Karnataka High Court
Shri.M.R.Nageshwar vs Smt. Lalithamba on 28 February, 2024
Author: B.M. Shyam Prasad
Bench: B.M. Shyam Prasad
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RESERVED ON: 29.01.2024
PRONOUNCED ON 28.02.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M. SHYAM PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO.7755 OF 2016 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI M.R. NAGESHWAR
S/O LATE M.R. RAMARADYA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESIDING AT H. MALLIGERE VILLAGE
DUDDA HOBLI
MANDYA TALUK AND DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI G. BALAKRISHNA SHASTRY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. LALITHAMBA
W/O SHANKUKARADHYA
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.406
Digitally
LEELAVATHI LAYOUT
signed by MADDUR TOWN.
ANAND N
Location:
HIGH 2. SRI. C.MADAPPA
COURT OF
KARNATAKA S/O LATE SRI PAPE GOWDA
AGED BOUT 75 YEARS
R/O H. MALLIGERE VILLAGE
DODDA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT
PIN NO.571 401.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SRINIVAS A.R., ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI M.R. RAJAGOPAL SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI H.C. SHIVARAMU, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,
PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OR ANY OTHER ORDER OR
DIRECTION OF SIMILAR NATURE SETTING ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 13.12.2013, IN EX.P.NO.109/2008
PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE JUNIOR
DIVISION, MANDYA VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND THEREBY
ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITION
UNDER ORDER 21 RULE 89 AND 90 READ WITH
SECTION 151 OF CPC AND PASS SUCH OTHER
ORDER/S AS THIS HON'BLE COURT DEEMS FIT TO
GRANT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 29.01.2024 COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner, who is the Judgment Debtor in
Execution Case in E.P.No.109/2008 on the file of the
Prl. Civil Judge, Mandya [for short, 'the Executing
Court'], is aggrieved by the Executing Court's order
dated 13.12.2013. The Executing Court by the
impugned order has rejected the petitioner's
application under Order XXI Rules 89 and 90 of Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 [CPC]. The petitioner's
application is for setting aside of the sale of land
measuring 05 acres 14 guntas [including 9 guntas of
kharab land] in Sy.No.160 of H. Malligere village,
Dudda Hobli, Mandya Taluk and district [the subject
property] held on 03.04.2010.
2. The Executing Court, on 04.12.2014, has
issued sale certificate in favour of the second
respondent [the auction purchaser] who asserts that he
is put in possession of the subject property. The
petitioner, who disputes the assertion that the second
respondent is in possession of the subject property,
has filed an application to amend this petition to
challenge the Executing Court's aforesaid order dated
04.12.2014, and on 01.12.2022, this Court has
observed that this application could be taken up along
with the writ petition for final disposal. Further, on
10.02.2020, this Court has granted stay against
dispossession from the subject property on the
condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of
Rs.1,50,000/- and another sum of Rs.2,67,500/-
within definite timelines. The petitioner has deposited,
with this Court, the first sum Rs.1,50,000/- by way of
a demand draft dated 18.02.2020 and the sum of
Rs.2,67,500/- by way of Demand Draft dated
07.03.2020.
3. The circumstances leading to the writ
petition and the subsequent orders as aforesaid can
be stated briefly thus. The first respondent has filed
his suit in O.S.No.285/2007 against the petitioner for
recovery of a sum of Rs.2,10,500/- along with interest
at the rate of 8% per annum. This suit is decreed on
08.08.2008, and the first respondent has filed the
subject Execution petition in E.P.No.109/2008 for
recovery of the decretal amount. The Executing
Court, after issuance of sale notice, has issued
proclamation for spot sale of the subject property on
03.04.2010 and for final bid [the Court sale] on
24.04.2010. The second respondent has offered the
highest bid at the spot sale held on 03.04.2010 but
has not deposited 25% of the amount on the same
day.
4. However, the petitioner on the same day
i.e., 03.04.2010 has filed an application with the
Executing Court for permission to deposit 25% of the
price offered on 05.04.2010 asserting that his bank
was closed early for the day before the sale
proceedings were completed because it was a
Saturday, and with the next day being Sunday, he
may be granted a reasonable time until 05.04.2010 to
deposit this amount. The Executing Court
considering such request has permitted the second
respondent to deposit 25% of the bid amount on
05.04.2010. The second respondent, in terms of
such permission, has deposited a sum of
Rs.1,26,500/- with the Executing Court on
05.04.2010.
5. In the meanwhile, a certain Sri H.K. Raju
had filed an application under Order XXI Rule 58 r/w
Section 151 of CPC, and the Executing Court has
rejected this application by its order dated
01.04.2010. The aforesaid Sri H.K. Raju has filed his
appeal in R.A.No.11/2010 calling in question this
order dated 01.04.2010, and the appellate Court on
23.04.2010, has stayed the proceedings in the
execution case until further orders. A copy of this
order in R.A.No.11/2010 is placed before the
Executing Court, and the Executing Court on
24.04.2010 has adjourned the execution proceedings
recording that the case is called twice because the
Court Sale was fixed for that day and that the learned
counsel for the aforesaid objector has placed on record
a copy of the interim order. The Executing Court has
also observed that in view of the interim order
granted, no Court Sale can be permitted.
6. The appellate Court has dismissed the
appeal in R.A.No.11/2010 by its order dated
03.12.2011, and with the dismissal of this appeal, the
first respondent has filed an application for issuance
of fresh sale proclamation. However, the Executing
Court by its order dated 23.06.2012 has rejected this
request and has directed its office to issue notice to
the second respondent, who, upon receipt of such
notice, has deposited on 25.08.2012 the balance sale
consideration of Rs.3,79,500/-. The petitioner has
thereafter filed an application under Order XXI Rule
69 of CPC to stop sale proceedings in favour of the
second respondent, and this application is essentially
filed asserting that the subject property is brought to
sale despite the interim orders granted in
R.A.No.11/2010.
7. The Executing Court by its order dated
07.12.2012 has rejected the petitioner's application
opining that the appeal in R.A.No.11/2010 is
dismissed and it has not received any communication
about the further challenge to its initial order dated
01.04.2010. The first respondent has filed an
application under Order XXI Rule 94 of CPC
requesting the Court to issue sale certificate to the
second respondent, and when this application was
pending consideration, the petitioner has filed the
present application under Order XXI Rules 89 & 90 of
CPC for setting aside the sale asserting that the sale
will be void because the second respondent has not
deposited the entire sale price within the period
contemplated under Order XXI Rules 84 and 85 of
CPC and also asserting that the final bid is not offered
in terms of Rule 138 of Karnataka Civil Rules of
Practice, 1967 [ for short, "the Civil Rules of Practice,
1967"].
8. The circumstances that emerge from the
records as indisputable are that the second
respondent, who offered the highest bid when sale was
held at the spot on 03.04.2010, did not deposit 25% of
the price offered on the same date but has approached
the Executing Court with an application for
permission to deposit such amount on 05.04.2010
contending that his bank was closed before the sale
proceedings could be completed and the next day
[04.04.2010] was a Sunday. The Executing Court has
granted such permission, and the second respondent
has deposited this amount on 05.04.2010. The
second respondent who had to deposit the remaining
75% of the bid amount within 15 days from
03.04.2010, as required under Order XXI Rule 85 of
CPC, has not deposited the same either before such
date or 24.04.2010. The second respondent has
deposited this amount on 25.08.2012 after the
dismissal of the appeal in R.A.No.11/2010, and again
not immediately after the dismissal of the appeal but
after receipt of notice from the Executing Court in that
regard.
9. Further, it emerges that the second
respondent, who had to offer the final bid [normally
referred to as the Court Sale as against the sale at the
place of the immovable property] on 24.04.2010 as
contemplated under Rule 138 of the Civil Rules of
Practice, 1967, has not finally offered the price. The
Executing Court on 24.04.2010, has recorded that
Court Sale cannot be held because of the interim order
of stay granted in R.A.No.11/2010. This appeal in
R.A.No.11/2010 is dismissed on 03.12.2011, and
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neither the respondents nor the petitioner has
informed the Executing Court about the dismissal of
the appeal until an application is filed by the first
respondent for issuance of fresh proclamation. It is
therefore indubitable that the petitioner has not
deposited the 25% of the sale price on the date of sale
held at the property [hence, immediately after being
declared the purchaser] or the remaining 75% within
fifteen days from the date of such sale.
10. In the light of these indubitable
circumstances, Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry, the
learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri M.R.
Rajgopal, the learned Senior Counsel for the second
respondent, are heard for final disposal of the writ
petition in view of the following questions1:
"a) Whether the Executing Court could have
permitted the purchaser to deposit 25% of
the bid amount on 05.04.2010 when the
1 These questions have been proposed by Sri G. Balakrishna
Sastry for consideration as recorded by this Court on
21.03.2023, and these questions are presently rephrased
as recorded above.
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'spot sale' is held on 03.04.2010 and the
requirement in law, given the provisions of
Order XXI Rule 84 of CPC and the
decisions thereon, including the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manilal
Mohanlal Shah And Others Vs. Sardar
Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and
Another reported in AIR 1954 SC 349, is
that 25% of the bid amount must be
mandatorily deposited immediately on the
bid being accepted;
b) Whether the Executing Court could have
permitted the second respondent [the
purchaser] to deposit 75% of the price
offered beyond fifteen days from the date
of 'spot sale' or confirmed the sale without
a fresh proclamation as contemplated
under Order XXI Rule 69 of CPC when the
second respondent had not deposited the
entire sale price offered within such time,
and
c) Whether, in the circumstances of the
present case, the Executing Court could
have issued sale certificate without the
mandatory 'Court sale' as contemplated
with Order XXI Rule 85 of CPC read with
Rule 138 of the Karnataka Civil Rules of
Practice, 1967."
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11. Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry submits that it
is mandatory that 25% of the price offered at the time
of sale must be made immediately thereafter and it
would also be mandatory that the remaining 75% of
the price offered should be deposited within a period
of 15 days, and if there is a breach of these
stipulations, there cannot be a sale. Sri G.
Balakrishna Shastry, relying upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gas Point Petroleum
India Limited Vs. Rajendra Marothi and Ors2,
contends that the second respondent must fail at the
first hurdle because he has not deposited 25% of the
sale immediately on completion of the sale of the
subject property at the spot on 03.04.2010. In
response, Sri M.R. Rajagopal, relying upon the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rosali V.
Vs. Taico Bank and Ors3, submits that the
requirement in law to deposit immediately on
declaration of sale must be construed as requiring
2 (2023) 6 SCC 391
3 (2009) 17 SCC 690
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that deposit must be made within a reasonable time
and that what is reasonable time will depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.
12. These decisions in Gas Point Petroleum
India Limited [supra] and Rosali V. [supra] are in the
light of the decision in Manilal Mohanlal Shah Vs.
Sardar Syed Mahmed [supra], and in this earlier
decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that
there can be no sale in favour of the purchaser unless
25% of the price offered is deposited in the first
instance and the balance 75% is deposited within 15
days, and if there is any failure in these regards, the
sale proceedings will be a complete nullity. This
proposition is affirmed in both the aforesaid decisions,
but insofar as the meaning that should be ascribed to
the expression immediately as found in Order XXI
Rule 844 of CPC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
4 Rule-84. Deposit by purchaser and re-sale on default.-
(1) On every sale of immovable property the person
declared to be the purchaser shall pay immediately after
such declaration a deposit of twenty-five per cent. on the
amount of his purchase-money to the officer or other person
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Rosali V. [supra], after referring to the decision in
Manilal Mohanlal Shah [supra], has opined thus:
30. While applying the principles of
interpretation, the courts are also required to
keep in mind the following two well-settled
principles of law: (i) Actus curiae neminem
gravabit (an act of court shall prejudice no man)
(see Satyabrata Biswas v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku
[(1994) 2 SCC 266] , Ram Chandra Singh v.
Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] , Board of
Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club
[(2005) 4 SCC 741] and Union of India v.
Pramod Gupta [(2005) 12 SCC 1] ); and (ii) Lex
non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not
compel a man to do that what he cannot
possibly perform). (See Ram Chandra Singh
[(2003) 8 SCC 319] and Board of Control for
Cricket in India [(2005) 4 SCC 741] .0
31. The term "immediately", therefore, must be
construed having regard to the aforementioned
principles. The term has two meanings. One,
indicating the relation of cause and effect and the
other, the absence of time between two events. In
conducting the sale, and in default of such deposit, the
property shall forthwith be re-sold.
(2) Where the decree-holder is the purchaser and is entitled to
set-off the purchase-money under rule 72, the Court may
dispense with the requirements of this rule
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the former sense, it means proximately, without
intervention of anything, as opposed to
"mediately". In the latter sense, it means
instantaneously. The term "immediately", is, thus,
required to be construed as meaning with all
reasonable speed, considering the circumstances
of the case. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
Edn., Vol. 23, Para 1618, p. 1178.)
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gas Point Petroleum
India Limited [supra] has also referred to the decision
in Rosali V. [supra], and the efficacy of the
proposition that the deposit [payment] under Order
XXI Rule 84 of CPC must be within a reasonable
period is not jeopardized. As such, the facts and
circumstances in the present case are examined to
ascertain whether the second respondent has
deposited 25% of the sale price within reasonable
time.
13. The auction for the sale of the subject
property at the place of the property is held on
03.04.2010 after 12.00 p.m., and the second
respondent, who has offered the highest bid, has
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immediately thereafter [i.e., on the same day] has filed
an application with the Executing Court stating that
he must be permitted to deposit 25% of the amount
on 05.04.2010 because the bank is already closed and
the next day is a Sunday. The Executing Court has
allowed the application, and petitioner has deposited
25% of the sale price on 05.04.2010. This Court,
given these circumstances, must opine that the
petitioner has indeed deposited 25% of the price
offered within a reasonable time. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot succeed on the ground that 25% of
the sale price is not deposited immediately after the
auction on 03.04.2010.
14. If the provisions of Rule 84 of Order XXI of
CPC stipulate that the purchaser shall pay
'immediately after declaration', a deposit of 25% of the
amount of the purchase money to the officer or the
other person conducting the sale, the provisions of
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Rule 855 of Order XXI of CPC stipulate that "the full
amount of the purchase-money" shall be paid by the
purchaser "into the Court before the Court closes on the
15th day from the sale of the property". The only
exception is the right to claim the advantage of set-off
under Rule 72 of this Order. The proposition that is
underscored by the Supreme Court in each of the
aforesaid three decisions is that there cannot be any
sale in favour of a purchaser if there is failure to
deposit the balance sale price within 15 days and non-
payment of the price on the part of the defaulting
purchaser renders the sale a complete nullity with the
Courts being bound to resell the property. The
stipulation that the balance sale price must be
deposited within 15 days from the date of the sale is
5 Rule 85. Time for payment in full of purchase money
-The full amount of purchase-money payable shall be paid
by the purchaser into Court before the Court closes on the
fifteenth day from the sale of the property:
Provided that, in calculating the amount to be so paid into
Court, the purchaser shall have the advantage of any set-
off to which he may be entitled under Rule 72
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thus declared mandatory by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Manilal Mohanlal Shah [supra]:
"Having examined the language of the relevant
rules and the judicial decisions bearing upon the
subject we are of opinion that the provisions of
the rules requiring the deposit of 25 per cent. of
the purchase money immediately on the person
being declared as a purchaser and the payment
of the balance within 15 days of the sale are
mandatory and upon non-compliance with these
provisions there is no sale at all. The rules do not
contemplate that there can be any sale in favour
of a purchaser without depositing 25 per cent of
the purchase money in the first instance and the
balance within 15 days. When there is no-sale
within the contemplation of these rules, there
can be no question of material irregularity in the
conduct of the sale. Non-payment of the price on
the part of the defaulting purchaser renders the
sale proceedings as a complete nullity. The very
fact that the court is bound to re-sell the property
in the event of a default shows that the previous
proceedings for sale are completely wiped out as
if they do not exist in the eye of law.............."
15. This Court must therefore opine that the
purchaser after the immediate deposit of the first 25%
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of the sale price must, within 15 days from the date of
auction, deposit the full purchase price to secure the
right to purchase the property sold in auction subject
to any order that may be made to set aside the sale.
The purchaser cannot hold back from depositing
fearing a precipitation or for any other reason. As
such, the second respondent [the purchaser] should
have deposited the 75% of the purchase price within
15 days from 03.04.2010. Even if there is stay of
further proceedings in the execution case, the second
respondent should have necessarily deposited 75% of
the sale price on or before 18.04.2010 and the failure
to so deposit jeopardizes his right to purchase.
16. This Court is of the considered view that
to hold otherwise is to enable the purchaser to offer a
price and take advantage of stay of the execution
proceedings without paying the full price. The
legislature, in prescribing the definite timeline for the
deposit of the remaining sale price, could not have
intended this outcome. Further, the second
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respondent, the purchaser in the present case who
has not deposited the entire sale price, cannot take
any advantage of the interim order of stay in
R.A.No.11/2010 inasmuch as such interim order is
granted only on 23.04.2010 after the lapse of fifteen
days from the date of sale at the property. This Court
must also observe that the second respondent has not
deposited the 75% of the purchase price even
immediately after the dismissal of the aforesaid appeal
on 03.12.2011.
17. Sri M.R. Rajagopal canvasses that this
Court must not intervene with the sale despite the
afore circumstances because the petitioner has not
challenged the Executing Court's order dated
04.12.2014 issuing the sale certificate even as on the
date of filing of the writ petition in the year 2016, and
the learned Senior Counsel emphasizes that an
application for amendment to raise the challenge to
the Executing Court's order dated 04.12.2014 is filed
only in the year 2022. However, when indubitably
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deposit of 75% of the sale price is much after the
period of 15 days contemplated under Order XXI Rule
85 of CPC, this Court must opine that the entire sale
proceedings are rendered a nullity and therefore, the
issuance of sale certificate is without jurisdiction.
18. Further, it is not as if that the petitioner
has not raised the challenge at all until the present
amendment application in 2022, the petitioner has
filed an application under Order XXI Rules 89 and 90
of CPC which is rejected by the Executing Court by
the impugned order dated 13.12.2013. If the
Executing Court had considered the merits of the
petitioner's application in the light of the exposition by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the sale certificate could
not have been issued at all.
19. The petitioner, to explain the delay in filing
an application for amendment to include the challenge
to the issuance of Sale Certificate, has also relied
upon certain circumstances such as the terminal
illness of his dependents viz., his sister and mother to
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explain why he could not completely challenge the
Executing Court's orders immediately after it was
pronounced. The petitioner has also relied upon
certain medical records. Therefore, this Court must
opine that the petitioner, though not on the first
ground [the delay in depositing 25% within a
reasonable time], must succeed on the second ground
[the delay in depositing the full purchase price within
15 days as contemplated under Order XXI Rule 85 of
CPC]. The second question is answered accordingly.
20. The provisions of Order XXI Rules 84 and
85 of CPC do not contemplate sale at the spot and
sale in the Court as two different proceedings.
However, the Executing Courts enable the sale of an
immovable property at the spot and submission of a
final bid in the Court on another day in view of the
provisions of Rule 1386 of the Civil Rules of Practice,
6 Rule 138:Sale of immovable property shall ordinarily take
place at the spot, subject to the condition that the final bid
shall be offered before the Presiding Officer at the Court
house.
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1967 which stipulate that the sale of immovable
property shall ordinarily take place at the spot,
subject to the condition that the final bid shall be
offered before the Presiding Officer at the Court house.
As observed by this Court in K.T. Krishnappa Vs. B
Gangappa by L.R. Siddamma & Ors7, there is
solemnity attached to the final bid to be made before
the Court for completion of the sale.
21. In the present case, on 24.04.2010, the
Executing Court has called the case twice and no
submission is made on behalf of the second
respondent confirming the sale price offered on
03.04.2010 as the final bid. Indeed, it is argued by
Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry that the Executing Court
should have permitted a third person to make offer,
but nothing is brought on record to demonstrate that
a third person was willing to make a higher offer to
purchase the property and the executing Court has
refused the same. Crucially, on 24.04.2020, it was
7 1982 (1) KLJ 356
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the second respondent's responsibility to confirm his
offer as the final bid bringing on record the details of
the deposit of the 75% of the sale price offered.
22. The second respondent has not offered
this confirmation though the case is called twice. The
Executing Court's observation that no Court Sale can
be held because of the stay is insignificant in the light
of the petitioner's failure to confirm the bid as a final
bid. The third question is answered accordingly
holding that the petitioner must succeed on the
ground that the second respondent has not confirmed
the sale price offered at the spot as the final bid.
23. There is some controversy on the question
of possession of the subject property. The second
respondent asserts that he is in possession of the
subject property and that he has made improvements
for cultivation, and the petitioner on the other hand
asserts that he continues to be in possession of the
subject property. Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry
emphasizes that no order for delivery of possession
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has been passed by the Executing Court as
contemplated under Order XXI Rule 95 of CPC. There
is merit in this submission as no order for delivery of
possession is placed on record. Even otherwise, with
the petitioner succeeding in the challenge to the
issuance of sale certificate, he is entitled to the
possession of the subject property without any claim
from the second respondent. The second respondent,
consequent to this order, must yield all claims to
possession of the subject property in favour of the
petitioner.
24. When there is default by the purchaser to
pay the purchase price within the period mentioned in
Order XXI Rule 85 of CPC, the discretion lies with the
concerned Court to forfeit the price paid to the
Government after defraying the expenses of the sale,
and the defaulting purchaser forfeits all claim to the
property and to any part of the sum for which the
property may be subsequently sold. In this regard,
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this Court must refer to provisions of Order XXI Rule
86 of CPC, which reads as follows:
"86. Procedure in default of payment- In
default of payment within the period
mentioned in the last preceding rule, the
deposit may, if the Court thinks fit, after
defraying the expenses of the sale, be forfeited
to the Government, and the property shall be
re-sold, and the defaulting purchaser shall
forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of
the sum for which it may subsequently be
sold."
25. The second respondent has deposited a
total sum of Rs.5,06,000/- with the Executing Court
and the petitioner has deposited a sum of
Rs.4,17,500/- with this Court. In the peculiarities of
this case where the second respondent has the
advantage of revenue entries for the subject property
and that the petitioner, notwithstanding the
circumstances that are pleaded, has not approached
this Court at the earliest, this Court is of the
considered view that the amounts deposited by the
second respondent with the Executing Court must be
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repaid in his favour without any order on forfeiture or
defraying of costs. The amount deposited by the
petitioner in the present proceedings must be
transferred to the Executing Court for payment to the
first respondent subject to further calculation of
interest and for action as is permissible in law to
recover the entire decreetal amount from the
petitioner, including upto date interests. In the light
of the afore, the following:
ORDER
[a] The petition is allowed, and the Executing
Court's impugned order dated 13.12.2013
as also the order dated 04.12.2014 for
issuance of Sale Certificate for the subject
property in favour of the second
respondent are quashed. Consequently,
the petitioner will be at liberty to file an
application with the Executing Court for
necessary directions to the jurisdictional
Sub-Registrar to cancel the registration of
the Sale Certificate issued in favour of the
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second respondent, and if such application
is filed, the Executing Court shall issue
appropriate directions.
[b] The Executing Court, upon the second
respondent filing necessary
application/Voucher for refund of
Rs.5,06,000/- deposited by him in the
execution proceedings, shall order refund.
[c] The registry is directed to transmit the
amount deposited in the present case to
the Executing Court for payment to the
first respondent subject to this Court's
observations above and the petitioner's
liability to pay interest.
All the pending applications stand disposed as a
consequence of this order.
SD/-
JUDGE
BL
