Karnataka High Court
M/S.Team Designs vs M/S.Add Value on 31 July, 2025
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COMAP No. 128 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. 128 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1. M/S.TEAM DESIGNS
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.290/B,
9TH MAIN ROAD, 4TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU-560011
REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR,
MR.K.A.NANJUNDESHWARA GUPTA
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PRAMODA GOWDA T P.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. M/S.ADD VALUE
HAVING ITS OFFICE ABOVE
Digitally
signed by POPULAR BAJAJ SHOW ROOM,
SUMATHY 2ND AND 3RD FLOOR,
KANNAN
Location: JAYANAGAR, 7TH BLOCK, BENGALURU-560085
High Court of REP. BY ITS PARTNERS
Karnataka
MR.PRASHANTH KUMAR BUTTE
AND MR.ANUP HEGGAR
...RESPONDENT
THIS COMAP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13(1)(A) OF
COMMERCIAL COURT ACT 2015, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.03.2023 PASSED BY THE LXXXII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH 83)
BENGALURU, IN COM.AP NO.93/2022, AND RESTORE THE
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COMAP No. 128 of 2025
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AWARD DATED 23.08.2022, PASSED BY THE ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL IN AC NO. 16/2022.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS ALONG WITH
I.A.NO.1/2025 THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU ,CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU,CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. None appears for the appellant.
2. The above-captioned appeal has been filed under Section 37
(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, [A&C Act]
impugning a judgment dated 29.03.2023 passed by the learned
Commercial Court [LXXXII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru] in Com.A.P.No. 93 of 2022, captioned 'M/s. Add Value
vs. M/s. Team Designs & Another" .
3. The said petition was filed by the respondent under Section
34 of the A&C Act, impugning an arbitral award dated 23.08.2022
[impugned award]. The learned Commercial Court had examined
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the said application and found that the impugned award was
vitiated by patent illegality.
4. We note that the present appeal has been filed, after an
inordinate delay of 641 days. The appellant has also filed an
application I.A.No.1/2025, for seeking condonation of delay. The
reasons for the delay are set out in paragraph no. 7 of the said
application. The same is reproduced below:
"7. I submit that, I had travelled to USA on
26.05.2022. The case judgment was pronounced
during my stay there. When I returned back to India, I
could not meet my Advocate due to my health issues
and instruct him file the appeal. Since I lost his phone
number I could not talk to him as well. I met my
Advocate in the April month 2024, he has informed me
about filing of the appeal, if I have to challenge the
order. Accordingly, I have filed the MFA No.2912/2024
before this Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka. Since my
health condition got little sensitive, I had not followed-up
case thinking if any update would be informed by
Advocate. Before ten days I met Advocate regarding
taking updates on the case then, he informed the
provision was wrongly mentioned in the Arbitration
appeal as per the notification we should prefer the
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appeal in the commercial, as he also informed that, he
have taken liberty to file the case. Hence, there is a
delay in filing the case."
5. The appellant has not provided any specific dates other than
stating that he had travelled to USA on 26.05.2022. The
explanation that he could not meet his Advocate on his return on
account of health issues and that he had lost his phone number,
are clearly not credible explanations that can be accepted for
condoning an inordinate delay of 641 days.
6. In Government of Maharashtra v. M/s. Borse Brothers
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. : (2021) 6 SCC 460, the
Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in NV International v.
State of Assam : (2020) 2 SCC 109, whereby the Court had held
that the power of the Courts to condone the delay in filing an
appeal under Section 37 of the Act, was restricted to the proviso to
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. However, the court also explained as
under:
"53. However, the matter does not end here. The
question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform
60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the
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judgment in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of
Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which
does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at
the other extreme, we have an open-ended provision in
which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided
sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes
that we have to steer a middle course.
54. One judicial tool with which to steer this course is
contained in the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. This maxim was fleshed out in CIT v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers [CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC
57] as follows : [ Followed in the separate opinion delivered
by Pasayat, J. in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,
(2008) 6 SCC 1 : 3 SCEC 35 (see paras 333-34).] (SCC pp.
73-74, paras 14-21)
"14. A construction which reduces the statute to a
futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision
therein must be so construed as to make it effective and
operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res
magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should
be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if
possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties.
[See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on
Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th
Edn.), p. 221.]
15. A statute is designed to be workable and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that
object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that
end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC[Whitney v. IRC,
1926 AC 37 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja
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Singh [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352]
and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [Gursahai Saigal v. CIT, AIR
1963 SC 1062] .)
16. The courts will have to reject that construction
which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even
though there may be some inexactitude in the language
used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe[Salmon v. Duncombe,
(1886) LR 11 AC 627 (PC)] , AC at p.
634, Curtis v. Stovin [Curtis v. Stovin, (1889) LR 22 QBD
513 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [CIT v. S. Teja
Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352] .)
17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest
purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction
which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should
rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view
that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of
bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., 1940 AC 1014 (HL)] referred
to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW [Pye v. Minister for
Lands for NSW, (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles
indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court
in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [Mohan Kumar
Singhania v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992
SCC (L&S) 455] .
18. The statute must be read as a whole and one
provision of the Act should be construed with reference to
other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute.
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19. The court must ascertain the intention of the
legislature by directing its attention not merely to the
clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must
compare the clause with other parts of the law and the
setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.
(See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka[R.S.
Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (L&S) 286] .) Such a construction has the merit of
avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a
section or between two different sections or provisions of
the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-
on clash between two sections of the same Act.
(See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [Sultana
Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373] .)
20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done
to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that
they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that
Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with
the other.
21. The provisions of one section of the statute
cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is
impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a
construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless
lumber" or "dead letter" is not a harmonised construction. To
harmonise is not to destroy."
55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid
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statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals
filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section
5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object,
it is necessary to discover as to what the expression
"sufficient cause" means in the context of condoning delay
in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
** ** **
**
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under
both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that
is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
"sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays
beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale
claims....
** ** **
**
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration
Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A)
of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30
days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a
party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind
that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party
may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or
laches."
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8. In the view of the above, we are unable to accept that the
delay in filing the present appeal can be condoned. The application
I.A.No.1/2025 is accordingly rejected.
9. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as well.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C M JOSHI)
JUDGE
KS
