Karnataka High Court
Sri N Ravi vs The Tahsildar on 16 July, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
WRIT PETITION NO.18806 OF 2018 (KVOA)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.49589 OF 2014 (KVOA)
IN WP NO.18806/2018:
BETWEEN:
SRI N RAVI,
S/O NARAYANA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
R/AT ADIGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI G A VISWANATHA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE TAHSILDAR,
ANEKAL TALUK,ANEKAL - 562104,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
2. SRI N VENKATASWAMY,
S/O LATE NANJAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
3. SRI RAJAPPA M,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
4. SRI MANJUNATHA
2
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
5. SMT MUNIYAMMA
W/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
6. SMT JAYAMMA
W/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
THE RESPONDENTS 2 TO 6
ARE R/AT ADIGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK -
562104,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
7. SRI LACHAPPA,
S/O YELLAPPA,AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT JANATHA COLONY,
ATTIBELE ANEKAL TALUK - 562104,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
8. SRI NARAYANAPPA,
S/O YELLAPPA,AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
R/AT KALENA AGRAHARA VILLAGE,
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK - 560079,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
9. SRI MUNIYAPPA,
S/O YELLAPPA,AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
10. SRI CHIKKA BYALAPPA
DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SMT GULLAMMA,
DEAD HER LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IS
10(b)
b. SRI A.C.VENKATSWAMY,
3
S/O LATE CHIKKA BYALAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
11. SRI MUNIYAPPA
DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SMT.RAMAKKA,
DEAD HER LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IS
11(b)
b. SRI ANNAYAPPA
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
12. SRI NAGAPPA
S/O LATE GULLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
(DIED HIS BROTHERS ARE ALREADY ON RECORD
AMENDMENT CARRIED OUT AS PER THE COURT ORDER DT
09.01.2025)
13. SMT RAMAKKA
DEAD BY HER LRS,
a. SMT PUTTAMMA,
D/O LATE RAMAKKA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
14. SRI CHINNAPPA,
DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SMT PAPAMMA,
W/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
15. SRI CHINNAPPA
S/O GONAPPA, DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SMT PAPAMMA,
W/O CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
4
b. SRI MUNIRAJU
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
c. SRI KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
16. SRI DODDA BYALAPPA,
DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SRI KRISHNAPPA,
S/O LATE DODDA BYALAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
17. SRI CHINNAPPA,
S/O GURAPPA,DEAD BY HIS LRS,
a. SRI MUNIRAJAPPA,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS.
b. SRI NARAYANAPPA
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
c. SRI RAMAPPA,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
THE RESPONDENTS 9 TO 17 (a) to (c)
ALL ARE R/AT ADIGONDANAHALLI
VILLAGE,ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK - 562104,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
..RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI VIVEK HOLLA, ADVOCATE FOR R2 TO R6,
5
SRI PRINCE ISAAC, AGA FOR R1 R9, R10(B),
R11(B) R13(A), R14(A), R15(A) TO R15(C),
R16(A), R17(A) TO R17(C) ARE SERVED AND
UNREPRESENTED,
SRI M Y LOKESH, ADVOCATE FOR R7 AND R8,
V/O/DT: 19.09.2024, R10(B) IS TREATED AS LRS OF
R10(A) AND R11(B) IS TREATED AS LRS DECEASED
R11(A))
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DTD 22.01.2018 PASSED BY THE
COURT OF THE THIRD ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT SIT AT
ANEKAL IN M.A.NO.90/2011 VIDE ANNX-A.
IN WP NO.49589 OF 2014:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI LACHAPPA,
S/O YELLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT JANATHA COLONY,
ATTIBELE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT,
PIN - 562106.
2. SHRI NARAYANAPPA,
S/O YELLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
R/AT KALYANA AGRAHARA,
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK,
PIN - 562106.
3. SMT MUNIYAMMA
W/O ANNAYYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
4. SMT GULLAMMA,
6
W/O LATE CHIKKA BYLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS,
5. SHRI A C VENKATASWAMY,
S/O LATE CHIKKA BYLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
6. SMT PUTTAMMA,
D/O SWATHAPPA & RAMAKKA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
7. SHRI ANNAYYAPPA,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
8. SMT PAPAMMA,
W/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
9. SHRI MUNIRAJU,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
10. SHRI KRISHNAPPA,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
11. SHRI KRISHNAPPA,
S/O LATE DODDA BYLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
12. SHRI MUNIRAJAPPA,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
13. SHRI NARAYANAPPA,
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
14. SHRI RAMAPPA,
7
S/O LATE CHINNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
PETITIONER NO.3 TO 14 ARE ALL
R/AT ADIGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT,
PIN - 562106.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI K SEENAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR P1 TO P3,
SRI M Y LOKESHA, ADVOCATE FOR P4 TO P14)
AND:
1. THE THASILDAR,
ANEKAL TALUK, ANEKAL,
BANGALORE DISTRICT, PIN - 562106.
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD,
CAVEARY BHAVAN, BANGALORE .
3. SHRI N VENKATASWAMY,
S/O LATE NANJAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
4. SHRI M RAJAPPA,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
5 . SHRI MANJUNATH,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
6. SMT MUNIYAMMA,
W/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
RESPONDENT NO.3 TO 6 ARE ALL
R/AT ADIGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
8
BANGALORE DISTRICT, PIN - 562106.
7. SMT JAYAMMA,
W/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT 10TH CROSS,WILSON GARDEN,
BANGALORE-560027.
8. SRI MUNIYAPPA,
W/O LATE YELLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
ADIGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT - 562106
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI PRINCE ISAAC, AGA FOR R1,
SRI H G VASANTHA KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R2,
SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI VIVEK HOLLA, ADVOCATE FOR R3 TO R7,
R8 - IS SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DTD.23.7.2014 IN MISC.APPEAL
NO.72/2011 PASSED BY THE COURT OF THE III ADDL.
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL
DISTRICT, SIT AT ANKEAL VIDE ANNEX-A AND ETC.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 11TH JUNE, 2025 AND
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
CAV ORDER
Writ petition No.49589/2014 is filed assailing the order
dated 10.05.2011 in proceeding No.V.O.A.E.V.R.127/80-81
9
before Tahasildar, Anekal. The Tahasildar, Anekal in terms of
the impugned, acting under the provisions of the Karnataka
Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (for short 'Act, 1961) has
regranted seven properties, having distinct survey numbers,
in favour of respondents No.3 to 7.
2. The District Judge, the Appellate Authority under
the Act, 1961, has dismissed the appeal in M.A. No.72/2011
vide order dated 23.07.2014 confirming the order passed by
the Tahsildar.
3. Assailing the said order passed by Tahasildar, and
order passed by the District Judge in M.A.No.72/2011
confirming the Tahasildar's order, one more petition is filed
in W.P.No.18806/2018. Said petition is filed by the son of
the purchaser of the land bearing Survey No.93, measuring
35 guntas, which is one of seven properties, in dispute in the
connected Writ Petition. The petitioner in the second petition
prays that his father purchased 35 guntas under registered
sale deed dated 05.11.1969. Neither his father nor he was
party to the proceeding No. V.O.A.E.V.R.127/80-81 before
the Tahasildar, as such, the matter be remanded to the
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Tahasildar to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to
participate in the proceeding.
4. The dispute is relating to the regrant of seven
survey numbers in Adigondanahalli Village, Anekal Taluk. All
seven lands were once attached to the Village Office. The
Act, 1961 abolished the Village Offices. Under the said
Act,1961, the person who was holding the Village Office as
on appointed day is entitled to apply for regrant of the land
attached to the village office, as emoluments. The person
who seeks regrant, must establish that he was holding the
Village Office as on the date of the appointed day under the
Act, 1961 and that the land was attached to the village
office.
5. Subject lands were Thoti Inam Lands. In other
words, the persons carrying out Thoti work are entitled to
claim regrant subject to the proof that the lands were
conferred on such persons, as emoluments for carrying Thoti
work.
6. Petitioners in first petition, claim that ancestors of
petitioners and respondents were doing Thoti work and were
11
in possession of the lands in question. Thus both petitioners
and contesting respondents are entitled to regrant to the
extent of respective holdings, though extent of respective
holding is not specified by the petitioners.
7. The contesting respondents contend that the
petitioners are unconcerned to the subject lands and the
Thoti work was done by their ancestors and as on the
appointed day, A.K.Pillaiah, their grandfather was doing
Thoti work. On this premise, the contesting respondents
claim exclusive right over the subject lands and prayed for
dismissal of the petitions.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.
No.49589/2014 would submit that in an application dated
23.03.1991 filed before the Deputy Commissioner, seeking
modification of the regrant order passed in 1986, the
predecessors of respondents (children of A.K. Pillaiah) have
admitted that the present petitioners' predecessors were
cultivating the property jointly along with the predecessors
of the contesting respondents. Though the contention in this
regard was raised before the Tahsildar, the document in
support of it was not produced before the Tahasildar and
12
same is now produced before this Court as additional
document.
9. It is urged that in the application dated
23.03.1991, the ancestors of contesting respondents
(children of A.K.Pillaiah) sought modification of earlier grant
order of 1986, jointly granting the subject lands in favour of
5 children of Thoti Guruva (ancestor of the petitioners) and
children of A.K. Pillaiah. In the said application, children of
A.K.Pillaiah claimed only half share and stated that
remaining half share belongs to the persons who are
beneficiaries under the order dated 03.02.1986.
10. Referring to one more document produced as
additional evidence i.e., the memorandum of Miscellaneous
Appeal No.103/1995 filed by children of A.K.Pillaiah, it is
urged that, in the said appeal, a reference is made to the
application of the year 1991 submitted before the Deputy
Commissioner.
11. Learned counsel submits that the documents now
sought to be produced by way of additional documents were
not with the petitioners as the documents were executed by
13
the contesting respondents' predecessors. Contesting
respondents and their predecessors have suppressed these
documents and the petitioners seek indulgence of the Court
to produce additional documents.
12. Learned counsel would also contend that the
impugned orders are passed based on the alleged admission
in the cross examination of one of the petitioners. It is
urged that alleged admission is now shown to be wrong from
the contents of additional documents where petitioners' right
is admitted in explicit terms.
13. Learned Senior counsel Sri Udaya Holla appearing
for the contesting respondents would contend that the
admission before the Tahasildar is unambiguous and explicit
and there is no room for any further interpretation to
contend that the admission is either stray admission or by
mistake.
14. It is also urged by learned Senior counsel that
impugned orders are not passed based only on admission
but also the documentary evidence viz., Ex.P.4, the order
granting monthly salary to Sri A.K.Pillaiah as Act, 1961 which
14
abolished Village Office, provided for compensation in the
form of monthly salary to the holder of the Village Office. It
is urged that the impugned orders based on the admission
in cross examination as well as documentary evidence, need
to be given the limited scope for interference in such order
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
15. Learned Senior counsel would also contend that
no reasons are made out to allow production of additional
documents at this juncture. The matter was before this Court
on earlier occasion. It was remanded on two occasions by
the learned District Judge and the documents were not
produced on earlier occasions and only on the ground of
delay, the application has to be rejected, is the submission.
16. Learned Senior counsel would also point out that
two different dates found in the said application viz.,
28.09.1995 and 23.03.1991 raise serious doubts as to the
authenticity of the alleged application for modification of the
interim order and it is more than sufficient to reject the
document.
15
17. It is also urged that, assuming that the
application is submitted by children of A.K.Pillaiah before the
Deputy Commissioner, same has to be construed as an
application filed by children of A.K.Pillaiah for redistributing
the properties among three children of A.K.Pillaiah and not
the petitioners.
18. Referring to the Memorandum of Appeal in
M.A.No.103/1995, learned Senior counsel would urge that
the contesting respondents are not parties to the said appeal
and the contents of the Memorandum of Appeal do not bind
the said respondents.
19. In so far as the Writ Petition filed by the son of
the purchaser of Sy.No.93, it is urged that vendor through
whom the purchaser is claiming title under the sale deed of
the year 1969, did not have the title. Thus alleged purchaser
or his son, the petitioner in W.P.No.18806/2018 is not
necessary party to any of the proceedings. It is urged that
the vendor has participated in the proceeding and contested
the matter and no prejudice is caused to the petitioner.
16
20. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners by
way of reply would refer to the regrant order at Annexure-C
passed in the year 1986 and would urge that the said order
is based on the joint application filed by the parties. The
impugned orders could not have been passed without
reference to the admission in the joint applications.
21. This Court has considered the contentions raised
at the bar and perused the records.
2. Section 3(1) of Act, 1961 reads as under:
3. Powers of Deputy Commissioner to
decide certain questions and appeals: (1)
If any question arises, -
(a) whether any land was granted or
continued in respect of or annexed to a
village office by the State, or
(b) whether any person is a holder of a
village officer, or
(c) whether any person is an authorised
holder, or
(d) whether any person is an unauthorised
holder,
the Deputy Commissioner shall, after giving
the party affected an opportunity to be heard
17
and after holding an enquiry in the prescribed
manner decide the question. "
22. Said provision contains 4 different aspects. As far
as first aspect is concerned, there is no dispute that all lands
in dispute are Thoti service lands.
23. Next question is whether the persons claiming
regrant are holders of village office?
24. The expression "village office" is defined in
Section 2(1)(n) of Act, 1961. Same reads as under:
2(1)(n)."Village office" means every village
office, to which emoluments have been
attached and which was held hereditarily
before the commencement of the
Constitution under an existing law
relating to a village office, for the
performance of duties connected with
administration or collection of the
revenue or with the maintenance of
order or with the settlement of
boundaries or other matter of civil
administration of a village, whether the
services originally appertaining to the office
continue or have ceased to the performed or
demanded and by whatsoever designation
the office may be locally known.
(emphasis supplied)
18
25. On a reading of the provision, it is evident that
"village office" means every village office to which
emoluments are attached and which was held hereditarily.
It is also relevant to notice that the village office must have
been held under the law prevailing prior to the Constitution
of India.
26. As noticed, under Section 3(1)(b) of Act, 1961
the authority under the Act, 1961 is required to decide as to
whether the applicant is a holder of village office or not.
27. Section 2(1)(g) of Act, 1961 reads as under:
2(1)(g) "Holder of a village office" or
"Holder" means a person having an interest in a
village office under an existing law relating to such
office:
Provided that where any village office has
been entered in a registered or record under an
existing law relating to such village office, as held
by the whole body of persons having interest in the
village office, the whole of such body shall be
deemed to be the holder;"
28. On a reading of the aforementioned definition of a
"holder of a village office" or "holder", it is noticed that
19
holder of a village office need not be necessarily an
individual, but it can be a whole body of individuals having
interest in the village office. The proviso also indicates if
whole body of individuals as is entered in the records as
holder of a village office, then such whole body will be the
holder of village office.
29. There is no provision in the Act, 1961 which
mandates the a particular kind or mode of proof relating to
village office by the person who claims regrant. However,
to consider whether the person was holding the village office,
the authority ideally will look into the revenue records or
village office registers.
30. In the absence of such records, the authority may
have to rely upon other circumstances and any other
evidence if available to find out as to the applicant was
holding the village office or not. Entry in the property
records or entry in the records like register of Barawardar, or
inam register relating to village office would be credible
evidence if such entries are made by following the
procedure. However, the proof need not be based only on
these two categories of records.
20
31. Admittedly, in these petitions, both parties have
failed to produce any specific order and entry in the
Barawardar, or inam register to hold that a particular person
is registered as village office holder. This is the finding in the
impugned order passed by the Tahasildar.
32. Both parties to the proceeding are claiming to be
the holders of hereditary Thoti village office, on the
premise that their ancestors did Thoti work. (It is relevant to
mention here that the application under the Act, 1961 does
not insist for detailed pleading and such plea is not found in
the applications filed by parties). Both parties are claiming
hereditary right as can be seen from the evidence led.
33. The State has not disputed that the subject lands
were service inam lands. Thus, this Court, in the absence of
records relating to village office, would proceed to consider
as to whether any other acceptable materials are produced
by the parties for the consideration of the Authority under
the Act, 1961.
34. Both Tahasildar and learned District judge have
come to the conclusion that A.K.Pillaiah (ancestor of
21
contesting respondents) was the village office holder on the
appointed day. The basis for such finding is Ex-P4
(wrongly mentioned as Ex.P5 in the impugned order). Said
document is dated 23-11-1982. This document reveals that
A.K. Pillaiah was paid Rs.75 per month as salary, towards
compensation payable under Act, 1961 for having abolished
the village office and Ex-P4 reveals that the salary is payable
with effect from 01.04.1982.
35. This document is not disputed by the petitioners.
Petitioners contend that A.K.Pillaiah used to collect monthly
salary on behalf of petitioners as well. The question is, does
Ex.-P4 demolish the claim of the petitioners and establishes
the claim of the contesting respondents.
36. Before considering whether the petitioners' claim
is demolished or not established, the respondents' claim,
who are regranted the subject lands be discussed and
considered.
37. Ex-P4 order does not indicate that same is passed
in recognition of Thoti service with reference to any
particular survey number. There is nothing on record to
22
suggest that said order is based on any adjudication or any
entry in the public documents. Extent of land in the name of
A.K. Pillaiah as holder of village office is not forthcoming.
Thus, based only on Ex.P4, one cannot conclude that A.K.
Pillaiah was Thoti service holder for all the subject lands.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that A.K. Pillaiah may be or
may not be the holder of village office attached to subject
lands. Or he may be the holder of part of the subject lands.
Based on Ex.P4, one can only draw an inference that A.K.
Pillaiah may have held a village office and nothing more.
Since, the petitioners also admit that A.K. Pillaiah's ancestors
were doing Thoti work, this Court can conclude that he was
the holder of the village office and based on Ex-P4, one
cannot jump to the conclusion that he held subject lands as
village office emoluments.
38. In the impugned order, Tahasildar has primarily
proceeded to pass regrant order based on Ex.P4. Tahasildar
also observed said document was the basis of regrant in
favour of all the applicants, in terms of regrant order in the
year 1986. It is to be noticed that order of 1986 was set
aside. Last paragraph in page No. 6 of the impugned order,
23
passed by the Tahasildar, refers to previously set aside
regrant order of the year 1986 to come to the conclusion
that A.K. Pillaiah was village office holder based on Ex-P4.
39. Coming to the petitioners' claim, it is noticed that
Tahasildar has held that no records are produced to hold that
petitioners or their predecessors held village office. It is also
held by Tahasildar that petitioners have not placed materials
to show that they belong to the family of A.K. Pillaiah. In the
cross examination, it is stated that family of Guruva
(petitioners' ancestor) is different from family of Parendiga,
the ancestor of respondents, though in the examination in
chief, petitioners asserted that Guruva was the ancestor of
petitioners and contesting respondents.
40. This Court is also of the view that before the
Tahasildar and District Judge, petitioners have not placed
cogent materials to accept their claim.
41. However, before this Court as already noticed,
petitioners have placed additional documents discussed
above. Before considering those documents, it is necessary
24
to look into the applications filed before Tahasildar seeking
regrant.
42. This Court has secured the original records from
the office of Tahasildar. Original file would reveal that there
are multiple applications seeking regrant.
43. Two separate applications were filed by one of his
sons namely Nanjappa, not individually, but along with
predecessors of the petitioners. Extent of lands claimed
by each of the joint applicants is not mentioned in both joint
applications. Both applications are filed for 7 survey
numbers.
44. In both applications, Nanjappa, one of the sons of
A.K. Pillaiah has signed. One application is in handwriting
(page No. 86 of the original file) and another, (in page Nos.
29 to 31 of original file), in a typed format and part of it
contains entries in handwriting. These applications also bear
the signature of Nanjappa. Both applications do not bear the
date.
45. In addition, quite a few individual applications are
filed, but not by children of A.K.Pillaiah.
25
46. After the remand of the matter by the learned
District Judge in the year 2007, legal heirs of children of
A.K.Pillaiah/contesting respondents of this petition, filed
application dated 15.04.2008 under Section 5(1) of Act,
1961 to regrant full extent of 7 survey numbers.
47. It is relevant to notice that A.K. Pillaiah had died
in the year 1986, did not file application seeking regrant.
Other than Nanjappa, his two children did not file any
application to claim regrant of land. The application seeking
regrant in respect of entire lands (exclusively) was filed only
by legal heirs of three children of A.K. Pillaiah in the year
2008.
48. Though learned counsel for the petitioners would
urge that the application filed in the year 2008 is time
barred, Sri Udaya Holla, the learned Senior counsel pointed
out that no time is fixed under the Act, 1961 to file
application seeking regrant.
49. The plea of limitation urged by the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner with reference to Form
No.7 under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is not applicable
26
to application seeking regrant under Act, 1961. Thus, the
contention that the application filed in the year 2008 is time
barred has to be rejected.
50. However, the manner in which the application is
filed in 2008 has to be considered with a bit of
circumspection. The reason is, this application is of the year
2008 seeks larger extent of lands than what was claimed
earlier in the joint applications submitted by Nanjappa, along
with others. Though the joint applications filed by Nanjappa
and others appear to recognize the rights of several persons
namely the petitioners' ancestors, the application filed in the
year 2008, was filed claiming exclusive right over the subject
lands.
51. The application filed in the year 2008, to the
aforementioned extent contradicts with the claim made in
the joint applications referred to above. The application filed
in 2008, if is considered carefully, does not contain a
statement that the propositus A.K.Pillaiah or earlier applicant
Nanjappa have mistakenly omitted to file an application
seeking regrant for the entire extent of subject lands. The
application does not say as to why the earlier applications
27
were filed jointly admitting the Thoti work carried out by
predecessors of the joint applicants who are the ancestors of
the petitioners.
52. What is further relevant to notice is after the
order which was passed in 1981, three sons of A.K. Pillaiah
namely Nanjappa, Muniyappa and Narayanappa filed an
appeal before the District Judge in M.A.No.103/1995
invoking Section 3(2) of Act, 1961. In the said appeal
memorandum, the appellants who are the sons of A.K.
Pillaiah contended that their predecessor (grandfather)
Muninandanappa, the father of A.K. Pillaiah was in
possession of half portion in the subject lands in dispute.
53. Paragraph No.13 of the said appeal memorandum
reads as under:
"13. The appellants has also filed an
application in the year 1991 for modification of
the earlier order on coming to know the regrant
order, but the first respondent has not considered
and not given any opportunity of being heard and
passed the impugned order. On this ground also the
impugned order are liable to be set-aside."
(emphasis supplied)
28
54. From the aforementioned ground No.13, it is
evident that appellants (children of A.K. Pillaiah) claim to
have filed an application in the year 1991 for modification of
the earlier regrant order (of 1986). The ground does not
indicate that the appellants therein claimed exclusive right
over the subject lands.
55. Further grounds No.6, 10 and 13 which are
extracted below also indicate the same.
"6). The first respondent has not inspected the spot and
not drawn any mahazar without knowing the realities
and possession of the respective parties, the
impugned order came to be passed. Hence, the same
liable to be set-aside.
10). Though the respondents No.1 and 2 are not entitled
for the regrant to the extent regranted by the first
respondent, first respondent had passed the regrant order
and the same is liable to be set aside.
13). The appellants have also filed an application
in the year 1991 for modification of the earlier
order on coming to know the regrant order, but the
first respondent has not considered and not given any
opportunity of being heard and passed the impugned
order."
(emphasis supplied)
29
56. The prayer in the said appeal also assumes
importance. The prayer reads as under:
"Wherefore the appellants pray that this Hon'ble Court
be pleased to call for the records and set aside the
impugned order passed by the first respondent in
VOA/EVR/127/1980-81 dated 3/2/1986 and regrant the
lands bearing survey No. in favour of the appellants.
3/2, measuring 1 1/2 guntas
Sy.No.16, measuring 23 guntas
Survey No.36, measuring 2 1/2 guntas,
Survey No.49, measuring 2 acres 04 guntas
Survey No.54, measuring 1 acre 07 guntas
Survey No.82, measuring 1 acre 04 guntas
all are situated at Adigondanahalli Village, Attibele
Hobli, Anekal Taluk, by allowing this appeal with costs,
in the interest of justice and equity."
57. On going through the said grounds extracted
above and the prayer, it is evident that the appellants in the
said appeal claimed only half share in the subject properties.
58. The said appeal in M.A.No.103/1995 came to be
dismissed for non prosecution vide order dated 17.08.1988.
59. However, one more appeal is filed in 2006
challenging the original regrant order which was subject
matter of challenge in M.A.No.103/1995 (probably
30
suppressing the fact that miscellaneous appeal No.103/1995
was dismissed for non prosecution) in Miscellaneous Appeal
No.118/2006.
60. Said appeal is filed by legal heirs of children of
A.K. Pillaiah. The appeal memorandum in the said appeal
does not disclose the dismissal of M.A.No.103/1995.
Probably it was also not brought to the notice of the
Appellate Court in M.A.No.118/2006 that Miscellaneous
Appeal No.103/1995 challenging the regrant of order of 1986
is dismissed for non prosecution. Nevertheless, the appeal is
allowed and the matter was remitted to the Tahsildar for
fresh consideration.
61. After the remand, the Tahsildar considered the
case afresh and said order was called in question in
M.A.No.29/2010 by the present petitioners as the Tahasildar
regranted the properties in favour of contesting respondents
of this petition. M.A.No.29/2010 was allowed and matter was
remanded to the Tahasildar for fresh consideration. In terms
of impugned order, again the properties were regranted to
the contesting respondents No.3 to 7.
31
62. In page No.6 of the impugned order dated
10.05.2011, the petitioners' contention that children of A.K.
Pillaiah, namely Nanjappa, Muniyappa and Narayanappa filed
an application before the Deputy Commissioner making a
claim that half share in the properties are exclusively
cultivated by them and the contention based on M.A.
No.103/1995 are noticed. However its implications are not
considered, probably for want of records as the
Memorandum of Appeal in M.A.No.103/1995 or the
application said to have been filed in the year 1991 before
the Deputy Commissioner are not placed before the
Tahasildar.
63. It is noticed from the cross examination, that the
contesting respondents have put a suggestion to the
petitioner's witness stating that no application is filed for
modification. In the examination in chief, the petitioners
have stated about the dismissal of M.A.No.103/1995. There
is no cross examination on the said document.
64. The additional document (application said to have
been filed before the Deputy Commissioner) if proved
speaks about exclusive possession of half share by three
32
children of A.K. Pillaiah and remaining half share by the
remaining parties to the proceeding before the Tahasildar.
Said document if proved and read along with the appeal
memorandum in M.A.No.103/1995, one can come to the
conclusion that three children of A.K. Pillaiah filed an
application for modification of the regrant order passed in
the year 1986.
65. However, as urged by Sri Udaya Holla, the
learned Senior Counsel, the discrepancy in the date in the
second page of the document creates some doubt about the
authenticity of the document which the petitioners have to
explain.
66. At the same time, even if the said disputed
application is not accepted at this stage, for want of proper
explanation and evidence relating to its proof, the appeal
memorandum refers to an application said to have been filed
in the year 1991. To substantiate the contention that the
application filed in the year 1991, which is referred to in the
appeal memorandum, is different from the application which
is produced by the petitioners, the respondents have not
placed any other document.
33
67. The contents of appeal memorandum indicates
(subject to proper explanation by contesting respondents)
that children of A.K. Pillaiah did not make a claim in excess
of half portion of the survey numbers involved in the present
petition.
68. The prayer in the said appeal itself was to regrant
half portion and not the entire portion of the subject lands.
The appeal was filed challenging the regrant order wherein
the grant is made jointly in favour of all the parties to the
proceedings. The appellants in the said appeal were only
aggrieved by the joint regrant in respect of the half portion
of the lands, which according to them were in their exclusive
possession.
69. The Tahsildar has not taken into consideration
this aspect though there is a reference in the impugned
order to the contention raised by the present petitioners
before the Tahsildar. Even before the learned District Judge,
there is no reference to these contentions. The reason is that
the documents were not placed before the Tahsildar though
the contention was raised.
34
70. Since the documents are placed before this Court,
for the first time, notwithstanding the fact that these
documents are not produced earlier before the Authority,
considering the fact that one of the documents namely the
appeal memorandum in M.A. No.103/1995 is filed by the
children of A.K.Pillaiah, grandfather of contesting
respondents, notwithstanding the delay in producing the
document, the appeal memorandum deserves consideration.
The reason is simple. The contesting respondents suppressed
the said appeal, through out all the proceedings that have
taken place since 1995. And the delay in producing the
document has to be condoned as the proceeding in
M.A.No.103/1995 is already referred to in the evidence
before the Tahasildar, though the document is not produced.
Since a reference is made to the said proceeding, the
contesting respondents in all fairness should have produced
the said document and offered their explanation to the said
document. However, it is not done.
71. Since this Court is of the view that the documents
have to be considered in accordance with law, the contesting
respondents should be given an opportunity to explain the
35
contents of appeal memorandum. The contesting
respondents should also be given the opportunity and to
contest the application said to have been filed before the
Deputy Commissioner, the execution of which is disputed.
The petitioners should be given an opportunity to prove the
application said to have been made before the Deputy
Commissioner which bears two different dates namely
23.03.1991 and 28.09.1995.
72. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.Udaya Holla,
appearing for the contesting respondents has placed reliance
on the following judgments:
(i) Sri. Shivaji Balaram Haibatti vs. Sri.Avinash
MaruthiPawar1
(ii) Ponnayal @ Lakhsmi vs. Karuppannan dead by legal
representatives and another2
(iii) Union of India and others vs. Dinesh Prasad3
(iv) State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan
Guru and others4
(v) M/s Essen Deinki vs. Rajiv Kumar5
(vi) Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate (Private) Ltd. 6
(vii) Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another vs. Rajendra Shankar
Patil7
1
(2018) 11 SCC 652
2
(2019) 11 SCC 800
3
(2012) 12 SCC 63
4
(2003) 6 SCC 641
5
(2002) 8 SCC 400
6
(2001) 8 SCC 97
36
(viii) State of Orissa & Another vs. Murlidhar Jena8
(ix) J.P. Sinha vs. Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. 9
(x) Union of India and others vs. P.Gunashekaran10
(xi) Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import 11
(xii) Avtar Singh & Others vs. Gurdial Singhand others12
(xiii) G V Subba Rao vs. Tahsildar and another13
(xiv) Patel Veerabasappa vs. Basamma14
(xv) Thirumagaral Muralidar vs. Muruga Pilla 15
(xvi) Anand Prakash and another Vs. Assistant Registrar,
Co-operative Societies and others16
73. This Court has noted the principles laid down
therein. As far as the jurisdiction of the High Court in Article
227 of Constitution of India is concerned, the law is well-
settled. Said Article does not vest the unlimited jurisdiction
on High Court to correct all orders.
74. The basic principle is in a proceeding of this
nature, the Court has to look into the decision making
process rather than the decision. However, it is equally well-
settled that the orders passed in ignoring the vital evidence
7
(2010) 8 SCC 329
8
AIR 1963 SCC 404
9
ILR 1992 Kar 538
10
(2015) 2 SCC 610
11
(1981) 1 SCC 80
12
(2006) 12 SCC 552
13
ILR 1998 Kar 2371
14
ILR 1996 Kar 1435
15
AIR 1960 Mad 55
16
AIR 1968 ALL 22
37
or passed without any evidence cannot be sustained and the
High Court would certainly step in the exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 227 of Constitution of India to set aside such
orders.
75. In the instant case, what is required to be noticed
is there is no discussion on the joint applications and
averments in the said applications. One of the joint
applications contains a statement that all joint applicants
are the holders of Thoti service lands, which Thoti work
carried out since their ancestors. In the absence of the
revenue records showing the names of either of the parties'
predecessors as holder of village office, the statement in the
joint application assumes importance more so in the light of
the grounds in appeal memorandum confining claim only to
50% of total extent. In this background, the contents of the
joint applications which are not disputed, are to be
considered by the Tahasildar and the learned District Judge.
76. The fact is that an appeal was filed in the year
1995 in M.A.No.103/1995 was suppressed by the contesting
respondents. Assuming that it was filed by the father of the
contesting respondents and not by the contesting
38
respondents, they were under obligation to make a
statement explaining the circumstances after going through
the records in the said appeal. This is one of the additional
reasons why this Court has to step in, to interfere with the
order passed by Tahasildar as well as the District Judge who
did not have the benefit of going through the said appeal
memorandum in M.A.No.103/1995.
77. Though the joint application filed by Nanjappa
was available on record, Tahasildar and the District Judge
have committed a serious error in not noticing the
implication of joint application and the application filed in the
year 2008 which does not make any reference to the earlier
joint application and which does not speak anything about
the omission to include entire extent of land on earlier
occasion.
78. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of
the view that even the decision making process is erroneous
and case is made out to interference in exercise of Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
39
79. As far as the contention that the High Court
cannot re appreciate the evidence on the findings recorded
by the Tribunal is concerned, this Court has to hold that it is
a peculiar case where the contesting respondents suppressed
the material facts relating to their lesser claim made earlier,
and thereafter made a claim for larger extent without
explaining anything as to the omission made earlier in
seeking regrant to the whole extent of the lands in dispute.
Moreover the additional documents produced require
consideration.
80. For this reason, the Court has to direct the
learned District Judge to consider the case afresh by taking
into consideration all the relevant factors and two additional
documents. The document which is said to be the application
submitted to the Deputy commissioner has to be read in
evidence if its execution is proved. However, the
memorandum of appeal in M.A.No.103/1995 has to be
treated as evidence. What it means or signifies is to be
decided in the light of other evidence on record or to be
adduced by the parties after the remand.
40
81. As far as the contention that the petitioners have
admitted in the cross-examination that they do not belong to
the family of Parendiga is concerned, this Court has noticed
that there is one sentence in the cross-examination where
the witness has stated that the petitioners who are claiming
under Guruva do not belong to the family of Parendiga and
respondents belong to the family of Parendiga. Though this
admission seems to be unambiguous, it is also well-settled
position of law that the admission by itself is not a conclusive
proof. The admissions can be explained.
82. More than anything else, in the joint application,
there appears a statement that all the applicants or their
predecessors were doing Thoti work. Even if the relationship
is not established, the claim made in the light of the joint
applications are required to be considered and which
consideration has certainly escaped the attention of
Tahasildar as well as learned District Judge.
83. This being the position, one cannot without
reference to contents of joint application seeking regrant and
contents of memorandum of appeal in M.A.No.103/1995
conclude that the said admission demolishes the petitioners'
41
claim and conclude that the petitioners are totally
unconcerned with the lands in question.
84. If one goes through the evidence led by the
petitioners, their claim is that they too did Thoti service and
their ancestors did Thoti service and they were holding
village office. The definition of 'village office' in the Act of
1961 speaks that it is a hereditary office. Thus, the
petitioners claim that they inherited village office, has to be
tested in the light of the contents of the joint applications
and the contentions in the appeal memorandum which is
made 13 years prior to larger claim made by the
respondents in their application filed in 2008.
85. Though learned Senior counsel by referring to the
judgment of this Court would contend that assuming that the
petitioners are in possession of some of the properties and
the contesting respondents are not in possession of some of
the properties (without prejudice to the contentions that
respondents are in exclusive possession) and possession is
not the criterion to claim regrant, and contesting
respondents' exclusive claim over the properties, in the light
of the pending two joint applications could not have been
42
decided without reference to the joint applications. Thus this
Court is of the view that the very decision making process
adopted by Tahsildar and learned District Judge is erroneous.
86. Tahasildar as well as the District Judge have
proceeded to negative the case of the petitioners by arriving
at a conclusion that Ex.P4- the order for payment of salary in
favour of A.K.Pillaiah establishes the case of the contesting
respondents which in the opinion of this Court does not
appear to be a proper approach.
87. It is also relevant to notice that in
W.P.No.18806/2018, the petitioner who claims to be the son
of the purchaser of Sy.No.93 to the extent of 35 guntas,
from one of the predecessors of one of the petitioners in
W.P.No.49589/2014, is before this Court on the premise that
though his father purchased the property in the year 1969, is
not made a party to any of the proceedings which
commenced in the year 1980.
88. It is indeed true that the purchaser of a land
attached to village office before the regrant will acquire right
over the property only if the vendor is regranted the land. It
43
is noticed that the vendor is a party to the proceeding before
the Tahasildar though the purchaser is not made a party.
Thus, the defense of the vendor could be a defense of the
purchaser.
89. It is also noticed that when the property was sold
in the year 1969, there was no proceeding pending in
relation to the property purchased by the father of the
petitioner in W.P.No.18806/2018. In that sense, doctrine of
lis pendens has no application. In any event, if the vendor or
his predecessors do not prosecute or defend the proceeding
before the District Judge probably the purchaser or his
successor may have to face the consequence. Keeping this in
mind, the petitioner in W.P.No.18806/2018 is also permitted
to lead evidence if any, in support of his claim.
90. This Court is conscious of the fact that the matter
technically has to go back to the Tahasildar for fresh
adjudication in the light of the finding that the documents
which are referred to by this Court are not considered by
the Tahasildar as they were not placed before the Tahasildar.
However the matter is remitted to the learned District Judge
given the fact that the matter is pending since 1981 and the
44
matter has been remanded to the Tahasildar on two
occasions earlier.
91. It is also noticed that in the impugned order
passed by the Tahasildar, the Tahasildar has relaxed 15
years non alienation clause while regranting the property to
respondents No.3 to 7. The provisions of Act, 1961 do not
enable the Tahasildar to relax non alienation period.
Tahasildar grossly erred in passing such order.
92. Before parting, this Court has to observe that
certain documents referred to above have been discussed in
detail and also a reference is made to the provisions of Act,
1961 just to invite the attention of the District Court on the
matters to be considered at the time of hearing. This Court is
of the view that relevant aspects of the matter are not
considered despite the matter was heard by the District
Court on two occasions earlier.
93. It is also made clear that the observations made
in this order should not be construed as a finding on the
rights of the petitioners or contesting respondents.
45
94. At the same time, it is also made clear that
findings on the production and admissibility of the
documents filed along with application for production of
documents filed by the petitioners binds the parties and the
learned District Court. The finding that the application
seeking regrant in the year 2008 is in time also binds the
parties.
95. Hence, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition No.49589/2014 and Writ
Petition No.18806/2018 are allowed in-
part.
(ii) The Order dated 23.07.2014 in
M.A.No.72/2011 on the file of III Additional
District Judge, Bangalore Rural District,
Bangalore sitting at Anekal is set aside.
(iii) The order dated 22.01.2018 in
M.A.No.90/2011 on the file of III Additional
District Judge, Bangalore Rural District,
Bangalore sitting at Anekal is set aside.
(iv) The impugned order dated 10.05.2011
passed by Tahsildar is set-aside.
(v) The matter is remitted to First Appellate
Court for fresh consideration by permitting
the parties to lead evidence in support of
their respective claims.
(vi) The appeal memorandum in M.A.No.103/
1995 shall be read in evidence. However,
the parties are permitted to adduce any
additional evidence for or against the said
documents subject to just exceptions in law.
(vii) The application dated 23.03.1991 (also dated
28.09.1995) can be considered only if the
document is proved to be valid.
(viii) The parties shall appear before First
Appellate Court on 18.08.2025.
(ix) Since the dispute is pending for over four
decades, all the parties shall co-operate for
early disposal.
(x) The observations if any made in this order
relating to possession over the properties
are tentative and nothing is decided on the
rights of the parties and all contentions on
the rights of the parties are kept open to be
decided by the learned District Judge.
(xi) Registry to send the Trial Court Records to
First Appellate Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE)
JUDGE
CHS/brn
