Karnataka High Court

Sri Muniraju C vs State By Hanumanthanagar on 18 February, 2025

Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar

Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar

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                                                 CRL.P No. 8851 of 2024




                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                   DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025

                                     BEFORE

                   THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

                       CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 8851 OF 2024

            BETWEEN:

            SRI. MUNIRAJU. C,
            S/O CHINNAPPA,
            AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
            RESIDING AT NO 155,
            BEGUR KOPPA MAIN ROAD,
            CHRIST ACADEMY SCHOOL,
            HULLAHALLI SAKALAWARA,
            ANEKAL, BENGALURU - 560 083
                                                            ...PETITIONER
            (BY SRI. ADINARAYANAPPA, ADVOCATE)

            AND:

            1.   STATE BY HANUMANTHANAGAR
                 POLICE STATION,
Digitally        HANUMANTHANAGAR,
signed by        BANGALORE - 560050
VANAMALA
N                REP BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Location:        HIGH COURT BUILDING,
HIGH             BENGALURU - 560 001
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
            2.   SMT. LAKSHMI,
                 W/O KAPANIPATHY
                 AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
                 RESIDING AT NO 96,
                 EAST ANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD,
                 GANDHI BAZAR, BANGALORE - 560 004

                                                         ...RESPONDENTS
            (BY SMT. RASHMI JADHAV, ADDL. SPP FOR R1;
                R2 SERVED BUT UNREPRESENTED)
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                                                   NC: 2025:KHC:7121
                                            CRL.P No. 8851 of 2024




       THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNNS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR AND CHARGE SHEET FILED BY THE
1ST   RESPONDENT        POLICE    AGAINST     THE    PETITIONER    IN
CR.NO.180/2001 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 392 OF IPC WHICH IS
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE XXXVII A.C.M.M AT
BENGALURU AS C.C.NO.2932/2001 WHICH ARE PRODUCED AT
ANNEXURE-A TO C AND GRANT COST OF THIS PETITION.

       THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM:       HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

                           ORAL ORDER

This petition by accused No.2 in C.C.No.2932/2001 on the

file of XXXVII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru,

seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings as against the

petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 392 of IPC.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1.

Respondent No.2 having been served with notice of the petition,

has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the

petition.

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3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that

respondent No.2 - complainant filed the instant complaint dated

07.05.2001 inter alia contending that one Ramesh and

Chandramouneshwara - original accused Nos.1 and 2 respectively

had snatched her chain, thereby allegedly committed the offence

punishable under Section 392 of IPC. In pursuance of the same,

FIR in Crime No.180/2001 was registered against the said accused

persons along with other offences. Subsequently, after

investigation, since the aforesaid Chandramouneshwara - original

accused No.2 expired, petitioner has been arraigned as accused

No.2 in the impugned proceedings based on the aforesaid charge

sheet filed by respondent No.1.

4. The undisputed material on record comprising of

complaint and the FIR will clearly indicate that the petitioner had

not been arraigned as accused person in the complaint or in the

FIR. In addition thereto, though respondent No.2 - complainant

stated that two persons who allegedly snatched her chain and

committed the alleged offence were not identifiable by her,

respondent No.1 - Police did not choose to arraign the petitioner as

an accused person in the FIR but instead chose to arraign Ramesh

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and Chandramouneshwara as accused persons. Subsequently

even during the course of statements of the complainant and the

other witnesses, the petitioner has not been identified as an

accused person by any of the witnesses.

5. In this context, it is also pertinent to note that the

petitioner has also not been identified as one of the persons who

allegedly tried to pawn the gold chain with pawn brokers whose

statements are also recorded as CW.3 and CW.4. It is also relevant

to state that the alleged gold chain which was supposed to be

snatched by the accused persons has not been recovered from the

custody or possession of the accused who has been arraigned as

accused No.2 in the impugned proceedings.

6. Under these circumstances, in the light of the

cumulative effect of the FIR, complaint, statement of witnesses,

charge sheet etc. which do not indicate the commission of the

offence under Section 392 of IPC by the petitioner, I am of the

considered opinion that though the matter is pending from the year

2001, the continuation of the proceedings would be an exercise in

futility as against the petitioner warranting interference by this Court

in the present petition.

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7. In the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy -

(1977) 2 SCC 699 relation to quashing of the proceedings even

after commencement of trial, the Apex Court has held as under:

"7. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that:

"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."

This section is contained in Chapter 18 called "Trial Before a Court of Session". It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if

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after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that:

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or other wise to secure the ends of justice."

In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or

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persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.

8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on

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the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of juslicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.

9. Learned counsel for the State Government relies upon a decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [(1960) 3 SCR 388 : AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1961) 1 SCJ 59 : 1960 CrLJ 1239] in which it was held that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. That may be so. But in the instant case the question is not whether any reliance can be placed on the veracity of

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this or that particular witness. The fact of the matter is that there is no material on the record on the basis of which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the respondents are in any manner connected with the incident leading to the prosecution. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur case observes in his judgment that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula.

10. On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar [AIR 1960 SC 1113 : 1960 Cri LJ 1499 : 62 Bom LR 915] and Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashra [AIR 1972 SC 545 : 1972 Cri LJ 3291972 SCC (Cri) 495] show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially

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whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. In Vadilal Panchal case, Section 203 of the old Code was under

consideration, which provided that the Magistrate could dismiss a complaint if after considering certain matters mentioned in the section there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding with the case. To an extent Section 327 of the new Code contains an analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible.

11. We are therefore in agreement with the view of the High Court that the material on which the prosecution proposes to rely against the respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that they are in any manner connected with the assault on the complainant. We would, however, like to observe that nothing in our judgment or in the judgment of the High Court should be taken as detracting from the case of the prosecution, to

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which we have not applied our mind, as against Accused 1 to 9. The case against those accused must take its due and lawful course.

12. The appeals are accordingly dismissed."

8. Similarly, in the case of Thesima Begum & Another

v. State of Tamil Nadu - (2020) 14 SCC 580 the Apex Court has

held as under:

"3. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and in this charge-sheet, names of the appellants were also included. The appellants at that stage filed petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") for quashing of the charge-sheet against them. The High Court rejected this petition vide order dated 22-4- 2016 [Thesima Begam v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33618] only on the ground that trial in the case has begun and, therefore, the High Court would not interfere with the said process.

4. A neat submission is made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the de facto complainant herself stated in her statement that she had implicated the appellants herein out of anger and as far as they are concerned, they had no role in the family dispute and they were not party in making any demand of dowry.

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5. Relevant part of the statement of the complainant reads as under:

"However my sister-in-law Thesimma, her husband Sakariah, brother-in-law's wife, namely, Hajira Beevi and small mother-in-law, namely, Saribu Nisha did not interfere in to the dispute and not taken steps and help me to live together with my husband therefore having angry over them I named their names in the complaint and otherwise they did not do any problem with me. My husband, mother- in-law and brother-in-law Mohamed Ajmir Saribu alone harassed me by demanding dowry."

6. In view of the aforesaid stand taken by the complainant herself, we see no justifiable reason for the investigating officer to rope in the appellants as well in the charge-sheet. Interestingly, even in the charge-sheet submitted by the investigating officer, she has very categorically stated that insofar as appellants are concerned, they were living in foreign country. In spite thereof, the investigating officer filed charge-sheet against all the persons including the appellants, mechanically and without application of mind.

7. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and quash the charge-sheet insofar as the appellants are concerned. The appeal stands disposed of."

9. It is well settled that the petition under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C. is maintainable even after filing of the charge sheet as

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held by the Apex Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v.

State (NCT of Delhi) - (2019) 11 SCC 706.

10. As stated supra, in the instant case apart from the fact

that the petitioner was not arraigned as an accused person in the

FIR, none of the witnesses whose names are cited in the charge

sheet have stated anything as regards either the presence or the

offences having been committed by the petitioner. It is also

pertinent to note that the chain which was stolen/snatched from

respondent No.2 has also not been recovered from the custody or

possession of the petitioner who also did not attempt to pawn the

said chain with the pawn brokers who were cited as CWs.2 and 3

in the charge sheet.

11. Under these circumstances, in the absence of

necessary material constituting the offence punishable under

Section 392 of IPC, I am of the considered opinion that

continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner would

be an exercise of futility and notwithstanding the fact that the case

is of the year 2001, in the peculiar/special facts and circumstances

of the case, the impugned proceedings deserves to be quashed.

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12. In the result, the following:

ORDER

(i) The petition is hereby allowed.

             (ii)   The         impugned        proceedings       in

                    C.C.No.2932/2001 [Crime No.180/2001]

                    on    the    file    of   XXXVII   Addl.   Chief