Karnataka High Court
Papanna Alias Sanna Ramappa vs The Deputy Commissioner on 2 July, 2025
Author: R.Devdas
Bench: R.Devdas
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WA No.100266 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
WRIT APPEAL NO.100266 OF 2025 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
PAPANNA @ SANNA RAMAPPA,
S/O LATE SRI HARIJAN MALLAPPA,
AGE: 75 YEARS, OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
R/O M. SUGUR VILLAGE, SIRUGUPPA TALUK,
BALLARI DISTRICT-583120.
- APPELLANT
(BY SRI. K. RAGHAVENDRA RAO AND Ms. V. VIDYA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BALLARI,
D.C. COMPOUND, BALLARI-583101.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
BALLARI SUB-DIVISION,
BALLARI DISTRICT-583101.
MOHANKUMAR
B SHELAR
Digitally signed by
MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR
Location: High Court of
Karnataka, Dharwad Bench
Date: 2025.07.04 10:17:37
SHRIKANTH GOUDA S/O G. DODDANA GOUDA
+0530
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS RESPONDENTS NO.3 TO 7
3. SMT. NIRMALA W/O SRIKANTHA GOUDA,
AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC.: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
4. SHIVALEELA GUTTIGANOOR D/O SRIKANTHA GOUDA,
AGE: 26 YEARS, OCC.: STUDENT,
5. G. MANJUNATH S/O G. SRIKANTHA GOUDA,
AGE: 24 YEARS, OCC.: STUDENT,
6. G. PURNIMA D/O G. SRIKANTHA GOUDA,
AGE: 22 YEARS, OCC.: STUDENT,
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WA No.100266 of 2025
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7. G. PREETI D/O G. SRIKANTHA GOUDA,
AGE: 20 YEARS, OCC. STUDENT,
RESPONDENTS NO.3 TO 7 ARE
RESIDENTS OF NO.14, MANNUR SUGUR,
SIRUGUPPA TALUK, BALLARI DISTRICT-583120.
SRI. BASAPPASHETTY
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.,
8. SMT. A. VENKAMMA D/O BASAPPASHETTY,
W/O IRAYYAVSHETTY, MAJOR, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
9. SRI. MAHANTAPPA S/O BHARMANNA,
MAJOR, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
10. VIJAYARAMAKRISHNA RAJU S/O BHEEMARAJU,
MAJOR, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
RESPONDENTS NO.8 TO 10 ARE RESIDENTS OF
M. SUGUR VILLAGE, SIRUGUPPA TALUK,
BALLARI DISTRICT-583120.
11. THE MANAGER, T.G.B. BANK,
MUDDATTANUR VILLAGE,
SIRUGUPPA TALUK,
BALLARI DISTRICT-583120.
- RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. T. HANUMAREDDY, A.G.A. FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI. CHETAN MUNNOLI, ADVOCATE FOR R3 TO R7;
NOTICE TO R8 TO R11 IS DEFERRED)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY
THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. NO.83444/2013 (SC-ST)
DATED 21.03.2025 AND RESTORE THE ORDER PASSED BY
RESPONDENT NO.1 IN PTCL/APPEAL/46/2008-09 DATED 18.09.2013
AND ALSO THE ORDER PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 IN
APPLICATION NO.PTCL/21/2004-05 DATED 28.06.2008 & ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
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WA No.100266 of 2025
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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS)
The appellants are aggrieved of the impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.
83444/2013 dated 21.03.2025.
2. A brief background in which the respondents
No.3 to 7 had filed the writ petition is required to be
stated. Initially it was Srikanth Gowda who had filed the
writ petition in the year 2013 and after his demise during
the course of the proceedings, his legal representatives
were brought on record.
3. The appellant herein filed an application before
the Assistant Commissioner invoking the provisions of the
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for
short, the 'Act') on 08.10.2004, seeking to declare the sale
deeds dated 11.05.1970 executed by Harijana Mallappa is
void, in terms of the provisions of the Act. It was
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contended that 6.83 acres of land situated at M. Sugur
village, Siruguppa Taluk, Ballari District, was granted in
favour of the appellant's father Sri Harijana Mallappa and
that the grant came with a condition of non alienation for a
period of 15 years. However the lands were sold in favour
of three different persons under three separate sale deeds,
all dated 11.05.1970, in violation of the conditions of the
grant. The Assistant Commissioner, after verifying the
records found that under grant order bearing No.
DR/RDS/30/67 dated 31.08.1957 the lands in question
were granted in favour of Harijana Mallappa, and in terms
of the Rules prevailing in the year 1957, namely, Madras
Board Standing Orders, the granted lands could not be
alienated for a period of 15 years. The Assistant
Commissioner found that the lands could not be alienated
till 30.08.1972. However since admittedly the lands were
sold under three registered sale deeds, dated 11.05.1970,
the same was in violation of the conditions of grant.
Therefore the Assistant Commissioner proceeded to
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declare that the sale deeds were void and directed the
lands to be resumed from the purchasers and to be
restored in favour of the legal representatives of the
original grantee.
4. Sri Srikanth Gowda, aggrieved by the order
passed by the Assistant Commissioner, approached the
Deputy Commissioner invoking the appeal provision
contained in Sec. 5A of the Act. However the appeal was
dismissed at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner on
18.09.2013. The Writ Petition was filed in the year 2013.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the writ petition has been allowed on the ground that the
application before the Assistant Commissioner was filed by
the appellant herein on 08.10.2004, after lapse of about
35 years from the date when which the sale deeds were
executed. The learned Single Judge has upheld the
contentions of the writ petitioners that the Hon'ble Apex
Court, in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi V. State
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of Karnataka and another1 and Vivek M. Hinduja and
Others v. Ashwatha and Others2, has declared that if
an application is filed before the Assistant Commissioner
invoking the provisions of the Act after an inordinate
delay, it defeats the right, if any, vested in favour of the
applicant and therefore on the ground of delay and laches
the application should have been rejected. However,
learned counsel for the appellant submits that when
similar orders were passed by the Apex Court in the case
of Ningappa V. Deputy Commissioner and Others in
Civil Appeal No. 3131/2007 dated 14.07.2011, which is
subsequently reported in (2020) 14 SCC 236, that since
the application invoking the provisions of the Act, was filed
after inordinate delay, the Assistant Commissioner should
have rejected the application on the short ground that
there was considerable delay in filing the same and thus
the application is not maintainable, a Co-Ordinate Bench of
this Court then headed by His Lordship Justice Vikramjit
(2020) 14 SCC 232
(2020) 14 SCC 228
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Sen, as the Chief Justice of this Court, in the case of Sri
G.M. Venkatareddy and Another Vs. The Deputy
Commissioner, Kolar District and Others3, while
referring to catena of decisions, held that the decision in
Ningappa (supra) was per incuriam. It was held that
there are a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court clarifying that the period of prescription of adverse
possession against the State government, assuming that
the concomitants have been pleaded and proved, is 30
years and therefore the doctrine of laches has no
application. It was held that there are concurrent findings
against the appellant therein and no arguments have been
raised before the Court to arrive at a different conclusion.
The Co-Ordinate Bench accordingly dismissed the appeal
preferred by the purchasers.
6. Learned counsel would further submit that the
decisions in G.M. Venkatareddy (supra) were challenged
before the Apex Court in Special leave to Appeal (Civil)
2012 SCC OnLine Kar 7533
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No. 17985/2012 and the Apex Court, by order dated
16.07.2012 has held as follows:
"We have heard Sri V. Giri, learned senior counsel
for the petitioner at length and carefully perused the well
crafted and well reasoned judgment of the Division Bench
of the High Court and are convinced that the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench did not commit any
error by refusing to entertain the petitioner's challenge to
the orders passed by the competent authority and the
appellate authority respectively.
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed."
7. Learned counsel submits that in another batch
of SLPs similar orders were passed by the Apex Court in
Special leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 23874/2024, dismissing
the SLPs.
8. Learned counsel submits that although the
decisions in Ningappa (supra) was held to be per
incuriam and was not followed by the Apex Court, it was
not noticed by the Apex Court in the subsequent
judgments commencing from Chhedi Lal Yadav and
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Others V. Hari Kishore Yadav (dead) through legal
representatives and others4, Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi (supra), Vivek M. Hinduja (supra), etc.
Learned counsel would therefore submit that the decisions
relied upon by the learned Single Judge, namely,
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, Vivek M. Hinduja, and
Union of India and others V. N. Murugesan and
Others5, have not laid down the correct legal position.
9. Learned counsel submits that in fact
Murugesan (supra) does not arise out of the provisions of
the PTCL Act and the same could not have been relied
upon at the instance of the contesting respondents.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting
respondents would submit that commencing from Chhedi
Lal Yadav (supra), a series of judgments have been
rendered by the Apex Court considering the provisions of
the Act and the Rules therein. Those judgments have
(2018) 12 SCC 527
(2022) 2 SCC 25
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consistently held that although there is no period of
limitation prescribed in the Act for filing an application
invoking Sec. 5 of the Act, nevertheless it is a well settled
position of law that even in case where the period of
limitation is not prescribed, action should be taken within a
reasonable time.
11. Learned counsel would also submit that
pursuant to the judgments rendered by the Apex Court
commencing from Chhedi Lal Yadav upto Shakuntala
Vs. State of Karnataka & Others6, the Apex Court has
consistently held that the annulment of the illegal
transfers could not be sustained owing to the delay. It
was held that even if no limitation is prescribed in the
statute, the party concerned ought to approach the
concerned Court or authority, within a reasonable time,
beyond which no relief can be granted.
12. Learned counsel submits that here is a case
where the application was filed before the Assistant
AIR 2023 SC 2867
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Commissioner after long lapse of 35 years and therefore
the learned Single Judge is right in allowing the writ
petition and setting aside the orders passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner.
13. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellant, the contesting respondents, the learned
Additional Government Advocate and perused the appeal
memo.
14. What is required to be noticed is that the first of
the decisions in the series, namely, Ningappa (supra)
where the Apex Court held that the application filed after
inordinate delay was required to be rejected at the hands
of the Assistant Commissioner, was held to be per
incuriam at the hands of Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court
and the fact that the said decision in G.M. Venkatareddy
(supra) has been upheld at the hands of the Apex Court.
We have culled out the observations of the Apex Court in
its order dated 16.07.2022 in the case of Champalal
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Bhandari V. Jayaprakash & Ors. in Special Leave to
Appeal (Civil) No. 17985/2012. It is noticeable that
the Apex Court has held that it has carefully perused the
well crafted and well reasoned judgment of the Division
Bench and the Apex Court was convinced that the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench did not commit any
error by refusing to entertain the petitioner's challenge to
the orders passed by the competent authority and the
appellate authority respectively. This aspect of the matter
has not been noticed in any of the subsequent judgments
rendered by the Apex Court commencing from Chhedilal
Yadav upto the recent judgment in Shakuntala (supra).
15. We have gone through the judgment rendered
by the Co-Ordinate bench in G.M.Venkatareddy (supra)
and we find that the Co-Ordinate Bench has considered
the judgments of the Apex Court commencing from
Manchegowda and others V. State of Karnataka and
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others7, where the constitutionality of the provisions of
the Act were questioned and considered.
16. The Co-Ordinate Bench considered a catene of
judgments of judgments of the Apex Court in
G.M.Venkatareddy (supra) which covers not only the
doctrine of adverse possession but also how it is to be
applied to the provisions of the PTCL Act. It would be
appropriate to extract paragraph No. 11 of the judgment
in G.M. Venkatareddy where reasons have been
assigned for holding the judgment in Ningappa as per
incuriam, which are as follows:
"11. Reliance is invariably placed on the extracted
observations of the Supreme Court in Manchegowda -Vs-
State of Karnataka, AIR 1984 SC 11511(1984) 3 SCC 301
to posit the proposition that on the efflux of the period of
prescription prescribed for claiming adverse possession
the vendee would become insulated from dispossession.
Their Lordships did not think it necessary to reiterate the
well-entrenched concomitants of such a defence, and
clarified that only if the claim stood substantiated would it
be available as a shield to dispossession of the Vendee.
(1984) 3 SCC 301
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The Court did not state that a mere passage of
twelve/thirty years would ipso facto, with more, establish
such a defence. This is our comprehension of the oft
relied upon passage from Manchegowda.
"24. Though we have come to the conclusion that
the Act is valid, yet, in our opinion, we have to
make certain aspects clear. Granted lands which
had been transferred after the expiry of the period
of prohibition do not come within the purview of the
Act, and cannot be proceeded against under the
provisions of this Act. The provisions of the Act
make this position clear, as Sections
4 and 5 become applicable only when granted lands
are transferred in breach of the condition relating to
prohibition on transfer of such granted lands.
Granted lands transferred before the
commencement of the Act and not in contravention
of prohibition on transfer are clearly beyond the
scope and purview of the present Act. Also in case
where granted lands had been transferred before
the commencement of the Act in violation of the
condition regarding prohibition on such transfer and
the transferee who had initially acquired only a
voidable title in such granted lands had perfected
his title in the granted lands by prescription by long
and continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance
with law before the commencement of the Act, such
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granted lands would also not come within the
purview of the present Act, as the title of such
transferees to the granted lands has been perfected
before the commencement of the Act. Since at the
date of the commencement of the Act the title of
such transferees had ceased to be voidable by
reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on
account of long and continued user for the requisite
period, the title of such transferees could not be
rendered void by virtue of the provisions of the Act
without violating the constitutional guarantee. We
must, therefore, read down the provisions of the
Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of
granted lands made in breach of the condition
imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands
only in those cases where the title acquired by the
transferee was still voidable at the date of the
commencement of the Act and had not lost its
defeasible character at the date when the Act came
into force. Transferees of granted lands having a
perfected and not a voidable title at the
commencement of the Act must be held to be
outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Section
4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have
the effect of rendering void the title of any
transferee which was not voidable at the date of the
commencement of the Act.
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Further in paragraph No. 30 of the judgment the Co-
Ordinate Bench has held as follows:
"Reliance has been placed on the Order passed by the
Apex Court dated 14.07.2011 in Ningappa V. Deputy
Commissioner (Supra), which we have already discussed
above. There are a series of decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court clarifying that the period of prescription
for adverse possession against the State Government,
assuming that the concomitants have been pleaded and
proved, is 30 years and therefore, the doctrine of laches
has no application. There are concurrent findings against
the appellant all throughout and no arguments have been
raised before us/ for us to arrive at a different conclusion.
The appeal ought to be dismissed with exemplary costs,
but considering the fact that we are not imposing any
costs in other cases, we desist ourselves from doing so.
The concurrent findings are affirmed. The appeal is
devoid of merits and is dismissed."
17. However, a series of judgments have been
rendered by the Apex Court, thereafter, commencing from
Cheddilal Yadav upto Shakuntala, consistently holding
that an application invoking Sec. 5 of the Act is required to
be filed within reasonable period from the date when
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which the cause of action arose for filing the application.
It has been held that insofar as the transactions that have
taken place prior to the commencement of the Act, the
applications are required to be filed within a reasonable
time from the date of commencement of the Act, i.e.,
01.01.1979. Insofar as the transactions that have taken
place subsequent to the commencement of the Act and for
specific violation of the provisions contained in Sec. 4(2) of
the Act which requires prior permission of the Government
before alienating the granted lands, the cause of action
would commence from the date of transaction and the
application will have to be filed within reasonable period.
18. We have to notice here that since the transactions
were made on 11.05.1970, before the commencement of
the Act, the time starts ticking from 01.01.1979 and
therefore the delay will be 26 years and not 35 years.
19. Nevertheless, we are not in a position to consider the
submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant.
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It is left to the appellant to canvass these aspects before
the Hon'ble Apex Court.
20. Consequently we proceed to dismiss the appeal.
At this juncture learned counsel for the appellant
submits that pursuant to the orders passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner,
the lands in question have been restored in favour of the
appellant herein, although during the course of the writ
proceedings. Learned counsel would therefore submit that
for a reasonable period the orders passed by the learned
Single Judge and this Court may be stayed to enable the
appellant to seek appropriate interim orders at the hands
of the Apex Court.
Learned counsel for the contesting respondents
would object to such a submission made at the hands of
the learned counsel for the appellant.
Having regard to the reasons for rejecting the
appeal, we are of the considered opinion that reasonable
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time should be given to the appellant to protect their
possession till appropriate orders are secured at the hands
of the apex Court. Accordingly we direct that the
directions given by the learned Single Judge to the Deputy
Commissioner, Ballari District, to restore the lands to the
possession of the writ petitioner and to restore the name
of the petitioners in the revenue records, shall stand
stayed for a period of two months commencing from
today.
In view of disposal of the appeal on merits, pending
interlocutory applications are also disposed.
Sd/-
(R.DEVDAS)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(K V ARAVIND)
JUDGE
BVV
CT:VP
