Karnataka High Court
M/S Sasken Communication Technologies ... vs Smt Lakshmi S Kumar on 30 August, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
WRIT PETITION NO.24376 OF 2013 (L-TER)
BETWEEN:
M/S SASKEN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,
(COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES
ACT 1956 HAVINGITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT NO.139/25, DOMMALUR RING ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 071)
REPRESENTED BY ITS RAJESH MANIAR
VICE PRESIDENT-FINANCE.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI HEGDE GANAPATHY, SR. ADVOCATE A/W
SRI ANIKETH B.C., ADVOCATE )
AND:
SMT LAKSHMI S. KUMAR,
D/O EPS KUMAR, MAJOR,
R/O NO.834, 24TH CROSS,
51ST MAIN, KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT,
BENGALURU-560078.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI K.B.NARAYANASWAMY, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
AWARD DATED 14.03.2013 IN REF. NO.62/2009 PASSED BY
THE II ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT, BENGALURU VIDE
ANNEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 22ND JULY, 2025 AND COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:
2
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
CAV ORDER
This petition is assailing the award dated 14.03.2013 in
Reference No.62/2009 on the file of II Additional Labour
Court, Bangalore.
2. In terms of the impugned award, the petitioner's
order dated 03.03.2009, terminating the respondent from
employment, is set aside. The petitioner is directed to
reinstate the respondent with full back wages, continuity of
services and other consequential benefits. Aggrieved by this,
the petitioner-Company is before this Court.
3. Heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent.
4. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner, taking through the pleadings, and also the
evidence placed on record, urged as under:
4.1 The respondent was employed as a Campus
Recruitment Executive with effect from 21.11.2006.
Respondent is a post-graduate in Business Administration
3
and was holding a managerial post, and was making
decisions on behalf of the petitioner-Company, when it came
to the recruitment of certain employees.
4.2 The terms of the employment between the
petitioner and respondent provided for termination
simpliciter, and assuming that the respondent was a
workman, in such an event, the respondent-employee is
entitled to benefits as provided under Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short Act, 1947). The said
benefit is paid to the respondent through a cheque, and said
payment is admitted in respondent's claim statement before
the Labour Court. After having accepted the monetary
benefits so paid, the respondent raised an Industrial Dispute,
though the respondent is not a workman.
4.3 The materials placed on record, which
demonstrated that the respondent-employee was working in
a managerial post, have been completely overlooked by the
Labour Court to record an adverse finding that the petitioner
has not produced any materials to show that the respondent
is not a workman.
4
4.4 The Labour Court framed the additional issue No.1
wrongly casting the burden on the Employer, though the
employee invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under
the Act, 1947. It was for the employee to make a positive
statement that he/she is a workman, and no such statement
is made by the employee, and the additional issue could not
have been framed, casting the burden on the petitioner-
Company.
4.5 Ex.M17 is the crucial document which clearly
demonstrated the role played by the respondent-employee,
and said document has been completely overlooked by the
Labour Court.
4.6 Assuming that the petitioner - Management has
the onus of establishing that the respondent was not a
workman and was discharging the duty in managerial
capacity, documents on record, more particularly, Ex.M17,
demonstrated the role played by the respondent-employee
that the respondent was discharging managerial duties, and
at any stretch of imagination, respondent cannot be
construed as a workman.
5
4.7 Evidence in the cross-examination by the
respondent is completely overlooked. The respondent-
employee has admitted that she used to conduct interviews
in the selection process, and no workman will have such
power to hold an interview, and the role played by the
respondent cannot be construed as clerical to classify the
respondent under the category of a workman.
4.8 Despite the respondent-employee making a
statement that she had received a certain amount on the
date of termination, the Labour Court erred in recording a
finding that payment was not made to the respondent is also
the submission made to emphasise the non-application of
mind and perversity in the impugned award.
4.9 The fact that the respondent was working in two
different Companies after the termination is admitted in the
cross-examination, and this fact is overlooked by the Labour
Court and resulting in an erroneous finding that the
respondent was not working elsewhere or gainfully employed
elsewhere and awarded back wages.
6
5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would
also rely on the following judgments:
(i) Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and
others.1
(ii) Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited
vs. Ajit Singh.2
(iii) Northoote Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd., Bombay
and Another vs. Zarine H.Rahina and
Another.3
(iv) Mukund Staff and Officers Association and
Another vs. Mukund Ltd.4
(v) Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court Delhi and Another.5
(vi) M. Venugopal vs. Divisional Manager, LIC,
Machilipatnam, A.P. and Another.6
(vii) Uptron India Ltd. vs. Shammi Bhan and
Another7.
(viii) Muir Mills Unit of NTC (UP) Ltd. vs. Swayam
Prakash Srivastava and Another.8
1
(2013) 10 SCC 324
2
(2005) 3 SCC 232
3
2001 (3) Mh.L.J. 476
4
2008(2) Mh.L.J.416
5
ILR (1976) I Delhi 565
6
(1994) 2 SCC 323
7
(1998) 6 SCC 538
7
6. Learned counsel for respondent raised the
following contentions:-
6.1 The appointment letter does not give any specific
job description. It does not specify that the respondent is
employed in a managerial capacity.
6.2 The respondent only coordinated the selection
process and did not take part in the selection process and
had no role in selecting the candidate, and has not issued
any appointment letter.
6.3 The appointment letter was required to be issued
by the head of the Human Resource Department, and the
documents produced by the petitioner would only indicate
that the respondent is communicating the decision taken by
the selection committee, and the communication sent by the
respondent would indicate that the appointment letter will be
issued separately.
6.4 No suggestion is put to the respondent/employee
in her cross-examination to say that the respondent was
heading certain employees, was issuing directions to certain
8
(2007) 1 SCC 491
8
employees, or was taking managerial decisions. There was
no suggestion in the cross-examination addressed to the
respondent/employee that the respondent had been
entrusted with the task of conducting a disciplinary enquiry
or the responsibility of terminating any of the employees,
and no suggestion to the effect that the respondent was
doing supervisory work.
6.5 The document at Ex.M.17 is not signed, and it is
only the proforma of an organizational chart said to have
been sent to the respondent; the respondent has not
prepared any chart. Documents at pages 87, 98 and 100 to
the Writ Petition are not the documents signed by the
respondent and assuming that the content of the said forms
has been filled by the respondent, it would only reflect the
opinion of the signing authority, and not the respondent.
6.6 The respondent was terminated, and in the place
of the respondent, the person who is employed after the
respondent is transferred, which amounts to a violation of
Section 25G of the Act, 1947.
9
6.7 Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the
following judgments:
(i) S.k.Maini vs. M/s Carona Sahu Company
Limited and others9
(ii) Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India
Ltd. Bombay10
(iii) Devinder Singh vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur11
(iv) The Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another
vs. Texas Instruments India Pvt. Ltd.,12
(v) Mysore Vegetable Oil Products Ltd. and
Labour Court, Madras and Another13
(vi) Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. vs. The
Workmen14
(vii) S.K.Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra and Another15
(viii) Mahajan Borewell Company vs Sri Rajaram
Bhat and Another16
(ix) Management, Church Of South India VS. Edith
Peter17
(x) K.H.Pandhi VS. Presiding Officer, the
Management of Holtecs Engineers Ltd.18
(xi) Chandrashekhar Chintaman Vaidya vs.
National organic chemical industries Ltd.19
(xii) LIC of India vs. R Suresh20
9
(1994) 3 SCC 510
10
(1985) 3 SCC 371
11
(2011) 6 SCC 584
12
I.T.A. No. 141/2020 C/W I.T.A. No.151/2020
13
1961 II-LLJ-508
14
(1970) 3 SCC 248
15
(1983) 4 SCC 214
16
ILR 1998 KAR 172
17
Laws (Mad) 2000-1-11
18
Laws (Delhi) 2004-2-42
19
Laws (Bombay) 2010-2-82
10
(xiii) Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors.,
VS. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale21
(xiv) M/S Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The
Employers of M/S Hindustan Tin Works Pvt.
Ltd. and Others22
7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner by way
of reply would contend that Section 25G does not apply as
no person who is employed by the petitioner, is transferred
to the place of the respondent, and Section 25F would apply,
and the same is complied.
8. Learned Senior counsel would also submit that
the person, Ms.Shona who is said to have replaced the
respondent was working through a contract labourer and was
in a different department in the petitioner-Company and has
not been placed to work in the place where the respondent
was working, and she continued in the same place where she
was working earlier as such Section 25G is not violated.
9. This Court has perused the records and has
taken note of the judgment cited by both sides. In terms of
20
2008 AIR SCW-2793
21
AIR 1960 SC 137
22
(1979) 2 SCC 80
11
the impugned award, the termination order dated
03.03.2009 is set aside.
10. This Court has considered the contentions raised
by both sides and considered the ratio laid down in the
judgments cited by both sides.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited
judgments which have laid down the law that the designation
of an employee is not the criterion to determine whether an
employee is a workman or not. Likewise, the nature of
occasional duty or function of the employee is also not the
criterion to determine whether the employee is a workman
or not. The Apex Court has held that predominant duty
performed by the employee is to be considered to see
whether the employee is a workman or not.
12. It is also noticed that the facts obtained in the
judgments cited by both sides differ from the facts obtained
in the present case in so far as the nature of the work done
by the employee as compared to the nature of the work done
by the employee in the aforementioned judgments.
12
13. Whether the employee is a workman or not is a
mixed question of fact and law and has to be ascertained
from the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the general
principles governing interpretation of the definition of
workman as found in Section 2(s) of Act, 1947 are to be
borne in mind.
14. The petitioner is assailing the award on two
counts:
a) The respondent was not a workman and
b) Assuming that the respondent is a workman,
the termination is in accordance with Section
25-F of the Act, 1947.
15. Certain facts necessary for adjudication of the
petition can be summarised as under:-
- Respondent was appointed as Executive - Campus
Recruitment on 21.11.2006. Respondent joined services on
30.11.2006 with an annual pay of Rs.3,70,000/- per annum.
Petitioner claims that on account of the global recession, the
petitioner company had to downsize its workforce and on
03.03.2009 the respondent was terminated.
13
16. The respondent raised an industrial dispute before
the jurisdictional Conciliation Officer, and as the conciliation
failed, the Government referred the dispute to the Labour
Court. Respondent filed a claim statement. The petitioner
filed counter disputing the status of the respondent as a
'workman'.
17. The Labour Court, has held that the respondent is
a workman and, thereafter, concluded that the termination is
illegal.
18. The fact that the respondent was appointed as
Executive Campus - Recruitment on an initial salary of Rs
3,70,000/- per annum is not in dispute. The designation or
the salary is not the criterion to decide whether an employee
is a workman or not. The salary becomes a criterion if the
employee is working in a supervisory capacity.
19. Whether the employee is a workman or not has to
be decided keeping in mind the definition of Section 2(s) of
the Act, 1947 and the nature of the job done by the
employee.
14
20. Clause No.6(a) of the appointment letter issued
to the respondent reads as under:-
"6. What we expect from you
(a) We hope that you will devote your full time
and attention in carrying out your work
activities honestly, faithfully and diligently,
keeping in mind at all times the Company's
progress. We expect that you will not engage
in or do any other business or render any
professional service either on a full-time or
part-time basis."
21. The aforementioned letter of employment does
not throw much light on the nature of the job.
22. Ex.M7 is the letter addressed by the
respondent/employee to a prospective employee,
communicating the decision to select an employee. The said
letter at Annexure-M7 also encloses the details relating to
the employee who has been selected by the petitioner
Company. Respondent, being a member of the selection
panel, has assessed the candidate as under:-
"Attitude - fair will be a good individual
contributor."
15
23. This is the observation in the HR assessment and
information sheet.
24. Ex.M8 is another letter addressed by the
respondent to another employee selected by the petitioner.
25. The said letter is also accompanied by the
observations made by the respondent as a member of the
selection panel.
26. The observation is as under:-
"Attitude - Good, can be a good team player"
Communication skill - Good."
27. Ex.M9 is also a letter of appointment sent to one
of the employees, signed by the respondent. However, the
HR assessment and information sheet attached to it is not
signed by the respondent.
28. Ex. M10 is one more appointment letter, which is
accompanied by an HR assessment and an information
sheet.
29. The observations made by the respondent are as
under:-
16
"Attitude - positive (+ve), willing to learn;
Communication skills - able to articulate,
recommended for selection - yes.
Reasons for selection/rejection: Fine with bond
and training class."
30. There is no dispute that the respondent was in the
Human Resource department and was entrusted with the
responsibility of visiting campuses and coordinating with the
campuses to initiate the recruitment process.
31. The respondent contends that she was only doing
a clerical job, and was not involved in the decision-making
process, nor did she have the authority to recruit the
employees or to finalize the terms of service conditions of the
newly recruited employee.
32. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the
evidence in the cross-examination. Relevant portion of cross
examination of respondent/employee reads as under:-
" PÁåA¥À¸ï jPÀÄæmïªÉÄAmï §UÉÎ £ÁªÀÅ ¥ÀæwªÀµÀð K¦æ¯ï wAUÀ½£À°è
ªÀiÁ»wAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¸ÀA§AzsÀ¥ÀlÖ ªÀĺÁ«zÁå®AiÀÄUÀ½UÉ
17
ºÉÆÃV PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¸ÀÄwÛzÉÝêÀÅ. ªÀiÁ£ÀªÀ ¸ÀA¥À£ÀÆä® ªÀUÀðzÀ ¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
£Á£Éà £ÀqɸÀÄwÛzÉ. "
33. In the cross-examination, the respondent has
also admitted that one Syed Saleem was recruited as an HR
Executive on 21.07.2008. Said appointment letter is marked
at Ex.M26. Ex.M27 is the e-mail addressed by the
respondent to Venkat V., and the respondent has admitted
having signed the e-mail. Said e-mail reads as under:-
"I had a discussion with Ashok Bhaskar and
Ramaraj on this issue.
I understand that this escalation was based on the
talk Saleem had with Chakri during the Campus
recruitment at BIT on the 23rd of July. Have
assured Ashok and Ramaraj that such a thing will
not be repeated.
Saleem is very new to Campus recruitment, and as a
corrective action, I spoke to him, briefing him on it."
34. Ex.M.27 is the e-mail addressed by the
respondent in response to the e-mail sent by Venkat,
another employee of the petitioner establishment.
18
35. The respondent has admitted the following
relevant factors in the cross-examination:
"10. It is true that, for the purpose of campus
recruitment, I used to go to various colleges
throughout the country. It is true that, in
order to do the campus recruitment, we are
required to plan in advance.
11. It is true that, as Executive, Campus
Recruitment, I used to contact the placement
officers of various colleges all over the
country."
12. It is true that, I used to conduct pre-
placement talks. It is true that, at the pre-
placement talk, I used to present the history
of the Company, its growth, business,
strategies, opportunities and policies.
Witness adds that it was a presentation made
by the Company, and she used to run it.
14. It is true that, I was co-ordinating with the
Placement Officer for conducting tests. It is
true that, I was conducting interviews,
witness adds that towards the later period.
It is true that, recruitment committee
consists of myself, technical persons and HR
official."
(Emphasis added)
19
36. Ex.M.4 is the copy of email trail between the
respondent and Sridhar. On perusal of Ex.M4, it appears that
the respondent has convened an interactive session of the
tentative candidates. The session was convened to address
the queries of selected candidates and to help them get the
details relating to the petitioner-Company.
37. The document at Ex.M17, marked at Annexure-L,
to the writ petition is the e-mail addressed by the respondent
to Venkat V., wherein, respondent has signed the job
description as an attachment. The relevant portion of the
said job description attachment sent through e-mail reads
as;
"Position Title - Sr. Executive HR
Domain - Campus Recruitment, Campus
Connect, Branding and Budget Management."
38. In addition, the respondent has also signed the
organizational chart, which is as under:-
20
Program Manager
Incumbent's
Superior
Incumbent
Direct Direct Direct Direct Direct
reports reports reports reports reports
39. Annexure-M (Ex.M20 in Labour Court records), is
an email from the respondent sent to Rajinder Handu before
conducting the recruitment process, wherein the respondent
has set certain terms and conditions highlighting the policy
of the petitioner-Company.
40. The learned counsel for the respondent, referring
to the evidence of the witness examined on behalf of the
petitioner in the cross-examination, has referred to the
following statements in the cross-examination.
"It is true that first party was required to fix the
date, venue for campus recruitment with prior
approval and consent of the concerned HR and
technical panel persons." "It is true that the
candidate appearing for the test are required to
undergo technical and HR test conducted by
21
respective panels". "The selection process involved
conducting an interview by the technical panel HR
and the first party."
41. In paragraph No.22 of the cross-examination of
the management witness, it is stated as under:-
"22. It is true that at the second party
company, without the offer made by the second
party company is accepted by the candidate, a
final letter of appointment will be issued. It is true
that the remaining package to be given to the
selected candidate would be decided by the
Management."
42. In paragraph No.23, it is stated as under:
"23.....It is true that the 1st party was
working under the supervision and guidance of the
manager-recruit."
43. In paragraph No.25, it is stated as under:-
"25. It is true that the decision as to the
number of vacancies, the number of candidates to
be interviewed and selected would be taken by
the top management."
22
44. Referring to the evidence in the cross-
examination of the witnesses examined on behalf of the
management, learned counsel for the respondent would urge
that the respondent had no decision making authority in the
company and she was only acting under the supervision and
control of the superior officers and she was only coordinating
with the persons who are responsible for taking managerial
decisions and the Labour Court is justified in passing the
impugned order.
45. On overall appreciation of evidence on record the
following things emerge:
1) The respondent is a member of the panel
which interviewed the candidates.
2) The respondent has also participated and
conducted the interview.
3) The respondent has given her opinion on the
candidates who appeared in the interview
and independently assessed whether the
person who faced the interview is suitable for
selection or not.
4) The respondent has also assigned the
reasons for her decision.
23
46. Though it is elicited in the cross-examination that
the respondent has no authority in finalizing the service
condition package and the decision to recruit, what is
required to be noticed is the respondent, had the authority to
interview the candidates, coordinate the recruitment drive,
coordinate and the identify the campus for holding interview,
and to forward the observations relating to the eligibility or
otherwise of the candidate who appeared for the interview
seeking appointment.
47. It is relevant to notice from the organizational
chart containing the job description which the petitioner has
sent as an attachment to another employee demonstrates
that she has five persons working under her. Respondent's
job description has clearly spelt out in the organizational
chart and same is prepared by the respondent where she has
stated that her major activity is to conduct HR interview,
relationship building, employer brand building, campus
connect program, designing the PPT and other brand building
materials. Respondent claims to have designed the campus
recruitment, internship and branding process, budgeting and
24
budget management. These aspects have been completely
overlooked by the Labour Court.
48. Considering these aspects and also the
documents referred to above, this Court is of the view that
the nature of the job done by the respondent in the
petitioner company before her termination was not clerical.
The job was indeed managerial.
49. Merely becdause the decision taken by the
respondent in the interview is not final and it is subject to
the approval of the higher officials in the management, one
cannot conclude that the nature of the job done by the
respondent was only clerical or of such nature to classify the
respondent as a workman.
50. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the
respondent that even assuming that there was a recession in
the year 2008 when the respondent was terminated from
service, the petitioner has not followed the requirement
under Section 25-N of the Act, 1947. Learned counsel
contended that if at all there was recession and a ground for
retrenchment, the respondent should have been retained
and the person who was junior to the respondent in the
25
establishment should have been retrenched by following the
procedure contemplated under Section 25-G on the principle
the 'last come, first go'.
51. Learned Senior Counsel by way of reply urged
that the contention that the 'last come first go' principle,
urged by the respondent with reference to employee by
name Ms.Shona, has no merit. It is submitted that
Ms.Shona is working for the petitioner through an
independent contractor and said employee is not the
employee of the petitioner.
52. It is noticed that Ms.Shona was not working
directly under the petitioner. Respondent in her cross
examination admitted that Ms.Shona was recruited by
independent contractor-Raj Office solutions. It is also
admitted in evidence that the Ms.Shona was not working in
H.R. Department and she was working in a different
department under the petitioner and later she was shifted to
H.R. Department. The terms and conditions relied on upon
while employing the respondent is also relevant. Relevant
portion of Clause No.7 of 'Letter of Appointment' dated
21.11.2006 reads as under:
26
"7. Termination
We hope your association with us will be a
very long one. However, this association may be
terminated by either party by giving two month's
notice. However, in the event of willful neglect of
your duties, breach of trust, gross indiscipline or
any other serious dereliction of duties that may
be prejudicial to the interests of the company,
the company has the discretion to terminate your
services forthwith or with such notice as it deems
fit and without any notice pay whatsoever."
(Emphasis supplied)
53. From the said clause it is evident that in case
either of the parties to the agreement intend to terminate
the association, the party has to issue two months notice.
The records would reveal that on 03.03.2009 the petitioner
has terminated the employment with immediate effect.
However, petitioner has paid Rs.75,000/- towards two
month's salary in lieu of two month's notice and in addition,
Rs.37,500/- is paid towards 15 days average salary for each
completed years of continuous service. In all petitioner has
paid Rs.1,12,500/- to the respondent. The respondent has
accepted the same without any protest. In other words, the
27
parties agreed to waive two months notice. This being the
position, the respondent cannot complain violation of any of
the provisions of the Act, 1947.
54. It is also admitted that the respondent was
working in a different establishment after being terminated
from the petitioner - Company. However, the Labour Court
has erroneously held that the respondent was not working
after termination. In fact, in the cross-examination, the
respondent admits that she was working for Robert Bosch
Engineering and Business Solutions Limited and Mind Tree
Limited.
55. After having gone through the impugned award
passed by the Labour Court, this Court is of the view that the
Labour Court erred in ignoring vital evidence placed before
it, which unmistakably points to the fact that the respondent
was working in a managerial capacity and not as a workman.
56. Hence, from the documents produced, it is not at
all possible for the Court to hold that the first party did not
have managerial powers while conducting the interviews and
selecting/recommending the candidates for appointment, of
course, subject to final approval of higher officials.
28
57. It is required to be noticed that it is not the case
of the petitioner that the respondent alone had the power to
conduct the interviews and select candidates. That is not the
requirement of law to classify an employee as a workman.
58. If the employee works along with other
employees and entrusted with the decision taking powers in
accomplishing certain tasks entrusted, then the employee
can also be termed as a person in managerial capacity, even
though the employee alone did not have the power to do
certain acts.
59. The analogy of the Labour Court that the
documents do not reveal that 1st party was alone in charge
of the campus selection and thus, the respondent is a
workman is unacceptable.
60. The observation in paragraph No.20 of the
impugned award that the first party was only required to
identify the campus and fix the calendar for recruitment with
the approval of the higher-ups in the office takes the
respondent out of the ambit of a managerial post is also not
sustainable.
29
61. The Labour Court again erred in holding that the
absence of authority to fix the remuneration package and
that the respondent was also under the supervision and
guidance of the manager in the department makes her a
workman is also an erroneous finding.
62. The Labour Court has also observed that the
respondent had no power to sanction leave or initiate
disciplinary action against the person working under her.
Assuming that such power was not there, that itself is not
sufficient to hold that the respondent was not working in a
managerial capacity.
63. Keeping in mind the principles laid down in the
decisions cited by both parties, this Court is of the view that
the Labour Court erred in holding that the respondent is a
workman.
64. It is also noticed that in paragraph No.38, of the
impugned award the Labour Court awarded full back wages
to the respondent and granted continuity of service and all
consequential benefits.
30
65. In paragraph No.43 of the cross-examination, the
respondent has stated that after her termination, for 1 and
1/2 years, she did not work anywhere, and when she
appeared before the Court to lead evidence, she was working
in "Mind Tree" and having an annual package of Rs
7,00,000/-.
66. Respondent also stated that before joining Mind
Tree, she was working at Robert Bosch Engineering and
Business Solutions Limited. Despite such a categorical
admission, in paragraph No.38 of the impugned award, the
Labour Court has held that the respondent was without any
employment.
67. There is one more angle to this, even assuming
that the respondent was a workman, then also the petitioner
has followed the procedure contemplated under the Act,
1947 before terminating the employment and paid the
retrenchment compensation.
68. Hence, the following:
31
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) Impugned award dated 14.03.2013 in
Reference No.62/2009 on the file of II
Additional Labour Court, Bengaluru
(Annexure-A) is set aside. Consequently, the
Reference is rejected.
(iii) No order as to cost.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE)
JUDGE
BRN/CHS
