meaning of section 2(18) of the 1961 Act. The same has
the same came to be dismissed on 29.08.2022. Issue
and therefore, now it cannot be re-agitated. As a
consideration, as rightly submitted by Mr.Holla.
5.2 AS TO ACQUISITION BY INVOKING URGENCY
CLAUSE AND CONVENTIONAL CLAUSE:
- 18 -
paramount. The citizen holds his property
subject always to the right of the sovereign to
take it for a public purpose. This right is called
'eminent domain."
This juristic opinion is reiterated by the Apex Court in
JILUBHAI NANBHAI KHACHAR VS. STATE OF
GUJARAT2. In Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's terminology3,
the word 'authority' instead of 'right' would be appropriate
since in exercise of such authority, the property right of
private entity is diminished, its jural correlative namely
sufficient elements of duty, in the circumstances lacking.
(b) The above view is more true because, constitutional
guarantee to Fundamental Right to Property u/a 19(1)(f),
is no longer on the statute book although its diminished
version has been enacted in Article 300A vide 44th
Constitutional Amendment w.e.f. 10.06.1979. State can
take private property for public purpose normally on
payment of compensation, as discussed in
K.T.PLANTATION PRIVATE LIMITED vs. STATE OF
(1995) Supp(1) SCC 596
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING
- 19 -
KARNATAKA4 cannot be disputed. Of course, it is a
discretionary power of great implications and as any
discretion, it too can be exercised only in accordance with
the rules of reason & justice as observed by Lord Halsbury
in SUSANNAH SHARP vs. WAKEFIELD5. I hasten to add
that Mr.Holla's contention as to unjustifiability of the
decision to dispense with Section 5A enquiry cannot be
sustained because of what has been enacted in sub-section
(4) of section 17 w.e.f. 16.04.1999. The very purpose of
invoking urgency clause is to accomplish a task on a fast
track, if not on war-footing. The authority need not assign
a cart load of reasons for that. At times, the reasons for
invoking the urgency clause partake the character of
reasons for dispensing with the summary enquiry u/s 5A,
as has happened in this case. Years have lapsed in the
litigation process, would not be a point in adjudging
validity of invocation, actus curiae neminem gravabit
literally meaning that an act of the court shall prejudice
(2011) 9 SCC 1
(1891) A.C. 173, 179
- 20 -
none; an act of court includes pendency of the proceedings
vide A.R.ANTULAY vs. R.S.NAIK6
(c) India is predominantly an agricultural country. It can
be said that agriculture is national culture. In M.C.MEHTA
(STUBBLE BURNING AND AIR QUALITY) vs. UNION OF
INDIA7, at para 9, the Apex Court observed:
"...Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of
this country. Its interest cannot be overlooked...
the State has the obligation towards the
agriculture... They cannot ignore the interest of
the small and marginal farmers. It is the
bounden duty of the Central as well as the State
Government to ensure the interest of these class
of farmers is catered and they have the facilities
of farming and harvesting by modern
machines..."
Any step aimed at agrarian reforms, the term being
construed in its wide amplitude, has the constitutional
support. It cannot be disputed that the contemplated Mega
Market of the kind would enure to the benefit of farmers
immediately and agriculture mediately. Therefore, it
cannot be gainfully contended that the same is not a public
purpose. Nor there is any warrant for the contention that
AIR 1988 SC 1531
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1733
- 21 -
while invoking urgency clause, the State should exercise
circumspection, merely because the lands belong to a
public trust of the kind. Ideally speaking, if it figures as a
factor, that would be appreciable in a Welfare State. No
Ruling nor any juristic opinion in support of the contra is
cited.
(d) It is relevant to mention what experts in the domain
have opined in this regard. V.G.Ramachandran8 an
acclaimed jurist of yester decades states as under:
"...It is for the appropriate Government, to
apply its mind to the facts of the case and
satisfy itself that there is an urgency in the land
acquisition and that the urgency is so great
that the normal procedure of calling upon
aggrieved persons to file objections should be
dispensed with and that the declaration and
further proceedings should take place with
great expedition... It is well settled that the
question of urgency is a matter for the
subjective satisfaction of the appropriate
Government and it is not open to the courts to
examine the propriety or correctness of the
satisfaction on an objective consideration of
facts. The opinion of the appropriate
Government can only be challenged in a court
of law if it can be shown that the Government
never applied its mind to the matter or that the
action of Government is mala fide..."
'Law of Land Acquisition and Compensation', Eastern Book Company, 8th
Edition, Pg.457
- 22 -
In UOI v. PRAVEEN GUPTHA9, the Apex Court has
observed that there is no need for the Government to pass
any reasoned order to reach the conclusion that there is
urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry u/s. 5A of the
1894 Act.
5.3 The vehement submission of Mr.Holla that the
invocation of urgency clause for acquisition and initiation
of normal acquisition are tainted by non-application of
mind and smack of legal malice & arbitrariness, is difficult
to countenance and reasons for this are not far to seek:
(a) The decision to notify acquisition is essentially of the
Executive, be it by way of urgency or in usual course.
Ordinarily, Writ Courts do not undertake a deeper
examination of such decisions, that are made on the basis
of a host of factors which by their very nature are not
judicially assessable. Courts as of necessity have to show
due deference to such decisions of the Coordinate Branch
of the State, subject to all just exceptions. Despite
(1997) 9 SCC 78
- 23 -
vociferous submissions, no such exceptional case is
demonstrated before me. In CHAMELI SINGH v. STATE
OF UP10, it is observed that the opinion of urgency formed
by the appropriate Government is a subjective conclusion
drawn based on the material before it and therefore, the
same is entitled to a great weight. In FIRST LAND
ACQUISITION COLLECTOR vs. NORODHI PRAKASH11,
it is said that the question of urgency is a matter of
subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily, it
is not open to the courts to undertake a deeper scrutiny of
the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal
of facts.
(b) The APMC by Resolution dated 18.1.1999 vide
Agenda No.3, had stated about the requirement of lands
for the above purpose. A proposal was sent to the
Director, Department of Agricultural Produce, Government
of Karnataka, to take steps in that direction through Single
Window Agency of the State. The decision was finalized at
(1996) 2 SCC 549
(2002) 4 SCC 160
- 24 -
the level of the government in the meeting held in the
year 1999. Several other meetings followed under the
Chairmanship of Additional Director, Department of
Agricultural Produce; the APMC letters dated 21.1.1999,
4.2.1999, 15.2.1999, 17.2.1999, 26.2.1999 concerning
the subject speak all about this. These letters are not in
dispute. Thus, it is not that the decision to invoke the
urgency clause of acquisition was taken overnight and at
the spur of the moment. Several meetings and
deliberations were held with the participation of the high
functionaries of the government as is reflected from the
original records exhibited to the court. A lot of deliberation
animated the decision making process. Therefore, there is
no merit in the contention that the invocation of urgency
clause is vitiated either by non-application of mind or by
legal malice.
(c) Mr.K.G.Raghavan and Prof.Nanda Kishore appearing
for the APMC are right in contending that in what cases,
urgency clause needs to be invoked, is again a matter of
Executive decision, and a Writ Court cannot undertake a
- 25 -
deeper examination of such decisions, conventional
constraints of writ jurisdiction being what they are. It is on
the basis of High Power Committee deliberation, the
subject acquisition process has been undertaken and
therefore, such a process cannot be said to have been
vitiated by the non-application of mind to the material
borne out by record. Which part of the relevant material is
lost sight of, is not demonstrated. I hasten to add that, a
plea of non-application of mind avails as a ground of
attack to the statutory proceedings when application would
have brought about a different end product, and not
otherwise.
5.4 The next contention of petitioner that for invoking
the urgency clause of acquisition, the pre-condition of
paying 80% of compensation is a must, cannot be
disputed, section 17(3A) of 1894 Act being as clear as
gangetic waters. Such a view gains support from
Mr.Holla's citation in DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT.
LTD vs. STATE OF U.P12. Let me examine whether the
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1408
- 26 -
requirement of payment of 80% was duly complied with.
Records reveal that the APMC which happens to be the
beneficiary of acquisition, deposited a sum of Rs.14 crore
with the State Government. The SLAO paid a sum of
Rs.2,36,96,175/- to the petitioner-Trust vide three
vouchers all dated 29.03.2003. It is noteworthy that the
Trust executed an indemnity bond while taking the said
amount. There is plausible explanation offered for not
handing rest of the amount huge in size to the petitioner-
Trust which was battling against the land ceiling prescribed
u/s 66 of the 1961 Act, having filed the declaration way
back on 31.12.1974 before the Land Tribunal. There were
multiple orders of the Tribunal that came to be remanded
for consideration afresh multiply. First case was
W.P.No.46841/2001 disposed off on 25.10.2005. The
second Writ Petition was W.P.No.4311/2010 disposed off
on 23.4.2014. The third Writ Petition was
W.P.No.14866/2015 disposed off on 2.5.2019. The fourth
Writ Petition was W.P.No.55344/2017 disposed off on
30.06.2021. Matter was taken in appeal by the State in
- 27 -
W.A.No.1089/2021 that was decided only on 22.06.2022.
At long last, this order is affirmed in SLP(C)
No.14524/2022 dismissed on 29.08.2022. That being the
position, no complaint as to non-payment of entire 80%, a
considerable part thereof having been admittedly paid,
cannot come to the aid of petitioner.
5.5 After all, it is public money which the State has to
pay for the lands acquired and therefore, it has to be extra
cautious in handing it to a private party when 'snake and
ladder' like proceedings were taking place in respect of
ceiling limit of land holding u/s 66 of the 1961 Act as is
reflected from the original records in general and the
Coordinate Bench judgment in W.A.No.1089/2021
disposed off on 22.06.2022. It gives full details of these
proceedings. A learned Coordinate Judge of this court vide
order dated 4.12.2000 had said as under:
"4. The learned Government Pleader submitted
that 80% payment could not be tendered
because the assistant commissioner has
addressed a letter to the special Land
Acquisition Officer on 26/5/1999 stating that
dispute under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961 is pending in regard to the lands and
- 28 -
therefore, 80% of the estimated compensation
could not be disbursed till disposal of the
disputes."
In fact, the SLAO in the Statement of Objections has
specifically stated the reasons for not disbursing the said
amount to the petitioner-Trust. The right to compensation
is always subject to claimant vouching a cloudless title, be
the acquisition under urgency clause or normal clause.
Mr.Holla's contention that the petitioner has returned the
money received would not advance his case inasmuch as
that was done after a Coordinate Judge had wrongly held
the proceedings as having lapsed u/s 24 of the 2013 Act,
which of course came to be reversed by the Apex Court as
already mentioned above. What one has to take note of is
the fact that the deposit made by the beneficiary of
acquisition still continues.
5.6 AS TO LAPSE OF ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS
BECAUSE OF JUMPING OF TIMELINES:
(a) The vehement submission of Mr.Holla that the gap
between Preliminary Notification and Final Notification
being in excess of the statutorily prescribed limit, the
- 29 -
acquisition proceedings have lapsed, appears attractive at
the first blush. However, a deeper examination of the
attending circumstances emanating from the record would
dispel the contention. Let me reproduce the relevant
statistical data: Section 4(1) notification was published on
3.9.1994 and gazette on the same day. A copy of the
same was published in Kannada daily namely Sanje Vani
and Samyukta Karnataka on 17.09.1994. It was also
pasted in the village chaawdi on 11.10.1994. The
acquisition proceedings were stayed during the period
between 22.12.1994 and 22.12.1995 by the order made in
W.P.No.28988/1994 filed by Rajajinagar Housing
Cooperative Society Limited. There was further stay in
W.P.No.6880/1997 filed by the very same Society. Final
Notification u/s 6(1) is dated 10.10.1996; it was printed in
Samyukta Karnataka dated 27.10.1996 and Indian
Express dated 30.10.1996 and it was gazetted on
31.10.1996. If the stay period is excluded while computing
the prescribed limitation period, the argument of delay
and consequent lapse of proceedings would fall to the
- 30 -
ground. This would apply as to the argument of passing of
award inasmuch as W.P.No.6880/1997 came to be
disposed off only on 15.07.2014. Learned AAG is right in
placing reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court
in V.T.KRISHNAMOORTHY vs. STATE OF
KARNATAKA13 in support of this. There is absolutely no
scope for invoking section 11A of the 1894 Act, either.
5.7 AS TO ACQUIESCENCE IN ACQUISITION
PROCEEDINGS:
(a) Learned AAG Mr.Kiran V.Ron is right in contending
that the petitioner-Trust having acquiesced in acquisition
proceedings by virtue of evincing interest and further
participating in the meetings held for fixation of market
value of the lands in question. The representatives of the
petitioner namely Sri.Halbe and Sri.S.B.Pande, CEO of the
Trust, participated in the meeting held on 24.09.1999
chaired by none other than the Principal Secretary to
Government, Department of Revenue, for the fixation of
land value. The representatives insisted that an amount of
ILR 1991 KAR 1183
- 31 -
Rs.17.50 lakh per acre of land in Srigandhadakaval. After
negotiation, the proceedings sheet was drawn as agreed
by the parties. The operative portion of the same reads as
under:
"(4) That the Khatedars will executive an
agreement in Form 'D' a required under Rule
108 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules c/w
Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 as per Circular dt. RD 136
AQW 86 dt. 7.8.1986.
(5) That the khatedars will also execute an
Indemnity Bond and the Special Land Acquisition
Officer is authorized to sign the agreement and
the Indemnity Bond.
(6) That they will hand over the possession of
lands wherever there are no litigation
immediately."
(b) The LAO vide letter dated 11.10.1999 informed the
CEO of the petitioner that in terms of the proceedings
drawn in the above meeting, petitioner would be paid
compensation at the rate of Rs.15 lakh in respect of 172
acres 04 guntas of Srigandhadakaval land. Petitioner-Trust
vide letter dated 9.10.2000 at paragraphs 7 & 8 had said
as under:
"7. Further, we draw the attention to our letter
No.VISC/99-2000/608 dated 13.07.2000 in
which we had sought for the payment of the
- 32 -
amount as per the award which comes to
Rs.951.045 lakhs to enable the Trust to
handover the possession of the lands concerned
at Heronahalli village. A remainder was also sent
by the Trust to the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Bangalore dated 10.08.2000.
8. We submit that if the payment is paid as per
the award, we will make necessary arrangement
to handover the possession of the lands situated
at Heronahalli village."
(c) Learned AAG is right in pressing into service
Krishnamoorthy supra wherein, paragraph 14 reads as
under:
"There is one other aspect which has a bearing.
Admittedly, the petitioners filed the claim
statement on 31 -3-1983 and the Writ Petition
was filed on 19-12-1983. We have held in Writ
Appeal No. 781/89 (disposed of on 6th
November 1989) as follows:
"This is clearly a case in which Writ Petition itself
is not maintainable because admittedly he had
filed an application claiming compensation for
the land in question. It is well settled law that
where a person asked for compensation he
cannot maintain a Writ Petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, vide 70 Calcutta
Weekly Notes, page 1100. Therefore, we agree
with the view taken by the learned single Judge
and dismiss the Writ Appeal."
A Coordinate Bench of this court in ROY RODRIGUES vs.
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA14 repelled the challenge
to acquisition on the ground that the land owner himself
2009 SC OnLine Kar 290
- 33 -
had sought for payment of compensation. Another
Coordinate Bench in SRI.M.GAJENDRA vs. STATE OF
KARNATAKA15 negatived the challenge to acquisition on
the ground that the land owner vide communication dated
3.5.2013 had sought for payment of compensation and
that amounted to consenting to the acquisition. The
vehement submission of Mr.Holla that the authorities have
gone back on their assurance of making the payment and
further, petitioner's participation in the price fixation
meeting was after reserving right to challenge the
acquisition, does not make much difference: Firstly, the
ceiling u/s 66 of 1961 Act that touch divestation of
petitioner's title to the lands were pending at large.
Secondly, pursuant to price fixation, petitioner accepted a
huge sum of money in crores and had retained the same
for a decade and a half and presumably earned interest on
that. Therefore, petitioner cannot be permitted to
approbate & reprobate, to say the least. One who expects
fairness should also reciprocate the same.
5.8 Lastly, Mr.Holla contended that the authorities having
established the Mega Market of the kind elsewhere in the
city have given up the very acquisition. In support of that,
he drew my attention to the observations allegedly made
2015 SCC OnLine Kar 5679, para 9
- 34 -
by a Coordinate Judge of this court in the order dated
27.02.2013 whereby, W.P.Nos.7389-7658/2013 (APMC)
has been disposed off to the effect that the very project in
question having been shifted to other place, the
substratum for acquisition has withered away. Para 4 in
the order reads as under:
"The third respondent has filed statement of
objections interalia contending that on account
of certain litigations in the matter of acquiring
the land, they have dropped the proposal to
establishing sub market yard at Sriganda
Kaval. As early as 07.10.2009, they issued a
notification under Section 6 (2) of the Act to
establish Dasanapura market yard in an area of
67.25 acres. Further by spending more than
100 crores rupees, the land is acquired and as
many as 240 godowns are constructed at
Dasanapura market yard..."
The above observations cannot be construed as the finding
of the court, as rightly contended by learned Senior
Advocate Sri.K.G.Raghavan appearing for the respondent-
APMC. His contention is supported by further observation
in the very same paragraph "... It is further contended that
the procedure under sections 3 and 4 of the Act is required
to be followed only in the case of establishing new market
yards... On these grounds, the respondents opposed the
- 35 -
claim of the petitioners." That was only a contention taken
up by the APMC to resist the writ petition filed by the
farmers for quashing the notification dated 24.1.2013 and
for a direction to consider their representation dated
30.01.2012. Under the said notification, the APMC had
invited applications for allotment of shops on leave cum
license basis in the newly constructed market yard at
Dasanapura. Therefore, such a contention cannot be
construed as being on pervasive to defeat the resistance
of the APMC to the challenge to acquisition. After all,
pleadings of the parties have to be construed in the light
of dominant nature of the lis. In any rate, there is no
finding recorded by a Coordinate Judge as to dropping of
the Mega Market project in question. It is told at the Bar
that belatedly some clarification is sought for at the hands
of another Coordinate Judge by moving an application in
the disposed off writ petition. This the APMC has done
after contention was taken up as to dropping of the project
itself. This apart the petitioner was not a party to the said
writ petition and therefore, that would not res judicate
- 36 -
contention of the said respondent. Pendency of said
application pales into insignificance in disposing off this
matter.
In the above circumstances, these petitions are
disposed off with the following directions:
[i] The challenge to acquisition in both the
petitions fails and the acquisition is held to be valid &
effective.
[ii] The petitioners shall be paid the compensation
for the subject lands at the rates agreed to in the Meeting
held on 24.09.1999, forthwith by formally accomplishing
the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law.
[iii] Keeping in view a spate of litigations and the
long time spent in prosecuting them and also the
skyrocketing of real estate prices, I direct the official
respondents to pay to the petitioner interest at the rate of
12 % per annum in addition to what is payable under the
provisions of 1894 Act, from the date of the award, within
three months.
[iv] If delay is brooked in making the payment,
petitioner shall be entitled to 1% additional interest per
mensem and on payment, the same may be recovered
- 37 -
from the officials responsible for causing delay, and in
accordance with law.
I shall be failing in my duty if I do not say that
hearing of these petitions was a great learning experience
for me.
Costs made easy.
Sd/-
(KRISHNA S DIXIT)
JUDGE
Snb/cbc
