[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
The Tahsildhar vs Sri. K.R Rajagopal on 18 December, 2025
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
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RSA No. 1306 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.1306 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE TAHSILDHAR,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-560 009.
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SANTHOSH S. GOGI, AAG A/W
Digitally signed SMT. RASHMI RAO, HCGP)
by DEVIKA M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AND:
KARNATAKA
SRI. K.R RAJAGOPAL,
MAJOR,
RESIDENT OF KAMBIPURA,
KENGERI HOBLI,
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LR.
1. SMT. SHASHIKALA,
W/O LATE K.R.RAJAGOPAL
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
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RSA No. 1306 of 2025
HC-KAR
R/AT NO.19, KAMBIPURA,
KENGERI HOBLI,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-560060.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. SUBRAMANYA, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. NARASIMHARAJU, ADVOCATE FOR C/R)
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC,
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 26.07.2024 PASSED ON IA NO.1
IN R.A.NO.58/2023 ON THE FILE OF IV ADDITIONAL SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU,
REJECTING THE IA NO.1 FILED UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 3A OF
CPC R/W SECTION 5 OF LIMITATION ACT - 1963 AND FILED
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 18.03.2000
PASSED IN O.S.NO.75/1997 ON THE FILE OF PRINCIPAL CIVIL
JUDGE (JR. DN), BENGALURU (R) DISTRICT, BENGALURU.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Heard both the learned counsel on admission. The
learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the
appellants were represented through the District Government
Pleader on 21.06.1997 and objection was also filed to the
application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC and
subsequently, the Trial Court noted that written statement was
not filed on 24.07.1998 and thereafter, proceeded to consider
the matter and the appellants have not pursued the matter
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diligently. However, appeal is filed before the First Appellate
Court after a delay of 23 years and the First Appellate Court
while considering the application in respect of the delay is
concerned, observed that the reason assigned in the application
is that the plaintiff has sought for the relief of declaration of his
title by way of adverse possession against the appellants, who
are the State Government and its mechanism.
2. The learned counsel for the appellants contend that
the suit is filed for the relief of adverse possession as against
the Government, but in the case on hand, only there was 27
years i.e., less than 30 years and while seeking the relief of
adverse possession against the Government, it must be 30
years. However, it is pleaded for condonation of delay before
the First Appellate Court that the length of delay is not matter
and merely because the delay is at length, the appeal cannot
be dismissed and right of the appellants cannot be thrown
away. Under the Limitation Act, no specific period to be
condoned is fixed. Hence, there is no legal bar to condone the
delay of any length. The appellants are the State Government
and mechanism and it has to look after several acts day to day.
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Admittedly, there is some sort of negligence on the part of the
Government Officials/Tahsildar and it is natural due to
bureaucratic process, but it is not intentional one. When this
averment was made in the application, the First Appellate Court
allowed the appellants to examine the witness and witness is
also examined in support of the said application to condone the
delay.
3. The First Appellate Court having considered the
material on record, in paragraph No.9 made an observation
that the delay is not of few years. The delay is of 8,580 days
i.e., more than 23 years and 6 months. This is an inordinate
delay and the appeal is barred by law of limitation. There is
gross and utter negligence on the part of the appellants and its
officials. The First Appellate Court also taken note of that
though Deputy Commissioner has ordered to prefer an appeal
in the year 2005 and 2008 and though they were aware of the
judgment long back, the officials have kept mum and not taken
any action. They cannot blame the earlier DGP (District
Government Pleader) as the officials were aware about the
proceedings of the suit. When the respondent initiated writ
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proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, they
were directed to mutate his name, but it was also not done by
them. When he initiated contempt proceedings, the appellant
No.1 has appeared before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka
and undertook to comply the said order. But, instead of doing
so, the present appeal has been filed just to deprive the benefit
of decree and right of the respondent. The appellants are not
sure about their case and they have not shown any bonafide
reasons to condone the delay and hence, comes to the
conclusion that the reason assigned in the application is not
sufficient to condone the inordinate delay of 23 years and
detailed order has been passed dismissing the same.
4. The said order is challenged before this Court in this
second appeal.
5. The main grounds urged in the second appeal are
that the First Appellate Court gravely erred in failing to see that
the judgment and decree in O.S.No.95/1997 was passed in
ignorance of the right of the defendant and that the schedule
property being Government kharab land, ought to be protected.
In failing to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Trial
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Court, the learned Appellate Judge, there has been an unjust
deprivation of the right of the defendants. The judgment and
decree of the Trial Court is perverse and the First Appellate
Court should have refrained from substituting its conclusions
and opinions on the ground of delay. The learned counsel for
the appellants also would contend that the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court is only in three lines and the same was
affirmed by the First Appellate Court in dismissing the appeal
and hence, this Court has to show its lenience in condoning the
delay and the matter may be remitted to the First Appellate
Court to consider the matter on merits by condoning the delay.
6. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent would
submit that the very affidavit filed before the First Appellate
Court for condonation of delay is that there is some sort of
negligence on the part of the Government Officials/Tahsildar
and it is natural due to bureaucratic process, but it is not
intentional one. When there was a delay of 23 years, it is
contended that it was natural in a bureaucratic process and not
intentional one and the same is taken note of by the First
Appellate Court while considering the application and dismissing
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the appeal since there was an inordinate delay of 23 years. The
learned counsel would vehemently contend that the judgment
was within the knowledge of the State and the Deputy
Commissioner of Bangalore District, vide communication dated
01.12.2005, directed to file an appeal, but not filed the appeal.
In 2008 also once again directed to file an appeal, but not filed
the appeal and officials kept mum. Only when the writ petition
was filed and contempt proceedings was initiated and though
undertaken to comply with the direction of this Court in the writ
petition as well as contempt proceedings, filed the appeal with
a delay of 23 years. The First Appellate Court also taken note
of that they were having the knowledge about the judgment in
the year 2005 itself, though decree was passed in 2000 and
even at that time also not filed the appeal and though they
were represented in the original suit, but not contested.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants
and the learned counsel for the respondent, no doubt, the suit
was filed in the year 1997, which is numbered as
O.S.No.75/1997 and judgment and decree of the Trial Court
was passed on 18.03.2000. It is also borne out from the
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records that the District Government Pleader appeared before
the Trial Court on 21.06.1997 and took time to file objections.
However, filed the objections in the month of February 1998
and thereafter, time was granted to file written statement and
written statement was not filed and the same was recorded on
24.07.1998. Thereafter, the Trial Court proceeded to consider
the matter and ultimately took three years time to dispose of
the suit and the same was disposed of in 2000. It is important
to note that it is not the case of the appellants that they were
not having the knowledge about the suit and judgment and
decree of the Trial Court.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to
the notice of this Court the communication issued by the
Deputy Commissioner to file an appeal in 2005 and also in
2008 and the same is also referred by the First Appellate Court
while dismissing the application and submits that they were
having full-fledged knowledge with regard to the earlier
judgment and decree. However, when the proceedings was
initiated before this Court in the writ petition and subsequently,
when the order passed in writ petition is not complied,
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contempt proceedings was also initiated, wherein undertook to
comply with the order passed in the writ petition. But instead
of complying the same, filed the appeal with delay of 23 years.
The delay of 23 years is not properly explained before the First
Appellate Court. In a casual manner pleaded before the First
Appellate Court that the appellants are the State Government
and mechanism and it has to look after several acts day to day
and also admitted that there was negligence on the part of the
Government officials. It is contented that it is natural due to
bureaucratic process, but it is not intentional one. The manner
in which the application is filed before the First Appellate Court
is that the Government can do anything and even if there is a
long delay, the same is not applicable and even gone to the
extent of making an averment in the application that under the
Limitation Act, no specific period to be condoned is fixed and
also there is no legal bar to condone the delay of any length.
9. This Court would like to rely upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of SHIVAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS., v.
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD AND OTHERS reported in
2025 SCC Online SC 1969, wherein it is categorically held
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that it is immaterial whether it is a State or a private party and
there cannot be two yardsticks to consider the delay. Even if
the Government is involved in any mechanism, the same
cannot be a ground to condone the delay. The Apex Court in
paragraph No.140 has held that the Courts must be mindful
that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of
delay and purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to
determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but
only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the
delay. In paragraph No.141 it is held that condonation of delay
is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not
on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are
considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured
with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may
be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would
lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law,
undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of
limitation is designed to maintain. Further, an observation is
also made that the judicial discipline required at this stage
demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and
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nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of
rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.
10. The Apex Court in paragraph Nos.259 and 260 of
the said judgment in detail discussed with regard to delay is
concerned and taken note of delay of 3,966 days in the said
case and in paragraph No.260 held that, it is abundantly clear
that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay
of 3,966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative
levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings,
along with finding certain merits in the case of respondent No.1
against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that
of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. It is further
observed that we have no hesitation in stating that such
grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court lost sight
of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by
it had delay of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more
particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient
cause. The present case, however, stands on a different
footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not
inclined to accept the condonation of delay by the High Court.
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11. In paragraph No.262, the Apex Court gave a
conclusion that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its
instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party
seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should
not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and
pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We
are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the
High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate
delay, until significant causes exists, as by doing so the Courts
only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already
limited to questions of law. No litigants should be permitted to
be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the
Courts to misuse the process of law.
12. The Apex Court in its recent judgment made an
observation when the High Court condoned the delay of 1,500
days that, it is dismay that the High Court has even not seen
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the judgment of Shivamma case (supra). The observation
made by the Apex Court in Shivamma case (supra), is that
lethargic persons, whether it is the Government or a private
party, cannot be encouraged by condoning the delay. In the
case on hand, the delay is 23 years and in the case of
Shivamma (supra), the delay was 3,996 days. This Court
while considering the similar set of facts in a case of appeal
filed by the State in R.S.A.No.1401/2023 dated 28.10.2025,
when there was a delay of 6,658 days, dismissed the appeal.
In the present case on hand, there is a delay of 23 years i.e.,
8,580 days. Having taken note of all these factors into
consideration and also the reasons assigned before the First
Appellate Court to condone the delay, it is not a case to
entertain the second appeal when there is a lethargic attitude
on the part of the Government and the reasons are also like it
is natural when the bureaucratic process is involved and length
of delay is immaterial as against the principles laid down in the
judgment of Shivamma case. Hence, I do not find any ground
to entertain the second appeal. The learned counsel for the
appellants would submit that this Court has to take note of the
reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court considering the
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matter. The Apex Court in its judgment in the case of
Shivamma (supra), has categorically held that there must be a
sufficient cause to condone the delay and unless sufficient
cause is shown to condone the delay, the appeal cannot be
entertained on merits in paragraph Nos.140 to 143 of the
judgment. When such observation is made, I do not find any
ground to entertain this second appeal and the First Appellate
Court taken note of the inordinate delay of 23 years and passed
the order. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed.
In view of the dismissal of the appeal, pending I.As., if
any, stands disposed of.
Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH)
JUDGE
MD
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 33
