Karnataka High Court

Sri C Muniswamy Reddy vs Sri Ravindra Kumar on 22 February, 2024

Author: Ravi V Hosmani

Bench: Ravi V Hosmani

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                                                             RSA No. 2166 of 2007




                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
                           DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2024
                                               BEFORE
                            THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAVI V HOSMANI
                          REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 2166 OF 2007 (SP)
                   BETWEEN:
                   SRI C. MUNISWAMY REDDY,
                   SINCE DEAD BY LRS.

                   1(a)    SRI M. SEENAPPA,
                           AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
                           S/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY,
                           NEKKUNDI DOMMASANDRA,
                           SARJAPURA HOBLI , ANEKAL TALUK,
                           BANGALORE DISTRICT.

                   1(b)    SMT. LALITHAMMA,
                           AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
                           D/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY,
                           W/O VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
                           MUTHANALLUR VILLAGE,
                           HUSKUR POST, SARJAPURA HOBLI ,
                           ANEKAL TALUK.

                   1(c)    SRI AMARESHA,
                           AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
Digitally signed by        S/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY,
GEETHAKUMARI               NEKKUNDI DOMMASANDRA,
PARLATTAYA S               SARJAPURA HOBLI , ANEKAL TALUK,
Location: High Court       BANGALORE DISTRICT.
of Karnataka
                    1(d)   SMT. SUNANDAMMA,
                           AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
                           D/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY,
                           W/O ERAREDDY,
                           S. MEDIHALLI VILLAGE,
                           ANDENAHALLI POST,
                           SARJAPURA HOBLI ,
                           ANEKAL TALUK,

                   1(e)    SRI NAGESH,
                           AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
                           S/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY,
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                                                   NC: 2024:KHC:7451
                                               RSA No. 2166 of 2007




       NEKKUNDI DOMMASANDRA,
       SARJAPURA HOBLI , ANEKAL TALUK,
       BANGALORE DISTRICT.
                                                        ...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI V. ANAND, ADVOCATE)

AND:

SRI RAVINDRA KUMAR,
S/O CHAMBENAHALLI R. NANJUNDAREDDY,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
MUTHASANDRA POST, VARTHUR VIA,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
                                                        ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI K. SRINIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR ;
SRI JAGADISH D. HIREMATH, ADVOCATE FOR )

      THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DATED
26.07.2007 PASSED IN RA.NO.204/2006 (OLD NO.79/2006) ON THE
FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.) AND JMFC., ANEKAL, ALLOWING
THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE
DATED 31.01.2006 PASSED IN OS.NO.22/05 ON THE FILE OF THE
PRL.CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) AND JMFC., ANEKAL.

     THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL COMING ON FOR FURTHER
DICTATION THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED FOLLOWING:

                          JUDGMENT

Challenging judgment and decree dated 26.07.2007

passed by Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Anekal in R.A.no.204/2006 (Old

no.R.A.no.79/2006) setting aside judgment and decree dated

31.01.2006 passed by Prl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Anekal, in

O.S.no.22/2005, this appeal is filed.

2. Appellant herein was original plaintiff in

O.S.no.22/2005; while respondent herein was defendant, for

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sake of convenience, they shall referred to as such in this

appeal.

3. Facts as stated are that, O.S.no.22/2005 was filed

by plaintiff stating that defendant was owner and in possession

of agricultural land bearing Sy.no.1/12 measuring 28 guntas

('suit property' for short) situated at Nekkundi Dommasandra

Village, Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru. In respect of

same, defendant had entered into agreement of sale with

plaintiff on 16.03.1988 agreeing to sell said suit property for

total sale consideration of `25,100/- accepting `13,000/- as

advance sale consideration and agreeing to execute sale deed

by receiving balance amount of `12,100/- within three months.

It was further stated that on 10.04.1988 as per request of

defendant, plaintiff paid further amount of `12,000/- leaving

balance of only `100/- to be paid. It was stated though plaintiff

was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract

and called upon defendant to receive balance amount and

execute sale deed, defendant postponed it on one pretext or

other. On 17.12.2004 plaintiff got issued legal notice to

defendant. As due to oversight suit property was not

mentioned, another legal notice dated 03.01.2001 was issued.

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When defendant did not come forward to execute sale deed,

cause of action to file suit arose and suit was filed on

17.01.2005.

4. Upon service of suit summons, defendant entered

appearance and filed written statement denying plaint

averments in toto except that defendant was absolute owner of

suit property. Execution of agreement of sale on 16.03.1988

and receipt of advance sale consideration were denied.

Allegation was made that agreement of sale was forged. It was

asserted that upon receipt of legal notice issued by plaintiff,

defendant replied on 10.01.2005, denying agreement of sale

and obligation of defendant to execute sale deed.

5. It was asserted that suit property was purchased by

one M. Chowda Reddy on 17.08.1987 under registered sale

deed and was in possession of same and entries in record of

rights stood in his name. It was also asserted that defendant

had offered suit property as security for loan obtained from

Sericulture Growers and Farmers Service Co-operative Society

Ltd., Sarjapur and said document was registered in office of

Sub-Registrar at Annexure-K dated 03.05.1998. Suit was also

opposed on ground of being barred by limitation, as alleged

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agreement of sale was dated 16.03.1988 and suit was filed

after lapse of 17 years.

6. Based on pleadings, trial Court framed following

issues:

(1) Whether plaintiff proves that the defendant had agreed to sell the suit schedule property in this favour for Rs.

25,100/-?

(2) Whether plaintiff proves that on 16-3- 1988 the defendant had executed the sit agreement and had received earnest money of Rs.13,000/-?

(3) Whether plaintiff proves that the defendant had received Rs.12,000/- on 10-4-1988 and had delivered the possession of the suit schedule property in his favour?

(4) If findings to issues 1 to 3 are in the affirmative whether plaintiff proves that he was/is ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?

(5) Whether plaintiff proves that defendant has failed to perform his part of the contract?

(6) Whether suit is barred by limitation?

(7) Whether plaintiff is entitled for he relief sought?

(8) What decree or order?

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7. Thereafter, plaintiff examined himself and three

other witnesses as PWs 1 to 4 and got marked Exs.P1 to P.7.

On other hand, defendant examined himself as DW.1 and got

marked Exs.D1 to D.3.

8. On consideration, trial Court answered issue no.1 to

5 and 7 in affirmative, issue no.6 as not barred by limitation

and issue no.8 by decreeing suit and directed defendant to

execute registered sale deed in respect of suit property in

terms of agreement of sale within three months.

9. Aggrieved thereby, defendant preferred appeal in

R.A.no.204/2006 on several grounds. That judgment and

decree passed by trial Court was opposed to law and facts and

probabilities of case; that it ought to have decided issue no.6

as preliminary issue; that it ignored stipulation of time as three

months and suit filed after expiry of three years from expiry of

three months (in fact after 17 years) was barred by time. Even

finding about readiness and willingness were alleged to be

without proper basis and issuance of legal notice in year 2005

itself indicated lack of readiness and willingness by plaintiff.

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10. Based on pleadings, first appellate Court raised

following points for consideration:

(1) Whether the plaintiff/respondent has proved that the defendant executed an agreement of sale dated 16-3-

1988 in favour of he plaintiff in respect of he suit property and received an advance amount of Rs.13,000/- on the said date and the defendant also received further advance amount of Rs.12,000/- on 10-4-1988 and executed a shara o that effect?

(2) Whether the time is not the essence of contract in question?

(3) If he time is not the essence of contract whether he suit filed by the plaintiff within 3 years from the date of denial of execution of an agreement by the defendant, by way of reply notice dated 10-1-2005 and refusal of he defendant of the defendant to perform his part of contract is in time?

(4) Whether the judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court in decreeing the suit is opposed to law, facts and circumstances of he case and is liable to be se aside by way of interference of this Court?

(5) What order?

11. On consideration, first appellate Court answered

points no.1, 2 and 4 in affirmative, point no.3 in negative and

points no.5 by allowing appeal, setting aside judgment and

decree passed by trial Court and dismissing suit of plaintiff.

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Aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by first appellate

Court, plaintiff is in appeal.

12. Sri H. Kantharaj, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for Sri V. Anand learned counsel for appellant submitted that

only ground on which first appellate Court interfered with well

reasoned judgment and decree passed by trial Court was that

suit was barred by limitation. It was submitted, Ex.P.1 -

agreement of sale was executed on 16.03.1988 in respect of

Sy.no.12, measuring 28 guntas for total sale consideration of

`25,100/- by receiving `13,000/- as advance, wherein it was

stipulated that balance of `12,100/- was to be paid within three

months and sale deed executed. Subsequently, on 10.04.1988,

further sum of `12,000/- was paid to defendant towards

advance sale consideration leaving only `100/- as balance. It

was submitted that plaintiff had thereafter called upon

defendant to come forward to execute sale deed, defendant

went on postponing same one or other pretext. Ultimately

plaintiff got issued legal notice dated 17.12.2004 and

30.01.2005 as per Exs.P.3 and P.4 and when defendant did not

come forward to perform his part of contract.

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13. On other hand, defendant's reply as per Ex.P.5 on

10.01.2005 was denying execution of agreement of sale and

also receipt of sale consideration. It was alleged that

agreement was forged. It was further submitted that though in

agreement of sale dated 16.03.1988, there was stipulation of

three months for performance of terms of agreement, payment

and receipt of further sale consideration on 10.04.1988 and

absence of any default condition and failure of defendant to

issue notice for cancellation indicated consensus of Ad idem

that time was not essence of contract. Such being case, suit

filed on 07.01.2005 could not have been dismissed as time

barred.

14. Relying upon decision of this Court in case of

Somanagouda and another Vs. Shamshiddin1, it was

submitted that in similar circumstances where plaintiff had paid

`48,000/- out of total sale consideration of `50,000/- leaving

only `2000/- as balance, suit filed in year 2001 in respect of

agreement of sale on 09.01.1989, question of limitation would

recede to background and submitted that in present case

balance amount was negligible at only `100/- and as per

AIR 2012 KAR 141

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endorsement dated 10.04.1988, plaintiff was put in possession

of suit property.

15. Reliance was also placed on decision of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in case of Welspun Specialty Solutions

Limited Vs. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited2; P

Daivasigamani C Vs. S.Sambandan,3 in para no. 12 and 20,

it has held as under:

"12. The aforesaid ratio has also been followed recently by this Court in R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji [R.Lakshmikantham v. Devar aji, (2019) 8 SCC 62]. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that mere delay alone in filing the suit for specific performance, without reference to the conduct of the plaintiff, could not be a ground for refusing the said relief, when the suit was filed within the statutory time- limit by the respondent-plaintiff.

20. There has been a steep rise in the prices of land in the last quarter of the 20th Century in India. With the rise in property value, the value of money has fallen. At times, delay in payment would defeat the defendant seller's purpose [See paras 25, 36 & 37 in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 12 SCC 18: (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 104.]. Therefore, the offer of the plaintiff purchaser in writing and the time and occasion when the offer to pay the balance amount to the defendant seller is an important factor which would matter when the court examines the question of discretion, that is, whether or not to grant a decree of specific performance. While examining these aspects, the quantum of money paid by the plaintiff purchaser to the defendant seller may

(2022) 2 SCC 382

2023 SAR (Civ) 1

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become a relevant fact that merits due consideration. There is a distinction between limitation and delay and laches. Limitation is a ground for dismissing a suit even if the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to specific performance, while delay operates to determine the discretion and exercise under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, even if the suit is not dismissed on account of limitation. However, not one but several aspects have to be considered when the court, in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, exercises discretion, guided by judicial principles, sound and reasonable.

16. Reliance was also placed on Gobind Ram Vs. Gian

Chand4, in para no. 7 to 9 it has held as under:

"7. It is the settled position of law that grant of a decree for specific performance of contract is not automatic and is one of the discretions of the court and the court has to consider whether it will be fair, just and equitable. The court is guided by principle of justice, equity and good conscience. As stated in P.V. Joseph's Son Mathew [1987 Supp SCC 340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328] the court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case and motive behind the litigation should also be considered.

8. The High Court considering the facts of this case observed as follows:

"We are conscious of the fact that the defendant has been in possession of the said quarter for the last several decades and logical consequence of affirming the judgment of the trial court would mean considerable hardship to him, at the same time the conduct of the defendant does not justify any further indulgence by the court. We have no doubt that the defendant has tried to wriggle out of the contract between the parties because of

AIR 2000 SC 3106

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the tremendous escalation in the prices of real estate properties all over the country and in Delhi, in particular in the last few years."

9. In view of the above clear finding of the High Court that the appellant tried to wriggle out of the contract between the parties because of escalation in prices of real estate properties, we hold that the respondent is entitled to get a decree as he has not taken any undue or unfair advantage over the appellant. It will be inequitable and unjust at this point of time to deny the decree to the respondent after two courts below have decided in favour of the respondent. While coming to the above conclusion we have also taken note of the fact that the respondent deposited the balance of the consideration in the trial court and also the amount in the High Court, as directed. On the other hand the appellant, as held by the High Court, tried to wriggle out of the contract in view of the tremendous escalation of prices of real estate properties. However, to mitigate the hardship to the appellant we direct the respondent to deposit a further sum of Rs 3,00,000 within 4 months from today with the Registry of this Court and the amount shall be kept in short-term deposit in a nationalised bank. While giving the above direction we have taken note of the offer made to us on behalf of the respondent. This amount is to be paid to the appellant on his giving possession of the suit property to the respondent within 6 months from the date of the deposit of the above amount. The appellant shall also be entitled to withdraw the amount already deposited in the trial court and the amount of Rs.1,00,000 which has been kept in interest-bearing fixed deposit in the Registry of the High Court."

17. Based on above, it was submitted that substantial

question of law framed by this Court on 15.03.2010 be

answered in favour of appellant, and judgment and decree

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passed by first appellant Court be set aside and judgment and

decree passed by trial Court be restored.

18. On other hand, Sri K. Srinivasa learned counsel for

defendant sought to oppose appeal. It was submitted that on

very face of it, plaintiff who had filed suit 17 years after

execution of alleged sale agreement on 16.03.1988 would be

time barred. Therefore judgment and decree passed by first

appellate Court was justified. It was also sought to be

contended that agreement of sale at Ex.P.1 produced by

plaintiff was not reliable as name of person who had purchased

stamp paper was shown as 'N Ravi Kumar' whereas name of

defendant was Ravindrakumar. It was submitted hat even as

per Ex.P.1 there was stipulation of period of limitation of three

months for execution of sale deed and as suit was filed 17

years after agreement of sale, suit was barred by limitation as

per Limitation provided min first part of Article 54 of Limitation

Act.

19. Relying upon decision of this Court in Sri Nagaraj

Vs. Smt.Uma5, it was submitted that if time limit is fixed in

agreement of sale, it must be performed within three years

2016 (4) KCCR 3720

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from time fixed in agreement and if no time were fixed to file

suit within three years from date of refusal.

20. Reliance was also placed on decision of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in case of Shenbagam & Ors. Vs. K.K.

Rathinavel6, to contend that conduct of plaintiff would

establish that he was never ready and willing to perform his

part of contract, therefore dismissal of suit by first appellate

Court is justified. In paras 29 and 30, it has held as under:

29. We shall now advert to the respondent's conduct throughout the sale transaction. The respondent has failed to provide any documents or communication which would indicate that he called upon the appellants to perform their obligations or discharge the mortgage within the time period stipulated in the contract. Even after the expiry of the six months, the respondent did not reach out to the appellants. It is only in response to the appellants' legal notice that the respondent demanded performance of their obligations.

Merely averring that he was waiting with the balance consideration and believed that the appellants would clear the encumbrance is insufficient to prove that the respondent-plaintiff was willing to perform his obligations under the contract.

30. Further, in 1991 the respondent instituted a suit for mandatory injunction for restraining the appellants from alienating the suit property. He did not however, institute a suit for specific performance of the contract until 17 June 1993. The respondent has taken the plea that he was waiting for the appellants to discharge the mortgage to file a suit for specific performance. We are

AIR 2022 SC 1275

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unable to accept this submission. By extending the respondent's argument, if the appellants had failed to discharge the mortgage, the respondent would not have filed a suit for specific performance of the contract at all. We also note that the respondent has withdrawn the balance consideration deposited by him before the trial court in 2001. The inconsistency in the respondent's conduct, the lack of communication with the appellants urging them to discharge the mortgage and showing his willingness to pay the balance consideration, and the delay of about three years from the date fixed for performance of the contract in filing a suit, are all indicative of the respondent's lack of will to perform the contract.

21. From above submissions, it is seen that plaintiff

filed suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated

16.03.1988, alleging that defendant had agreed to sell suit

property to plaintiff for total sale consideration of `25,100/-

after receiving advance sale consideration of `13,000/- and

agreeing to execute sale deed after receiving Rs.12,100/-,

within three months. Plaintiff claims that on 10.04.1988,

defendant endorsed receipt of further advance of Rs.12,000/-

and delivery of possession of suit property to plaintiff. And

when defendant failed to come forward to execute sale deed

even after plaintiff's legal notice, suit was filed on 07.01.2005.

22. On 15.03.2010, Appeal was admitted to consider

following substantial question of law:

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"Whether first appellate Court was justified in holding that suit is barred by limitation thereby dismissing suit filed by plaintiff?"

23. Insofar as limitation and cause of action, it was

stated that plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his

part of contract and repeatedly called upon defendant to

perform his part of contract, but defendant had postponed

execution on some pretext, prompting plaintiff to get issued

legal notice on 17.12.2004 and 03.01.2005 and failure to

comply with legal notice gave rise to cause of action to file suit.

24. On other hand, defendant denied execution of

agreement of sale and receipt of sale consideration in toto and

in fact alleged agreement of sale to be forged. He claimed to be

in possession by asserting that suit property was mortgaged in

favour of Co-operative Society for obtaining loan. He also

pleaded that suit filed 17 years after alleged date of agreement

of sale was barred by limitation.

25. While passing judgment and decree, trial Court

framed specific issues regarding proof of agreement of sale,

receipt of advance sale consideration entitlement of relief and

also about suit being barred by limitation. Taking note of

deposition of plaintiff as PW.1, scribe and one of witnesses to

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agreement of sale as PWs.3 and 2 as well as contents of Exs.P1

to P.7, trial Court held that plaintiff proved execution of

agreement of sale and receipt of sale consideration and also

delivery of possession by defendant. Taking note of issuance of

legal notice to defendant calling upon him to execute sale deed

in favour of plaintiff as per Exs.P.3 and P4, it held issue of

readiness and willingness against defendant. Relying upon

decision of Kallaiah Vs. Ningegowda7, it concluded that when

plaintiff pleads time was not essence of contract and defendant

fails to deny same, Court was bound to accept plea of plaintiff.

And when time was not essence of contract, suit would not

suffer from period of limitation and granted decree for specific

performance.

26. In appeal, on point no.1 about proof of agreement

of sale and payment of sale consideration, first appellate Court

referred to deposition of plaintiff as PW.1 supported by

deposition of scribe and witness to agreement as PWs-3 and 4

in light of exhibits marked on behalf of plaintiff answered it in

favour of plaintiff. On remaining points for consideration

namely whether time was essence of contract, and if not

1981 (2) KLJ 11

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whether suit filed within three years from denial of agreement

of sale was within time and whether decree passed by trial

Court called for interference, it observed that deposition of PW-

1 in terms of plaint averments was duly corroborated by PWs.3

and 4 i.e. scribe and witness, which proved agreement of sale

and payment of advance sale consideration.

27. Insofar as time being essence of contract, it

observed that since neither plaintiff nor defendant had pleaded

about same, framing of issue was not called for. From recitals

in Ex.P1, it held that there was stipulation of period of three

months for executing sale deed. Referring to Section 55 of

Indian Contract Act, it observed that based on conduct of

parties, especially fact that there was no default clause in

agreement of sale, defendant had not taken steps for

cancellation of agreement of sale or called upon plaintiff to

perform his part of agreement within time stipulated, it could

be deduced that time was not essence of contract.

28. On limitation, it referred to very same decision

relied upon by trial Court namely Kallaih's case (supra)

wherein it was held that even if time stipulated in a contract of

sale of immovable property were not essence of contract, same

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had nothing to do with period of limitation within which suit for

specific performance of contract had to be filed and that period

of limitation stipulated can neither be ignored or extended by

Courts. It held that as period of three months was stipulated in

Ex.P1 agreement of sale, plaintiff ought to have filed suit on or

before 15.06.1991, and therefore, suit filed by plaintiff on

07.01.2005 was barred by limitation, and reversed decree

passed by trial Court.

29. Admittedly, in instant case agreement of sale -

Ex.P1 contains stipulation of three months for execution of sale

deed. Thus, prima facie it would attract period of limitation

prescribed in first part of Article 54 of Limitation Act. For

deciding whether a suit for specific performance was filed within

period of limitation prescribed in Article 54 of Limitation Act,

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Urvashiben v. Krishnakant

Manuprasad Trivedi8, has held as follows:

"18. On the other hand, in the judgment in Gunwantbhai [Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah v. Anton Elis Farel, (2006) 3 SCC 634] this Court has held as under:

"8. We may straightaway say that the manner in which the question of limitation has been dealt with by the courts below is highly

(2019) 13 SCC 372

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unsatisfactory. It was rightly noticed that the suit was governed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Then, the enquiry should have been, first, whether any time was fixed for performance in the agreement for sale, and if it was so fixed, to hold that a suit filed beyond three years of the date was barred by limitation unless any case of extension was pleaded and established. But in a case where no time for performance was fixed, the court had to find the date on which the plaintiff had notice that the performance was refused and on finding that date, to see whether the suit was filed within three years thereof. We have explained the position in the recent decision in R.K. Parvatharaj Gupta v. K.C. Jayadeva Reddy [R.K. Parvatharaj Gupta v. K.C. Jayadeva Reddy, (2006) 2 SCC 428] . In the case on hand, there is no dispute that no date for performance is fixed in the agreement and if so, the suit could be held to be barred by limitation only on a finding that the plaintiffs had notice that the defendants were refusing performance of the agreement. In a case of that nature normally, the question of limitation could be decided only after taking evidence and recording a finding as to the date on which the plaintiff had such notice. We are not unmindful of the fact that a statement appears to have been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs that they did not want to lead any evidence. The defendants, of course, took the stand that they also did not want to lead any evidence. As we see it, the trial court should have insisted on the parties leading evidence on this question or the court ought to have postponed the consideration of the issue of limitation along with the other issues arising in the suit, after a trial."

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In the aforesaid case, it is clearly held that in cases falling in second limb of Article 54 finding can be recorded only after recording evidence. The said view expressed by this Court supports the case of the respondent-plaintiff."

(Emphasis supplied is mine)

30. Likewise, three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme

Court in case of Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) Vs. Bibijan9,

has held that word 'date' used in Article 54 of Limitation Act,

would be a definite date and if time limit is fixed in agreement

for performance, it would be within three years from such date

and if no time is so fixed, within three years from date on which

plaintiff has knowledge of refusal by defendant to perform his

part of contract.

31. Indisputably, Ex.P1 - Agreement of Sale dated

16.03.1988 stipulates period of three months for receipt of

balance sale consideration and to execute sale deed by