass under it on the date of the instrument is correct Section 47 of the Registration Act does not however, say when a sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property is to have effect. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of S. 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of S. 47, to have been completed on January 31, 1946. The view that we have taken of S. 47 of the Registration Act seems to have been taken in Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain, AIR 1921 Pat 150. We

believe that the same view was expressed in Nareshchandra Dutta v. Girishchandra Das, ILR 62 Cal 979: (AIR 1936 Cal

17) and Gobardhan Bar v. Gana Dhar Bar, ILR (1940) 2 Cal 270: (AIR 1941 Cal 78)."

20. The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of RAM SARAN LAL referred supra, is holding field till date

and referred in many recent judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court,

as well this Court and other High Courts across the Country. The

object of the Provision interpreted as above clears that, the time of

execution is only to consider which among the two registered deeds

in respect of different persons, is considered in priority on

subsequent registration. In the case on hand, the Sub-Registrar

exercised his power under Section-6 of PTCL Act and declined to

register the document and registered the same after being satisfied

that there was a previous permission to convey the land by way of

transfer issued by the Government, in accordance with law. As such,

the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants on Section-

47 of Registration Act, requires to be rejected and we accordingly,

rejects the same in view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex

Court supra.

21. In so far as both the judgments relied on by the learned

counsel for the appellants is concerned, the same are entirely

different on facts when compared to the facts in the present case.

In the case of DHARMA NAIKA referred supra, the sale deed was

executed without a valid permission, as such, the sale deed was

held as void ab-initio. In the case on hand, admittedly there was a

prior permission granted by the Government, in the year 1997 and

the sale deed was registered in the year 1998. In SATYAN's case

referred supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court, has held that though there

was a prior permission obtained to transfer the land, but it was

found that the documents purporting to be prior permission were

forged and fabricated for which criminal proceedings are separately

pending. The said observation has been enumerated in para-22 of

the aforesaid judgment. In the present case, the original grantee

applied for the previous permission before the Government and

after valid permission granted by the Government in 1997,

conveyed the property by way of a registered sale deed, in the year

1998. In these circumstances, the judgments relied on by the

appellants are distinguishable without much ado.

22. The learned Single Judge, considered the contentions

raised by the appellants, on the effect of date of execution of the

document and held at paragraph Nos. 7 to 10, extracted by us

above, that the subject property was conveyed to Respondent No.4

in this appeal (Respondent No.5, in the writ petition) on 15.06.1998

after obtaining necessary permission as contemplated under

Section-4(2) of PTCL Act, cannot be held to be in contravention of

Section-4(2) of PTCL Act. We could not take any exception to the

reasons of the learned Single Judge and accept the same in view of

the settled position of law as enumerated supra.

23. So far as the contention of the learned counsel

Sri.K.R.Krishnamurthy, on Section-6 of the PTCL Act, it is clear from

the record, that the Sub-Registrar has in fact, invoked the power

enjoined under the Provision and declined to register the document,

when the same was presented on 16.11.1996, for short of previous

permission from the Government, as contemplated under Section-

4(2) of PTCL Act. The sale deed comes to be registered in the year

1998, after a valid previous permission granted by the Government

to convey the subject land by a registered sale deed. The

contentions argued are taken only to be rejected in the facts and

circumstances of the case.

24. In view of the above, we have no hesitation to hold that

there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the

appellants so far as Section-4(2) and Section-6 of PTCL and

Section-47 of Registration Act.

25. Now comes the point of time within which the grantee or

the descendants of grantee claim under him/her could invoke the

provisions of the Act, to seek an order in their favour. There is no

time limit prescribed under the Act, however the proceedings should

be invoked under the provisions of PTCL Act, within a reasonable

time. What is reasonable time is not defined anywhere, but it is

depending on the facts of each case. In this case, the proceedings

under the provisions of PTCL Act, has been invoked by the Original

Grantee, Late Smt.Chikkavenkatamma @ Venkatamma, after delay

of more than 7 years. Sri.K.R.Krishnamurthy, learned counsel took

an exception to the reasons of the learned Single Judge, for

quashing the order of respondent No.1 - Special Deputy

Commissioner on the ground of delay in initiating the proceedings,

based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ningappa's

case referred supra, on the premise that, the delay in initiating the

proceedings under the Provisions of the Act in the said case was 15

years, as contended at paragraph No.15 in grounds of the appeal.

At first blush, it appeared to us as attractive, but for their conduct,

the appellants are disentitled to seek the remedy on this count also.

26. We have noticed from the record that the appellants

along with other relatives entered into a registered agreement of

sale with respondent No.5 herein. This fact is visibly apparent at

Annexure-J. On the query of this Court, Sri.K.R.Krishnamurthy,

learned counsel for the appellants admits, that the appellants did

entered into a registered agreement of sale with Sri.C.Venkatesh.

Despite the same, the appellants have not disclosed the said fact in

the writ appeal either in the facts of the case or in the grounds, the

same amounts to suppression of facts before this Court, though

they have produced a copy of the registered agreement of sale at

Annexure-J. This clearly postulates a serious impact and hit hard on

the bonafides of the appellants. In these circumstances, the

contention of learned counsel for the appellants on the ground of

delay arguing that the original grantee was an illiterate and the

respondent No.4 herein lured the grantee by making a monetary

offer to purchase the land and without understanding the

consequences she sold the land by executing a sale deed, is not

appealing to us, on the other hand, the same amounts to gross

abuse of process of law and invites cost be imposed for the reasons

stated supra.