Karnataka High Court
Udaya Shankar.K.R vs United India Insurance Co.Ltd on 12 February, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
WP No. 147182 of 2020
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 147182 OF 2020 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
UDAYA SHANKAR K. R.
S/O. LATE K. N. RAMA RAO,
AGE: 59 YEARS, FORMER ASSISTANT MANAGER,
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
NOW UNEMPLOYED,
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT C/O. G. N. RAO,
SRI. LAXMI NARASIMHA NILAYA,
PAMPANAGAR, GANGAVATHI -583227,
KOPPAL DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI HARSH DESAI, AND
SMT. V. P. VADAVI, ADVOCATES)
AND:
VISHAL
NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL
1. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
Digitally signed by VISHAL
REGISTERED AND HEAD OFFICE AT NO.24,
NINGAPPA PATTIHAL
Location: High Court of
Karnataka Dharwad Bench
Date: 2025.02.19 10:32:39
+0530
WHITES ROAD, CHENNAI -600 014,
TAMIL NADU,
BY ITS CHIEF MANAGING DIRECTOR.
2. THE REGIONAL MANAGER AND
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY,
REGIONAL OFFICE,
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.,
NO.3, ENKAY COMPLEX, 1ST FLOOR,
KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580 023
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI S. K. KAYAKAMATH, ADVOCATE)
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
WP No. 147182 of 2020
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IS PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE ORDER BEARING NO. 2016-19:23:2017
DATED 09.06.2017 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 AS PER
ANNEXURE-P AND ORDER BEARING NO. HO:HRM:1DD:A-2:2017-18
DATED 18.06.2018 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 AS PER
ANNEXURE-R, AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO REINSTATE THE
PETITIONER WITH ALL THE BENEFITS. ISSUE SUCH OTHER
WRIT/ORDER/DIRECTION AS DEEMED FIT, IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B'
GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in
question an order by which the disciplinary authority
imposes penalty of removal from service and the order of
the Appellate Authority that confirms the penalty imposed
dismissal from service.
2. Heard the learned counsel Sri.Harsh Desai on
behalf of Sri.V.P.Vadavi appearing for petitioner and learned
counsel Sri.S.K.Kayakamath appearing for respondent.
3. Facts in brief germane are as follows:
The petitioner joins the service of the respondent-
United India Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
referred to as "the Company" for short) on 01.12.1986 as a
Development Officer and his claim of the petitioner that he
was promoted to the cadre of Assistant Administrative
Officer in the year 2001 and further to the cadre of
Assistant Manager. At the relevant point in time he was
working as a Branch Manager at Gangavati Branch in the
Company and leaves the branch on his further transfer. It
transpires that owing to certain omissions and commissions
of the petitioner at the time when he was working as a
Branch Manager at Gangavati Branch, disciplinary
proceedings come to be initiated against him on receipt of
certain complaints at the hands of the agents of the
company.
4. The petitioner was proceeded with
departmentally and pursuant to the departmental enquiries
so conducted the petitioner was imposed with a penalty of
removal from service. The petitioner prefers an appeal as
obtaining under the regulations and the appeal comes to be
rejected and petitioner is before this Court calling in
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
question both the orders of Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority.
5. Learned counsel Sri.Harsha Desai appearing for
the petitioner would take this Court through the documents
appended to the petition and project certain grounds to
buttress submission that the proceedings are illegal and
contrary to law.
6. Learned counsel would submit that all the
complaints of the agents that are made in the year 2015
are of the incidents that have happened five or six years
earlier to said complaint. Therefore the delay in initiating
proceedings of incidents that have happened five or six
years ago has vitiated the proceedings. The second
submissions the learned counsel is that, the three persons
were involved in the alleged episode of misconduct, two of
them are imposed with penalty, petitioner removal from
service. The other stoppage of increments and on the third
no disciplinary proceedings were even initiated. He would
submit that since all the three were involved in the same
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
transaction, parity in penalty ought to have been
maintained. The third submission is that since all the three
were involved. A joint enquiry has obtaining under the
regulations was necessary to be conducted. This non
conduct of a joint enquiry as vitiated the proceedings.
Learned counsel further contend that not one person who
has taken insurance from the hands of the petitioner has
complained of any alleged act of misappropriation or
otherwise. It is the agent who has complained and would
submit that the penalty of removal from service is grossly
harsh and excessive. He would seek quashment of the
penalty and consequential leaves on the aforesaid score.
7. Per contra learned counsel for the Insurance
Sri.S.K.Kayakmath would submit that agent has
complained. It comes to the knowledge of the Company
only when the agent complaint it may be incident of six
years or seven years, but the complaint comes about only
in the year 2015 and when the Company got knowledge of
what the transactions of the petitioner are immediately
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
Departmental Enquiry is initiated. Therefore there is no
delay in the case at hand. He would contend that even
otherwise it has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner
as procedure stipulated under the discipline and appeal
regulations have been completely followed, he would seek
dismissal of the petition.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel
appearing for the parties and perused the material on
record.
9. The dates of joining of the petitioner and his
promotion to the higher echelon of office is not in dispute
they are matter of record. The agent for the first time
complains on 10.08.2015. The complaint reads as follows:
"Dear sir,
As I am working as agent since, with UIIC
and I want to put some information and problems
by one and your officer Mr. Udayashankar was
A.O. Hospet and now working as Branch Manager
at Gangavati under Hubli Region.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
1. He has changed agency from my
agency to his dummy agents for several
policies.
a. 3 Motor tipper policies belongs to
M/s V.S.Lad & Sons
b. Motor Policies of M/s Harekrishna
Metalics Hire Buyer
c. Fire policies belongs to M/s India
Sugar Refinery
d. Fire policies belongs to M/s
K.K.Farms & Sister Concare
2. I brought 4.25 lakh premium from
M/S V.S.Lad and Son Soundar in 2008 by
issuing 6 cover notes for dumpares. But not
issued policy from Hospet. But he issued
policies from Bellari Office by putting
dummy agency name till date I never
received commission and he enjoyed
commission 4 years.
3. He use to issue letter unnecessary
to me even though I having cover note
authorization.
4. Unhealthy connotation with my
existing clients by all de tariff discounts as
he wish and disturbed my clients.
5. He has taken cash Rs. 124000/-
from me in 2007 and he issued cheques as
follows:
DATE AMOUNT CHEQUES
A. 15-02-2007 80000 284026
B. 24-06-2008 31182 800207
C. 25-06-2008 13202 800194
RS. 124384
Other than above mentioned subjects he
made so many agency changes and illegal things
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
in the office. His main intension is not to dealing
agents, He wants money either way (any other)
This information is submitting to the best of my
knowledge I request you to kindly take necessary
action regarding the above subject."
10. The contents of the complaint are in unequivocal.
They are incidents that have happened in the year 2007 to
2010 and the complaint is registered in the year 2015.
Another complaint comes about by another agent on
17.12.2015 again for the same period. The transaction in
the subject complaint is between 2006 to 2009. Therefore
the complaints that were registered in the year 2015 are of
incidents that have happened between 2006 to 2009. This
is the tenure of the complaint itself.
11. On the basis of the said complaint, charge sheet
was issued to the petitioner against the petitioner on
07.04.2016 and the enquiry officer holds the petitioner
guilty of the allegations and disciplinary authority imposes
penalty of removal from service against the petitioner. The
enquiry officer holds the petitioner guilty of few of the
allegations and exonerates on few of the allegations. The
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
disciplinary authority imposes a penalty of removal from
service against the petitioner. The petitioner is said to have
filed an appeal against the said order which comes to be
rejected.
12. The issue now would be whether the entire
proceedings are vitiated by delay. The afore-narrated dates
and events are not in dispute, the first complaint quoted
supra made on 10.08.2015 the incidents that have occurred
between 2007 and 2008 the second complaint made on
17.12.2015 the incidents that have occurred between 2006
and 2010. Therefore, the incidents are of 5 to 8 years
vintage at the time when the complaint comes to be made
against the petitioner. Therefore, if any person aggrieved it
would have been the insured. No insured has complied, it is
the agent. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold the entire
proceedings are vitiated on account of delay inter alia.
13. Learned counsel Shri S.K. Kayakamath would
submit that as and when they got the information, about
the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged acts, they
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
have instituted the proceedings and has not caused any
prejudice is noted only to be rejected, as delay in initiating
departmental enquiry undoubtedly causes prejudice,
whether it can become a matter to quash the proceedings
need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the
matter. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ANDHRA
PRADESH VS. N. RADHAKISHAN1 has held as follows:
"18. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal
Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 :
(1995) 29 ATC 546] State of Punjab was aggrieved
by the order of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana quashing memo of charges against Goyal
and also the order appointing Enquiry Officer to
inquire into those charges. In this case the incident,
which was the subject-matter of charge, happened in
December 1986 and in early January 1987, when
Goyal was working as Superintendent of Nabha High
Security Jail. It was only on 9-7-1992 that memo of
charges was issued to Goyal. He submitted his
explanation on 4-1-1993 denying the charges.
Enquiry Officer was appointed on 20-7-1993 and
soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in the High
Court on 24-8-1993. The High Court quashed the
memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of
five and a half years in serving the memo of charges,
for which there was no acceptable explanation. This
Court examined the factual position as to how the
delay occurred and if Goyal had been prejudiced in
any way on account of delay. This Court relied on the
principles laid down in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and
1998 (4) SCC 154
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
said that though that case pertained to criminal
prosecution the principles enunciated therein were
broadly applicable to the plea of delay in taking the
disciplinary proceedings as well. Referring to decision
in A.R. Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] this Court said: (SCC p. 576, para 11)
"In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court
mentioned the propositions emerging from the
several decisions considered therein and observed
that 'ultimately the court has to balance and
weigh the several relevant factors -- balancing
test or balancing process -- and determine in
each case whether the right to speedy trial has
been denied in a given case'. It has also been held
that, ordinarily speaking, where the court comes
to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the
accused has been infringed, the charges, or the
conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed.
At the same time, it has been observed that that
is not the only course open to the court and that
in a given case, the nature of the offence and
other circumstances may be such that quashing of
the proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is
open to the court to make such other appropriate
order as it finds just and equitable in the
circumstance of the case."
In that case this Court said that it was more
appropriate and in the interest of justice as well as in
the interest of administration that the enquiry which
had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be
completed. At the same time the Court directed that
Goyal should be considered forthwith for promotion
without reference to and without taking into
consideration the charges or the pendency of the
enquiry, if he is found fit for promotion.
19. It is not possible to lay down any
predetermined principles applicable to all cases
and in all situations where there is delay in
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
concluding the disciplinary proceedings.
Whether on that ground the disciplinary
proceedings are to be terminated each case has
to be examined on the facts and circumstances
in that case. The essence of the matter is that
the court has to take into consideration all the
relevant factors and to balance and weigh them
to determine if it is in the interest of clean and
honest administration that the disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to terminate
after delay particularly when the delay is
abnormal and there is no explanation for the
delay. The delinquent employee has a right that
disciplinary proceedings against him are
concluded expeditiously and he is not made to
undergo mental agony and also monetary loss
when these are unnecessarily prolonged
without any fault on his part in delaying the
proceedings. In considering whether the delay
has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the
court has to consider the nature of charge, its
complexity and on what account the delay has
occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice
to the delinquent employee is writ large on the
face of it. It could also be seen as to how much
the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing
the charges against its employee. It is the basic
principle of administrative justice that an
officer entrusted with a particular job has to
perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in
accordance with the rules. If he deviates from
this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.
Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to take their course as per relevant
rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay
causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it
can be shown that he is to blame for the delay
or when there is proper explanation for the
delay in conducting the disciplinary
proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance
these two diverse considerations."
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
Subsequent to said judgment, the Apex Court again in the
case of P.V. MAHADEVAN VS. M.D. TAMIL NADU
HOUSING BOARD2 has held as follows:
"10. Section 118 specifically provides for
submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the
end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual
audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions
have not been complied with at all. In the instant
case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The
expenditure ought to have been considered in the
accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case
the audit report was ultimately released in 1994-95.
The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the
audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the
above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17 of
1961. It is now stated that the appellant has retired
from service. There is also no acceptable explanation
on the side of the respondent explaining the
inordinate delay in initiating departmental
disciplinary proceedings. Mr R. Venkataramani,
learned Senior Counsel is appearing for the
respondent. His submission that the period
from the date of commission of the
irregularities by the appellant to the date on
which it came to the knowledge of the Housing
Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of
ascertaining whether there was any delay on
the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant has no merit
and force. The stand now taken by the
respondent in this Court in the counter-affidavit
is not convincing and is only an afterthought to
give some explanation for the delay.
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the
opinion that allowing the respondent to
proceed further with the departmental
2005 (6) SCC 636
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
proceedings at this distance of time will be very
prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher
government official under charges of corruption
and disputed integrity would cause unbearable
mental agony and distress to the officer
concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry
against a government employee should,
therefore, be avoided not only in the interests
of the government employee but in public
interest and also in the interests of inspiring
confidence in the minds of the government
employees. At this stage, it is necessary to
draw the curtain and to put an end to the
enquiry. The appellant had already suffered
enough and more on account of the disciplinary
proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental
agony and sufferings of the appellant due to
the protracted disciplinary proceedings would
be much more than the punishment. For the
mistakes committed by the department in the
procedure for initiating the disciplinary
proceedings, the appellant should not be made
to suffer."
The Apex Court yet again in the case of SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND OTHERS VS. PRABHASH
CHANDRA MIRDHA3 has held as follows:
"8. The law does not permit quashing of charge-
sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent
employee has any grievance in respect of the
charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a
representation and wait for the decision of the
disciplinary authority thereon. In case the charge-
sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on
the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary
(2012) 11 SCC 565
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
proceedings or delay in concluding the
proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the
charge-sheet after considering the gravity of
the charge and all relevant factors involved in
the case weighing all the facts both for and
against the delinquent employee and must
reach the conclusion which is just and proper in
the circumstance. (Vide State of M.P. v. Bani
Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 :
(1991) 16 ATC 514] , State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal
Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 :
(1995) 29 ATC 546] , Registrar, Coop.
Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [(1995) 3 SCC
134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538]
, Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC
180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 : (1995) 29 ATC 145]
, Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [(1996)
3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC
745] , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC
154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833]
, Food Corporation of India v. V.P. Bhatia [(1998) 9
SCC 131 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 466] , Supt. of
Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646] , M.V.
Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475] , P.D.
Agrawal v. SBI [(2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 43] and Govt. of A.P. v. V. Appala
Swamy [(2007) 14 SCC 49 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S)
440] .)"
The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments holds that delay
can be taken note of to quash the proceedings as delay
would undoubtedly cause prejudice to the employee. In the
case at hand, as observed herein above, the delay is not a
year or two, but of 7 to 8 years, incidents being complained
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
of that too by the agents in the year 2015. Therefore, this
would be the circumstance enough to quash the impugned
orders.
14. The second submission of the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner is that, the respondents have
not maintained parity in penalty. The said submission also
merits acceptance, as the complaint and the defence of the
petitioner if read in tandem an would clearly indicate that
there were three persons involved in the transaction, one
the petitioner, the other two persons, one the Senior Officer
and a Senior Assistant, they were cohorts in allegation with
the petitioner. Therefore, if the petitioner was preceded
with departmentally, as well as the Senior Officer, parity in
penalty ought to have been maintained. It is an undisputed
fact that the Senior Assistant is imposed with stoppage of
two increments as a penalty, and the petitioner is chosen to
for imposition of extreme penalty of removal from service.
Against the Senior Officer who is admittedly a part of the
transaction, no departmental enquiry even is instituted.
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner would merit acceptance that parity in
penalty is not maintained. The issue whether parity in
penalty should be maintained or otherwise, again need not
detain this Court for longer delve deep into the matter. The
Apex Court in the case of RAJENDRA YADAV VS. STATE
OF MADHYA PRADESH4 has held as follows:
"9. The doctrine of equality applies to all
who are equally placed; even among persons
who are found guilty. The persons who have
been found guilty can also claim equality of
treatment, if they can establish discrimination
while imposing punishment when all of them
are involved in the same incident. Parity among
co-delinquents has also to be maintained when
punishment is being imposed. Punishment
should not be disproportionate while comparing
the involvement of co-delinquents who are
parties to the same transaction or incident. The
disciplinary authority cannot impose
punishment which is disproportionate i.e.
lesser punishment for serious offences and
stringent punishment for lesser offences.
10. The principle stated above is seen applied in a
few judgments of this Court. The earliest one is DG
of Police v. G. Dasayan [(1998) 2 SCC 407 : 1998
SCC (L&S) 557] wherein one Dasayan, a police
constable, along with two other constables and one
Head Constable were charged for the same acts of
misconduct. The disciplinary authority exonerated
2013 (3) SCC 73
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
two other constables, but imposed the punishment of
dismissal from service on Dasayan and that of
compulsory retirement on the Head Constable. This
Court, in order to meet the ends of justice,
substituted the order of compulsory retirement in
place of the order of dismissal from service on
Dasayan, applying the principle of parity in
punishment among co-delinquents. This Court held
that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
11. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah
case [(2006) 6 SCC 548 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1486] the
workman was dismissed from service for proved
misconduct. However, few other workmen, against
whom there were identical allegations, were allowed
to avail of the benefit of voluntary retirement
scheme. In such circumstances, this Court directed
that the workman also be treated on the same
footing and be given the benefit of voluntary
retirement from service from the month on which the
others were given the benefit.
12. We are of the view that the principle laid
down in the abovementioned judgments would
also apply to the facts of the present case. We
have already indicated that the action of the
disciplinary authority imposing a comparatively
lighter punishment on the co-delinquent Arjun
Pathak and at the same time, harsher
punishment on the appellant cannot be
permitted in law, since they were all involved in
the same incident. Consequently, we are
inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the
punishment of dismissal from service imposed
on the appellant and order that he be
reinstated in service forthwith. The appellant
is, therefore, to be reinstated from the date on
which Arjun Pathak was reinstated and be
given all consequential benefits as were given
to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly. However,
there will be no order as to costs."
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
15. The Apex Court was following an earlier
judgment in the case of DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
AND OTHERS Vs. G. DASAYAN5 where the Apex Court
considers the fact that, if two employees are involved in the
same transaction and against one the major penalty is
imposed and the other a minor penalty, it would
undoubtedly become arbitrary, as there is no parity in
penalty. This Court, on this issue would have directed
imposition of penalty of withholding of increments as is
directed against Senior Officer, but the proceedings are
vitiated by delay in its entirety. In that light, the petition
deserves to succeed. For the aforesaid reasons, the
following:
ORDER
(i) The petition allowed.
(ii) The order dated 09.06.2017 passed by
respondent No.1 vide Annexure-P and the
order dated 18.06.2018 passed by
1998 (2) SCC 407
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2759
respondent No.1 vide Annexure-R are
quashed.
(iii) The petitioner becomes entitle with all
consequential benefits that would flow from
the quashment of the order.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
RHR/- - up to para 10
VNP - from para 10
