Karnataka High Court
The Management Of M/S Grasim Industries ... vs The President / General Secretary on 28 February, 2025
Author: B.M.Shyam Prasad
Bench: B.M.Shyam Prasad
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
WA No. 100356 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100356 OF 2023 (L-RES)
BETWEEN:
THE MANAGEMENT OF
M/S GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD.,
CHEMICAL DIVISION, KARVARA P.O.,
BINAGA-581307, UTTARA KANNADA JILLE
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. DR. ADITYA SONDHI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. GANGADHAR S. HOSAKERI, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed AND:
by VISHAL
NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL
Location: High 1. THE PRESIDENT/GENERAL SECRETARY
Court of
Karnataka, ADITYA BIRLA EMPLOYEES' UNION
Dharwad Bench
M/S GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD.,
CHEMICAL DIVISION,
BINGA P.O.,
KARWAR 581 307.
UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT.
2. DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER
BELAGAVI DIVISION, MAJAGAVI ROAD,
ITI COMPOUND,
BELAGAVI-11.
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
WA No. 100356 of 2023
3. THE ADDITIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER
(INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS)
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER THE
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT
(STANDING ORDERS ACT),
1946 DAIRY CIRCLE,
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BENGALURU-560029.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. V.M. SHEELVANT, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1;
SRI. PRAVEEN K. UPPAR, AGA FOR R2 & R3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO, SET-ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED 14.02.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE
IN WRIT PETITION NO.115417 OF 2019 (L-RES) AND ALLOW
THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANT IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY,
B.M.SHYAM PRASAD, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
-3-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
WA No. 100356 of 2023
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD)
This intra-court appeal by M/s. Grasim Industries
Limited [the appellant] is as against the writ Court's order
dated 14.02.2023 in W.P. No.115417/2019. The first
respondent [the Union] has filed this in W.P.
No.115417/2019 calling in question the second
respondent's order dated 14.08.2018 in the proceedings
No.4/2017 [Annexure-H] and the third respondent's order
dated 30.10.2019 [Annexure-K]. The second respondent's
order dated 14.08.2018 is under Section 5[3] of the
Industrial Employment [Standing Orders] Act, 1946 [for
short, 'the I.E. Act'], and the third respondent's order is in
appeal under Section 6 of the I.E. Act confirming the second
respondent's order.
2. The second and third respondents' impugned
orders relate to the age of retirement of the workmen with
the appellant at its Chemical Division in Karwar. The second
respondent has modified the appellant's Certified Standing
Orders enhancing the age of the workmen to 60 years from
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
58 years, and the third respondent has confirmed the same.
The appellant has unsuccessfully challenged these
respondents' orders in the subject petition in W.P.
No.115417/2017. The writ Court has dismissed this writ
petition essentially on the following two grounds:
[a] The retirement age in one of the appellant's
unit [its Polyfibers and Grasilene Division at
Haveri] is 60 years, and if the retirement age
in the appellant's Chemical Division [the
Subject Division] is 58 years, there would be
disparity resulting in unrest, and therefore,
there must be equality in the retirement age
amongst the workmen in the two units.
[b] The second and the third respondents have
analyzed the facts and applied the relevant
Rules / Standing Orders in appreciating the
claim for retirement age of 60 years.
The writ Court has also referred to decision of a Division
Bench of this Court in M/s. Grasim Industries Private
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
Limited, General Secretary, Harihar Polyfibers Union in
W.A. No.100250/20211. The Division Bench has held that
the retirement age must be 60 years.
3. This Court must now recount the factual
circumstances leading to the present intra-court appeal. The
appellant's Standing Order2 is certified w.e.f. 19.04.1976
under Section 3 of the I.E. Act. A copy of this Certified
Standing Order [CSO] is produced as Annexure-A. The CSO
provides for 55 years as a retirement age. The Union has
raised a demand for increase in the retirement age from 55
years to 58 years, and this demand is discussed and made
part of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 05.11.1985.
This settlement has prevailed until a demand is raised by
the Union in the year 2013 seeking enhancement in the
retirement age to 62 years. This demand [identified as
demand No. VIII in the relevant Charter of Demand] is
1 This writ appeal is decided on 05.07.2022
2 The Chemical Division was known as Ballarpur Industries Limited,
but the second respondent, in the impugned order dated
14.08.2018, has permitted the change in name in the CSO while
enhancing the retirement age to 60 years.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
discussed but not agreed upon.3 The Memorandum of
Settlement dated 05.07.2015 [hereafter referred to as 'the
Settlement - 2015], apart from recording this failure of
consensus, also contains certain terms that are mentioned
under heading General. The terms under this head that are
germane for the present controversy is thus.
This Memorandum of settlement comes into
operation w.e.f. 01.04.2015 and will remain in force
till 31.03.2018 and shall continue to be in operation
and binding on both the parties even after this date
till such time, the terms and conditions herein are
modified or substituted by another settlement.
This Memorandum of Settlement shall be treated as
a Package Deal and is in full and final settlement of
all the demands / issues raised by the Union in
their Charter of Demands dated 02.01.2015. Any
demand / issue raised by the Union/ workmen and
it is agreed that the Union and the Workmen will
not raised any demands involving financial
implications on the Management during the
currency of the settlement. All the existing practices,
privileges and other terms and conditions of service
3 However, as part of the discussion on the demand for retirement,
the appellant has agreed that the workmen will retire on the last
date of the corresponding month.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
except to the extent modified in this settlement will
continue to be operative and effective.
4. The Union has filed another Charter of
Demand on 05.02.2018. On the age of retirement, the Union
has once again demanded for increase of the age of
retirement from 58 to 62 years. This demand, along with
other demands, is discussed and a Memorandum of
Settlement dated 11.03.2019 [hereafter referred as 'the
Settlement - 2019'] is drawn. The Settlement - 2019 is
agreed to be in force between 31.03.2018 and 31.03.2021.
As regards the demand for increase in the retirement age,
the settlement is recorded thus: 'as the matter is legal both
the parties agreed to bind with the higher Courts judgments.'
The Settlement - 2019 further records that any demand
raised by the Union but not specifically settled or is dropped
and pressed, the Union and the workmen will not raise any
demand if those demands involve financial implications on
the management.
5. In the meantime, the State Government has
issued notification dated 27.03.2017 [Annexure - D]
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
amending Schedule I of the Karnataka Industrial
Employment [Standing Orders] Rules, 1961 [for short, 'the
I.E. Rules 1961']. The entry in Sl. No.15A of the Schedule of
these Rules relates to the age of retirement, and this entry is
amended by the aforesaid notification to stipulate that a
workman may retire at the age of 60 years. The Union,
relying on this notification, has submitted an application
with the second respondent on 18.04.2017 for directions to
the appellant to implement the amendment and increase the
age of retirement for workmen from 58 to 60 years.
6. The second respondent, upon receipt of such
application, has extended an opportunity to the appellant to
file objections. The second respondent by the impugned
order dated 14.08.2018 has amended the CSO to read that
every workmen with the appellant in this Division shall
retire on attaining the age of 60 years. This Court must
observe that the second respondent, referring to Section 3[2]
of the I.E. Act, has opined that a Standing Order such as the
CSO must be, so far as it is practicable, in conformity with
the Model Standing Order [as contained in Schedule I of the
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
I.E. 1961 Rules4] and the CSO must also be according to
such amendment. The third respondent has dismissed the
appellant's appeal as against the second respondent's order
by the next impugned order dated 30.1.2019 accepting the
reasons assigned.
The details of the rival submissions.
7. Dr. Aditya Sondhi, the learned senior counsel
for the appellant, argues for interference with the writ
Court's order on the following grounds.
7.1 The writ Court has affirmed the second and
third respondents' impugned orders on the ground that the
retirement age in the appellant's unit in Haveri Division is
60 years and that there must be parity amongst the
workmen across the Units to ensure equality in service
condition, but the writ Court has not considered that though
the application by Workmen's Union for this Division is alled
by the Certifying Officer, the Appellate Authority, in the
appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 6 of the I.E.
4 The amendment to Entry in Sl No. 15A vide the notification dated
27.03.2017.
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
Act, vide the order dated 21.04.2021 has interfered with the
Certifying Officer's order. The Workmen's Union has called
this order in question in W.P. No.102555/2021 which is still
pending consideration. When the question of retirement age
in the Haveri Division is thus pending, there will be no
justification to apply the principle of parity.
7.2 The writ Court has relied upon the decision in
W.A. No.100250/2021, but both the appellant and the
concerned Union have filed the review petitions in R.P.
No.100126/2022 and R.P. No.100057/2023. These review
petitions are pending consideration. In any event another
Co-ordinate Bench in the Management of Hindalco
Industries Limited v. General Secretary, Employees'
Union in W.A. No.100325/2022 has distinguished the
decision in W.A. No.100250/2021 observing that the
decision in the earlier application is without considering the
decision of the Apex Court in Barauni Refinery
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil
Corporation and others5.
7.3 The Apex Court in Barauni's case supra has
declared that during the operation of a settlement, it is not
open for the workmen to demand a change in service
condition contrary to the settlement. This principle must
apply in the present case, and the decision in the writ
appeal in W.A. No.100250/2021 must be distinguished,
because the appellant, both under the Settlement - 2015
and Settlement - 2019, did not agree for increase in the
retirement age from 58 years. The agreement specifically on
both the occasions is that that any demand or issue which is
not specifically settled shall be treated as dropped with the
workmen not being entitled to raise a demand in that regard
during the tenure of the settlement when there is financial
implication. The Union cannot go beyond this agreement.
7.4 The second and third respondents could not
have relied upon Sections 3[2] of the I.E. Act alone, and they
5 [1991] 1 SCC 4
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
should have read such provision in conjunction with the
entry in Sl. No.15A of Schedule I of the I.E. Rules 1961. This
entry stipulates that the Standing Orders may be in
conformity with the Model Standing Orders so far as is
practicable and subject to the further condition that the age
of retirement of a workmen may be 60 years or such other
age as may be agreed upon between the employer and the
workmen by any agreement which is binding on them under
any law for the time being in force. The agreement under the
Settlement - 2019 is a binding settlement, and during the
currency of this agreement, no application could have been
filed with the second respondent.
8. Sri. V.M. Sheelvant, the learned counsel for the
Union, rebuts the appellant's case as presented by Dr.
Aditya Sondhi urging the following.
8.1 The appellant and the Union indisputably have
entered into another settlement for the period upto
31.03.2021. The Union once again raised a demand for
increase in the retirement age. This demand was discussed
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
and made part of the Settlement -2019. The appellant and
the Union have specifically agreed that they shall be bound
by the decision of the higher Courts. This agreement is in the
backdrop of the indisputable fact that the Union's claim for
increase in the retirement age from 58 to 60 years is in view
of the notification dated 27.03.2017, the second respondent
had decided in favour of the workmen, and the appellant's
grievance with such decision was pending consideration
with the third respondent as of that date. The third
respondent's decision affirming the second respondent's
order on amendment of the CSO increase in the retirement
age to 60 years is on 30.10.2019.
8.2 The agreement under the Settlement - 2019
therefore is not to drop the demand or not to raise the
demand for any particular period but it is to abide by the
decision of the third respondent, who has now confirmed the
second respondent's decision to amend the CSO increasing
the retirement to 60 years. The writ Court has also
confirmed the same. Therefore, even if the decision of the
Apex Court in Barauni's case is made applicable, because
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
the agreement is to be bound by the third respondent's order
dated 30.10.2019 the age of retirement as 60 years would be
in consonance with the agreement as contained in the
Settlement - 2019.
8.3 The Apex Court in the recent decision in
Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh v. M/s. Jet
Airways Limited in Civil Appeal No.4404/2023, which is
decided on 25.07.2023, has held that, "any condition of
service, if inconsistent with the certified Standing Orders,
would not prevail, as the certified Standing Orders would
have precedence over all such agreements. Any settlement,
the employee Union enters into with the employer would not
over ride the Model Standing Order, unless it is more
beneficial to the employees." The decision that Model
Standing Order must over-ride any settlement must prevail
because the Model Standing Order [as contained in Schedule
I of the I.E. Rules 1961] is amended by the notification dated
27.03.2017 enhancing the age of retirement to 60 years.
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
8.4 If this Court opines that the Union could not
have applied during the subsistence of the Settlement -
2015 i.e., on 18.04.2017, this Court may permit the
retirement age for the workmen with the appellant in the
Chemical Division with effect from the date of the Settlement
- 2019 viz., 11.03.2019 as both the appellant and the Union
have agreed on this date to be bound by the decision in the
pending proceedings. If despite the changes in the Model
Standing Order [as per Schedule I of the I.E. Rules 1961'] as
is brought about by the notification dated 24.03.2017, a
management, such as the appellant, is permitted to deny the
benefit of increase in the retirement age citing lack of
agreement, this beneficial change can never be implemented.
9. In reply Dr. Aditya Sondhi emphasizes the
following.
9.1 This Court must distinguish the facts of the
present case from the case in hand before the Apex Court in
Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh supra,
because the Workmen's Union therein was contending that
its members were being held to an agreement contrary to the
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
Certified Standing Order to deny the benefit of permanency
in employment and in this case, the appellant [the
management] is only insisting on adherence to the CSO
wherein the Union has agreed to drop the demand and not
to raise any demand which has financial implication for a
certain period. The Union has applied much before the
expiry of the period.
9.2 The Union cannot draw support from the
Settlement - 2019 because it has, as in the case of
Settlement - 2015, specifically agreed that it will not raise
any demand which has financial implication for the period
up to 31.03.2021. The agreement in the Settlement - 2019
that the Management will be bound by the decisions of the
higher Courts must necessarily be considered in the light of
the pending proceedings before the writ Court challenging
the second and the third respondent's order and this
assurance.
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
The reasoning:
10. The Apex Court in Barauni's case supra has
held that it will not be open to the workmen to demand a
change in condition of service contrary to the settlement, but
the Union relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in
Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh supra,
wherein it is exposited that the Model Standing Order must
prevail over the settlement unless it is shown that the
settlement is more beneficial to the workmen. However, this
Court must observe that in Bharatiya Kamgar
Karmachari Mahasangh the exposition in Barauni's case
did not come up for consideration and the efficacy of such
exposition is not disturbed.
11. The Apex Court in Barauni's case, while
considering whether the settlement through conciliation
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, 'I.D. Act']
put a bar on the rights of the workmen to approach the
authorities under the I.E. Act for fixation of the age of
superannuation, has held that a settlement through
conciliation [as contemplated under Section 18 of the ID Act]
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
will be distinct from a regular contract and will be binding
on even those who are in a minority union and who join
service later.
11.1 The Apex Court's decision in Barauni's
case in this regard reads as under:
It may be seen on a plain reading of Sub-sections
(1) and (3) of Section 18 that settlements are
divided into two categories, namely, (1) those
arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and
(ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first
category has limited application in that it merely
binds the parties to the agreement but the
settlement belonging to the second category has
extended application since it is binding on all
parties to the industrial dispute, to all others who
were summoned to appear in the conciliation
proceedings and to all persons employed in the
establishment or part of the establishment, as the
case may be, to which the dispute related on the
date of the dispute and to all others who joined the
establishment thereafter. Therefore, a settlement
arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings
with a recognized majority union will be binding on
all workmen of the establishment, even those who
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
belong to the minority union which had objected to
the same. To that extent it departs from the
ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to
uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the
active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to
discourage an individual employee or a minority
union from scuttling the settlement. There is an
underlying assumption that a settlement reached
with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair
and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made
binding not only on the workmen belonging to the
Union signing the settlement but also on others.
That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of
conciliation proceedings is put on par with an
award made by an adjudicatory authority.
The Apex Court in a subsequent decision in National
Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan,
which is by a larger Bench of three Judges, has referred to
the decision in Barauni's case endorsing the proposition
that a settlement through conciliation is put on par with an
award by an adjudicating authority. As such, the
unassailable position in law will be that when the settlement
through conciliation is subsisting, the workmen cannot be
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
permitted to demand a change contrary to the terms of the
settlement.
11.2 This Court, in view of these two decisions
and the position that emerges from them, must opine that
the crucial question that should have been considered by
the writ Court was whether the second and the third
respondents had examined the specifics of the agreement
between the appellant and the Union through conciliation on
the increase in the retirement age. This Court must also
opine that the writ Court could have upheld the second and
third respondents' decisions only if it could have opined that
there was no settlement through reconciliation on the
increase in the retirement age.
11.3 The writ Court has referred to a decision of
the Co-ordinate Bench in W.A. No.100250/2021 the
appellant's own case but insofar as a Polyfibers Unit in
Harihar. This Court must observe, as is emphasized by Dr.
Aditya Sondhi relying upon another decision by another co-
ordinate Bench in Hindalco Industries Limited supra, the
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
decision in this writ appeal in W.A. No.100250/2021 must
be distinguished because the decisions of the Apex Court in
Barauni's case and National Engineering Industries
Limited supra are not considered.
11.4 Further, the writ Court could not have
applied the principle of parity referring to the retirement age
in the appellant's yet another Unit as it remains undisputed
that though the certifying Officer permitted amendment of
the appropriate Standing Order to increase the retirement
age, the Appellate Authority has interfered with such order
on 21.04.2021, and a writ petition as against this decision is
pending in W.P. No.102555/2021. Crucially, though the writ
Court has referred to the settlement between the appellant
and the Union, its decision is not predicated on the terms of
the settlement.
11.5 In the light of the afore, the outcome in the
present writ appeal must turn on the question: whether the
appellant and the Union have agreed by a settlement through
conciliation on increasing the retirement age of the workmen.
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
This question is examined in the light of the terms of the
CSO as is originally certified in the year 1976 under Section
3 of the I.E. Act and the subsequent settlements through
conciliation over the next four-four and a half decades. It is
undisputed that the CSO, as originally certified in the year
1976, provided 55 years as the retirement age, and further,
in the year 1985 by way of a settlement, the appellant and
the Union agreed that the retirement age will be 58 years.
This settlement has prevailed until the commencement of
the present dispute.
11.6 The Union has filed a Charter of Demand in
the year 2015 seeking enhancement in the retirement age
from 58 to 62 years. There are conciliation proceedings, and
a settlement is arrived at between the appellant and the
Union. The settlement - 2015 is drawn on 05.07.2015. It is
specifically recorded that the demand for increase in the
retirement age is discussed but not agreed. The noting in the
Charter of Demand itself [which is hand written] is that the
demand for increase in the retirement age to 62 years is
dropped. The Union has again raised this demand in
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
submitting its Charter of Demand dated 09.02.2018. It is
seen from the terms of Settlement - 2019 that there were
several rounds of bilateral discussions with exchange of a
number of proposals, but with the intervention of the
Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, the
settlement is reached on 11.03.2019. The settlement is that
both the appellant and the Union will be bound by the
decision of the Higher Courts.
11.7 This Court must observe that if the
Settlement 2015 had continued without any change, there
would be no dispute that the Union had unequivocally
dropped the demand for increase in retirement age for the
period up to 2018 [until 31.03.2018]. However, the
subsequent agreement vide the Settlement - 2019 is to be
bound by the decision of the Higher Courts. This change in
stand, and therefore the Settlement, must be examined in
the backdrop of certain vital circumstances. The following
are such circumstances.
[A] The State Government had issued notification dated
27.03.2017 amending the Model Standing Orders
- 24 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
as contained in Schedule I of the I.E. Rules 1961
increasing the age of retirement for workmen to 60
years. The relevant amendment is to entry in Sl.
No.15-A which reads as under:
"The age for retirement or superannuation of
the workman may be [60 years] or such other
age as may be agreed upon between the
employer and the workman by any agreement,
settlement or award which may be bind on the
employer and the workman under any law for
the time being in force."
[B] The Union in view of this change had approached
the second respondent, the Certifying Officer under
the IE Act, immediately for modification in the CSO.
The Union's application in this regard dated
18.04.2017. The second respondent, after extending
an opportunity to the appellant, had concluded that
the CSO should be modified bringing it on par with
the Model Standing Orders as aforesaid. The
appellant had not accepted the second respondent's
decision inasmuch as it had availed statutory
remedy against the second respondent under
Section 6 of the I.E. Act with the third respondent.
11.8 It follows from these indisputable
circumstances that if there was an agreement under the
- 25 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
Settlement - 2015 with the Union agreeing to drop the
demand for increase in the retirement age, the agreement
under the Settlement - 2019 is to be bound by the decision
of the Higher Courts.The appellant relies upon the further
term [as part of the General terms] in the Settlement - 2015
viz., that the Union / workmen have agreed not to raise any
demand or issue which is not specifically settled or is
dropped / not pressed if there is any financial implication to
the appellant during the currency of the settlement.
11.9 This term could have been invoked if it
could be opined reasonably that the Union / workmen had
either dropped the demand for increase in the retirement age
or the demand was not specifically settled, but the
agreement under the settlement is to be bound by the
decisions of the Higher Courts. This term not to raise a
demand that has financial implication will have to be read
subject to the agreement that both the appellant and the
Union will be bound by the decision of the Higher Court. As
such, the application of the proposition in Barauni's case
that it would not be open to the workmen to demand a
- 26 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
change in the condition of service contrary to the settlement
during the operation of the settlement is rendered tenuous
Therefore, the appellant cannot draw any support from the
agreement not to raise the demand which has financial
implication to the appellant.
11.10 The State Government has issued
notification dated 27.03.2017 increasing the retirement age
for the workmen by amending the I.E. 1961 Rules. The
retirement age is increased to 60 years. When the settlement
between the appellant and the Union is to be bound by the
decisions of the Higher Courts and not a concluded
settlement through conciliation on the particular age for
retirement, the provisions of Section 3[2] of the I.E. Act will
be crucial. These provisions read as under:
"3[2] The Standing Order prepared as
required under sub-section [1] shall refer to
every matter set out in the schedule which may
be applicable to the industrial establishment
and where Model Standing Orders have been
prescribed shall be so far as is practicable in
conformity with such Model Standing Order."
- 27 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
11.11 The stipulation is that certified Standing
Orders must be in conformity with the Model Standing
Orders subject to practicability. Therefore, it follows that if
the appellant is unable to demonstrate why it would be
impracticable for its workman to retire at the age of 60
years, the CSO must be in conformity with the Model
Standing Orders in terms of I.E. 1961 Rules. This Court
must record that no circumstance to justify a conclusion
that it would be impracticable to have the workmen retire at
the age of 60 years is not brought on record. In which event,
the retirement age must be 60 years. Next, this Court must
refer to the provisions in SL No. 15A of the I.E.1996 Rules
[Model Standing Orders]. This Entry in the Model Standing
Order reads as under:
"15A. The age for retirement or superannuation of the
workman may be [60 years] or such other age
as may be agreed upon between the employer
and the workman by any agreement,
settlement or award which may be bind on the
employer and the workman under any law for
the time being in force."
- 28 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3988-DB
11.12 This Rule in the Model Standing Order
stipulates that the retirement age may be 60 years or such
age as may be agreed between the employer and the
workmen. As opined supra there is no agreement between
the appellant and Union on the retirement age and the
agreement is only to be bound by the decision of the Higher
Courts. The workmen cannot be denied the benefit of
retiring at the age of 60 years in terms of a beneficial law
when there is no agreement on the retirement age and the
agreement against raising a demand that has financial
implication to the appellant cannot be held against them.
Therefore, the question framed in favour of the Union
concluding that there is no justification to interfere with the
writ Court's order.
As such, this intra-Court appeal is rejected.
Sd/-
(B.M.SHYAM PRASAD)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR)
JUDGE
RSH, CT:VP
