2. The petitioner was a former Village
Administration Officer in the Revenue Department. He
mutation of land records. The chronology of events reveals
pertaining to Sy. No. 101 of Chikkanakote village.
3. This complaint led to registration of FIR in
Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
extended the benefit of doubt to the accused.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that, parallelly
Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The
DW1. The Enquiry Officer submitted report dated
stood proved. The Upa-lokayuktha, upon consideration of
and considering the petitioner's representation.
5. This was challenged by the petitioner before the
which forms the subject matter of this Writ Petition.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner
(iv) That the findings in the Departmental
Enquiry are perverse, being based on no
evidence and the penalty imposed is
shockingly disproportionate.
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Arguments of the counsel for the respondent:
7. Per contra, the learned Additional Government
Advocate and counsel for the Lokayuktha defended the
impugned orders. It is their submission that:
(i) The standard of proof in Departmental
Proceedings being preponderance of
probability is distinct from criminal trials, as
held in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd., reported in (2005) 7 SCC
764.
(ii) The acquittal being on benefit of doubt does
not operate as res judicata in Departmental
Proceedings.
(iii) The enquiry was conducted in strict
compliance with the principles of natural
justice and the penalty is commensurate
with the gravity of misconduct.
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8. We have given our anxious consideration to the
arguments of both sides. Perused the records.
Analysis and findings:
9. The Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal's
order dated 09.01.2025 commenced its analysis by
establishing the jurisprudential framework governing the
judicial review of Departmental Enquiries, drawing upon
the seminal decision in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India & Others, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, which
authoritatively delineates the constitutional boundaries of
interference in disciplinary matters. The Tribunal correctly
emphasized that judicial review is not an appellate re-
examination of evidence but a limited supervisory
jurisdiction to ensure compliance with fundamental
principles of natural justice and the absence of
jurisdictional errors.
10. The Tribunal undertook a microscopic
examination of the evidentiary matrix before the Enquiry
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Officer. It systematically analyzes the depositions of each
witness, i.e., the complainant PW1, who gave detailed
testimony about the demand and acceptance of the bribe;
so also the evidence of shadow witness (PW2), who
corroborated the sequence of events during the trap
operation; and the Investigation Officers (PW3 and PW4),
who established the procedural integrity of the
investigation. The Tribunal noted to the precedent how
their testimonies were corroborated by contemporaneous
documentary evidence, including the trap mahazar (Ex.P3)
and the Forensic Report (Ex.P32) confirming the presence
of phenolphthalein powder on the petitioner's hand. This
evidentiary change, the Tribunal rightly concluded,
satisfied the standard of preponderance of probability
applicable to Departmental Proceedings.
11. Sofaras acquittal of the petitioner in criminal
proceedings is concerned, the Tribunal engaged in a
nuanced analysis distinguishing between different species
of acquittal. It extracted verbatim the operative portion of
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the Criminal Court judgment, which specifically used the
phrase "benefit of doubt" rather than a finding of complete
exaggeration. The Tribunal correctly applied the ratio in
Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya &
Others, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 699, which holds that
an acquittal based on 'benefit of doubt' does not operate
as res judicata in Departmental Proceedings owing to the
different standards of proof. A Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in WP.No.9642/2020 (S-KSAT) in P.V Rudrappa
v. The State of Karnataka, authored by one of us,
(Dixit J), decided on 30.01.2024 it is specifically
distinguished between honourable acquittal, its effect on
disciplinary action, and also the meaning of 'benefit of
doubt'. In para-2 and 3 of the said judgment, it is
observed as follows:
"2. AS TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS & DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS,
AND INVOCABILITY OF DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY:
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(a) The vehement submission of learned AGA &
learned Panel Counsel that there is difference
between Criminal Proceedings and Disciplinary
Proceedings, cannot be disputed. Even an average
law student would not disagree with this. The
nature of criminal proceedings, the form before
which they are brought, the quality & quantum of
evidence, degree of proof and the outcome of such
proceedings, are all much different from those in a
Disciplinary Proceeding. The rule of evidence
applicable to Departmental Proceedings is not the
same for criminal trial; criminal cases are ordinarily
governed inter alia by the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 & the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. The technical rule relating to sufficiency of
evidence does not apply to departmental enquiries.
The authority conducting such enquiry is guided by
the Rules of Natural Justice & Fairness. In a
departmental enquiry, there is no inhibition against
placing reliance on the evidence of a co-delinquent,
unlike in a criminal case. This is the reason why
courts ordinarily do not stay the disciplinary
proceedings only on the ground that a parallel
criminal proceeding pends.
(b) What is observed by the Apex Court in AJIT
KUMAR NAG vs. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.,
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2005 SCC Online SC 1352 at para 11 is worth
reproducing:
"As far as acquittal of the appellant by a
criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said
order does not preclude the Corporation from
taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our
judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by
a criminal court would not debar an employer from
exercising power in accordance with Rules and
Regulations in force. The two proceedings criminal
and departmental are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different
objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to
inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in
accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial,
incriminating statement made by the accused in
certain circumstances or before certain officers is
totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of
evidence and procedure would not apply to
departmental proceedings. The degree of proof
which is necessary to order a conviction is different
from the degree of proof necessary to record the
commission of delinquency. The rule relating to
appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is
also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is
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on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is
able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond
reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a
court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other
hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent
officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the
appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does
not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We
are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of
the appellant that since he was acquitted by a
criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him
from service deserves to be quashed and set
aside".
However, the above observations are by way of
general rule which admits at least one exception
namely the abnormal of honourable acquittal.
(c) In RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN,
(2024) 1 SCC 175, it is observed at para 30 as
under:
"We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of
the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary
proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot
be allowed to stand. The charges were not just
similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses
and circumstances were all the same. This is a case
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where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the
orders of the disciplinary authority and the
appellate authority as allowing them to stand will
be unjust, unfair and oppressive."
In other words, when the facts, evidentiary material
and the circumstances arising from the criminal
case are identical to those in the disciplinary
proceedings, ordinarily there cannot be difference
in terms of their outcome. If on identical set of
facts/allegations that are vouched by the very same
evidentiary material/witnesses, an accused
employee is acquitted after a full-fledged trial,
ordinarily he cannot be punished in a disciplinary
enquiry. In a way, this can be likened to doctrine of
double jeopardy, constitutionally enacted in Article
20(2); the Apex Court in a catena of decisions has
applied the same even in disciplinary proceedings
eg., STATE OF HARYANA vs. BALWANT SINGH,
(2003) 3 SCC 362. This vital aspect has not figured
in the consideration of petitioner's case at the
hands of disciplinary authority. Alas, Tribunal too
missed it. This constitutes yet another lacuna in the
impugned orders.
3. AS TO PLEA OF HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL &
ITS EFFECT ON DISCIPLINARY ACTION:
(a) As a norm offences are tried in the Criminal
Courts. After the trial, Court may convict or acquit
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the accused. Even at the pre-trial stage, an accused
may be discharged too. There may be quashment
of criminal cases by the Apex Court/High Court. An
order of acquittal generally means that the person
has not committed the offence for which he was
charged and tried; the cloud on his presumed
innocence thus stands removed. Acquittal is
recorded when prosecution fails to prove its case
beyond all reasonable doubt; that is, when the guilt
is not proved to the hilt. The benefit of doubt given
to the accused does not mean that he was involved
in the case, but the same could not be established
by the prosecution. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the
term "beyond reasonable doubt" employed in a
judgment ordinarily does not imply stigma qua the
one who was accused. However, that is not the end
of matter when the accused being a delinquent
employee is facing a disciplinary proceeding on the
same allegations. That is where the plea of
'honourable acquittal', factors.
(b) The concept of 'honourable acquittal' is easy
to say, but difficult to employ, there being no
statutory definition thereof, more particularly in the
IPC, Cr.PC & Indian Evidence Act. Lord Williams, J.
in ROBERT STUART WAUCHOPE vs. EMPEROR
(1934) 61 ILR Cal.168 observed: "The expression
'honourably acquitted' is one which is unknown to
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court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order
used in courts martial and other extra judicial
tribunals...". The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF
POLICE, NEW DELHI v MEHER SINGH, (2013) 7
SCC 68 at para 25 explained the same:
"...the expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are
unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the
Penal Code. They are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is
meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". ...
when the accused is acquitted after full
consideration of the prosecution case and the
prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges
leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said
that the accused was honourably acquitted."
(c) The idea of 'honourable acquittal' is not easy
to define although it can be illustrated. If an
accused is discharged at pre-trial stage or the
criminal proceeding launched against him is
quashed, there is no difficulty in treating the same
as the cases of 'honourable acquittal' for the limited
purpose of disciplinary enquiry. (We are mindful
that the question of acquittal comes post trial). A
case of 'honourable acquittal' may arise when, after
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trial the Criminal Court orders acquittal with any of
nearly the following illustrives:
(i) the accused is falsely prosecuted to seek
vengeance or for some ulterior motive.
(ii) that there is absolutely no evidence to
implicate the accused in the proceedings;
(iii) there is very little evidence which is
insufficient to connect the accused with the
commission of crime;
(iv) the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charges against the accused;
(v) the prosecution witnesses are unworthy of
any credit and their version does not generate any
confidence.
We again say that the above are only illustrative
and not exhaustive. We would also add a caveat
that in considering as to whether the case of
delinquent is of 'honourable acquittal', the entire
judgment in Criminal Case should be perused. It is
also desirable to secure a copy of record of the
proceedings for examination, unless the said
exercise poses practical difficulty. At least, it should
be open to the delinquent employee to produce
such copies".
12. The Tribunal's legal analysis regarding the
jurisdiction or competence of the Upa-lokayuktha deserves
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particular mention. It interpreted Rule 14-A (2)(d) of KCS
(CCA) Rules through the lens of established principles of
statutory construction, noting that the rule-making
authority had consciously used the term
"recommendation" without specifying any limitation on its
scope. The Tribunal relied on the doctrine of implied
powers to hold that, recommending a specific penalty falls
within a legitimate ambit of the Upa-lokayuktha's
functions, provided it is based on proper application of
mind to the facts of the case.
13. On the procedural fairness of fact, the Tribunal
verified the sequence of events - from the issuance of
charge memo to the conduct of enquiry and the
opportunity given for defence. It is noted that the
petitioner was represented by defence assistant
throughout the proceedings, had full access to documents,
and was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses. This scrupulous adherence to procedural
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safeguards, the Tribunal concluded, left no room for
allegation of violation of natural justice.
14. The juridical distinction between criminal trials
and departmental enquiries forms the bedrock of
administrative law. As expounded in judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Umesh in Civil
Appeal Nos.1763-1764 of 2022 decided on 22.03.2022 by
the full Bench as these proceedings operate in parallel but
distinct universes - while criminal law focuses on
reformative justice through the prism of penal
consequences, departmental enquiries serve the
preventive and reformative purpose of maintaining
institutional integrity. This dichotomy is rooted in offering
standards of proof, the criminal standard of "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" V/s. the civil standard of
"preponderance of probability" applicable to departmental
matters.
15. The doctrine of double jeopardy under Article
20(2) of the Constitution has been consistently interpreted
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in a narrow technical sense. The Constitution Bench in
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, reported in
(1953) 1 SCC 736, established that, it applies only when
there is prosecution and punishment for the same offence
before a Court of competent jurisdiction. Departmental
proceedings, being administrative in nature, do not
constitute "prosecution" under this constitutional
provision.
16. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary
matters has been circumscribed by a catena of decisions.
In Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran,
reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court enumerated the limited grounds for interference:
i. When the enquiry is conducted by an
incompetent authority,
ii. Violation of principles of natural justice,
iii. Conclusions based on no evidence or
iv. Findings which are manifestly perverse.
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17. The High Court cannot transform itself into an
appellate authority to reweigh evidence, as emphasized in
High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 416.
18. Regarding proportionality of punishment, the
jurisprudence has evolved through several landmark
decisions. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India &
others, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611, the Apex Court
laid down the "shock the conscience" "test for judicial
review of penalties". However, in cases involving
corruption by public servants, the Courts have shown
deference to disciplinary authorities, as seen in
Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012)
1 SCC 442, which upheld dismissal for misconduct
involving financial impropriety. The rational is that, such
misconduct erodes public trust and warrants stringent
action regardless of the frugality of amount involved. The
principle of "unclean hands" assumes significance in cases
involving corruption charges. As observed in Delhi
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Admn. v. Sushil Kumar, reported in (1996) 11 SCC
605, a person holding positions of public trust must
demonstrate impeccable integrity. The Courts have
consistently refused to interfere with penalties imposed in
such cases unless there is glaring perversity in the
findings, keeping in view the larger public interest in
maintaining probity in public service.
19. After the aforesaid analysis of legal principles
and factual matrix, we arrive at the inescapable conclusion
that the Tribunal's order represents a model of judicial
discipline in dealing with disciplinary matter. The Tribunal
has not merely paid lip service to the principles of limited
judicial review but has demonstrated their applications
through analysis of evidence and cogent reasoning.
20. The petitioner's contentions, while articulated
with legal sophistication, ultimately fail to overcome the
formidable barriers directed by settled jurisprudence
against interference in disciplinary matters. The attempt
to equate the departmental proceedings with criminal
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trials overlooks their fundamentally different purposes and
standards. The argument regarding double jeopardy,
though superficially appealing, crumbles upon the closure
examination of constitutional text and precedent.
21. The proportionality argument deserves
particular rejection. In an era where corruption in public
office has become a pressing national concern, Courts
must be particularly circumspect about interfering with
penalties imposed for proven misconduct. The penalty of
compulsory retirement, while severe, cannot be termed as
shockingly disproportionate when viewed against the
brevity of the misconduct - demand of illegal gratification
by an officer entrusted with maintaining land records,
which form the very foundation of property rights in our
society.
22. The procedural objections regarding the
repealed rules are nothing but an afterthought. The
petitioner's active participation in the enquiry proceedings
without raising this objection at the appropriate stage
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creates an insurmountable barrier of waiver and
acquiescence. Moreover, the substance of charges would
remain unchanged under the new rules, rendering this
technical objection devoid of substantive merits.
23. For the multifaceted reasons elaborated above,
the Writ Petition is found to be devoid of merits.
Consequentially, it is liable to be dismissed.
24. Resultantly, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed.
(ii) Pending applications, if any, stand
disposed off.
(iii) Costs made easy.
Sd/-
(KRISHNA S DIXIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR)
JUDGE
AM
