[Cites 30, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
M/S Mp 24 Construction Company vs State Of Karnataka on 9 December, 2025
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WP No. 25668 of 2025
C/W WP No. 22904 of 2025
WP No. 31906 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO. 25668 OF 2025 (GM-TEN)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO. 22904 OF 2025 (GM-TEN)
WRIT PETITION NO. 31906 OF 2025 (GM-TEN)
IN WP No. 25668/2025
BETWEEN:
M/S. MP24 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(LEAD MEMBER OF CONSORTITUM WITH
RAMALINGAM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PVT. LTD)
A PROPRIETORY CONCERN
HAVING ITS HEAD OFFICE AT
NO.95 , HADENAHALLI VILLAGE
SHRAVANABELAGOLA ROAD
BARALU POST
Digitally signed by CHANNARAYAPATNA TALUK
ARUNKUMAR M S HASSAN DISTRICT.
Location: HIGH BRANCH OFFICE:
COURT OF
KARNATAKA B2, 1201, BRAHMAGIRI
MALAGALA BDA FLATS PHASE 2
5TH NORTH CROSS ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 072
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR.
.... PETITIONER
(BY SRI S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PRASHANTH MURTHY S.G., ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
NO.28, VIKASA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF
COMPANIES ACT, 1956
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010
REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR.
3. CHIEF ENGINEER
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
4. STATE LEVEL DEBARMENT COMMITTEE
ROOM NO.317, 3RD FLOOR
VIKASA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
5. BHARAT VANIJYA EASTERN PVT. LTD
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF
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THE COMPANIES ACT
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
126, CHITTARANJAN AVENUE
2ND FLOOR, KOLKATA - 700073
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR.
6. VASANT VALAPPA NAIK
S/O VALAPPA RAMAPPA NAIK
CHIEF ENGINEER
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
7. N. SUSHELAMMA
MANAGING DIRECTOR
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI KIRAN V. RON, AAG A/W
SRI. MANJUNATH B. AGA FOR R1 & R4;
SRI. S. BASAVARAJ, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR R2 & R3;
SRI. NAMAN JHABAKH, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
SMT. SUMANA BALIGA M., ADVOCATE FOR R6 R7)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
DECLARE THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL; QUASH THE GOVERNMENT
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ORDER NO.PWD 203 BMS 2025 DATED 13.08.2025
(ANNEXURE-A) ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.1; AND ETC.
IN WP NO.22904/2025
BETWEEN:
M/S. MP24 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(LEAD MEMBER OF CONSORTITUM WITH
RAMALINGAM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PVT. LTD)
A PROPRIETORY CONCERN
HAVING ITS HEAD OFFICE AT
NO.95 , HADENAHALLI VILLAGE
SHRAVANABELAGOLA ROAD
BARALU POST
CHANNARAYAPATNA TALUK
HASSAN DISTRICT.
BRANCH OFFICE:
B2, 1201, BRAHMAGIRI
MALAGALA BDA FLATS PHASE 2
5TH NORTH CROSS ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 072
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR.
.... PETITIONER
(BY SRI S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PRASHANTH MURTHY S.G., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
NO.28, VIKASA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF
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COMPANIES ACT, 1956
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010
REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR.
3. CHIEF ENGINEER
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
4. TENDER EVALUATION COMMITTEE
KRDCL
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
5. STATE LEVEL DEBARMENT COMMITTEE
ROOM NO.317, 3RD FLOOR
VIKASA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
6. BHARAT VANIJYA EASTERN PVT. LTD
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF
THE COMPANIES ACT
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
126, CHITTARANJAN AVENUE
2ND FLOOR, KOLKATA - 700073
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REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR.
7. VASANT VALAPPA NAIK
S/O VALAPPA RAMAPPA NAIK
CHIEF ENGINEER
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
8. N. SUSHELAMMA
MANAGING DIRECTOR
KARNATAKA ROAD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LIMITED
SURVEY NO.8. "SAMPARKA SOUDHA"
BEP PREMISES
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU - 560 010.
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI KIRAN V. RON, AAG A/W
SRI. MANJUNATH B. AGA FOR R1 & R5;
SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR R2 TO R4;
SRI. NAMAN JHABAKH, ADVOCATE FOR R6;
SMT. SUMANA BALIGA M., ADVOCATE FOR R8)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
DECLARE THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL; QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS
DATED 19.07.2025 (ANNEXURE-A) BEARING NO.
KRDCL/MANDYA DISTRICT/EE-3/D-V-K ROAD/2025-26/1415
OF RESPONDENT NO.4; AND ETC.
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IN WP NO.31906/2025
BETWEEN:
M/S MP 24 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(LEAD MEMBER OF CONSORTITUM WITH RAMALINGAM
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PVT. LTD.)
A PROPRIETORY CONCERN,
HAVING ITS HEAD OFFICE AT
NO. 95, HADENAHALLI VILLAGE,
SHRAVANABELAOAL ROAD,
BARALU POST, CHANNARAYAATNA TALUK,
HASSAN DISTRICT
BRANCH OFFICE
B2, 1201, BRAHMAGIRI,
MALAGALA BDA FLATS, PHASE 2,
5TH NORTH CROSS ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560072
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR.
.....PETITIONER
(By Sri. S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PRASHANTH MURTHY S. G.)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
NO. 28, VIKASA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
....RESPONDENT
(BY SRI KIRAN V. RON, AAG A/W
SRI. MANJUNATH B., AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
RESTORE THE ACCESS OF THE KARNATAKA E-PROCUREMENT
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PORTAL TO THE PETITIONER OR TO GIVE APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE E-GOVERNANCE CELL, THEREBY
GIVING FULL OPERATIONAL EFFECT TO THE INTERIM ORDER
DATED 25.09.2025 (ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE
COURT IN W.P. NO.25668/2025 (GM-TEN); AND ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR
ORDERS, COMING FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
E.S. INDIRESH J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
CAV ORDER
In these writ petitions, common questions of law and
facts are involved, and as such, at the consent of learned
counsel appearing for the parties, the writ petitions were
clubbed, heard together and disposed of by this Common order.
2. In W.P.No.25668 of 2025, the petitioner is assailing
the Government Order dated 13.08.2025 (Annexure-A) passed
by the respondent No.1, as illegal and unconstitutional.
3. In W.P.No.22904 of 2025, the petitioner is
challenging the proceedings dated 19.07.2025 (Annexure-A)
issued by the respondent No.4, inter alia seeks quashing of the
letter dated 25.07.2025, (Annexure-T), letter dated 24.07.2025
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(Annexure-X1) and letter dated 11.08.2025 (Annexure-AF) and
further seeking direction to the respondents Nos.2 and 3 to
issue letter of award to the petitioner in pursuance of the
Request For Proposal (Annexure-B).
4. In W.P.No.31906 of 2025, the petitioner has sought
for writ of mandamus to the respondent to restore the access
of the Karnataka e-Procurement Portal to the petitioner as per
the interim order dated 25.09.2025 passed by this Court in
W.P.No.25668 of 2025 inter-alia directing the respondents to
enable the petitioner to participate in ongoing and forthcoming
tenders published on the Karnataka Public Procurement Portal
as per the interim order passed by this court in W.P.No.25668
of 2025.
FACTS IN WP NO.25668 OF 2025:
5. The petitioner claims to be certified contractor had
completed several major public works projects. The
respondent-Karnataka Road Development Corporation Ltd., (for
short, 'Corporation), invited tender in relation to development
of road from Devanahalli - Vemagal - Kolar of SH-96 as per
Annexure-B. The petitioner, in joint venture with one M/s.
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Ramalingam Construction Company Pvt., Ltd., (hereinafter
referred to as 'RCCL') submitted its bid and was declared
technically qualified by the Tender Scrutiny Committee and
ranked as the lowest (L1) bidder. In the meanwhile, the
respondent No.5 being a rival bidder lodged a complaint to the
respondent-Corporation alleging that one of the Work
Experience Certificate submitted by the petitioner in Technical
Bid was forged and fabricated. The petitioner in its letter dated
19.06.2025 clarified that the said certificate issued by the
Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Department, has been
uploaded by its employee, without knowledge or authorization
by the petitioner and as such, the petitioner lodged complaint
with the jurisdictional Police and thereby, F.I.R. has been
registered against their employee for having uploaded the
fabricated certificate. The said aspect was communicated to
the respondent-Corporation as per Annexure-D. Thereafter,
the respondent No.2 by letter dated 25.07.2025, addressed to
the respondent No.1, recommending for disqualification of the
petitioner in the Tender process and decided to award contract
in favour of the respondent No.5 i.e., L2 Bidder. The
respondent No.2 sought for clarification with regard to circulars
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dated 11.05.2022 and 16.01.2025 as to awarding the contract
in favour of the respondent No.5-L2 Bidder as per Annexure-F.
It is also stated that the Circular dated 03.12.2002 (Annexure-
G) was in force as to decide on awarding work order. It is the
case of the petitioner that the allegation made against the
petitioner was referred to the State Level Debarment
Committee (respondent No.4) and therefore, the petitioner filed
WP No.22904 of 2025 before this Court, alleging bias and
favoritism by the respondent-Authorities in favour of the
respondent No.5-L2 Bidder. The petitioner had produced the
complaint and F.I.R. made against the respondent No.5 as
alleged by Sri. Venkatesha Bhushan and another complaint filed
by one Girish, Advocate. It is also the case of the petitioner
that respondent No.5 submitted a fabricated work done
certificate dated 14.08.2024 issued by National Highways
Authority of India and same was made known to the
respondents as per e-mail dated 10.06.2025 (Annexure-H and
H1). It is further stated in the writ petition that, the
respondent No.4 had issued notices dated 24.07.2025,
08.08.2025 and 12.08.2025 to the petitioner for their
appearance before State Level Debarment Committee and as
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such, the petitioner has sought for time to respond effectively.
It is further stated in the writ petition that the respondent-
Corporation had communicated through e-mail to the petitioner
on 12.08.2025 as to cancel the petitioner's bid and sought to
forfeit its Earnest Money Deposit. It is further stated in the writ
petition that, the respondent No.1 by order dated 13.08.2025
accepted the recommendation made by respondent No.4-
Committee and as such, debarred the petitioner from
participating in all public works in the State of Karnataka for a
period of three years. In this regard, the petitioner has filed
W.P.No.22904 of 2025 and this Court, granted an interim order
as per Annexure-J. It is further stated in the writ petition that
the respondents have lodged a complaint against the petitioner
before the Subramanya Police Station in Crime No.106 of 2025
for the offences punishable under Sections 318(4), 336(2),
336(3), 340(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Annexure-
K1). It is the case of the petitioner that, the respondent -
authorities have illegally blacklisted the petitioner and same
has been published in the Government Gazette as per
Annexure-L. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the
impugned order passed by the respondent-authorities is
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without providing fair opportunity to the petitioner. Hence, the
petitioner has filed W.P.No.25668 of 2025.
FACTS IN W.P.No.22904 of 2025:
6. The petitioner has sought for quashing the
proceedings dated 19.07.2025 (Annexure-A) issued by the
respondent-Corporation, letter dated 25.07.2025 (Annexure-T),
letter dated 24.07.2025 (Annexure-X1), letter dated
11.08.2025 (Annexure-AF), inter-alia, sought for direction to
the respondent -Corporation to issue the letter of award, in
pursuance of the Request For Proposal (for short 'RFP') and to
direct the respondents, to refund an amount of
Rs.7,63,00,000/- to the petitioner.
7. It is the case of the petitioner that, the petitioner,
an ISO-certified contractor, had successfully completed several
projects of the PWD and other State departments. Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 floated a tender (RFP dated 25.02.2025,
Annexure-B) for construction of the Devanahalli-Vemagal-
Kolar road. The last date for submission of bid document was
on 16.04.2025. It is further stated that, respondent No.5 is a
body constituted under Rule 26B of the Karnataka
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Transparency in Public Procurements Rules, 2000 (for short,
'KTPP Rules'), for the purpose of recommending for debarring a
bidder or a contractor. The respondent No.6 is one of the
bidders along with the petitioner.
8. It is further averred in the writ petition that, the
respondent-Corporation had issued addendum on 07.04.2025,
instructing the bidders to submit the document physically in the
office of the respondent No.3 and same is contrary to the
provisions of Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements
Act, 1999 (For short, 'KTPP Act') and KTPP Rules. It is stated
that, the petitioner had participated in the pre-bidding meeting
on 19.03.2025 and therefore, filing of the physical copy of the
bid is not required. It is also stated that Technical Bid was
opened on 19.04.2025 and the Financial Bid on 16.05.2025. It
is stated at paragraph 10 of the writ petition that, there were
four bidders and the petitioner was found to be technically
qualified and was declared as L1-Bidder. It is further stated
that, the bid document submitted by the petitioner was
discussed by the respondent No.4- Committee before opening
the Financial Bid. It is further stated that the petitioner had
joined with RCCL and form a consortium and as such,
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participated in the tender process. Copy of the Joint Bidding
Agreement dated 11.04.2025 is produced at Annexure-G. It is
further case of the petitioner that, one of the employees of the
petitioner, namely, Mr. Amarappa B. Nagurmeti, had obtained a
work done certificate in relation to HNSS Main Canal at Kadari,
Anantapuram District, issued by Andhra Pradesh Water
Resources Department produced at Annexure-H and same was
illegally uploaded by the said employee without the knowledge
and consent of the petitioner - Management. The petitioner
came to know about the same only through the respondent
No.3 vide letter dated 12.06.2025 (Annexure-J) and
authenticity of the said document is questioned in the writ
petition. Thereafter, the petitioner addressed letter dated
18.06.2025 (Annexure-K) to the respondent-Corporation,
expressed its inability to attend the meeting on 19.06.2025 as
called for by the respondent - Corporation vide letter dated
12.06.2025 (Annexure-J), on the ground of health issue.
Thereafter, the petitioner has addressed letter dated
19.06.2025 to the respondent-Corporation stating that, the
petitioner's technical capacity exceeds the required threshold of
Rs.762.86 Crores with its total capacity of 776.05 Crores and
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accordingly, requested for issuance of letter of award as per
Annexure-L Series. In the meanwhile, the petitioner conducted
internal investigation about the allegation of uploading fake
certificate said to have been issued by Andhra Pradesh Water
Resources Department, by its employee and as such lodged
complaint before the jurisdictional police and accordingly, FIR
was registered as per Annexure-M. Thereafter, the petitioner
addressed a detailed reply by letter dated 30.06.2025
(Annexure-N) stating that the procurement of the impugned
certificate said to have been uploaded by its employee, was
without the knowledge of the Management of the petitioner and
as such, clarified that the mistake committed by one of its
employees should not be considered as a fraudulent act on the
part of the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondent - Corporation
addressed letter dated 11.07.2025 (Annexure-P), directing the
petitioner to attend the meeting on 16.07.2025. In response to
the same, the petitioner replied as per letter dated 16.07.2025
(Annexure-Q). In the meeting dated 16.07.2025, the
representative of the petitioner sought for a copy of the
clarification received by the Income Tax Department from the
respondent No.3, however, same was declined by the
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respondent - Corporation. It is further stated that, the
petitioner had received a letter dated 22.05.2025 (Annexure-S)
from the member of the consortium- RCCL, as to disassociate
from the consortium. On 23.07.2025, the petitioner received
the proceedings of the meeting of the Technical Evaluation
Committee held on 18.06.2025 (Annexure-A) from the
respondent No.3, wherein, the Committee had recommended to
take action against the petitioner on the ground of fraudulently
participated in the tender process and further to submit a letter
to the State Government to place the subject in the State Level
Committee. Subsequently, the respondent - Corporation
addressed letter dated 25.07.2025 (Annexure-T) to the
respondent No.1 by referring to letter dated 24.07.2025
addressed by the Chairman of the respondent-Corporation,
regarding Circulars dated 11.05.2022 and 16.01.2025, seeking
clarification. The petitioner alleges that the respondent-
Corporation has deliberately recommended the matter to the
State Level Committee to enable work order be awarded to
respondent No. 6, despite the existence of complaints and a
CBI-registered FIR against respondent No.6 concerning large-
scale irregularities. It is pleaded that the respondent Nos.1 and
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2 are attempting to award the contract to the respondent No.6.
It is further stated in the writ petition that, the petitioner had
received e-mails from the respondent - Authorities as per
Annexure-X and X1, calling upon the petitioner to attend the
hearing before the respondent No.5 on 01.08.2025. The
petitioner has also produced e-mail dated 31.07.2025,
(Annexure-Z), wherein, the proprietor of the petitioner has
sought for postponement of the meeting. Thereafter, the
petitioner had received another notice dated 05.08.2025
(Annexure-AA) calling upon the petitioner to attend the
meeting on 08.08.2025. It is stated in the writ petition that,
the representatives of the petitioner had waited for 45 minutes
on 08.08.2025 and thereafter, received calls from Additional
Secretary of respondent No.1 that the meeting has been
cancelled. It is further stated that the petitioner had requested
the respondent No.1 to fix a date after 15.08.2025 as per e-
mail dated 08.08.2025 (Annexure-AB). However, the
respondent-State has fixed meeting on 12.08.2025 as per the
letter dated 11.08.2025 (Annexure-AC). Again, the petitioner
has addressed e-mail dated 12.08.2025 and letter dated
11.08.2025 as per Annexure-AE and AF respectively, seeking
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re-schedule of the meeting after 15.08.2025, however, the
respondent - Corporation, without considering the time sought
for by the petitioner, issued the impugned letter dated
11.08.2025 (Annexure-AF) and being aggrieved by the same,
petitioner has presented W.P.No.22904 of 2025.
FACTS IN W.P.No.31906 of 2025:
9. In this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for
writ of mandamus against the respondent authority to restore
the access of the Karnataka e-Procurement Portal to the
petitioner in terms of the interim order dated 25.09.2025
(Annexure-A) in W.P.No.25668 of 2025.
10. It is the case of the petitioner that, the petitioner
has challenged the order of blacklisting passed by the
respondent-State in W.P.No.22904 of 2025 and W.P.No.25668
of 2025 before this Court in respect of the tender issued by the
respondent- Karnataka Road Development Corporation Ltd (for
short 'Corporation') in the above writ petitions for improvement
and construction of State Highway-96 between Devanahalli-
Vemagal-Kolar under the Hybrid Annuity Mode. It is further
stated that, the award of tender is likely to be given to L2-rival
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bidder (respondent No. 6 in W. P. No.22904 of 2025) in which,
the petitioner also participated in the tender process and
declared as L1-bidder. This court, vide order dated 25.09.2025,
issued notice and granted interim order of stay and same is
continued. In the meanwhile, notwithstanding, the subsistence
of the interim of order of this court, the respondent-State has
deliberately restrained the petitioner to access to the Karnataka
e-Procurement portal. It is further stated that, the petitioner
has addressed reminders and follow up communication, with
regard to unblock the e-Procurement Portal, however, the
petitioner is not able to access with the portal, hence, the
petitioner has filed W.P.No.31906 of 2025.
11. In the meanwhile, the respondent-State has
challenged the interim order dated 25.09.2025, passed in
W.P.No.25668 of 2025 in W.A.No.1729 of 2025, and the
Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 03.11.2025
dispose of the appeal as the matter is pending consideration
before this Court.
12. I have heard Sri. S.S. Naganand, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of learned counsel Sri. Prashanth
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Murthy S.G., for the petitioner-M/s. MP24 Construction
Company; Sri. Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate
General along with Sri. Manjunath B., learned Additional
Government Advocate for the respondent-State; Sri. S.
Basavaraj, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Sri. Veeresh R.
Budihal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
Karnataka Road Development Corporation Ltd.; Sri. Naman
Jhabakh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bharat
Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd.; Smt. Sumana Baliga M., learned
counsel appearing for private respondents;
ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER:
13. Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner contended that, the entire action of
the respondent-authorities, to blacklist and debar the petitioner
is to facilitate the respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd.,
to be successful bidder in the tender. In this connection,
learned Senior Counsel, refers to following instances:
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a) Issuing of addendum dated 07.04.2025 (Annexure-C
in W.P.No.22904 of 2025), calling upon the bidders for
physical submission of bids;
b) Initiating the enquiry, after declaring the petitioner as
technically qualified and L1 bidder, and;
c) Despite the petitioner furnishing valid explanation
regarding the alleged uploading of fake document by its
employee and further, the respondents continued to find
fresh grounds to disqualify the petitioner from the tender
process.
14. It is further contended by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that, as per Section 2.2.2(A) and 3.4
of Tender document provides for eligibility criteria and in this
regard, the work done certificate of the petitioner, accumulates
to a total of financial capacity of Rs.776.05 Crores as against
Rs.762.86 Crores as per threshold technical capability. It is the
contention of the learned Senior Counsel that, even if, the
impugned certificate has not been submitted or considered by
the respondent-corporation, the petitioner would have been
eligible for award of contract. It is further submitted that the
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respondent-corporation have alleged discrepancies in the
petitioner's net worth as certified by its Chartered Accountant
vis-à-vis information obtained from the Income Tax
Department. However, this issue was first raised in the meeting
dated 14.07.2025 without any prior notice to the petitioner for
discussion is detail. It is further contended by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, the Tender Inviting
Authority may act only if fraud or corrupt practices are
established, as defined under Section 4 of the RFP- tender
document (Annexure-B in W.P.No.25668 of 2025) and
therefore, the finding recorded while recommending at
Annexure-A, is devoid of jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.
The respondent-authorities have failed to consider the
distinction between fraud and mistake, where mistake refers to
an error or misunderstanding which is bonafide in nature,
whereas a fraudulent act, involves intentional deception. In this
regard, learned Senior Counsel contended that, the petitioner
had no such intention to approve the impugned certificate as
the same was uploaded by its employee, a mistake without the
petitioner's knowledge and therefore, the said aspect of the
matter was not properly appreciated by the respondent-
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authorities. It is further contended that, the respondents are
making all possible efforts to award contract to respondent-
rival bidder, by disqualifying the petitioner and same is evident
from the letter dated 19.07.2025 issued by the respondent-
Corporation.
15. Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned Senior Counsel,
further, submitted that, although the petitioner repeatedly
sought for fair hearing pursuant to the notices issued therein,
the respondent-authorities hurriedly passed the impugned
order removing the petitioner from consideration. In this
regard, it is argued that, respondent-Tender Evaluation
Committee placing the case of the petitioner before the State
Level Debarment Committee to blacklist the petitioner from any
project in the State of Karnataka is wholly without jurisdiction.
It is further argued that, though various allegations have been
made against respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd., as to
the CBI investigation, the respondent-authorities are favouring
towards, said respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd., and
therefore, contended that the respondent-authorities are acting
contrary to the settled principle of law. It is further argued that,
by referring to the letter dated 24.07.2025 addressed by the
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Chairman of the respondent -Corporation as to clarification to
follow the circular issued by the State Government or the
direction issued by the Government to proceed against the
petitioner and the said aspect would makes it clear that, the
action of the respondent-authorities requires interference by
this Court.
16. It is further contended by the learned Senior
Counsel that, the entire proceedings and allegations made
against the petitioner is contrary to Section 4 of the Tender
document and further, for the bonafide reasons, the petitioner
had lodged Criminal complaint against its employee before the
jurisdictional police, in relation to uploading the fabricated
document and therefore, it is argued that the aforesaid aspect
have been ignored by the respondent-authorities and
accordingly, sought for interference of this Court.
17. It is further argued by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner, that, the respondent-authorities
were unreasonable towards the petitioner in not only denying
fair opportunity to submit reply/personal hearing but also,
acted arbitrarily against the petitioner to award contract in
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favour of respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd. In order
to buttress his arguments, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gorkha Security
Services vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others
reported in AIR 2014 SC 3371 and argued that, the Show-
cause notice must contain the material grounds necessitating
the action that may be taken against the petitioner and
accordingly, the impugned notices issued against the petitioner
lacks material on which the alleged action would be taken
against the petitioner and therefore, submitted that, the notice
issued by the respondent-authorities is contrary to the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UMC
Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. Foor Corporation of India and
another reported in (2021)2 SCC 551, in the case of Oasis
Projects Ltd vs. National Highways and Infrastructure
Development Corporation Ltd., reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine Delhi 2549.
18. Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Basudev Dutta vs. State of West Bengal and
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others reported in 2024 INSC 940 and in the case of
Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another reported in (2021) 1 SCC 804 and contended
that the action of the respondent-authorities is illegal and non-
est. The learned Senior Counsel further argued that, the
respondent-authorities have to be extremely cautious while
blacklisting the petitioner, as it will cause grave consequences
and the blacklisting constitutes civil death and therefore, any
order of blacklisting ought to have contain proper reasons with
a detailed or elaborated circumstances and in the absence of
the same, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. To
support the said contentions, learned Senior Counsel refers to
the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Blue
dreamz Advertising Pvt Ltd and another vs. Kolkata
Muncipal Corporation and others, reported in 2024 INSC
589 and in the case of M/s. Techno prints vs. Chhattisgarh
Textbook Corporation and another reported in 2025 INSC
236. Learned Senior Counsel, further, contended that,
blacklisting is a disproportional penalty made against the
petitioner, despite the petitioner had brought to the notice to
the respondent-Corporation as to uploading fake information by
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mistake by its employee, which is bonafide in nature. In this
regard, learned Senior Counsel refers to the judgment rendered
by the Delhi High Court in the case of Aurobindo Realty and
Infrastructure Pvt Ltd., vs. National Highways Authority
of India reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Delhi 8266.
19. It is further argued by Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that, the impugned
order passed by the respondent-State, blacklisting and
debarring the petitioner is contrary to Section 14-A(2) of KTPP
Act. It is argued that, the respondent-authorities has to issue
proper show-cause notice under Section 14-B(2) of KTPP Act,
before concluding the debarment proceedings. Learned Senior
Counsel further contended that, Rule 26B of the KTPP Rules,
provides for different mechanism and as such the respondent-
State Level Debarment Committee is only a recommendary
body under Rule 26B of the KTPP Rules and therefore, it is
submitted that, the impugned order is ultra-virus of the KTPP
Act and KTPP Rules.
20. It is further argued that the impugned order passed
by the respondent-Government is without any basis and no
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cogent reasons have been assigned and therefore, sought for
interference of this Court. Emphasising on the averments made
in the impugned order, it is argued by Sri. S. S. Naganand,
learned Senior Counsel that, sequence of events in the
impugned notice shows pre-determination by the respondent-
Government to disqualify the petitioner with ulterior motive and
therefore, sought for interference of this court on the ground
that, the impugned order has been passed by the respondent-
Government by exercising colorable exercise of power.
21. It is also argued by Sri. S. S. Naganand that the
digital signature certificate does not require OTP and mobile
verification and document which are in fake were uploaded by
the employee of the petitioner without knowledge of the
petitioner-management and the said aspect has been ignored
by the respondent-Corporation. The entire, impugned order is
based on the malafide act and is a abuse of power by the
respondent-authorities. It is argued that the status of the
petitioner is L1 in the tender process as the petitioner was
technically qualified and in this regard, the entire document
produced by the petitioner has been accepted by the
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respondent-Corporation and therefore, sought for setting aside
the impugned orders.
22. It is also contended by Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned
Senior Counsel that the petitioner cannot be blacklisted based
on non-essential document and in this regard, he referred to
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Banshidhar Constructions Pvt Ltd vs. Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd and others reported in (2024) 10 SCC 273. It is further
argued that, an order must be passed by an authority which
conducted the enquiry and in the present case as no enquiry
was conducted by the respondent-State and in view of the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others vs. Andhra Pradesh
State Road Transport Corporation and another reported in
AIR 1959 SC 308, the entire procedure adopted by the
respondent-authorities is contrary to law and as such, sought
for quashing of the impugned order passed by the respondent-
authorities.
23. Nextly, Sri. S. S. Naganand, learned Senior Counsel
while urging the principle of non-est factum, that, the action of
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uploading the fake document is not by the petitioner but by its
employee and in this regard, he refers to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramathal and others
vs. K Rajamani (dead) through LRs and another reported
in 2023 SCC onLine SC 1022. Having urged the
aforementioned grounds, the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner argued that, as the respondent-Government has not
complied with the interim order passed by this Court, and
therefore, respondent-authorities cannot be heard in the matter
and further as the respondent-authorities have disobeyed the
order passed by this court by not opening e-Procurement Portal
in favour of the petitioner to allow them to participate in the
tender process of the different Departments in the State
Government and accordingly, sought for setting aside the
impugned order of blacklisting and debarment order passed by
the respondent-authorities.
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS:
24. Per contra, Sri. S. Basavaraj, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for learned Counsel Sri. Veeresh R. Budihal,
for respondent-Corporation submitted that, the petitioner is an
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unregistered proprietary concern and therefore, the petitioner
is not a juristic person and has no jurisdiction to challenge the
impugned order passed by the respondent-authorities. It is
argued that, the petitioner has uploaded the fabricated
document at the time of participating in the tender, holding
itself, to be a eligible on the strength of fabricated document
and same was clarified with the competent department of State
of Andra Pradesh by the respondent-corporation as to geniuses
as to issuance of such certificate or not and therefore, it is
contended that, the petitioner being uploaded the
bogus/fabricated document is not entitled for equitable relief
under Article 226 of Constitution of India. It is further argued
by the learned Senior Counsel that, the petitioner being a
member of consortium with another company, i.e. RCCL-
petitioner in W.P.No.24912 of 2025 participated in the
proceedings and the said member of the consortium i.e. RCCL
had terminated its relationship with the petitioner much before
the opening of the technical bid and the said information was
suppressed by the petitioner with the respondent-corporation
and therefore, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. It is
further argued that as the Memorandum of Understanding
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dated 02.04.2025, Power of Attorney dated 07.04.2025 and
Joint Bidding Agreement dated 11.04.2025, entered into
between the petitioner with its consortium partner-RCCL, has
been terminated as per the email dated 16.04.2025 sent by
RCCL to the petitioner, withdrawal from the consortium (as per
Annexure-R14 in statement of objection filed by respondent-
Corporation in W.P.No.22904 of 2025) and therefore, the
petitioner has no legal right to participate in the tender process
and therefore, sought for dismissal of the petitions on the sole
ground that the Technical Bid was opened on 19.04.2025, and
while opening the Technical Bid the petitioner has not
whispered about the termination of its relationship with RCCL,
from the consortium and therefore, these writ petitions itself
are not maintainable.
25. It is further argued by the learned Senior Counsel by
referring to the legal notice dated 16.04.2025 issued by RCCL
to the petitioner, revoking the Power of Attorney, Joint Bidding
Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding by e-mail, at
2.37 pm, on 16.04.2025, just before the close of bidding,
directing the petitioner to not to participate in the tender
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process as a consortium and therefore, it is argued that the
writ petitions do not survive for consideration.
26. Learned Senior Counsel by inviting the attention of
the Court to the letter dated 28.05.2025 addressed by Water
Resources Department, Government of Andra Pradesh to
respondent-Corporation, wherein, it is clearly stated that the
certificate enclosed by the petitioner is purely bogus and forged
and not genuine and therefore, it is pleaded that the writ
petitions do not survive for consideration. It is argued by the
learned Senior Counsel that, as the writ petitions being a abuse
of process of this Court, and vitiates by false assertion and
misrepresentation and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the
writ petitions. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondent-Corporation contended that, under identical
circumstances in the petition before the High Court of Delhi, in
the case of CCS Computers Private Ltd., vs. New Delhi
Municipal Council and Another reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine Del 5354, the writ court decline to interfere with the
relief sought for by the petitioner therein, and accordingly,
sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
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27. Sri. Naman Jhabakh, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd, argued that, on
16.04.2025, all the interested parties had participated in the
bidding process by submitting their tenders. The respondent-
Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd., by letter dated 17.04.2025,
addressed to respondent-Corporation, requesting the
respondent-Corporation not to consider the certificate
submitted by them in respect of the four laning of NH39 (Old
NH 75) in the State of Jharkand on Hybrid Annuity Mode and is
not required under the RFP-Tender document of respondent-
Corporation, and further the said letter was addressed to the
respondent-corporation much before the opening of technical
bid and as such, respondent-Corporation and evaluation
committee has not considered the same. It is further argued by
the learned Counsel, that, the allegation made against the
respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd., by one Venkatesh
Bhushan, Advocate, is fake, as no such person is existing and
therefore, sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
28. It is further argued by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-Bharat Vanijya Eastern Pvt Ltd.,
that the petitioner has uploaded the fake document and same
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has been verified and proved by the Tendering Authority -
respondent-Corporation as fake document and therefore, the
writ petitions do not survive for consideration. In this regard,
learned counsel refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) vs. M/s Shaw
Brothers reported in (1992) 1 SCC 534 and argued that,
fraud vitiates even the most solemn transaction and
accordingly, sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. Further,
learned counsel refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and
others reported in (2007) 10 SCC 448 and argued that,
when the fraud is apparent on face of the record, pleadings are
not necessary to be looked into and therefore, sought for
dismissal of the writ petitions.
29. Sri. Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the respondent-State, argued that one of
the employees of the petitioner had misrepresented by
uploading the fake document and same was within the
knowledge of the petitioner, on 16.04.2025 itself much before
opening of technical bid. It is further argued by learned
Additional Advocate General, by referring to Annexure-R10,
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dated 19.07.2025, (filed by the respondent-Corporation) in
W.P.No.25668 of 2025, and argued that the recommendation
made by the State Level Debarment Committee has been
accepted as the petitioner himself admits in the writ petition as
to uploading the fake document and therefore, the writ
petitions requires to be dismissed in limine. Referring to Rule
26B of the KTPP Rules, it is contended by the learned Additional
Advocate General that, debarment of the petitioner is required
in the public interest and therefore, no interference is called for
in these writ petitions. He further refers to the notices issued
by the State Level Debarment Committee, seeking appearance
of the petitioner as per Annexure-R3, R4 and R5 in
W.P.No.25668 of 2025, wherein, the petitioner has sought time
to drag the proceedings beyond the statutory period under
KTPP Act and KTPP Rules and therefore, as the respondent-
authorities have to pass appropriate orders, within the time
frame, inter-alia, as per Annexure-R13 in W.P.No.25668 of
2025 wherein in the letter dated 30.06.2025, addressed by the
petitioner to the respondent-Corporation admits its liability as
well as uploading the fake document would suffice for taking
action against the petitioner. Even if the petitioner contends
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that, the principles of natural justice has not been extended
and further, opportunity of personal hearing was not extended
to it, however the same is only an empty formality on account
of admission made by the petitioner itself in the writ petitions
as to uploading the fake document which was subsequently
verified by the respondent-Corporation with the Public Works
Department of State of Andra Pradesh and therefore,
interference is in these writ petitions is not required based on
pleadings on record. Referring to the Annexure- R15 in
W.P.No.25668 of 2025, particularly, paragraph at 7, wherein
the proprietor of the petitioner alone, required to use the key of
the portal and therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
vicariously put the blame on its employee and accordingly,
sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
30. While referring to paragraph at 7 in W.P.No.25668
of 2025, it is argued by the learned Additional Advocate
General that, nothing has been stated in the writ petition as to
how the prejudice is caused to the petitioner on account of not
extending personal hearing and further as the petitioner has
approached the Court with unclean hands, and as such
petitioner is not entitled for equitable relief under Article 226 of
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Constitution of India. In this regard, learned Additional
Advocate General, refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Principal Chief conservator of
Forest and others vs. Suresh Mathew and others reported
in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 933 and argued that, correctness of
the conclusion reached by the respondent-authorities, in a
tender proceedings is not open to judicial review under Article
226 of Constitution of India unless arbitrariness is established
against the authorities. Referring to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagadish Mandal vs.
State of Orissa and others reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517,
Sri. Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate General,
representing respondent-State submitted that, as the petitioner
has uploaded the fake document and same is admitted in the
writ petition, and as such, the petitioner is not entitled for
hearing by the respondent-authorities, and accordingly, sought
for dismissal of the writ petitions.
31. In the light of the submission made by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties, I have perused the records
submitted by the respondent-authorities.
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32. It is forthcoming from the records that, the
respondent -State has preferred W.A. No.1729 of 2025, against
the interim order dated 25.09.2025 in W.P.No.25668 of 2025,
and the Division Bench of this Court, at paragraph Nos 9 to 14
held as under:
"9. Insofar as the first issue is concerned- whether the
decision of the competent authority to award the contract to
L2 or issue fresh tenders- is concerned, it is clear that the
same would necessarily have to be subject to the orders
passed in the writ petitions. This is so because the writ
petitioner's tender has in effect been rejected on the ground
of the complaints received and the blacklisting order, if the
blacklisting order is set aside, the writ petitioner would be
entitled for being considered for award of the contract. In
such circumstances, the question of awarding the contract to
L2 or issuing a fresh tender, need not arise.
10. Given the fact that the learned Single Judge has placed
the matter for consideration on 05.11.2025, we do not
consider it apposite to interfere with the interim
arrangement, at this stage.
11. Insofar as the Second issue is concerned- that is,
pending the writ petitioner to participate in tenders floated
by M/s Cauvery Niravari Nigam Limited,- the learned Single
Judge has amply clarified that the same would be subject to
the outcome of the petitioner's challenge. Further, the writ
petitioner would not claim any equities or any advantage of
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the interim order except to the extent that is removes the
disability in participating in the tender on account of the
blacklisting order. The rationale of issuing such directions is
apparent. If the writ petitioner was to succeed in the writ
petition and the blacklisting order is set aside, the writ
petitioner could not be visited with any disadvantages on
that account.
12. Undeniably, permitting the petitioner to participate in
such tenders, may create some uncertainty in the
finalisation of the tenders. However we do not consider it
apposite to examine the said question, as the writ petition
are listed by the Learned Single Judge for final hearing on
05.11.2025. Thus, the apprehension that there may be a
delay at this stage, is unfounded. However, if the petitions
are not disposed of and it is likely that finalisation of the
tenders invited by M/s Cauvery Nigam Limited would be
delayed, the appellant would have the liberty to apply
afresh.
13. The apprehension that the decision of the writ petitions
may be delayed on account of any delay by the competent
authority (State Cabinet) to take a stand, is also unfounded.
14. As noticed above, the writ petitioner's challenge is
premised on actions taken by the appellant against the writ
petitioner. Thus, irrespective of whether the State Cabinet
takes a decision within time or not, the same would not
impede the learned Single Judge form taking up the final
hearing of the writ petitions, as scheduled."
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33. In view of the direction issued by the Division Bench
of this Court in W.A.No.1729 of 2025, the writ petitions were
heard together.
34. The undisputed facts are that, the respondent-
Corporation has invited tender for development of road from
Devanahalli-Vemagal-Kolar, as per Annexure- B to the writ
petitions. The petitioner has participated in the tender as a
consortium along with another member-RCCL.
35. Perusal of the tender document would indicate that,
the last date for submission of tender/bid was on 16.04.2025.
Opening of the Technical Bid on 19.04.2025. After declaration
of the eligible/qualified bidder, Financial Bid would be open on
16.05.2025 and the list of event description of schedule of
bidding process is reflected at Section 1.3 of the tender
document-Request For Proposal (RFP). It is the case of the
petitioner that, the respondent-authorities have issued the
impugned order dated 13.08.2025, blacklisting the petitioner
and debarring the petitioner from all works in the State of
Karnataka for three years and same was uploaded in e-
Procurement Portal of the State Gazatte without following the
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principles of natural justice and entire action of the respondent-
authorities is bad in law. In the backdrop of the arguments
advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the
following points arises for consideration:
i) Whether the petitioner has made out a case for
interference in these writ petitions ?
ii) Whether the petitioner is justified in stating that the
principles of natural justice is being curtailed by the
respondent-authorities ?
iii) Whether the impugned order dated 13.08.2025 is
arbitrary and requires to be interfered with under
Article 226 of Constitution of India ?
36. In order to answer the aforementioned points, the
terms and conditions stipulated at Tender document, plays vital
role to assess the credibility of the petitioner in the tender
process. Perusal of Section 1.2.1 of Tender document indicate
that, the respondent- Corporation adopted a single stage two
envelope process for selection of the bidder for award of the
project. The intending bidders shall pay non-refundable sum
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of Rs.10,00,000/- as the bid document fee to the respondent -
Corporation. Eligible and qualified bidder will be first examined
based on the details submitted under first envelope (Technical
bid) with respect to their eligibility and qualifications criteria as
per the bid document. The second envelope (Financial Bid) shall
be opened only of those bidders who were declared eligible and
qualified in the Technical Bid. The Schedule of Bidding Process
is provided under Section 1.3 of the tender document. It is also
to be noted that, provision has been made for bidding
individually as well as through consortium. In order to
understand the terms and conditions of the Tender document,
as to assess the credibility and fairness in the procedure in the
tender process, some of the terms and conditions are relevant
and are hereby extracted for the purpose of easy reference for
adjudication of the writ petitions. Section 2.1.9, which reads as
under:
"In case the Bidder is a Consortium, the Members thereof
should furnish a Power of Attorney in favour of any Member,
which Member shall thereafter be identified as the Lead
Member, in the format at Appendix - VI. In case the Bidder
is a Consortium, Joint Bidding Agreement in the format at
Appendix V shall be submitted by the Bidder."
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37. Section 2.1.15(f) provides that members of a
consortium shall form an appropriate special purpose vehicle to
execute the project, if work order is awarded to the consortium.
Section 2.1.15(g) provides for members of the consortium shall
enter into a binding Joint Bidding Agreement as per appendix-V
to the bidding document and same shall be submitted to the
respondent - Corporation. Section 2.2.1(a)&(b) provides as
follows:
"2.2.1 For determining the eligibility of the Bidder the
following shall apply:
(a) The Bidder may be a single entity or a group of entities
(the "Consortium"), coming together to implement the
Project. However, no Bidder applying individually or as a
member of a Consortium, as the case may be, can be
member of another Bidder. The term Bidder used herein
would apply to both a single entity and a Consortium.
(b) Bidder may be a natural person, private entity, or any
combination of them with a formal intent to enter into a
Joint Bidding Agreement or under an existing agreement to
form a Consortium. A Consortium shall be eligible for
consideration subject to the conditions set out in Clause
2.1.15."
(underlined by me)
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38. Section 2.6.2 provides as follows:
"The Authority reserves the right to reject any Bid and
appropriate the Bid Security if:
(a) at any time, a material misrepresentation is made or
uncovered, or
(b) the Bidder does not provide, within the time specified by
the Authority, the supplemental information sought by the
Authority for evaluation of the Bid.
Such misrepresentation/ improper response shall lead to the
disqualification of the Bidder. If the Bidder is a Consortium,
then the entire Consortium and each Member of the
Consortium may be disqualified/rejected. If such
disqualification/rejection occurs after the Bids have been
opened and the lowest Bidder gets disqualified/rejected,
then the Authority reserves the right to annul the Bidding
Process and invites fresh Bids."
(emphasis supplied)
39. Section 4.1 of the Tender documents provides for
disqualification of the tenderer, if misrepresentation or fraud is
committed by not only the applicant/ tenderer but also their
employees.
40. Perusal of the aforementioned provisions make it
clear that, if a bidder is a consortium and indulged in
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misrepresentation, shall lead to disqualification of the bidder.
Consortium in true sense, means each member of the
consortium, irrespective of their active / non active / limited /
lead bidder / advisory or any of incidental nature of
participation in the tender process would suffer penalty of
disqualification, being a member of the consortium. Section
2.11.2 of the tender document provides for furnishing the
original document to the respondent - Corporation by the
bidder including all the members of the consortium and Section
2.11.5 provides for unconditional debarment in case of failure
to comply with Section 2.11.2. Section 3.2.1(e) provides for
test of responsiveness in which, the Lead Member of
Consortium shall file the Power of Attorney and the Joint
Bidding Agreement as per Section 2.1.9. Section 4.1 of the
tender document provides for disqualification of the bidder in
case of indulging in 'fraud' and 'corrupt practices'. The
aforementioned document being accepted by the consortium
consisting of the petitioner and RCCL as one unit, must face all
consequences together in the event of any action by them
which is contrary to the tender document. To elaborate in
detail, the consortium member-RCCL, came to know about the
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uploading of fabricated document by the petitioner and as such,
immediately, sent e-mail dated 16.04.2025, admittedly, to the
petitioner, however, the said e-mail was not marked or sent to
the respondent- Corporation for the reasons best known to the
RCCL and on the other hand, the petitioner did not disclose to
the said fact to the respondent-Corporation as the Technical Bid
opened on 19.04.2025 and Financial bid on 16.05.2025. It is
forthcoming from the letter dated 22.05.2025, wherein, the
RCCL had informed the respondent-Corporation with regard to
withdrawal of Joint Bidding Agreement and the Power of
Attorney belatedly from the petitioner, of course, after a period
of one month and as such, RCCL requested the respondent -
Corporation to reject the tender. If at all the petitioner was
more cautious about its stand in making allegation against its
employee as to uploading fake certificate, nothing prevented
the petitioner or RCCL to inform the respondent - Corporation
on the very same day i.e., on 16.04.2025 as the Technical Bid
was opened on 19.04.2025 and in this regard, the conduct of
the petitioner and RCCL has to be deprecated. It is also to be
noted that, the date of submission of tender/bid through online
was 16.04.2025. The Technical Bid was opened on 19.04.2025
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as per Section 1.3 of the tender document, and if at all the
petitioner had notified to the respondent - Corporation about
the fraudulent act on the part of petitioner's employee at the
earliest as to uploading of fabricated document, the respondent
- Corporation ought to have taken appropriate decision in the
matter. It this regard, it is relevant to extract the letter/ e-mail
dated 16.04.2025 addressed by RCCL to the petitioner which
reads as under:-
To
M/s MP24 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
No.95,Hadenahalli, Channarayapatna Shranabelagola Road,
Hassan, Karnataka- 573135.
Subject: Withdrawal of our consortium/Joint venture
agreement
TENDER ID No. KRDCL/IFB/2024-25/28 Dated:25.02.2025
Description works: Development of Road from Devanahalli to
Kolar (from 0.00 km to km 49.284) of SH-96 (Design length
48.20km) in the state of Karnataka on PPP-DBFOMT-Hybrid
Annuity Mode.
Respected Sir
We refer to the Consortium/Joint Venture Agreement entered
into between our company, M/s Ramalingam Construction
Company Private Limited, and M/s. MP24 Construction
Company, dated 7th April 2025, for the purpose of jointly
undertaking the above tender. But due to unavoidable reasons
we are not ready to continue our consortium/Joint venture
agreement.
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Hence, we requesting you to not to submit our prequalification
criteria for the above tender, we request you to not to submit
to the above tender along with out Prequalification documents.
Kindly do the needful.
Thanking you.
For Ramalingam Construction
Company Private Limited
S Baskaran
Manager Tenders
41. The perusal of the writ papers and the records,
make it clear that, the petitioner has not approached this Court
with clean hands and suppressed the true facts as to knowledge
of uploading of fabricated document for a considerable period
till the conclusion of the technical bid and that apart , learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner did not dispute as to to receipt
of the above e-mail dated 16.04.2025, and therefore, the entire
act of the petitioner cannot be accepted to grant equitable relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
42. It is the categorical submission of Sri.
S.S.Naganand, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that,
the impugned order of disqualification and blacklisting is non-
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est on the ground of not providing fair opportunity to the
petitioner and the respondent-authorities are interested to
award the contract in favour of respondent-Bharat Vanijya
Eastern Pvt Ltd., illegally. In this regard, on careful
consideration of the pleadings in writ petitions, would make it
clear that, the petitioner being a consortium along with RCCL
has uploaded, the fabricated certificate issued by State of
Andra Pradesh, Water Resources Department and has violated
the terms and condition of the Tender document. In view of the
admission made by the petitioner, in the pleadings itself as to
uploading the fake document, I am of the view that, the
petitioner is not entitled for hearing in view of Section 4 of the
Tender document at Annexure-B. It is also not in dispute that,
the petitioner has lodged criminal action against its employee
for having uploaded the fake document and therefore, the
petitioner is vicariously liable for fraudulent practice indulged
by its employees and therefore, there is no question of
providing opportunity to the petitioner as the uploading the
fake document itself is not disputed by the petitioner. In this
regard, it is relevant to deduce the declaration of law by the
High Court of Delhi in CCS Computers Pvt Ltd (supra)
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wherein paragraphs 41 to 49, 58 to 61, 64, and 70 and 71
reads as under:
"41. Law with respect to vicarious liability of an employer for
acts and omissions of the employees is no longer res integra.
In Sitaram Motilal (supra), the Supreme Court restated the
law laid down by Lord Denning in Ormord v. Crosville Motor
Services Ltd., [1953] 2 All ER 753 that owner is not only liable
for negligence of the driver, if the driver is his servant acting
in the course of his employment but also where the driver is,
with the owner's consent, driving the car for his own purpose.
This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court
in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing
Co. (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745. In Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh
Reddy, (1996) 5 SCC 21, the Supreme Court held that the
crucial test is whether the initial act of the employee was
expressly authorized and lawful. If it was, then the employer
shall nevertheless be responsible for the manner in which the
employee acts. If the dispute revolves around the mode or
manner of execution of the authority of the master by the
servant, master cannot escape the liability so far as the third
parties are concerned on the ground that he had not actually
authorized the particular manner in which the act was done. It
was also held that the accident in that case took place when
the act authorized was being performed in a mode which may
not be proper but nonetheless was directly connected with the
course of employment and was not an independent act for a
purpose which had no nexus or connection with the business
of the employer so as to absolve him from the liability.
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In Salmond's Law of Torts (Twentieth Edn.), it is stated as
follows:--
"On the other hand it has been held that a servant who is
authorised to drive a motor vehicle, and who permits an
unauthorised person to drive it in his place, may yet be
acting within the scope of his employment. The act of
permitting another to drive may be a mode, albeit an
improper one, of doing the authorised work. The master
may even be responsible if the servant impliedly, and not
expressly, permits an unauthorised person to drive the
vehicle, as where he leaves it unattended in such a manner
that it is reasonably foreseeable that the third party will
attempt to drive it, at least if the driver retains notional
control of the vehicle."
42. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edn., Vol. 16, para
739 is held as follows:--
"Where the act which the employee is expressly authorised
to do is lawful, the employer is nevertheless responsible
for the manner in which the employee executes his
authority. If, therefore, the employee does the act in such
a manner as to occasion injury to a third person, the
employer cannot escape liability on the ground that he did
not actually authorise the particular manner in which the
act was done, or even on the ground that the employee
was acting on his own behalf and not on that of his
employer."
43. I may also allude to a judgment of the Privy Council
in United Africa Company Limited v. Saka Owoade, [1957] 3
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All ER 216, wherein it was laid down that a master is liable for
his servant's fraud perpetrated in the course of master's
business, whether the fraud was for master's benefit or not, if
it was committed by the servant in the course of his
employment.
44. In Punjab National Bank v. Smt. Durga Devi, 1977 SCC
OnLine Del 93, Division Bench of this Court held that acts of
fraud or collusion by bank officials with a view to benefit a
person presenting a forged or materially altered cheque
results in payment being made by the bank against such a
cheque and such an act of the bank employees, being within
the course of their employment, is binding on the bank at the
instance of the person who is damnified by the fraud albeit the
bank is free to take action against its officials. In Smt.
Niranjan Kaur v. New Delhi Hotels Ltd., 1987 SCC OnLine Del
313, this Court observed that a master is not responsible for
wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in the
course of employment and it is deemed to be so done if it is
either: (1) a wrongful act authorized by the master; or (2) a
wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorized
by the master. It was also observed that a master is liable
even for acts which he has not authorized, provided they are
so connected with acts which he has authorized that they may
rightly be regarded as modes albeit improper modes of doing
them. If a servant does negligently that which he was
authorized to do carefully or if he does fraudulently that which
he was authorized to do honestly, his master will answer for
that negligence, fraud or mistake.
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45. In Poongottil Prasad v. Melattur Grama Panchayat, 2023
SCC OnLine Ker 5596, the Kerala High Court observed that
ordinarily a person is liable for his own wrongful acts and one
does not incur any liability for acts done by others, however,
principle of vicarious liability makes certain persons liable for
acts of others. This principle applies where the law presumes
that 'he who does an act through another is deemed in law to
do it himself'. Commonly accepted examples of vicarious
liability are in cases of relationship between principal and
agent, master and servant and partners in each other's tort.
Fundamental requirements to apply vicarious liability are that
there should be a certain relationship between the two parties
and that the wrongful act should be done in such a way that it
is connected to the relationship. It would be useful at this
stage to refer to a judgment of this Court in CE Info Systems
Pvt. Ltd. v. Gas Authority of India Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del
7779, where a challenge was laid by the Petitioner to an order
debarring it from participating in bidding process related to a
tender floated by GAIL, for a period of three years, based on
an allegation that Petitioner had submitted a forged certificate
indicating that it had completed certain works for IOCL for a
certain value. There was no dispute that the certificate was
forged but the Petitioner contended that this did not warrant a
punitive measure as the certificate was furnished by its
employee who was not authorized to do so and moreover, it
did not affect Petitioner's eligibility for participating in the
tender in question. Challenge to the debarring order was laid
by the Petitioner on five fronts, the first of them being that
the forged completion certificate was not issued by its
authorized officer and emphasis was laid on a Power of
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Attorney furnished along with the bid indicating that one of
the General Managers of the Petitioner company was
constituted as the attorney to act on behalf of the Petitioner in
respect of the said tender. Court negated the contentions,
observing that it was wholly unpersuasive that the document
had been furnished by an unauthorized person inasmuch as
Petitioner had furnished a letter of authority in favour of Shri
Sandeep Rathore, which also indicated that he was authorized
for any subsequent correspondence/communication in relation
to the bid document submitted by the Petitioner. Court also
held that the fact that Petitioner submitted a forged document
was enough for GAIL to take a decision not to deal with the
Petitioner and the question whether Petitioner derived any
benefit from the same is relevant only to determine the
quantum of punishment.
46. In the aforesaid case, Court also referred to the guidelines
laid down by the Supreme Court in Kulja Industries (supra),
but declined to interfere with the debarment order observing
that Petitioner did seem to derive benefit from submission of
the forged document for the reason that although Petitioner
claimed to be eligible on the basis of work executed for Atlas
Comnet, it did not provide the document sought by GAIL for
establishing the same and instead supplied forged completion
certificate, allegedly issued by IOCL, showing that Petitioner
had completed work of the value required as eligibility
condition. It was observed that it was obvious that intention of
the Petitioner was to acquire eligibility to participate in the
bidding process based on the contract with IOCL, conveniently
ignoring the requirement of providing document of experience
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of working with Atlas Comnet, basis which Petitioner had
initially claimed to be eligible for participating in the bidding
process. Significantly, Court also held that notwithstanding
the provisions of the terms of the contract, GAIL would have
the authority to take a decision not to enter into business with
the contractor, if it is found that contractor had indulged in
fraudulent practices as this is an inherent right available with
any authority. Reference was made in this context to the
judgment in Patel Engineering Limited v. Union of
India, (2012) 11 SCC 257. On the aspect of principle of
natural justice, Court noted that Petitioner was put to notice
before taking the action of blacklisting.
47. From the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it is
luminously clear that an employer or a master cannot distance
himself from the acts or omissions of the employee/servant
where the acts or omissions are in the course of employment
and authorized by the employer/master, even if the acts or
omissions are through wrongful and unauthorized modes so
long as they have a direct nexus with the employment. In the
instant case, it is an admitted case of the Petitioner that Sh.
Puspendra Singh was duly authorized to take necessary steps
towards the bidding process and therefore his act of
submitting the bid document, including the forged Turnover
Certificate was an act in the course of employment. In fact,
Petitioner has itself placed on record job description of Sh.
Puspendra Singh, which shows his role and responsibilities
and inter alia includes revenue generation by selling IT
infrastructure services and solution in Government sectors
etc.; participating in Government procurement projects
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through tenders; liasoning; coordinating and negotiating
prices with OEMs; preparing quotations as per customer
requirement; coordinating with all teams to process
bid/tender related activities etc. Therefore, once the bidding
process was carried out by an employee, authorized by the
Petitioner to do that act, Petitioner cannot distance itself and
contend that it be absolved of the liability. It bears repetition
to state that a master is liable even for acts he has not
authorized, provided they are connected with the employment
or the acts which were authorized and the only exception that
can be carved out is where the employee does an act which is
not even remotely connected with his scope of employment
and is his independent act, which is not the case here.
48. A significant aspect of this case, which weighs heavily
against the Petitioner is that there is no dispute that the
Turnover Certificate was forged. It is equally undisputed that
the Certificate was uploaded by employees of the Petitioner,
duly authorized to process and submit the tender document.
It is crucial to note that Respondent No. 2/the OEM has not
only taken a categorical stand before NDMC and on an
affidavit before this Court that its officials had vide e-mail
dated 23.06.2022 provided the product link for the electronic
tablets, the goods that were to be supplied under the tender
in question after it was decided that Respondent No. 2 being
the OEM would supply the electronic tablets and along with
the product link, it had sent several document to the
Petitioner including Authorization Letter dated 21.06.2022, a
BIS Renewal Certificate, an Udyam Registration Certificate as
also the Turnover Certificate dated 24.03.2022, among other
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document. It is also stated in the affidavit that the Turnover
Certificate as shared by Respondent No. 2 reflected a turnover
of Rs. 28,20,10,671/- of Respondent No. 2 for Financial Year
2020-2021. E-mail with its attachment containing the
Turnover Certificate, which indeed reflects the turnover as Rs.
28,20,10,671/-, has been filed by Respondent No. 2 and
importantly, this document has been concealed by the
Petitioner. It is an uncontroverted position that Respondent
No. 2's financial status and certifications were regularly
updated on the GeM Portal and/or that Respondent No. 2 was
able to establish in the personal hearing that the Turnover
Certificate it had shared with the Petitioner before uploading,
reflected the actual and correct turnover. This completely
explains the position of NDMC in not taking any action against
Respondent No. 2, which is one of the contention and
grievance of the Petitioner albeit the role of its representative
is under examination in the pending criminal case and hence
no observation is made here. Be that as it may, the
responsibility to submit and upload the bid was of the
Petitioner and therefore, due caution ought to have been
taken at the senior level to ensure that the bid is submitted
with true and correct information and supporting document
and therefore, the fact that NDMC has not taken any action
against Respondent No. 2 is inconsequential.
49. The main stake of the argument of the Petitioner with
respect to the forgery of the Turnover Certificate is that the
Management of the Petitioner was completely unaware of the
forgery by its employees. As noted above, Petitioner cannot
claim immunity for the acts of its employees done in the
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course of their employment. Even otherwise, the onus of
submitting factually correct information and document was on
the Petitioner. The tender in question was a high value bid
and it is unbelievable that the Management of the Petitioner
had completely distanced itself from the process of preparing
the document etc. for submission of the bid and assuming
that it did, it was at its own peril and NDMC cannot be faulted
for taking action once it was clear that a forged bid document
had been submitted. Also it cannot be glossed over that with a
turnover of Rs. 28,20,10,671/-, Petitioner was ineligible to bid
and therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of the award of
contract must accept responsibility for the forgery to achieve
the eligibility condition. The argument that NDMC has nothing
to lose since ultimately the tender was not accorded is
irrelevant since the sanctity of a tender process is required to
be maintained and therefore, a party which indulges in
wrongdoings at the stage of bidding cannot be heard to say
that no penalty should be imposed. Assuming a situation
where no complaint was received highlighting the forgery in
the Turnover Certificate, the contract may have been awarded
to the Petitioner basis a forged bid document which was
against public interest.
***
58. It is true that blacklisting is a serious action and amounts
to civil death of a business entity. It is equally settled that
before taking a decision for blacklisting or debarring any
entity, the Competent Authority must arrive at an objective
satisfaction taking into account relevant consideration and
eschewing irrelevant ones. [Ref.: Erusian Equipment &
Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70]. It
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has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court that
before taking action of blacklisting/debarment, principles of
natural justice must be followed by issuing a show cause
notice and giving an opportunity of hearing to the entity
against whom action is sought to be taken to ascertain if there
is any rationale behind the alleged misconduct. [Ref.: Joseph
Vilangandan v. The Executive Engineer, (PWD),
Ernakulam, (1978) 3 SCC 36, Raghunath Thakur v. State of
Bihar, (1989) 1 SCC 229 and Gorkha Security
Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105].
Indisputably, in the present case, these parameters are duly
met inasmuch as show cause notice was issued and Petitioner
was given opportunity of presenting its case.
59. In State of Odisha v. Panda Infraproject Limited, (2022) 4
SCC 393, the Supreme Court held that debarment is an
effective method for disciplining deviant suppliers/contractors
who may have committed acts of omission and commission
and negated the plea that even if the alleged action was the
first offence committed by the contractor, it was of no avail
where the allegations were serious. Relevant paragraphs are
as follows:--
"24. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of
decisions "debarment" is recognised and often used as an
effective method for disciplining deviant
suppliers/contractors who may have committed acts of
omission and commission. It is for the State or appropriate
authority to pass an order of blacklisting/debarment in the
facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the High
Court has erred and has exceeded its jurisdiction in
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exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India by quashing and setting aside the blacklisting order,
that too, without adverting to the serious allegations and
the act of omission and commission on the part of the
contractor which led to a serious incident of collapse of ten
metre slab while concrete work of the deck was going on
and due to which one person died and eleven others were
injured. It was specifically found that the safety
arrangements were lacking severely in the construction
work zone. It was also found that quality assurance was
not emphasised as stipulated in the codes and manuals
and as per the agreement. Therefore, the High Court ought
to have considered the seriousness of the incident in which
due to omission and commission on the part of the
contractor in constructing the flyover one person died and
eleven others were injured.
25. The next question which is posed for consideration of
this Court is, whether, in the facts and circumstances of
the case the contractor was required to be
debarred/blacklisted permanently?
26. In Kulja Industries [Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Western
Telecom Project BSNL, (2014) 14 SCC 731], this Court has
observed that "debarment" is never permanent and the
period of debarment would invariably depend upon the
nature of the offence committed by the erring contractor.
In the said decision this Court emphasised on prescribing
guidelines by determining the period for which the
blacklisting should be effective. It is observed and held by
this Court that while determining the period for which the
blacklisting should be effective, for the sake of objectivity
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and transparency it is required to formulate broad
guidelines to be followed. It is further observed that
different periods of debarment depending upon the gravity
of the offences, violations and breaches may be prescribed
by such guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
28. Duration of blacklisting cannot be solely per offence.
Seriousness of the lapse and the incident and/or gravity of
commission and omission on the part of the contractor
which led to the incident should be the relevant
considerations. In a given case, it may happen that the
commission and omission is very grave and because of the
serious lapse and/or negligence, a major incident would
have taken place. In such a case, it may be the
contractor's first offence, in such a case, the
period/duration of the blacklisting/banning can be more
than three years. However, as the said guidelines are not
under challenge, we rest the matter there and leave it to
the State Government to suitably amend and/or modify the
said office memorandum. However, what we have
observed above can be a guide while determining the
period of debarment/blacklisting.
29. In the instant case, it might be true that the offence
was the first offence committed by the contractor.
However, considering the seriousness of the matter that
due to the omission and commission on the part of the
contractor a serious incident had occurred as there was a
collapse of a ten metre slab while constructing a flyover in
which one person died and eleven others injured, as such
the contractor does not deserve any leniency. However, to
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debar him permanently can be said to be too harsh a
punishment. But considering the subsequent OM dated 26-
11-2021 reproduced hereinabove (to which as such we do
not agree as observed hereinabove), we are of the opinion
that if the blacklisting is restricted to five years, it may be
in the fitness of things."
60. In W.B. State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co.
Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 451, the Supreme Court emphasized on
the degree of care that should be taken in a bidding process
and that it was essential to maintain the sanctity and integrity
of the tender process as also award of a contract. One of the
decisions of the Supreme Court where the blacklisting was
found to be justified also needs a mention. In Patel
Engineering Limited (supra), Petitioner had chosen to go back
on its offer of paying a premium of Rs. 190.53 crores per
annum after realising that the next bidder quoted a much
lower amount. The Supreme Court held that whether the
decision of the Petitioner was bona fide or mala fide required a
further probe but the dereliction in which the Petitioner had
indulged if not handled firmly, was likely to result in
recurrence of such activity not only on part of the Petitioner
but also others who deal with public bodies. The Supreme
Court also observed that there was no illegality or irrationality
in the conclusion of the Respondent that Petitioner was not
commercially reliable and trustworthy in the light of its
conduct. In fact, in Kulja Industries (supra), the party was
blacklisted on account of a fraudulent withdrawal of huge
amount of money which was not due to it, in collusion and
conspiracy with officials of the Respondent Corporation and
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the Supreme Court in fact upheld the decision to blacklist the
Petitioner but only directed reconsideration of the period of
blacklisting.
61. The facts of this case come close to the decision of this
Court in CE Info Systems Pvt. Ltd. (supra), facts of which
have been brought out in detail in earlier part of the
judgment. At the cost of repetition, in the said case, the Court
was examining an order passed by GAIL debarring the
Petitioner from participating in the bidding process for three
years basis an allegation that Petitioner had submitted a
forged certificate indicating that it had completed certain
works for IOCL for a certain value indicated therein. Petitioner
did not dispute that the certificate was forged but contended
that the same was furnished by its employee, who was not
authorized to do so and therefore, there was no warrant for a
punitive measure. Petitioner contended inter alia that the
forged certificate was not issued by the authorized officer.
GAIL, on the other hand, disputed that the forged certificate
was not issued by the authorized officer and sought to
establish his authorization. It was also contended that
Petitioner did not qualify the eligibility criteria but for the
forged completion certificate.
***
64. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner laboured hard to
emphasise on the credentials of the Petitioner by referring to
its impeccable track record and proven integrity, substantiated
by its contracts with various Government as also Public Sector
Undertakings, including Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Gas, Ministry of Defence, National Informatics Centre, Ministry
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of Power, NTPC, Airport Authority of India, Power Grid
Corporation of India, IIT, Mumbai, BHEL etc., with a view to
urge that these mitigating factors, when seen cumulatively do
not justify blacklisting. NDMC has refuted this argument on
the ground that it has no knowledge of the contracts executed
by the Petitioner with other entities and is only concerned with
the manner in which the bid was submitted by the Petitioner
with NDMC. No doubt, past history and impeccable track
record are mitigating factors to be taken into consideration
while taking a decision on blacklisting or the period thereof.
Even taking these factors into account, I am unable to agree
with the Petitioner that in light of the serious act of forgery of
a crucial bid document, which is an admitted position, the
decision to debar/blacklist by NDMC was uncalled for.
In Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board (supra), the
Supreme Court summarised the law on proportionality as
follows:--
"36. Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2
All ER 680 (CA)] applies to a decision which is so
reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
or ethical standards that no sensible person who had
applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have
arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of
being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness
test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a
decision made by a public authority which requires the
courts to "assess the balance or equation" struck by the
decision-maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is
also described as the "least injurious means" or "minimal
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impairment" test so as to safeguard the fundamental rights
of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual
rights and public interest. Suffice it to say that there has
been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and
structure, it is difficult to compartmentalise or lay down a
straitjacket formula and to say that
Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2
All ER 680 (CA)] has met with its death knell is too tall a
statement. Let us, however, recognise the fact that the
current trend seems to favour proportionality test but
Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2
All ER 680 (CA)] has not met with its judicial burial and a
State burial, with full honours is surely not to happen in
the near future.
37. Proportionality requires the court to judge whether
action taken was really needed as well as whether it was
within the range of courses of action which could
reasonably be followed. Proportionality is more concerned
with the aims and intention of the decision-maker and
whether the decision-maker has achieved more or less the
correct balance or equilibrium. The court entrusted with
the task of judicial review has to examine whether decision
taken by the authority is proportionate i.e. well balanced
and harmonious, to this extent the court may indulge in a
merit review and if the court finds that the decision is
proportionate, it seldom interferes with the decision taken
and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e. if the
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court feels that it is not well balanced or harmonious and
does not stand to reason it may tend to interfere.
xxx xxx xxx
39. The courts have to develop an indefeasible and
principled approach to proportionality, till that is done
there will always be an overlapping between the traditional
grounds of review and the principle of proportionality and
the cases would continue to be decided in the same
manner whichever principle is adopted. Proportionality as
the word indicates has reference to variables or
comparison, it enables the court to apply the principle with
various degrees of intensity and offers a potentially deeper
inquiry into the reasons, projected by the decision-maker."
***
70. Reliance on the judgment of the Guwahati High Court
in Satya Builders (supra) is also misplaced. Reading of the
judgment shows that the said case pertained to submission of
false credential document with the bid for which the
Respondent terminated the letter of award and forfeited the
earnest money, bank guarantee and performance bank
guarantee to the tune of Rs. 3,08,93,889.65 along with
imposing penalty of debarring/blacklisting for five years. The
Guwahati High Court did not interfere in forfeiture of the
amount but held that penalty of blacklisting was harsh and set
aside the same but without any reasoning. This judgment,
with due respect, does not persuade this Court as there is no
reasoning as to why blacklisting order was interfered with
besides the fact that the Court did not think it fit to interfere
with forfeiture of a huge amount in light of the serious and
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grave conduct of the Petitioner in furnishing false credential
document with the bid.
71. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order warrants
no interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction
and the present petition is dismissed along with pending
application."
43. The finding recorded by the Delhi High Court in the
above decision answers all the question/ grounds raised by the
learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. S. Naganand and therefore,
providing fair hearing to prove the wrong thing which has been
admitted by the wrongdoer itself would not serve any purpose.
In the case of Shrisht Dhawan (supra), paragraph 20 reads
as under:
"20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a
concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a
fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability
to, 'wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into
snares'. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit.
In Webster's Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity
has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment
by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience
over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being
prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is
defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of
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inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable
thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false
representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to
his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been
defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to
gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According
to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to
have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at
the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of
the Contract Act defines fraud as act committed by a party to a
contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary
meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active
role of representator about a fact which he knows to be untrue
yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him
believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent
must be of a fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading
English case [Derry v. Peek, (1886-90) All ER 1 : (1889) 14 AC
337 : 5 TLR 625] what constitutes fraud was described thus :
(All ER p. 22 B-C)
"[F]raud is proved when it is shown that a false
representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without
belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be
true or false."
But fraud in public law is not the same as fraud in private law.
Nor can the ingredients which establish fraud in commercial
transaction be of assistance in determining fraud in
Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge
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in Khawaja [Khawaja v. Secretary of State for Home Deptt.,
(1983) 1 All ER 765] that it is dangerous to introduce maxims
of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in
relation to statutory law. In Pankaj Bhargava [Pankaj
Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556 : AIR 1991 SC
1233] it was observed that fraud in relation to statute must be
a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute.
"If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose,
a court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be
made to extend the operation of the Act to something else
which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope." [
Craies on Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 79] Present day concept of
fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide
exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits
of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting
subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or
irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or
administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different
shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of
incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of
power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It
must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would
not have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in
relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or
non-existence of which power can be exercised. But non-
disclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed
may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions
non-disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement.
"In a contract every person must look for himself and ensures
that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad
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bargain." [ Anson's Law of Contract] In public law the duty is
not to deceive. For instance non-disclosure of any reason in
the application under Section 21 of the Act about its need after
expiry of period or failure to give reason that the premises
shall be required by son, daughter or any other family member
does not result in misrepresentation or fraud. It is not
misrepresentation under Section 21 to state that the premises
shall be needed by the landlord after expiry of the lease even
though the premises in occupation of the landlord on the date
of application or, after expiry of period were or may be
sufficient. A non-disclosure of fact which is not required by law
to be disclosed does not amount to misrepresentation. Section
21 does not place any positive or comprehensive duty on the
landlord to disclose any fact except that he did not need the
premises for the specified period. Even the Controller is not
obliged with a pro-active duty to investigate. Silence or non-
disclosure of facts not required by law to be disclosed does not
amount to misrepresentation. Even in contracts it is excluded
as is clear from explanation to Section 17 unless it relates to
fact which is likely to affect willingness of a person to enter
into a contract. Fraud or misrepresentation resulting in
vitiation of permission in context of Section 21 therefore could
mean disclosure of false facts but for which the Controller
would not have exercised jurisdiction."
44. In the case of Lachhman Dass (supra), it is held
that, when the fraud is apparent on the face of record based on
the pleadings of the parties, such petitions requires to be
dismissed in limine. Having committed the fraud by uploading
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the fake document in the tender process, the petitioner cannot
be permitted to urge that the fake document is non-essential to
award contract, is perse liable to be rejected as it goes to the
root of fairness actions by the petitioner.
45. In the case of Municipal Committee Katra, and
others vs. Ashwani Kumar, in Civil Appeal No.14970-71
of 2017, disposed of on 09.05.2024 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court at paragraph 19 held as follows:
"19. It is beyond cavil of doubt that no one can be permitted to
take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain
favorable interpretation of law. It is s sound principle that he
who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of
the non-performance he has occasioned. To put it differently,
'a wrong doer ought not to permitted to make profit out of his
own wrong'. The conduct of the respondent- writ petitioner is
fully covered by the aforesaid proposition."
46. In the case of Aigargh Muslim University and
others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in (2000) 7 SCC 529,
paragraph 25 reads as under:
"25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an
exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or
indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to
above, there has been considerable debate on the application
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of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in
regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this
Court in M.C. Mehta [(1999) 6 SCC 237] referred to above.
This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments
in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord
Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases
and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner,
Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have
said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed
for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some
others have said that there is no such absolute rule and
prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via
media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go
deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may
depend on the facts of a particular case."
47. The aforesaid dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
is aptly applicable to the facts of the case as the petitioner
admits in the writ petitions as to uploading fake document,
while participating in the tender process and same is further
fortifies through the email/letter dated 16.04.2025 by RCCL-
member of the consortium and therefore, providing opportunity
to the petitioner to prove that, it did not upload fake document,
does not arise as the same is useless exercise by the
respondent-authorities and therefore, the writ petitions liable to
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be dismissed on this ground alone as the petitioner approached
this Court with unclean hands.
48. In the case of M.P. Mittal vs. State of Hariyana
and others reported in (1984) 4 SCC 371 paragraphs 5 and
6 held as under:
"5. Now there is no dispute that the appellant knowingly and
deliberately entered into the Guarantee agreement, and is
liable as Guarantor to make payment of the dividend due from
Messrs Depro Foods Limited. Nor is it disputed that the amount
due, with interest, stands at Rs 2,02,166 -- in respect of the
period ending with the year 1977. It was not contended that
the appellant in fact does not possess sufficient funds or
cannot avail of sufficient personal property for the purpose of
discharging the liability. The record also shows that before
instituting coercive proceedings, the Assistant Collector
provided the appellant an opportunity to pay up the amount
due from him, and that the appellant made no attempt to
discharge the liability. When that is so, we are of opinion that
he is not entitled to relief in these proceedings. The appeal
arises out of a writ petition, and it is well settled that when a
petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution, it is open to the High Court to
consider whether, in the exercise of its undoubted
discretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such
petitioner if the grant of relief would defeat the interests of
justice. The Court always has power to refuse relief where the
petitioner seeks to invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure
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a dishonest advantage or perpetuate an unjust gain. This is a
case where the High Court was fully justified in refusing relief.
On that ground alone, the appeal must fail.
6. Before parting with this case, we think it appropriate to
point out that it would be beneficial to the general
administration of justice if in certain cases where the High
Court disposes of a writ petition in limine it does so by an
order incorporating the reasons for such order. Where a case is
admitted to final hearing, the judgment of the High Court
disposing of the appeal almost invariably sets forth the reasons
for its decision. We think it desirable that even when a writ
petition is dismissed in limine the High Court should set out its
reasons, however briefly, for doing so, especially in those
cases where the matter in controversy is the subject of judicial
examination for the first time and has not been processed
earlier by an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial authority. It is of
some importance that a party should know from the Court of
first instance the reasons for an adverse decision received by
it, for that promotes acceptance of the judgment and thereby
ensures credibility and public confidence in the judicial
institution. It must be remembered that the High Court
exercises original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, and it is only appropriate that a petitioner whose
writ petition is dismissed in limine should know what are the
precise reasons for the adverse order, whether the writ
petition has been rejected on the ground of laches or other
preliminary ground or on the merits of the controversy, and
what are the reasons of the High Court therefore. We may add
that a brief statement of reasons rendered by the High Court,
when dismissing the writ petition in limine, is of great
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assistance also to this Court when the judgment and order of
the High Court are sought to be brought here by a petition for
special leave to appeal. To sum up, we think it desirable that
the High Court, when dismissing a writ petition in limine,
should set forth a brief statement of the reasons for its order
instead of disposing of the proceeding by the single word
"dismissed"."
49. In the case of Principal Chief conservator of
Forest and Others vs. Suresh Mathew and others reported
in 2025 SCC Online SC 933, paragraphs 16 to 19 reads as
under:
"16. The question of scope of judicial review in the cases of
award of contracts has already been dealt with by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Mandal v. State of
Orissa2 wherein the Court observed as under:
"22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias
and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or
decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice
or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is
invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of
contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind.
A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders
and awarding contracts are essentially commercial
functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a
distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is
bonafide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise
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of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural
aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a
tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not
be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the
cost of public interest or to decide contractual disputes. The
tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek
damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful
tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and
business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of
some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to
self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power
of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences,
either interim or final, may hold up public works for years,
or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and
may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court
before interfering in tender or contractual matters in
exercise of power of judicial review should pose to itself the
following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
Or
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary
and irrational that the Court can say:"the decision is such that
no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance
with relevant law could have reached.
(ii) Weather public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or
imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or
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distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant
of licenses, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different
footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in
action."
We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a
gross error while observing the facts in the case of Jagdish
Mandal (supra) were entirely different in regard to a defective
tender submitted by a participant.
17. In the case of State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal, in
relation to excise revenue, the Supreme Court observed as
under:
"13. ... The Government is the guardian of the finances of
the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of
the State. Hence quite naturally, the Legislature has
empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage
in its revenue. It is for the Government to decide whether
the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While
accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an
executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not
open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of
contravention of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 14 can arise in
these cases..."
18. The law regarding government contracts or auctions and
the nature and scope of its judicial review is well settled. In
the case of Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka4,
the Supreme Court observed as under:
"23. From the above decisions, the following principles
emerge:
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(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action
by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and
substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are
amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the
State must act validly for a discernible reason and not
whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within
the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to
take into consideration the national priorities;
(b)Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the
purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any
role to play in this process except for striking down such
action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or
unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with
certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of
contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the
interference by courts is very limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender
document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is
required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the
action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious
and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts
is not warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have
to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the
capacity and the resources to successfully execute the
work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly
and in public interest in awarding contract, here again,
interference by court is very restrictive since no person can
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claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the
Government."
19. In the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India5, the Supreme
Court emphasised the need to find a right balance between
administrative discretion to decide the matters on the one
hand, and the need to remedy any unfairness on the other,
and observed:
"94. (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely
reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision,
without the necessary expertise, which itself may be
fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the
realm of contract.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In
other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an
administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere.
However, the decision must not only be tested by the
application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness
(including its other facts pointed out above) but must be
free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by
mala fides.
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(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative
burden on the administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure."
50. It is well established principle in law that, the
Tendering Authority is empowered to reject all tenders as per
Section 14 of KTPP Act, before taking final decision in the
matter. (See. South India Corporation Private Limited
Annasalai, Chennai vs. Karnataka Power Corporation Limited,
Bangalore and another reported in (2016) 2 KLJ 132). In the
present case, the respondent-corporation has not finalized the
tender process, after completion of the Financial Bid and
therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner with regard to making allegations
against the respondent-authorities cannot be accepted as the
petitioner has not produced any document/ certificate/ work
order issued by the respondent-Corporation as to declaring the
petitioner as lowest bidder after the completion of entire tender
process is, after declaration of Financial Bid, and to award
contract and it is at the stage of under process to finalise the
tender, which is in the domain of the Tendering Authority and
with regard to procedure adopted by the respondent-
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Corporation, this Court shall not enter the area of tender
process as the same is in realm of the Tendering Authority .
51. In the case of Utsav Flavours vs. Union of India,
reported in 2008 SCC Online Jhar 255, paragraphs 14 to 16
reads as under:
"14. So far argument of impugned order being violative of
natural justice on account of non affording of the opportunity
of oral hearing is concerned, that also does not seem to be
tenable in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation,
((1996) 4 SCC 69) : (AIR 1996 SC 1509) wherein it has been
held as follows:
"It need not be pointed out that under different situations and
conditions the requirement of compliance of the principle of
natural justice vary. The Courts cannot insist that under all
circumstances and under different statutory provisions
personal hearings have to be afforded to the persons
concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing is
extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the
power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory
appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory
appeals and applications are disposed of by the competent
authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose of
the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be quasi-
judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial mind
over the grievances made by the appellants or the applicants
concerned, but it cannot be held that before dismissing such
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appeals or applications in all events the quasi-judicial
authorities must hear the appellants or the applicants, as the
case may be. When principal of natural justice require an
opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on
any appeal or application, it does not in all circumstances
mean a personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by
affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present
his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to
apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if in
his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the applicant
to be heard because of special facts and circumstances of the
case, then certainly it is always open to such authority to
decide the appeal or the application only after affording a
personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into
consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application
shall not be held to be invalid merely on the ground that no
personal hearing had been afforded."
15. Thus, what emerges from the ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is that it is never mandatory on the
part of the authority to give opportunity of personal hearing
always rather it would depend on the facts and circumstances.
16. So far this case is concerned, respondent in his wisdom
would not have thought it proper and appropriate to give an
opportunity of personal hearing as the petitioner in his show
cause had virtually admitted about the condition of Food Plaza
being unhygienic and once acceptance of breach of one of the
conditions was there, the respondent cannot be said to have
acted arbitrarily in passing the impugned order."
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52. In the case of CCS Computers Pvt Ltd (supra)
paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as under:-
"39. Broadly understood, Petitioner pegs its case on two
points: (a) forgery was committed by Petitioner's employees
for their own vested interests and management had no
knowledge of uploading of forged certificate and thus cannot
be held vicariously liable for acts, not authorized; and (b)
decision to blacklist the Petitioner, which amounts to civil
death, has been taken oblivious of the guidelines in Kulja
Industries (supra). Added to this was the point that credibility
of the Petitioner is beyond question in light of its business
dealings with Government departments/agencies/PSUs etc. for
over three decades and the list of includes 108 institutions.
Petitioner is stated to have no past history of any
misdemeanour. Much emphasis was also laid on the action
taken to hold an inquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent
employees and their consequent termination along with
recourse to criminal action.
40. The moot question that thus arises for consideration is
whether Petitioner can claim that it cannot be held vicariously
liable for the forgery, admittedly committed by its employees.
From a careful analysis of facts and arguments it is clear as
day that Sh. Puspendra Singh was duly authorized to process
the bid document and upload them. In the additional affidavit
filed by the Petitioner on 08.11.2024, it is stated that as per
general practice in Petitioner's organization, Directors assign
customer accounts to their employees and in the present case,
Sh. Puspendra Singh was authorized and responsible for
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overseeing the entire tender process in question, including but
not limited to scrutinizing document, attending meetings,
signing the requisite document and submitting the bids. It is
also stated that the designated employees of the Petitioner
scrutinize all document in relation to the bid and handle the
submission thereof. It is thus clear that Sh. Puspendra Singh
scrutinized and submitted the bid under authorization of the
Petitioner and hence with its knowledge and consent."
53. In the case of Silppi Constructions Contractors
vs. Union of India and another reported in (2020) 16 SCC
489 it is held at, paragraph 20, as follows:
"20. The essence of the law laid down in the judgments
referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution;
the need for overwhelming public interest to justify
judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the
State instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the
opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally
arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like a
court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court
must realise that the authority floating the tender is the
best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's
interference should be minimal. The authority which
floats the contract or tender, and has authored the tender
document is the best judge as to how the document have
to be interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then
the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The
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courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. With this
approach in mind we shall deal with the present case."
54. Having taken note of the principles laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, I am of
the view that, the judgments referred to by Sri. S. S.
Naganand, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referring to
the case of Gorkha Security Services (supra) and other
judgments making allegation against the respondent-
authorities as to denial of opportunity and favoritism towards
rival tenderer cannot be accepted on the sole ground that, one
who approaches equity Court must come with clean hands and
therefore, the judgment referred to by Sri. S. S. Naganand,
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot be made
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in view of
admission made by the petitioner in the writ petition as to
uploading the fake document which clearly offend the terms
and conditions of the Tender document (RFP).
55. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Subodh
Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Chief Executive Officer and
others reported in AIR 2024 SC 3784, after considering the
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scope of judicial review in the matters pertaining to contractual
disputes, in detail held that, the judicial review is permissible to
prevent arbitrariness of public authorities and to ensure that,
they do not exceed or abuse their powers in contractual
transaction, particularly, action of State Government relating to
tender process. Taking into consideration the forgoing reasons
as the petitioner itself admitted as to uploading the fake
document, in the pleadings as well as by letter dated
30.06.2025 produced Annexure-R13 in W.P.No.25668 of 2025
particularly, refers to paragraph at 6 of the said letter, I am of
the view that, even if the arguments advanced by the learned
Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is accepted, as to
denial of principles of natural justice, however, the end result
would be same in terms and conditions of the Tender document
to disqualify the petitioner. It is also relevant to consider the
Letter Comprising the Technical Bid-Appendix-1A, referring to
Clause 2.1.5, 2.11 and 3.2 of the Tender document as per
Annexure-B (W.P.No.25668 of 2025), wherein the petitioner
being a member of the consortium undertakes about the
fairness as per paragraphs at 7 to 9 thereunder.
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56. That apart, it is also to be noted that the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, refers to circulars
dated 11.05.2022, and 16.01.2025 as enclosed along with
letter at Annexure-F dated 25.07.2025 ( in W.P.No.25668 of
2025), as to procedure adopted by the Government entities,
which dealing with tendering process, however, I am of the
view that, as the tender process is not yet concluded by the
respondent-Corporation and therefore, it is for the respondent-
Corporation to take decision in the matter in accordance with
tender documents, and at this stage, this court is not inclined
to interfere with the tender procedure adopted by the
respondent-Corporation as there is no arbitrary exercise of
power by the respondent-Corporation and it is pertinent to
mention here that, the said arguments of the learned Senior
Counsel is premature and as such, this court is not inclined to
make any observation as to the tender process.
57. Having arrived at a conclusion to dismiss the
petitions on merits, I am of the opinion that the arguments
advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that
the respondent-state has not obeyed the interim order of this
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Court cannot be accepted as the petitioner itself approached
this Court with unclean hands.
58. It is not forthcoming from the arguments advanced
by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner as to
denial of letter/ e-mail received on 16.04.2025 itself, RCCL
member of the consortium of the petitioner, informed the
petitioner not to participate in the tender process as a
consortium along with RCCL. If, as argued, the petitioner
intended to act fairly while approaching this Court, it ought to
have informed the respondent-Corporation about the revocation
or termination of the Joint Bidding Agreement with RCCL at the
initial state itself before opening of the technical bid on
19.04.2025 as the petitioner aware of the revocation of the
aforesaid agreement on 16.04.2025 itself. This omission makes it
clear that the petitioner is not entitled for equitable relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the points for
consideration referred to above favours the respondents as the
petitioner fails to establish the denial of principles of natural
justice, being uploaded the fake document and approached this
Court with unclean hands. Therefore, the writ petitions deserve
to be dismissed as being devoid of merits. Having arrived at a
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conclusion to dismiss the W.P. No.22904 of 2025 and W.P. No.
25668 of 2025, I am of the opinion that, the prayer made in
W.P. No. 31906 of 2025, does not survive for consideration for
the forgoing reasons. Accordingly, the writ petitions stand
dismissed.
All pending applications, if any, accordingly, dismissed.
SD/-
(E.S.INDIRESH)
JUDGE
SB
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 56
