Karnataka High Court

United India Insurance Co. Ltd vs S. Chandrashekar on 14 July, 2025

Author: S.G.Pandit

Bench: S.G.Pandit

                          1



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

    DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF JULY 2025

                     PRESENT

    THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT
                    AND
     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF

      WRIT APPEAL NO.3159/2016 (S-DIS)


BETWEEN:

  1. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD.,
     REGD. & HEAD OFFICE NO.24
     WHITES ROAD
     CHENNAI-600014
     REP. BY ITS ASSISTANT MANAGER
     REGIONAL OFFICE, BENGALURU.

  2. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD.,
     REGIONAL OFFICE,
     KRISHI BHAVAN
     5TH & 6TH FLOORS,
     NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
     BENGALURU- 560001
     REP. BY ITS ASSISTANT MANAGER

     NOW BOTH THE APPELLANTS ARE
     REP. BY SRI K.K. RAJAN IYER
     ASSISTANT MANAGER.
                                       ...APPELLANTS

(BY SRI.SYED KASHIF ALI, ADV. FOR
 SRI PRADEEP S SAWKAR, ADV.)
                           2



AND:

  1. S CHANDRASHEKAR
     S/O LATE S SURYANARAYANA
     AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
     R/AT NO.422, 4TH STAGE
     4TH MAIN, THONACHI KOPPAL LAYOUT
     MYSORE - 570009.

  2. UNION OF INDIA
     DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & INSURANCE
     MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
     NORTH BLOCK
     NEW DELHI - 110001

  3. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
     CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
     BELLARY ROAD
     BENGALURU- 560032.
                                  ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI RAMESHA H.E., ADV. FOR R1 & ASG FOR R2 & R3)


       THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 946/2011
DATED 07.06.2016.


       THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 26.06.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:


CORAM:    HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
          and
          HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
                                3



                     CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)

This writ appeal filed under Section 4 of the

Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 is directed against the

learned Single Judge's order dated 07.06.2016 in

W.P.No.946/2011 whereunder the petitioner's writ

petition is allowed partly, granting 50% of backwages

from the date of dismissal till reinstatement.

2. The parties to this appeal would be referred

to as they stood before the Writ Court. Appellants

were respondent Nos.2 and 3 and respondent No.1

herein was petitioner before the Writ Court.

3. Brief facts of the case are that, the

petitioner was appointed as typist in the respondent-

Insurance Company. On conviction of petitioner by

judgment dated 13.08.2010 under Section 13(1)(d)

r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for

short, '1988 Act') and Section 420 of IPC, the

Disciplinary Authority passed order of dismissal dated

30.12.2010 against the petitioner. In pursuance of

the order of dismissal, the petitioner was relieved of

his duties. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated

30.12.2010, petitioner filed W.P.No.946/2011. In the

meanwhile, the petitioner challenged the judgment of

conviction in Crl.A.No.835/2010 before this Court.

This Court, by judgment dated 01.03.2012 allowed

the appeal and set aside the judgment convicting the

petitioner. Against the order of acquitting the

petitioner, respondents filed Civil Appeal before the

Hon'ble Apex Court with the leave of the Court in

Crl.A.Nos.1872-1873/2014. The Hon'ble Apex Court

dismissed the appeal by its order dated 03.11.2015.

Thereafter, the writ petition was disposed of under

impugned order dated 07.06.2016 directing

reinstatement of the petitioner with 50% backwages

and all consequential benefits. Thereafter, the

petitioner was reinstated on 25.07.2016. Aggrieved by

the portion of the order granting 50% backwages from

the date of dismissal till date of reinstatement, the

respondent is before this Court in this appeal.

4. Heard learned counsel Sri.Syed Kashif Ali

for Sri.Pradeep S. Sawkar, learned counsel for the

petitioner, learned counsel Sri.Ramesha H.E., for

respondent No.1 and learned Additional Solicitor

General for respondent Nos.2 and 3. Perused the writ

appeal papers.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants would

contend that the order dated 30.12.2010 dismissing

the petitioner was on the basis of conviction of the

petitioner for the offences punishable under Section

13(1)(d) and 13(2) of 1988 Act, which was set aside

by this Court by judgment dated 01.03.2012. The

appeal filed by the appellants before the Hon'ble Apex

Court was dismissed on 03.11.2015. Thereafter,

considering the representation of the petitioner dated

16.11.2015, the petitioner was reinstated into service

on 25.07.2016.

6. Learned counsel would submit that the

respondents/appellants have taken action to

reinstate the petitioner into service immediately

after disposal of the appeal before the Hon'ble Apex

Court. In the said circumstances, it is submitted that

the learned Single Judge was not justified in

granting 50% back wages from the date of dismissal

till reinstatement. Learned counsel for the appellants

would submit that though the conviction of the

petitioner was set aside by this Court on

01.03.2012, the petitioner for the first time made a

demand for reinstatement only after disposal of the

appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court, by

representation dated 16.11.2015. When the

petitioner has not come forward seeking

reinstatement or has not come forward to report to

duty, immediately after the order of acquittal passed

by this Court in appeal supra, the petitioner cannot

seek for backwages. As the petitioner was out of

service from 30.12.2010 till reinstatement on

25.07.2016 and as the petitioner has not worked,

the petitioner would not be entitled for back wages.

Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on

the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

of STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS.

MOHAMMED ABDUL RAHIM [(2013) 11 SCC 67] in

support of his contention.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondents would submit that the judgment

convicting the petitioner was set aside by this Court on

01.03.2012 in Crl.A.No.835/2010 and from the said

date, the petitioner became entitled for reinstatement,

as only reason for petitioner's dismissal was conviction

in a criminal case. As the respondents failed to

reinstate the petitioner on setting aside of conviction

order, learned Single Judge was right in granting 50%

of back wages from the date of dismissal. Learned

counsel for the petitioner would submit that the

petitioner made representation immediately on setting

aside of the conviction on 01.03.2012 to reinstate him

into service. It is also submitted that thereafter the

petitioner made several representations seeking

reinstatement into service. But, the petitioner was

reinstated into service only on 25.07.2016.

8. Learned counsel would submit that the

petitioner had sought information under Right to

Information Act, 2005 by addressing a letter dated

06.07.2012 with regard to his reinstatement and the

respondent-Insurance Company had replied on

24.07.2012. By referring to the said letter, learned

counsel would submit that the respondents were

aware of the setting aside of the judgment convicting

the petitioner and demand of the petitioner for

reinstatement. Learned counsel for the petitioner

would submit that the petitioner made representation

dated 06.03.2012 to the second respondent

immediately on his acquittal, requesting

reinstatement. Thereafter also, the petitioner made

several representations seeking reinstatement. But

the respondents, only after dismissal of SLP filed by

the respondents took steps to reinstate the petitioner

into service. Therefore, in the said circumstances, he

supports the order passed by the learned Single

Judge. Thus, learned counsel prays for dismissal of

the appeal.

9. Having heard the learned counsel

appearing for the parties and on perusal of the appeal

papers, the only point which falls for consideration is

as to,

"Whether the order under appeal requires

interference?"

10. Answer to the above point would be that

the order under appeal needs modification, holding

that the petitioner would be entitled for back wages,

on setting aside the order of conviction from the date

of demand and approaching the respondent -

authorities.

11. The petitioner was convicted by judgment

of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.08.2010

in Spl.C.C.No.2/2006 by XXXII Additional City Civil

and Sessions Judge for the offences punishable under

Sections 120B read with Sections 467, 468, 409, 477A

and 420 of IPC and under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2)

of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner,

aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and

order of sentence filed Criminal Appeal No.835/2010

before this Court. This Court, by judgment dated

01.03.2012 set aside the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence and consequently acquitted the

petitioner of the alleged offences on which he was

convicted. The respondent-appellants herein though

were not parties before this Court or before the

Sessions Court, filed Special Leave Petition before the

Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (Criminal) Nos.8630-

8631/2012. The said appeals were dismissed by

Hon'ble Apex Court by order dated 03.11.2015

(Annexure-D). Thereafter the petitioner made a

representation dated 16.11.2015 (Annexure-G) for

reporting to duty, enclosing certified copy of the

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thereafter, the

petitioner was reinstated into service on 25.07.2016.

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in MOHAMMED

ABDUL RAHIM (supra) was considering a case of

entitlement to backwages of an employee of the

Bank against whom conviction was set aside. In the

said case, the employee therein was acquitted on

22.02.2002, the demand for reinstatement was

made on 22.04.2002 and he was reinstated into

service by the Bank on 07.11.2002. The Hon'ble

Apex Court held that the employee would be

entitled for back wages from the date he had

lodged the demand for the same following his

acquittal. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, and 12 read

as follows:

9. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted by the appellate court. There can be no manner of doubt that the said acquittal would relate back and the initial order of conviction would stand obliterated. On that

basis, there can be no manner of doubt that the substratum of the cause that had led to the respondent's dismissal/discharge in the present case had ceased to exist. The same would entitle him to be reinstated in service, an act that has been duly performed by the appellant Bank.

10. The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore, Jaipal Singh and Baldev Singh, the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work.

11. In Banshi Dhar this Court answered the question against the employee by holding that grant of back wages is not automatic and such an entitlement has to be judged in

the context of the totality of the facts of a given case. It is on such consideration that back wages were declined. In the present case, it will not even be necessary for the Court to perform the said exercise and delve into the surrounding facts and circumstances for the purpose of adjudication of the entitlement of the respondent to back wages in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The said provisions impose a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude.

No discussion as to the meaning of the expression "moral turpitude" is necessary having regard to the nature of the offences alleged against the respondent, namely, under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. No doubt, the respondent was not in custody during the period for which he has been denied back wages inasmuch as the sentence imposed on him was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. But what cannot be lost sight of

is that the conviction of the respondent continued to remain on record until it was reversed by the appellate court on 22-2- 2002. During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.

12. The respondent was acquitted on 22-2- 2002, the demand for reinstatement was made by him on 22-4-2002 and he was

reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 7-11-2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest, what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date he had lodged the demand for the same following his acquittal, namely, from 22-4-2002, until the date of his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant Bank.

13. In the case on hand, the petitioner

produced letter dated 06.07.2012 addressed to Public

Information Officer seeking information with regard to

his reinstatement. The said representation was not to

the authority competent to reinstate the petitioner.

The petitioner has also produced representation dated

06.03.2012 along with memo dated 16.06.2025.

Though the said representation is addressed to second

respondent and said to have been sent through RPAD,

no receipt or acknowledgement for having sent

through RPAD is placed on record. But, along with the

writ petition, the petitioner has produced