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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, no
court shall impose a sentence in excess of
that specified in sub-section (1) for any
contempt either in respect of itself or of a
court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section, where a person is found guilty of a
civil contempt, the court, if it considers that
a fine will not meet the ends of justice and
that a sentence of imprisonment, direct
that he be detained in a civil prison for such
period not exceeding six months as it may
think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of
court in respect of any undertaking given to
a court is a company, every person who, at
the time the contempt was committed, was
in charge of, and was responsible to, the
company for the conduct of business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be
deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the
punishment may be enforced, with the leave
of the court, by the detention in civil prison
of each such person:
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Provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall render any such person liable to
such punishment if he proves that the
contempt was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent its commission.
5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (4), where the contempt of court
referred to therein has been committed by a
company and it is proved that the contempt
has been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or is attributable to any
neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other officer of the
company, such director, manager, secretary
or other officer shall also be deemed to be
guilty of the contempt and the punishment
may be enforced, with the leave of the court,
by the detention in civil prison of such
director, manager, secretary or other
officer."
8. On this premise, learned Senior Counsel is
seeking consideration of I.A.No.1/2020 to condone the
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delay of 366 days in preferring the Contempt petition and
to initiate action against the respondent/Accused No.1.
9. On the contrary, learned AAG Sri N. Devadas, has
taken us through Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. The said Section 20 reads thus :-
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.- No
court shall initiate any proceedings for
contempt, either on its own motion or
otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one
year from the date on which the contempt is
alleged to have been committed."
10. Learned AAG for the respondent/accused referred
to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the decision in S. TIRUPATHI RAO Vs. M. LINGAMAIAH
AND OTHERS reported in 2024 SCC ONLINE SC 1764
wherein at paragraph 41 it also referred to PALLAV SHETH
cited supra holding that a Three Judge Bench of this Court
had the occasion to consider whether the view taken by
the Two Judge Bench in OM PRAKASH JAISWAL Vs. DK.
MITTAL AND ANOTHER reported in (2000) 3 SCC 171 was
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correct. In OM PRAKASH JAISWAL cited supra, it is held
the Bench had taken the view that filing of an application
or petition for initiation of proceedings for contempt does
not amount to limitation of proceedings by the Court and
initiation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
can only be said to have occurred when the Court is of the
prima facie opinion that Court has been committed and
issue notice to the contemnor to show-cause, why he
should not be punished. Such view did not find favour
with the Bench in PALLAVA SHETH cited supra. It was
observed that a provision like Section 20 has to be
interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation
and that, to narrow a view of Section 20 of the Act had
been taken in OM PRAKASH JAISWAL cited supra, which
does not seem to warrant the view taken, not only
because of hardship but that it would cause injustice.
Relevant passages from the decision in PALLAVA SHETH
cited supra was also referred. Whereas paragraph No.53
of the aforesaid judgment indicates that reverting to the
point of limitation, even in case of a petition disclosing
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facts constituting contempt, which is civil in nature, the
petitioner cannot chose a time convenient to him to
approach the Court. The Statute refers to a specific time
limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt for
proceedings to be initiated, as laid down by in PALLAVA
SHETH supra that the action should be initiated within one
year and not beyond, irrespective of when the proceedings
for contempt are actually initiated before the High Court.
11. However, Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, which is referred supra is a statutory limitation. But
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is only filed seeking
condonation of delay. When the very Statute itself
indicates that the contempt proceedings shall be initiated
within a period of one year or twelve months, it is the
objectivity of Section 20 of the Act, and it cannot be
dwelling about Article 129 and also Article 215 of the
Constitution of India. The said Articles were also referred
to in the cases cited supra, which is referred by the
learned Senior Counsel in the matters of the complainant.
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However, the decision in PALLAV SHETH cited supra at
paragraph No.41 it has addressed the issues that one of
the Principles underlying the Law of Limitation is that a
litigant must act diligently and not sleep over his/her
rights. In this background such an interpretation should
be placed on Section 20 of the Act, which does not lead to
an anomalous result causing hardship to the party, who
may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the
inaction on the part of the Court, a contemnor cannot be
made to suffer. Therefore, keeping in view the reliance
which is rendered by the learned Senior Counsel for the
complainant and wherein the contempt proceeding has
been initiated keeping in view the provision of Section 2(b)
of the Act, which is punishment in nature as well as to be
said that spirit in nature. Therefore, after lapse of 366
days, this contempt proceedings has been initiated by the
complainant, which shows that he is neither diligent or
vigilant, and the said issue is also addressed in the
aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in PALLAVA SHETH cited supra. Therefore, keeping
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in view the aforesaid citations relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the complainant and also citations
relied upon by the learned AAG for the
respondent/accused No.1.
12. However, learned Senior Counsel for the complainant
is referring to the preceding order sheet maintained in this
contempt proceedings and whereby giving clarification
relating to scope of Section 2(b) of the Act and also the
provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, whether the
contempt proceeding has to be initiated by the
complainant as contemplated with the provisions of
Section 20 of the Act. However, it is made clear that an
order sheet maintained is only seeking to issue some sort
of a direction or permitting the counsel to clarify the
position. Merely because it is sought to clarify the
position, it cannot be said that delay application ought to
have been considered. Accordingly, even on this premises
also this contempt proceedings do not survive for
consideration.
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13. In the meanwhile, Smt. Shilpa S. Gogi, who is
present before the Court personally on behalf of the
complainant and she has secured the services of
Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel. Learned Senior
Counsel has sought for liberty.
14. Cognizance is a judicial action, which is to be taken,
keeping in view the relevant provision of the Contempt of
Courts Act. But considering the provision of Section 20 of
the said Act, this contempt proceedings does not survive
for consideration, consequently this contempt petition is
dismissed. However, liberty as sought for is granted in
accordance with law.
Sd/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
CT:SNN
