1. This revision petition is directed against
the judgment dated 19.12.2017 passed in Crl.A. No.
No. 316/2016 by Principal Civil Judge and J.M.F.C.
2. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and
learned counsel for respondent.
3. Facts in brief are that, the petitioner -
2005 (hereinafter referred to as the `D.V. Act')
the gold jewelry and other reliefs. Along with the
under Section 23(2) of the D.V. Act seeking interim
for the child. After service of notice, respondent
filing objections. On 22.11.2014, learned Magistrate
disposal of the petition. on 05.12.2014 respondent
balance amount. Thereafter, the matter was referred
to conciliation, but not settled. On 20.08.2015
D.V. Act praying to take cognizance against the
respondent for breach of interim protection order.
Respondent filed objections to the said application.
to register the P.C.R. and P.C.R. No. 316/2016 came
to be registered. Enquiry was conducted. Learned
31 of the D.V. Act and sentenced him to undergo
pay fine of Rs.20,000/-. Agreed by the said order,
in Crl.A. No. 15003/2017. Learned Sessions Judge,
aside the order dated 28.01.2017 passed in P.C.R.
No. 316/2016 by Principal Civil Judge and J.M.F.C.
Section 31 of the D.V. Act. He further contended that
Shanthakumar Vs. Christina Geetha Rani and
others reported in 2015(2) KCCR 1776. He further
order passed under Section 23 of the D.V. Act is
deemed to be passed under Section 18 of the D.V.
Section 31 of the D.V. Act.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent would
Section 18 of the D.V. Act does not include monetary
relief. Remedy for petitioner is recovery of
maintenance awarded. Order on maintenance is not a
18 of the D.V. Act. She placed reliance on the
8. Considering the arguments advanced by
the learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel
for respondent, the following point arises for
consideration in this revision petition:
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"Whether the penal provision provided
under Section 31 of the D.V. Act can be
invoked for non payment of arrears of
maintenance?"
9. Section 18 of the D.V. Act deals with the
protection orders which reads as under:
"18. Protection orders.--The Magistrate may,
after giving the aggrieved person and the
respondent an opportunity of being heard and
on being prima facie satisfied that domestic
violence has taken place or is likely to take
place, pass a protection order in favour of the
aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent
from-- (a) committing any act of domestic
violence; (b) aiding or abetting in the
commission of acts of domestic violence; (c)
entering the place of employment of the
aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is
a child, its school or any other place
frequented by the aggrieved person; (d)
attempting to communicate in any form,
whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or electronic
or telephonic contact; (e) alienating any
assets, operating bank lockers or bank
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the
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parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent or singly by the respondent,
including her stridhan or any other property
held either jointly by the parties or separately
by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other
relatives or any person who give the aggrieved
person assistance from domestic violence; (g)
committing any other act as specified in the
protection order."
10. The word `Protection Order' is defined
under Section 2(o) of the D.V. Act and it reads as
under:
"2. (o) "protection order" means an order
made in terms of section 18;
11. On a plain reading of Section 18 of the
D.V. Act, in the light of definition found under Section
2(o) of the D.V. Act, it can be definitely said that the
order of granting maintenance does not amount to
`protection order' and violation of the same will not
attract the provisions of Section 31 of the D.V. Act.
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12. Section 31 of the D.V. Act is reproduced
hereunder and it reads thus:
"31. Penalty for breach of protection
order by respondent.--(1) A breach of
protection order, or of an interim protection
order, by the respondent shall be an offence
under this Act and shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to twenty thousand rupees,
or with both. (2) The offence under sub-section
(1) shall as far as practicable be tried by the
Magistrate who has passed the order, the
breach of which has been alleged to have been
caused by the accused. (3) While framing
charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate
may also frame charges under section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any
other provision of that Code or the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case
may be, if the facts disclose the commission of
an offence under those provisions."
13. In the present case provisions of Section
31 of the D.V. Act was pressed into service before the
trial Court essentially on the ground that arrears of
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maintenance was not paid and therefore it paved for
penal action under Section 31 of the D.V. Act.
Learned Magistrate has construed that even non-
payment of arrears of maintenance amounts to
violation of protection order and therefore Section 31
of the D.V. Act could be invoked.
14. Providing two separate reliefs, one under
Section 18 of the D.V. Act for protection and another
for monetary relief under Section 20 of the D.V. Act
will have to be taken into consideration while
analyzing the scope of Section 31 of the D.V. Act. If
protection order was inclusive of monetary relief of
granting maintenance, Section 20 of the D.V. Act
would not have been separately provided.
15. Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case
of Mr. Francis Cyril C Cunha, (supra) considered
similar case and has exhaustively dealt with scope of
Section 31 of the D.V. Act in the light of Sections
2(o), 18 and 20 of the D.V. Act and held that
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protection order does not include the order of
granting monetary relief of maintenance under
Section 20 of the D.V. Act.
16. Placing reliance on the decision of this
Court in the case of Mr. Francis Cyril C Cunha
(supra) and considering the provisions of D.V. Act this
Court in the case of Mohammed Yaseen Naikwadi
(supra), has held that protection order does not
include the order granting monetary relief under
Section 20 of the D.V. Act and quashed the
proceedings initiated for offence under Section 31 of
the D.V. Act.
17. In the case of Vincent Shanthakumar
Vs. Christina Geetha Rani and Others, (supra)
coordinate Bench of this Court has observed thus:
"36. xxx xxx xxx In that manner, if the
provisions are understood, the exparte interim
maintenance order passed u/s 23, comes
definitely within the ambit of section 3 of the
Act, because of the simple reason, that in order
to prevent and avoid vagrancy and also to
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protect the women from domestic violence, the
court can pass order of maintenance to avoid
economic abuse. Therefore, when it is said
that in order to pass order u/s. 23 of the Act,
there should be a domestic violence and in
order pass orders u/s. 18 also there should be
a domestic violence. Therefore, in my opinion,
an order passed u/s. 23 is nothing but a
protection given to the victim u/s. 18
prohibiting the abuser from economically
abusing the victim. Therefore, any order
passed u/s. 23 of the Act is deemed to be
passed u/s. 18 also in order to attract the
penal provision u/s. 31 of the Act."
18. It is apparent from a bare perusal
of Section 31 of the D.V. Act that it speaks about
protection order and interim protection order. It does
not speak about monetary orders. It was laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Commissioner of Customs VS. Dilip Kumar & Co.,
reported in (2018) 9 SCC 1: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 747
that when the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, the Courts have to give meaning to
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them regardless of consequences. It was observed
that the well-settled principle is that when the words
in a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous and
only one meaning can be inferred, the Courts are
bound to give effect to the said meaning irrespective
of consequences. If the words in the statute are plain
and unambiguous, it becomes necessary to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The
words used declare the intention of the legislature.
19. In Kanai Lal Sur VS. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907 it was
held that if the words used are capable of one
construction only then it would not be open to the
courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction
on the ground that such construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and policy of the
Act.
20. In applying the rule of plain meaning, any
hardship and inconvenience cannot be the basis to
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alter the meaning of the language employed by the
legislation. This is especially so in fiscal statutes and
penal statutes. Nevertheless, if the plain language
results in absurdity, the court is entitled to determine
the meaning of the word in the context in which it is
used, keeping in view the legislative purpose.
(Commissioner Vs. Mathapathi Basavannewwa,
reported in (1995) 6 SCC 355). Not only that, if the
plain construction leads to anomaly and absurdity,
the Court, having regard to the hardship and
consequences that flow from such a provision, can
even explain the true intention of the legislation.
21. It was held in Vidarbha Industries
Power Ltd. Vs. Axis Bank Ltd., reported in (2022)
8 SCC 352: (2022)4SCC(CIV)329: 2022 SCC On
Line SC 841 that the first and foremost principle of
interpretation is the literal interpretation and when
the provisions of the statute are clear the same is to
be interpreted literally and other rules will apply
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subsequently. It is well settled that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute is the
rule of literal interpretation, as held by this Court in
Lalita Kumari Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2014)
2 SCC 1, is construed literally the provision must be
held to confer a discretion on the adjudicating
authority (NCLT).
22. In Hiralal Rattan Lal Vs. State of U.P.
reported in 1973 (1) SCC 216 it is observed that, in
construing a statutory provision, the first and
foremost rule of construction is literary construction.
All that we have to see at the very outset is what
does that provision say? If the provision is
unambiguous and if from that provision, the
legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the
other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules
of construction of statutes are called into aid only
when the legislative intention is not clear.
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23. In B. Premanand Vs. Mohan Koikal
reported in 2011 (4) SCC 266 it is held that, it may
be mentioned in this connection that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in
every system of interpretation is the literal rule of
interpretation. The other rules of interpretation,
eg., the mischief rule, purposive interpretation,
etc., can only be resorted to when the plain words
of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no
intelligible results, or if read literally would nullify
the very object of the statute. Where the words of
a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous,
recourse cannot be had to the principles of
interpretation other than the literal rule, vide
Swedish Match AB Vs. SEBI reported in 2004
(11) SCC 641.
24. In Lalita Kumari Vs. State of U.P.
reported in 2014 (2) SCC 1 the Court construed the
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use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and held that Section
154(1) postulates the mandatory registration of an
FIR on receipt of information of a cognizable offence.
If, however, the information given does not disclose a
cognizable offence, a preliminary enquiry may be
ordered, and if the enquiry discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered.
25. The words in Section 31 of D.V. Act are
plain and unambiguous. They only mention the
protection and interim protection order. Therefore,
applying the literal rules of interpretation, Section
31 applies only to the breach of protection orders
mentioned in Section 18 and not to residence orders
mentioned in Section 19, monetary reliefs mentioned
in Section 20, custody orders mentioned in Section
21, and compensation orders mentioned in Section
22. Had the legislature intended to apply Section
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31 to these orders, it would have mentioned them
specifically.
26. Section 31 of the D.V. Act creates an
offence. It is the rule of interpretation of the statute
that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed
because they deprive a citizen of his life and liberty,
and no act, which does not fall within the purview of
the criminal statute, can be added to it by way of
interpretation. It was held in Mohd. Wajid Vs. State
of U.P., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 that
the Court has to see that the thing charged is an
offence within the plain meaning of the statute and
not by a strained meaning of the words. It was also
observed that the general rule governing the
interpretation of a penal statute is that it must be
strictly construed. Strict interpretation in the words of
Crawford connotes, "if a statute is to be strictly
construed, nothing should be included within its scope
that does not come clearly within the meaning of the
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language used. Its language must be given exact and
technical meaning with no extension on account of
implications or equitable considerations; or has been
aptly asserted, its operation must be confined to
cases coming clearly within the letter of the statute as
well as within its spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps
more concisely, it is close and conservative adherence
to the literal or textual interpretation." According to
Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction, it is not
meant that the statute shall be stringently or
narrowly construed, but it means that everything
shall be excluded from its operation which does not
clearly come within the scope of the language used.
When it is said that all penal statutes are to be
construed strictly, it only means that the Court must
see that the thing charged is an offence within the
plain meaning of the words used and must not strain
the words."
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27. The monetary relief which is separately
provided in Section 2 (k) of the D.V. Act cannot be
added to the protection order separately provided
in Sections 2 (o) and 18 of the D.V. Act by plain
meaning.
28. Kerala High Court in the case of Suneesh
Vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine
Ker 6210, has held that Section 31 applies to the
breach of the protection orders mentioned in Section
18 of the D.V. Act and not to any other orders. It was
observed that a plain reading of Section 31 would go
to show that a breach of a protection order or interim
protection order by the respondent shall be an
offence under this Act and is punishable. Section
18 deals with protection orders categorised as (a) to
(g) referred to in Section 18 herein above
extracted. Section 19 deals with residence orders
and Section 20 deals with monetary reliefs
and Section 20(d) authorises a Magistrate to grant
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maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her
children, if any, including an order under or in
addition to an order of maintenance under Section
125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)
or any other law for the time being in force. Thus, it
could be noticed that while incorporating provisions
under Section 31 to impose a penalty on violation of
breach of 'protection order', the legislature never
intended to impose a penalty for violation of
'residence orders' or 'monetary reliefs'. Based on this
principle, Kerala High Court in Velayudhan Nair v.
Karthiayani's case reported in 2009 (3) KHC 377
held that Section 31 of the D.V. Act would apply only
on violation of the interim order or final protection
order passed under Section 18 of the D.V. Act and it
was held further that in case of violation of any order
passed other than an order passed under Section
18 of the D.V. Act, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. can
be resorted to. In this connection, it is apposite to
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refer to Rule 6(5) of Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Rules, 2006, which provides that
the application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act shall
be dealt with and the orders enforced in the same
manner laid down under Section 125 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973.
29. Whereas in the case of Surya Prakash
Vs. Rachna reported in 2018 Crl.L.J. 2545, a
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
considered the term 'economic abuse' defined
under Section 3(iv) of the D.V. Act and it was held
that the same includes deprivation of all or any
economic or financial resources, payment of rental
related to shared household and maintenance. It was
further held that the grant of monetary relief
under Section 20 does not exclude the amount of
maintenance under Section 18 of the D.V. Act as part
of the affirmative order in respect of the domestic
violence as defined under Section 3 of the D.V. Act.
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Therefore, it was found that non-payment of
maintenance is a breach of a protection order, and
hence, Section 31 of the D.V. Act can be invoked.
30. In this context, it has to be held that when
the plain meaning of the words in the Statute is clear
and unambiguous, the meaning of the said words
shall be understood in its plain meaning; so as to
accord the wisdom of the legislature. In such cases,
the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as
well as noscitur a sociis have no application.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the expression
"noscitus a sociis" means thus:
"A canon of construction holding that the
meaning of an unclear word or phrase should
be determined by the words immediately
surrounding it."
31. The expression "ejusdem generis",
according to Black's Law Dictionary, means thus:
"A canon of construction that when a
general word or phrase follows a list of specific
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persons or things, the general word or phrase
will be interpreted to include only persons or
things of the same type as those listed. For
example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep,
pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the
general language or any other barnyard animal
- despite its seeming breadth - would probably
be held to include only four-legged, hoofed
mammals (and thus would exclude chickens)."
32. Indubitably the Latin expression 'ejusdem
generis' which means "of the same kind or nature" is
a principle of construction, meaning thereby when
general words in a statutory text are flanked by
restricted words, the meaning of the general words
are taken to be restricted by implication with the
meaning of restricted words. This is a principle which
arises from the linguistic implication by which words
having literally a wide meaning (which, taken in
isolation,) are treated as reduced in scope by the
verbal context". In fact, the ejusdem generis principle
is a facet of the principle of Noscitur a sociis.
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33. The Latin maxim Noscitur a sociis
contemplates that a statutory term is recognised by
its associated words. The Latin word 'sociis' means
'society'. Therefore, when general words are
juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot
be read in isolation. Thus, like all other linguistic
canons of construction, the ejusdem generis principle
applies only when a contrary intention does not
appear.
34. Here, the legislature vigilantly included
'protection orders' alone under Section 31 of the D.V.
Act after specifically categorising the orders which
would be given under the head 'protection orders'
under Section 18 of the D.V. Act. Another very
pertinent aspect to be noted in this context is the
implications and ramifications of widening the scope
of Section 31. Say for instance, a person when
ordered to pay a specified amount on every month as
maintenance or interim maintenance and
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under Section 20(4) of the D.V Act, if he fails to pay
the same on completion of every month for
justified/unavoidable reasons, is it fair to hold that
the said failure and omission would be penalised
under Section 31 of the D.V Act. Similar is the
position inasmuch as other orders, excluding the
order under Section 18. Moreover, if such a wide
interpretation is given, the Courts will be over-flooded
with cases under Section 31 of the D.V Act, and the
said situation cannot be said to have been intended
by the legislature. Therefore, the Court cannot
overturn the legislative wisdom to hold that a
'monetary relief' such as payment of maintenance, if
disobeyed, the same also would attract a significant
penalty under Section 31 of the D.V. Act, treating the
same as a breach of 'protection order' or 'interim
protection order'. Therefore, it is held that the penalty
provided under Section 31 of the D.V. Act would
attract only for breach of protection orders passed
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under Section 18 of the D.V. Act, and the same would
not apply to maintenance orders under Section 20 of
the D.V. Act.
35. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in
the case of Anish Pramod Patel Vs. Kiran Jyot
Maini reported in 2023 SCC online Del 7605 has
observed as under:
39. Thus, in view of the statutory framework
of PWDV Act and Rules, the order granting
maintenance or interim maintenance
under Section 20 of PWDV as monetary relief
to the aggrieved women will have to be
enforced in the manner as provided
under Section 20(6) of PWDV Act or otherwise
as per provisions of Cr.P.C. including manner
for enforcement of orders passed
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.
40. As discussed in preceding
paragraphs, Section 31 of PWDV Act
exclusively deals with breach of "protection
order‟ or "interim protection order‟ and an
order granting maintenance in an application
filed under Section 12, which is an order
passed under Section 20 which provides for
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"monetary relief‟, cannot be interpreted to fall
within the ambit of term "protection order‟ as
used in Section 31 of the Act. The scheme
of PWDV Act envisages different categories of
reliefs and orders, as discussed previously, and
the term "protection order‟ has been
specifically defined in Section 2(o) and its
scope in Section 18, whereas monetary relief
has been defined under Section 2(k) and its
scope in Section 20, which is distinct in nature.
Therefore, while deciding the issue in question,
this Court has kept in consideration the intent
of the legislature behind legislating separate
provisions for different reliefs under the PWDV
Act.
41. The aforesaid view is also supported by the
decisions of several other High Courts
in Velayudhan Nair v. Karthiayani, 2009 (3)
KHC 377, Kanka Raj v. State of Kerala 2009
SCC OnLine Ker 2822, Kanchan v. Vikramjeet
Setiya 2012 SCC OnLine Raj 3614, Francis
Cyril C Cunha v. Smt. Lydia Jane
D'Cunha 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 8760, Manoj
Anand v. State of U.P. 2012 SCC OnLine All
308, S. Jeeva Ashok v. Kalarani 2015 SCC
OnLine Mad 3719, Suneesh v. State of Kerala
2022 SCC OnLine Ker 6210, wherein also, it
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was held that Section 31 of PWDV Act cannot
be invoked for breach of order granting
maintenance.
42. This Court has also carefully considered the
opposite view expressed by some other High
Courts in cases of Vincent Shanthakumar v.
Christina Geetha Rani 2014 SCC OnLine Kar
12409, Surya Prakash v. Rachna M.Cr.C.
No.16718/2015. However, with utmost respect
to the observations made in these judgments,
this Court does not agree with the ratio laid
down therein.
43. It is also relevant to note that offence
under Section 31(1) Act has been made as
cognizable and non-bailable under Section
32(1) of PWDV Act. Thus, the provision
of Section 31 is punitive in nature, in an Act
which is otherwise a beneficial and welfare
legislation. However, it is cardinal rule of
interpretation of statutes that in case of a
provision which is punitive in nature, and
where penalties are imposed for infringement,
the provision is to be construed strictly. In this
regard, reference can be made to the
observations of Constitution Bench of Hon‟ble
Apex Court in case of Tolaram Rerumal v.
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State of Bombay reported in 1954 SCC
OnLine SC 22, which read as under:
"8. ...It may be here observed that the
provisions of section 18(1) are penal in
nature and it is a well settled rule of
construction of penal statutes that if two
possible and reasonable constructions can
be put upon a penal provision, the Court
must lean towards that construction
which exempts the subject from penalty
rather than the one which imposes
penalty. It is not competent to the Court
to stretch the meaning of an expression
used by the Legislature in order to carry
out the intention of the Legislature. As
pointed out by Lord Macmillan in London
and North Eastern Railway Co. v.
Berriman 1946 AC 278 "where penalties
for infringement are imposed it is not
legitimate to stretch the language of a
rule, however beneficent its intention,
beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of
its language"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
44. In this Court's opinion, the intent of the
legislature is spelt out clearly from the words
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used in the enactment and the provisions
therein, and an examination of Section
20, 28 Section 9 of PWDV Act and Rule 6 of
PWDV Rules clarifies the procedure and
manner in which the non-compliance of
monetary orders including order for
maintenance is to be addressed and dealt with.
45. Thus, when there is no ambiguity in the
scheme of legislature and the purport of
provisions of the Act and Rules, no purpose
would be served by giving a different
interpretation to the provisions, which are
otherwise clear and unambiguous.
46. The High Court of Kerala in case
of Suneesh v. State of Kerala (supra) had
also expressed its opinion on the implications
and ramification of widening the scope
of Section 31 and the relevant observations are
extracted hereunder:
"...Another very pertinent aspect to be
noted in this context is the implication
and ramification of widening the scope
of Section 31. Say for instance, a person
when ordered to pay a specified amount
on every month as maintenance or
interim maintenance and under Section
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20(4) of the D.V Act, if he fails to pay
the same on completion of every month
for justified/unavoidable reasons, is it
fair to hold that the said failure and
omission would be penalised
under Section 31 of the D.V Act. Similar
is the position inasmuch as other orders
excluding the order under Section 18.
Moreover, if such a wide interpretation is
given, the Courts will be over-flooded
with cases under Section 31 of the D.V
Act and the said situation cannot said to
have intended by the legislature..."
47. While deciding such issues, particularly in
relation to interpretation of provisions of PWDV
Act, it is important to carefully analyse and
examine the aim and objects which were
sought to be achieved through enactment
of PWDV Act. It was realized by the legislature
that while criminal recourse was available for
women facing domestic violence in matrimonial
settings, as provided under Section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code, the same only led to
the punishment of the accused without
immediate remedies for the woman's specific
needs and livelihood challenges. In response to
this gap in legal provisions, the PWDV Act was
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enacted to offer certain civil remedies to the
victims of domestic violence. These remedies
encompass an array of protective measures,
residence orders, and monetary reliefs,
designed to address the multifaceted nature of
abuse. The aim of the Act was, therefore, to
provide for protection, rehabilitation and
upliftment of victims of domestic violence, in
contrast to sending the aggressor to prisons.
In other words, the purpose behind
enforcement of monetary orders would be to
provide monetary sustenance to the victim,
and not the incarceration of the aggressor.
48. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the
focus of PWDV Act is on providing immediate
and effective relief to victims of domestic
violence by way of maintenance or interim
maintenance orders, and the idea is not to
immediately initiate criminal proceedings
against the aggressor i.e. "respondent‟ as
defined in the Act for non-payment of
maintenance and to send such person to prison
forthwith.
49. Therefore, for the reasons recorded in the
preceding discussion, this Court is of the view
that a person cannot be summoned
under Section 31 of PWDV Act for non-
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compliance of monetary order such as order
for payment of maintenance passed
under Section 20 of PWDV Act.
50. The respondent in the present case had
filed a complaint under Section 31 of PWDV Act
before the Court concerned solely on the
ground that the petitioner had failed to pay the
amount of interim maintenance so granted by
the learned Trial and Sessions Court
under PWDV Act, and thus, he was liable to
face consequences under Section 31 of the Act
and further under Section 498A of IPC for
commission of cruelties against the
complainant.
51. Having held that a the "respondent"
under the PWDV Act cannot be summoned as
an accused under Section 31 for non-
compliance of an order of monetary relief, this
Court is inclined to quash the impugned order
dated 12.03.2019 passed by learned
Additional Civil Judge, Third, Gautam Budh
Nagar, and all consequential proceedings
which are pending before learned Mahila
Court, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in Case No.
882/2022.
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36. Telengana High Court also expressed
similar view in the case of C.D. Ravindernath and
Ors. Vs. Srilatha and Others reported in
MANU/TL/0700/2023 and has held as under:
"9. Under the DV Act, several reliefs can be
granted. The kind of reliefs that can be granted
are segregated and specifically mentioned
under Sections 18 to 22 and also the power to
grant interim and ex-parte orders
under Section 23 of the Act.
10. Section 18 of the Act deals with protection
orders when the Court is satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place or likely to
take place, protection order in favour of
aggrieved person can be passed.
11. Under Section 19 of the Act, the Court, if
satisfied that the domestic violence has taken
place, pass orders regarding the right to be
given shelter/ residence.
12. Under Section 20 of the Act, the Court can
direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to
meet the expenses incurred and loss suffered
by the aggrieved person or the child as a result
of domestic violence. The said monetary relief
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would include loss of earnings, medical
expenses etc. and maintenance.
13. Under Section 21 of the Act, the Court,
while considering the application either for
protection orders or for any other relief, can
grant temporary custody of a child to the
aggrieved person or any person making an
application on her behalf.
14. Under Section 22 of the Act, in addition to
the said reliefs under Sections 18 to 21, the
Magistrate, on the application being made by
the respondent to pay compensation and
damages for injuries which include mental
torture, emotional distress caused on account
of the acts of domestic violence.
15. The Legislature has thought it fit to
segregate reliefs that can be sought under DVC
Act. The reliefs that can be granted by a Court
under the DVC Act are mentioned
under Sections 18 to 22. By applying the rule
of literal construction, the words of the statute
have to be understood in their natural,
ordinary sense in accordance with their
grammatical meaning, unless it leads to some
absurdity or if the intent of the Legislature
suggests otherwise. The words of the statute
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must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. In the case of B. Premanand Vs.
Mohan Koikal, MANU/SC/0249/2011:
(2011) 4 SCC 266:
24. The literal rule of interpretation
really means that there should be no
interpretation. In other words, we should
read the statute as it is, without
distorting or twisting its language. We
may mention here that the literal rule of
interpretation is not only followed by
Judges and lawyers, but it is also
followed by the layman in his ordinary
life. To give an illustration, if a person
says "this is a pencil", then he means
that it is a pencil; and it is not that when
he says that the object is a pencil, he
means that it is a horse, donkey or an
elephant. In other words, the literal rule
of interpretation simply means that we
mean what we say and we say what we
mean. If we do not follow the literal rule
of interpretation, social life will become
impossible, and we will not understand
each other. If we say that a certain
object is a book, then we mean it is a
book. If we say it is a book, but we
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mean it is a horse, table or an elephant,
then we will not be able to communicate
with each other. Life will become
impossible. Hence, the meaning of the
literal rule of interpretation is simply that
we mean what we say and we say what
we mean."
16. A Court cannot read into the provisions of
an enactment to arrive at a different meaning
from what the words in the statute suggest.
The intention can only be inferred from the
words used and cannot draw inferences
contrary to the meaning of the words, unless
permitted by law to refer to aids to
interpretation.
17. Under the DVC Act, as already stated supra
the reliefs are segregated under different
provisions from Sections 18 to 22 of the Act,
and there is a clear demarcation. If the
legislature had intended that any breach of the
order made while granting reliefs
under Sections 18 to 22 be punishable
under Section 31, the same would have been
said in clear terms. Since there is no ambiguity
in any of the reliefs that can be granted under
the DVC Act and clearly demarcated, the
Courts need not search for any other
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interpretation other than the actual meaning of
the words.
18. Section 31 of the DVC Act prescribes
penalty for breach of protection order made
under Section 18. The said provision cannot be
read as a penalty for residence orders
under Section 19, monetary reliefs
under Section 20, custody orders
under Section 21 or compensation order
under Section 22.
19. The Learned Magistrate has relied on Rule
15(7) of Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Rules, 2006 (for short 'the Rules of
2006').
"Rule 15(7) Any resistance to the
enforcement of the orders of the court
under the Act by the respondent or any
other person purportedly acting on his
behalf shall be deemed to be a breach of
protection order or an interim protection
order covered under the Act."
20. Rule 15 is for 'Breach of Protection Orders'
granted under section 18 of the Act. Under
Rule 15(7), if there is any resistance to the
enforcement of the protection order as ordered
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by the Court either the respondent or any
other person acting on his behalf can be dealt
with under Section 31 of the Act. It is
incorrect, as found by the learned Magistrate
that Rule 15(7) of the Rules, applies to every
violation under DVC Act and can be prosecuted
under Section 31 of the Act.
21. With great respect, the findings and
interpretation in Surya Prakash Vs.. Smt.
Rachna's case (supra) of Madhya Pradesh
Court and Vincent Shanthakumar Vs. Smt.
Christina Geetha Rani's case (supra) of
Karnataka High Court, for the reasons
discussed above, cannot be accepted."
37. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the
case of Akshay Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
and others (2025HHC:11017) considered all the
decisions on the point referred to supra and held that
violation of monetary order does not constitute
offence punishable under Section 31 of the D.V. Act.
38. Considering the above aspects, the view
taken by coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
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Vincent Shanthakumar (supra) cannot be accepted.
Considering the said aspect learned appellate Judge
has rightly not followed the decision in the case of
Vincent Shanthakumar (supra) and passed the
impugned judgment. There are no grounds made out
to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by
the learned appellate Judge.
39. In the result, revision petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR)
JUDGE
LRS
