C.Krishniah Chetty Corp., C. Krishniah Chetty & Co., Chetty & Co.,
Chetty, C. Krishniah Chetty & Co 1869, Chetty & Co., 1869 at any
reliefs.
4. An application filed along with the plaint for temporary
5. Aggrieved by the order, an appeal in Commercial Appeal
No.61/2021, was filed before this Court. A Co-ordinate Bench of this
6. The defendant / respondent Nos.1 to 3 upon receipt of
7. The plaintiff / appellant filed its objections to the
application supra. The Trial Court upon hearing the parties to the lis
The plaintiff in para-4 of the plaint mentioned that he is
represented herein by its Chief Financial officer Mr. S.A. Suresh
S/o A.S. Arunachalam also the Principal Officer of the plaintiff
company within the meaning of Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. It is not in
dispute plaintiff has not produced any authorization letter or
board resolution issued by 1™ plaintiff company authorizing him
to institute this suit for perpetual injunction against defendants.
It is the contention of defendants that suit is not maintainable in
view of Sec. 430 of Companies Act, 2013 which reads as under:
This provision establishes that any matters in respect of which
power has been confirmed on the NCLT the jurisdiction of the
civil court is completely barred. NCLT has specifically conferred
powers to address grievance, relief to the company which may
prejudicial or addressing to any member of the company or for
issue of appointment of Directors, the management of the affairs
of the company. The plaintiff in this suit sought for the relief of
perpetual injunction restraining the defendants or anybody
claiming through them jointly and severally, directly or indirectly
at any location including online etc., from using in relation to any
products or services connected with the jewellery business in
clause 14, 16, 21, 35, 36, 37 and 42, the trademarks C Krishniah
Chetty Corp, and others mentioned in the prayer column and for
such other reliefs.
8. The learned counsel for plaintiff himself has produced copy of
the order of the NCLAT dated 05.01.2022, 12.07.2022 passed in
Company Appeal (AT) 65/2019 and CP NO.4/2020 respectively.
The relief claimed in this suit and also before NCLT are almost
similar. The plaintiff himself filed rejoinder contending that the
challenge to the findings of the NCLT is pending before the NCLT
amounts to res-judicata. Further, it is not in dispute that plaintiff
has filed this suit without authorization issued by 1st plaintiff
company. It is the contention of plaintiff that since there is a
restriction for holding board meeting question of issuance of
resolution at this stage does not arise. However, same cannot be
a ground. It is also not in dispute that there exists abritral clause
for resolution of the disputes before arbitral tribunal. The plaintiff
in para-53 of his plaint has mentioned that one group of share
holders had approached the NCLT by way of an application
(54/2018) on the basis of which the NCLT was pleased to
restrain the defendants 1 to 3 from competing with the plaintiff
in any manner. At para-54 it is mentioned that interim order was
extended from time to time until 24.01.2019. At para-55, it is
stated that, however, notwithstanding the express statutory
prohibition under Sec. 166(5) of the Companies Act which was
already recognized and enforced by the NCLT, the defendants
have continued their activity and made use of the infringing
marks and also continued to make hectic preparation to open a
competing business under the infringing marks. In para-56, it is
mentioned that the plaintiff is also a party to CP/04/BB/2020
filed by one group of the shareholders against defendants 1 to 3
before NCLT, interim applications were also moved and heard
and orders were reserved by the NCLT, Bengaluru to restrain the
defendants 2 and 3 from indulging any Conflicting and competing
business. These averments' in the rents in the plaint establishes
that matter now sought to be adjudicated by the plaintiffs CFO
Sri. S.A. Suresh is already pending consideration before NCLT
much belts institution of this suit. Under such circumstances, in
view of bar mentioned in Section 430 of the Companies Act, this
court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit and the jurisdiction
of this court is completely barred. All these circumstances
establishes that suit filed by the plaintiff is hit by the provisions
of Sec. 430 of the Companies Act and thereby liable to be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. Accordingly, I
answer Point No.1 in the Affirmative.
9. Point No.2: In view of my finding on point No.1 in the
Affirmative, I proceed to pass the following:
8. It is this order passed by the Trial Court which has been
questioned in the present appeal along with application seeking
condonation of delay of 366 days in preferring the appeal.
9. The appellant in the affidavit filed in support of the
application for the condonation of delay, except paragraph Nos.4 to
6, which we have reproduced as under, as the main ground has not
stated / explained the delay within the meaning of 'sufficient cause'
as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASTRA (WATER RESOURCES
DEPARTMENT) REP. BY THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER VS. BORSE
BROTHERS ENGINEERS AND CONTRUCTION1 in preferring the
appeal:
4. I state that since the petitioner was awaiting the
outcome of I.A. 1075/76 of 2021 in Comp.App. (AT) 65 of
2019 which is the I.A. to withdraw the voluntary undertaking
given by the petitioner. However, during the pendency of the
same, several actions are being undertaken by the
Respondents to the detriment of the petitioner.
5. That, the subsistence of the impugned order will have
disastrous consequences for the appellant's business. The
perversity of the findings in the impugned order and the
complete abdication of the judicial responsibility therein
makes it evidence that the learned Trial Court has failed to
grasp the issues in the present case and as such continuation
of the impugned order without decided the main appeal will
inevitably have adverse effects on the appellant's case.
6. That, the appellant will suffer great hardship and
irreparable loss and damage if this application is not allowed.
(2021) 6 SCC 460
On the contrary, the respondents will not suffer any loss of
damage if this application is allowed."
10. The defendant / respondent Nos.1 to 3 appeared and
have filed their statement of objections to the main appeal, as well
as to the application seeking for condonation of delay. The
respondents in their statement of objections have referred to
several proceedings between the parties from the date of filing of
the suit till filing of the appeal on the order impugned and taken a
specific contention that there is no plausible explanation by the
appellant for huge delay beyond the permissible period under the
Act of 2015, more specifically in paragraph Nos.4 to 7, which we
reproduce as under:
"4. The Appellant cannot be permitted to approbate and
reprobate. It is evident that while they claim to have awaited
court permission to hold board meetings for authorization, they
have, in parallel, purportedly passed a resolution by circulation
on 15.12.2024 and 23.12.2024. Respondents No. 2 and 3,
being 50% shareholders the Appellant, have already opposed
the validity of such a resolution by filing an application for
declaration and injunction in L.A. M 8807/2024 in T.A. No.
1/2024 and a contempt petition in Contempt Case (AT) No. 1-3
of 2025. The Hayagrivs yet again passed resolution by
circulation on 14.01.2025 authorising one S.A. Suresh to
represent it. The Appellant's inconsistent stance exposes their
attempt to mislead this Hon'ble Court. It is pertinent to note
that if the Appellant believed board authorization was necessary
to contest legal proceedings, then their participation in prior
litigations-including WP 12211/2022, WP 2646/2021, CP
4/BB/2020, and COMAP 61/2021-without such authorization is
inconsistent with their present stand. Further, assuming the
purported resolution by circulation was a valid mode of
authorization, the Appellant must explain why they failed to
adopt this mechanism earlier instead of using the pendency of
I.A. No. 1075-1076 as an excuse for delay. The Appellant's
actions demonstrate an attempt to manipulate legal
proceedings to suit their convenience. On one hand, they
contend that board authorization was a prerequisite for
contesting litigation, but on the other, they have engaged in
multiple legal battles without such authorization. This
contradictory stance exposes the lack of bona fides in their plea
for condonation of delay. Copies of the resolution by circular
dated 15.12.2024 and 23.12.2024 are attached herewith as
ANNEXURE R11 and R12, respectively. Copies of I.A. No.
8807/2024 in T.A. No. 1/2024 and Contempt Case (AT) No. 1-3
of 2025 are attached herewith as ANNEXURE R13 and R14,
respectively. Copy of the resolution by circular dated
14.01.2025 is attached herewith as ANNEXURE R15.
5. The finality of the judgment in COMAP No. 61/2021 [2021
SCC OnLine Kar 12513; C. Krishniah Chetty & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v.
Deepali Company Private Limited and Others], which held that
S.A. Suresh lacked authorization to institute COM OS 306/2020,
further negates any purported reliance on resolutions passed
subsequently. The Special Leave Petition against this judgment
(Diary No. 10605/2023) having been dismissed on 17.01.2025,
the Appellant's claim of valid authorization stands nullified.
6. The Appellant has not accounted for the delay on a day-to-
day basis, which is a mandatory requirement for condonation
under settled legal principles. The failure to provide specific
explanations for each period of delay renders the application
legally untenable.
7. In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that the Appellant
has failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The plea
taken is vague, lacks bonafides, and seeks to abuse the process
of this Hon'ble Court."
11. Heard Sri.Mandeep Karla, learned counsel for Sri.Hitesh
Gowda B.J., learned counsel for the appellant, Sri.Arun Kumar,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for Ms.Krutika Raghavan, learned
counsel for the caveators / respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 and
Sri.Deepak Bhaskar, learned counsel for respondent No.5.
12. Sri.Mandeep Karla, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant reiterating the grounds urged in the affidavit in support of
the application submitted that in view of the pendency of the
application bearing Nos.1075-1076/2021 in Company Appeal (AT)
No.65/2019 before NCLAT seeking permission to the appellant to
convene and hold board meetings, the appeal could not be filed
within the permissible time provided under Section-13 of the Act of
2015. He has further stated that, the appellant herein preferred a
Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court against the
order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Commercial
Appeal No.61/2021 in SLP Civil Diary No.10605/2023 on
13.03.2023. The said petition came to be dismissed as infructuous
with observations, which we reproduce under:
"UPON hearing the counsel, the Court made the following
ORDER
We are informed that the civil suit has been dismissed and an
appeal has been preferred by the petitioner, C. Krishniah Chetty
and Sons Private Limited, which is pending before the High
Court.
In view of the aforesaid position, the present special leave
petition has become infructuous and, therefore, we are not
going into the question(s) of law.
It will be open to the parties to raise all pleas and contentions
before the High Court in accordance with law. In case of an
adverse decision, it would be open to the petitioner, C.
Krishniah Chetty and Sons Private Limited, and/or the
respondents to raise the question(s), which is/are left open
before this Court."
13. With this, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the delay caused is neither intentional nor deliberate, but for
the bonafide reasons stated in the affidavit in support of the
application and seeks condonation of delay of 366 days in filing the
appeal.
14. Refuting the submissions, Sri.Arun Kumar, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that
the explanation offered by way of submission by the learned counsel
for the appellant is not so simple to be accepted as a valid
explanation. The delay caused is intentional, deliberate and falls
short of plausible explanation to bring the same within the
parameters of 'sufficient cause' in line with the provisions of Act of
2015. He stressed on the materials placed along with the objections
to contend that the case of the appellant that they could not prefer
appeal in time because of lack of resolution and awaiting NCLAT
permission to hold meetings, is a misconceived submission as there
were several proceedings initiated between the parties such as
W.P.No.12211/2022, W.P.No.2646/2021, C.P.No.4/BB/2020 and
COMAP No.61/2021, without there being any resolution or a valid
mode of authorization. He also submitted that the action of the
appellant demonstrate an attempt to manipulate the legal
proceedings to suit their convenience. This contradictory stance
exposes the lack of bonafides in the plea for condonation of delay
and it borders negligence as such the, application need to be
dismissed.
15. Sri.Deepak Bhaskar, learned counsel for respondent No.5
argues on the same lines, stating that there is an inordinate delay in
filing the appeal and in view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex
Court as well as this Court, the application requires to be dismissed.
16. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the
only question which fall for consideration before us is:
Whether the appellant has properly explained the
inordinate delay of 366 days in filing the present appeal,
which depict 'sufficient cause', as held by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of BORSE BROTHERS referred
supra?
17. Before dwelling upon the submissions made by the
counsel for the parties, and also the materials placed on record, it is
apposite to look into the object of Act of 2015. Act of 2015 has been
enacted with an avowed object to ensure that there is no
unnecessary delay in disposal of commercial disputes. The
Legislature, in its wisdom incorporated rigour provisions to give
effect to the object of the Act, i.e., for speedy disposal of
Commercial Suit / Dispute. As such, the strict procedure provided in
terms of the Act of 2015, the timeline specified therein, are
mandatory in nature and bound to be followed by the litigant.
Failing to comply with the statutory timelines and strict procedure
would result in adverse order on account of lack of
bonafide/bordering negligence on the party seeking relief at the
hands of the Court.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of BORSE
BROTHERS referred supra has made observations to the effect that
the approach of the Court for condoning the delay in matters
involving commercial disputes under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015, should not be unduly elastic. The relevant portions are stated
in paragraph Nos.58 and 63 which we reproduce as under:
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the
speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient
cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the
expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for
the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] ,
has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to
accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious
man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the
facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
The applicant must satisfy the court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting
his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964
SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770]
, Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC
545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient
cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of
good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice
is done, but only [Ed. : The matter between two
asterisks has been emphasised in original.] so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter
between two asterisks has been emphasised in
original.] , whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal,
(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC
195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.' The statutory provision may cause hardship
or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy,
its aim being to secure peace in the community, to
suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to
prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably and have
from lapse of time become stale. According
to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p.
266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting
the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that
long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice
in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons
with good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.'
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment
or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510]
, Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik
Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by
the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which
means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of
the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the
court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117
of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days,
respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not
by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise
acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay
beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in
equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's
inaction, negligence or latches."
19. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in RFA
(COMM) No.231/2023 and CM Appeal No.53957/2023, in the case of
M/S. MAYA RAM KRISHAN LAL JAIN vs. M/S. SHRI BISHAN
DASS TRADERS AND OTHERS, following the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court supra dismissed, the application seeking to
condone the delay of 130 days in filing the appeal beyond the
permissible period holding that the expression "sufficient cause" is
not elastic enough to cover inordinate unexplained delay.
20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a recent judgment dated
15.04.2025, in Special Leave to Appeal Civil (C) No.9580/2025 in
the case of JHARKHAND URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LIMITED AND
ANOTHER VS. M/S. BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED,
upholding the order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi, in dismissing the application seeking condonation of delay of
301 days, dismissed the appeal by stating in paragraph Nos.16 to
18, which we reproduce as under:
"16. In the present case we find that after the order in question
came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the
appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to
even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was
only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order
and almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period,
that the realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants
herein to apply for the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the
Commercial Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC
applicable to the Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is
no unnecessary delay in disposal of the commercial suit. Once
specific time lines are fixed and there is a strict procedure
provided in terms of the Commercial Courts Act, parties are by
the statute put to notice that they have to very carefully
contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that failing to
comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure, certain
adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of
application by a contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon
the commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment
that does not mean that the parties can shirk away all
responsibility of endeavoring to procure the certified copies
thereof in their own capacity. Any such interpretation would
result in frustrating the very fundamental cannons of law of
limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act, 2015 of ensuring
timely disposals."
21. Coming to the case on hand, the suit was filed in the
year 2020. The application filed seeking temporary injunction came
to be dismissed on 20.02.2021. Against which, an appeal in
Com.Appeal No.61/2021 was preferred and dismissed on
27.05.2021. The main suit came to be dismissed on the application
filed by the defendant / respondent Nos.1 to 3 under Order-VII,
Rule-11(d) of CPC, read with Act of 2015 on 17.02.2022. As could
be gathered from the records a SLP (C) Diary No.10605/2023
calling in question the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Com Appeal No.61/2021 was filed on 13.03.2023, i.e.,
nearly after one year, one month from the date of dismissal of suit.
The present appeal is filed on 19.04.2023 i.e., after one year, two
months from the date of dismissal of the suit. In the interregnum,
there are several proceedings, initiated by the appellant against the
respondent herein and the same are forth coming from the records.
What is more appealing to us is the stand of the respondent Nos.1
to 3 in their statement of objections to the application for
condonation of delay, which we have already reproduced above,
especially the following:
"It is pertinent to note that if the Appellant believed
board authorization was necessary to contest legal
proceedings, then their participation in prior litigations
- including W.P.No.12211/2022, W.P.No.2646/2021,
C.P.No.4/BB/2020 and COMAP No.61/2021, without
such authorization is inconsistent with their present
stand. Further, assuming the purported resolution by
circulation was a valid mode of authorization, the
Appellant must explain why they failed to adopt this
mechanism earlier instead of using the pendency of
I.A.Nos.1075-1076 as an excuse for delay."
(emphasis supplied)
22. The explanation offered by the appellant that it was
awaiting for the outcome of the Application Nos.1075-1076 of 2021
in the proceedings instituted before the NCLAT, is only a ploy, to
overcome the delay of 366 days. Surely, the conduct of the
appellant lacks bonafides and the same borders negligence, as has
been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of
BORSE BROTHERS supra.
23. There is nothing to suggest that the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the SLP supra said anything regarding the delay in preferring the
appeal. In fact all the contentions of the parties were left open. In
that view of the matter, the arguments of learned counsel for the
appellant seeking condonation of delay on the premise that the
appellant was awaiting the decision on the Application Nos.1075-
1076/2021 is clearly misplaced.
24. As could be seen from the record, that the suit came to
be dismissed on 17.02.2022, there is nothing on record to show that
the appellant at an earlier point of time shown its eagerness to
apply for the certified copy at least within the time limit prescribed.
The same was applied after the filing of the appeal. Further as could
be gathered from the records, the appeal filed after one year, two
months from the date of dismissal of the suit and 10 months after
the time limit of 60+60 days i.e., total 120 days. The explanation
offered is very bald and vague as there are several other
proceedings initiated by the appellant presumably with the
resolution by way of circulation as a valid mode of authorization.
The same could have been adopted in the suit. The unexplained
delay and the conduct in instituting appeal after 1 year, 3 months
before the Hon'ble Apex court challenging the orders passed on an
interlocutory order and the filing appeal before this Court after delay
of 1 year, 2 months from the date of dismissal of suit clearly
postulates that the appellant is barred seeking any equity under the
hands of this Court.
25. It is a trite law that strict compliance of the provisions of
Act of 2015 with respect to statutory timeline prescribed in
consonance with the object of the Act, is mandatory, any short fall
would reflect in adverse orders to a party/litigant who is not vigilant
about his right. That apart, the words 'sufficient cause' used under
Section-5 of Limitation Act should not be unduly elastic in terms of
stringent provisions of the Act of 2015, so far as the statutory
timeline fixed.
26. In view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court
supra, we find no merits in the application seeking condonation of
inordinate delay of 366 days in filing the present appeal. In view of
the reasons stated supra, we answer the question raised above in
'negative' and against the appellant. Accordingly, we proceed to
pass the following:
ORDER
i. Application in I.A. No.1/2023 filed seeking to
condone inordinate delay of 366 days in filing the
appeal is dismissed.
ii. In view of dismissal of the application for
condonation of delay, the appeal does not survive
for consideration and accordingly, the same is also
dismissed.
iii. All pending application(s) also stands disposed off.
iv. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(V KAMESWAR RAO)
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE
JJ
CT: BRS
