This appeal is directed against the order dated
06.03.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in
"7. It is very clear from the above
provisions of Section that no person shall transfer
or acquire by transfer any granted land without the
previous permission of the Government. The
original grantee contrary to Section 4(2) of the Act
has sold the land in favour of Narasamma, who is
mother of petitioners on 18.03.1986. The legal
representative of original grantee has filed an
application for resumption of land before the
Assistant Commissioner in the year 2009. The
application for resumption of land under Sections 4
and 5 of the Act has been filed after lapse of 23
years from the date of sale. There is an inordinate
delay in invoking the provisions of Sections 4 and 5
of the Act. This view is fortified by the Apex Court
in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra),
at paragraph No.8 has held as under:
Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of
2007, decided on 14.07.2011)
reiterated a settled position in law that
whether Statute provided for a period of
limitation, provisions of the Statute
must be invoked within a reasonable
time. It is held that action whether on
an application of the parties, or suo
motu, must be taken within a
reasonable time. That action arose
under the provisions of a similar Act
which provided for restoration of certain
lands to farmers which were sold for
arrears of rent or from which they were
ejected for arrears of land from 1st
January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950.
This relief was granted to the farmers
due to flood in the Kosi River which
make agricultural operations impossible.
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An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in
that background that this Court upheld
that it was unreasonable to do so. We
have no hesitation in upholding that the
present application for restoration of
land made by respondent-Rajappa was
made after an unreasonably long period
and was liable to be dismissed on that
ground. Accordingly, the judgments of
the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner,
2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523,
Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka,
2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303
and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy
Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr.
L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no
limitation provided by Section 5 of the
Act and, therefore, an application can
be made at any time, are overruled.
Order accordingly."
8. It is very clear from the above
judgment of the Apex Court that the application for
resumption of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the
Act has to be filed within a reasonable time. In the
case on hand, land has been granted in the year
1967-68. The PTCL Act came into force on
01.01.1979. The original grantee has sold the land
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in favour of mother of petitioner on 18.03.1986.
The application for resumption of land has been
filed in the year 2009 and there is an inordinate
delay of 23 years in invoking the provisions of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In view of the law laid
down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment,
the application itself is not maintainable.
9. In view of the above, the impugned
orders at Annexures-A and B are liable to be
quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.
Order dated 06.01.2014 passed by respondent
No.2-the Deputy Commissioner and order dated
02.07.2012 passed by respondent No.3-the
Assistant Commissioner at Annexures-A and B
respectively are quashed."
2. The writ petition was filed by the respondent Nos.4
and 5 herein challenging the order dated 06.01.2014 passed by
respondent No.2 (the Deputy Commissioner) and the order
dated 02.07.2012 passed by respondent No.3 (the Assistant
Commissioner), whereby the said Authorities have restored the
land in favour of the legal representatives of the original
grantee under Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Act, 1978 ('the PTCL Act' in short).
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3. The facts as noted by the learned Single Judge are
that the land bearing old Sy.No.105 (new Sy.No.105/3)
measuring 02 acres situated at Soppahalli Village, Kasaba
Hobli, Chikkaballapura Taluk was originally granted in favour of
Kuttalappa under the Darkasth Rules in the year 1967-68 and
Saguvali Chiti was issued on 12.06.1974, with a condition not
to alienate the property, for a period of 15 years.
4. It is a fact that the original grantee had sold the
land in favour of Smt.Narasamma, who is the mother of
respondent Nos.4 and 5 under the Registered Sale Deed dated
18.03.1986. The legal representatives of the original grantee
have filed an application for resumption of land before the
Assistant Commissioner in the year 2009, which was allowed by
the Assistant Commissioner (Respondent No.3) by the order
dated 02.07.2012. The appeal filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5
before the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent No.2) resulted in
the dismissal of the same.
5. The finding of the learned Single Judge is primarily
that the application for resumption of land has been filed after
an inordinate delay of 23 years invoking the provisions of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In that background, the learned
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Single Judge in support of his conclusion has also referred to
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND ANOTHER reported in 2018(1) KAR.L.R. 5 (SC), in
paragraph No.7, which we have already reproduced above.
6. The submission made by Mr.Hegde, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant is primarily keeping in view of the
amendments brought to Section 5(1), whereby sub-Clauses (c)
and (d) have been incorporated.
7. The Co-ordinate Bench in W.A.No.210/2023 decided
on 25.11.2024, has in Paragraph No.4.4 referred to the
amendments which have been brought in Section 5 of the PTCL
Act. The conclusion reached by the Co-ordinate Bench from
paragraph No.4.4 onwards is as follows:
"4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief
of setting aside of transfer could not be granted
after unreasonably long period and the
applications made under Section 5 for
restitution or resumption of the land by a
person could not be acted upon in favour of
such person on the ground of delay, the
legislature intervened to proceed to amend
Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste
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and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of
Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified
in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023.
Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted,
namely,
"(c) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law, there shall
be no limitation of time to invoke
the provisions of this Act.
(d) The provisions of clause
(c) shall apply to all cases
pending before all the competent
authorities and all Courts of Law
adjudicating the cases under this
section."
4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity
of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in
Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending
before the learned Single Judge of this Court.
This judgment does not travel anything on merit
of the said validity proceedings.
4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in
light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in
Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to
be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this
Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias
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Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner,
Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of
2024 decided on 29th July 2024.
4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section
5, the division bench observed thus, in para
3(d),
"The Amendment Act that is made
applicable with retrospective effect is
only a duplication of the existing legal
position. Such duplication happened
even in English legislative history,
hardly needs to be mentioned. The
question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent
about. Clauses (c) and (d), now
introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act,
do not bring any change in the
statutory scheme. At the most, they
are declaratory of what the statute has
been all through, so far as the
limitation period is concerned. Nobody
disputes that there was no limitation
period earlier and there is no limitation
period now too. Laches, which would
involve a host of factors, pertains to
the Domain of Equity."
4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation
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period, but focused on the long lapse of time in
making the application for restitution of the
land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the
said decision, the division bench then held as
per para 3(f),
"It may be true, that the legislative
debates might have taken place about
the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while
passing the Amendment Bill. That per
se does not lend credence to the
contention that the said amendment
intends to invalidate the law declared
by the highest court of the country
which it did after considering all
aspects of the matter including the
sense of equity & justice. If the
Legislature intended to silence the
voice of Nekkanti, it would have
employed a different terminology. We
repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of
limitation prescribed by law, whereas
"laches" is decided keeping in view a
host of factors. Cases are repleat in
Law Reports relating to delay and
laches in writ jurisdiction under
Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India. This is only to
illustrate."
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4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2
SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the
nice distinction between 'delay and latches', as
against 'limitation'. It was observed that the
'limitation' is a prescription of time for taking an
action as contemplated by the legislature,
whereas the concept of 'delay and latches' has a
different connotation to operate.
4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in
Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the
above reasoning to clarify that the issues were
examined without touching the aspects of
validity of amendment which is pending
adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma
(supra) that on the ground of latches, the
court would be justified in denying the relief of
setting aside the transfer and restoring the land
to the applicant when he has approached the
court after unreasonable delay and his
approaching the court is marred by latches.
5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan
(supra), explained the word 'laches' thus,
"The word "laches" is derived from
the French language meaning
"remissness and slackness". It thus
involves unreasonable delay or
negligence in pursuing a claim
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involving an equitable relief while
causing prejudice to the other
party. It is neglect on the part of a
party to do an act which law
requires while asserting a right,
and therefore, must stand in the
way of the party getting relief or
remedy."
(para 21)
5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe
that the remedy for which the party knocks the
doors of the Court may not be provided to him
on equitable grounds when such party is guilty
of indolence and his action suffers from latches,
"Two essential factors to be seen are
the length of the delay and the
nature of acts done during the
interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of
the party approaching the court apart
from the change in position in the
interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to
confer a remedy on a party who
knocks its doors when his acts would
indicate a waiver of such a right. By
his conduct, he has put the other
party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable
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to facilitate a challenge before the
court. Thus, a man responsible for
his conduct on equity is not expected
to be allowed to avail a remedy."
(Para 22)
5.2 Though the principles governing overlap,
the delay and latches has the facet in equity.
Delay is the genus to which the latches and
acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential
concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence
have their own colour and connotation and
conceptually often different from crossing the
period of limitation prescribed in the statutory
provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms
of initiating a legal action or filing any
proceedings. Laches concedes an element of
culpability in allowing time to pass by in
commencing the action in law.
6. In light of the above discussion and the
position of law that would emerge, in the facts
of the case, the restoration of the land cannot
be permitted after 12 years. The question of
latches would come into play. 12 years having
been passed, it would be highly unreasonable,
unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to
grant any relief to the original grantee-the
petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of
the land and to treat the transfer of the land
taken place long back to be null and void.
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6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as
above, the judgment and award of the learned
Single Judge does not book any error.
7. The appeal is dismissed.
In view of dismissal of the appeal, the
interlocutory applications, as may be pending,
would not survive and they stand accordingly
disposed of."
8. In view of the position of law, and also the fact that
the appeal has been filed with a delay of 532 days, we are of
the view that the appeal needs to be dismissed both on merits
as well as on the ground of limitation.
9. Pending I.A.No.1/2024 do not survive for
consideration and stands dismissed as infructuous.
Sd/-
(V KAMESWAR RAO)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE
