Sri. P. Jnaneshvar vs The State Of Karnataka
2024 Latest Caselaw 10181 Kant

Karnataka High Court

Sri. P. Jnaneshvar vs The State Of Karnataka on 10 April, 2024

                           1


     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2024

                        BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

     WRIT PETITION NO. OF 8660 OF 2023 (S-RES)

BETWEEN:


SRI. P. JNANESHVAR,
S/O PARASHURAM
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
ASSISTANT ENGINEER
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
ELECTRICAL DIVISION
BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
SOUTH ZONE, 2ND BLOCK, 9TH MAIN ROAD
BENGALURU
R/AT NO 15, 2ND CROSS
THALAGATTAPURA, KANAKAPURA ROAD
BENGALURU -560062.

                                      ....PETITIONER

(BY SRI. VIJAYA KUMAR B, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
       REPD. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
       URBAN DEPARTMENT
       BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
                          2


     VIKAS SOUDHA
     BENGALURU 560001.

2.   THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER
     BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
     N R SQUARE
     BENGALURU 560002.

3.   THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER (ADMIN)
     BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
     N R SQUARE
     BENGALURU 560002.

4.   THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
     ELECTRICAL DIVISION
     BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
     SOUTH ZONE
     JAYANAGAR
     BENGALURU 560011.

                                   ....RESPONDENTS

(SRI.B. SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R-1; SRI.M.A.
SUBRAMANI, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS 2 TO 4)

     THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL
FOR RELEVANT RECORDS RELATINTG TO ISSUE OF
IMPUGNED ORDER BEARING NO.Na Aa E 491 Mng 2017
DATED 11.04.2023 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 VIDE
ANNEXURE-M AND AFTER PERUSAL SET ASIDE THE SAME
AND ETC.,

     THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 04.04.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
                                  3


                           ORDER

The captioned petition is filed assailing the

impugned order imposing penalty of compulsory

retirement issued by respondent No.1 as per

Annexure-'M'.

2. The facts leading to the case are as under:

The petitioner was appointed as a Junior

Engineer in BBMP. The petitioner finds himself

embroiled in disciplinary proceedings that arose from

allegations originating from criminal proceedings. The

chain of events commenced with the complaint lodged

by one Y.B. Krishnamurthy, which prompted

Upalokayuktha to register FIR in Crime No.72/2015.

Subsequent investigations culminated in a report

under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act,

1984 by the Lokayukta, triggering departmental

proceedings against the petitioner alleging that

petitioner has demanded illegal gratification.

3. Based on the report submitted by the

Enquiry Officer, respondent No.1 has issued a second

show-cause notice and has imposed penalty of

compulsory retirement, which is assailed by the

petitioner.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner reiterating

the grounds urged in the writ petition would

vehemently argue and contend that the findings

recorded by the Enquiring Officer are perverse and

contrary to the findings recorded by the criminal Court

which led to honorable acquittal. He would point out

that enquiry officer has placed reliance on

contradictory deposition of shadow witness examined

as P.W.1 and investigating Officer who is examined as

P.W.3 in departmental proceedings. Learned counsel

has persuaded this Court to take cognizance of

deposition of complainant and has questioned the

findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer while

submitting his report. Reliance is placed on the

judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of

Union of India .vs. Gyan Chand Chattar1. He has

highlighted various inconsistencies and inadequacies

significantly undermining the charges alleged against

the petitioner. He would vehemently argue and

contend that the entire allegations relating to trap

which is preceded by alleged illegal demand made by

the petitioner is not substantiated. He has referred to

the evidence of one S.C. Ramanjaneya recorded in

Special C.C.No.74/2017 relating to identification of

petitioner's voice in CDs. He has also laid emphasis on

the findings recorded by the criminal Court while

disbelieving the demand of bribe by petitioner to clear

the bills. He would point out that the alleged demand

of illegal gratification on 20.11.2015 is also rejected

by the criminal Court while taking cognizance of the

statement made by S.C.Ramanjeya, who is examined

2009(12) SCC 78

as P.W.8 in criminal proceedings. The said superior

Officer has admitted that the consolidated bills

submitted by the complainant was required to be

considered only after 30.11.2015 and therefore, the

counsel referring to the statement made by the

Investigating Officer in criminal proceedings to the

effect that complaint was found to be premature has

questioned the findings arrived at by the Enquiry

officer and the consequent penalty imposed by the

Disciplinary Authority without examining the

explanation offered by the petitioner to the Enquiry

Officer. He has also pointed out that this complaint

was lodged by the complainant on the advice of one

Kaushik, who happens to be the friend of complainant.

Complaint is lodged under the impression that the bills

will be cleared at the earliest. He has also referred to

the several discrepancies in the manner in which the

trap was conducted. Complainant's evidence is read

to substantiate that the shadow witness did not

accompany the complainant. The tainted cash was

placed on petitioner's table and therefore, there was

no acceptance of bribe. The Disciplinary authority has

simply accepted the recommendations and has

imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the

petitioner, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and the

learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4.

6. Before I advert to the case on hand, it

would be useful for this Court to take cognizance of

the findings recorded by the Criminal Court while

acquitting the petitioner in Spl.C.C.No.74/2017. Paras

40 and 41 would be relevant and the same are

extracted as under:

"40. PW-8 S.C.Ramanjaneya is the higher officer of this accused and as per the prosecution he was examined before the court for identifying

the voice of this accused appearing in the said CDs and for collecting other documents from his office marked at Ex.P-3 & 8. However, in his examination-in-chief he denied the fact of identifying the voice of this accused appearing in the CD and giving of his report as per Ex.P-8. Later he was cross-examined by the PP and nothing was elicited in his cross examination, so his evidence is of no use for considering the prosecution case against the accused.

41. Now the evidence of PW-9 remains for consideration of this court. As per the complaint and prosecution case it is clear that, the bill amount for five months was pending with BBMP and this accused has not assisted the complainant in preparing his bill, so he has registered the case and investigated the matter and submitted charge sheet. In the cross-examination by the accused counsel he has admitted that, the complaint itself is a premature, as the BBMP authority ought to have consider the same after 30-11-2015. PW-8 S.C.Ramanjaneya has also stated in his cross- examination stating that, the consolidated bill submitted by the complainant from 01-07-2015 to 30-11-2015, so it ought to have been considered

after 30-11-2015. Said fact was also admitted by the IO. By considering this fact also it indicates that, the complaint itself is pre-matured. When the complainant and shadow witness have not whispered a single word stating that, on 24-11- 2015 at about 4-15 p.m., when the complainant, shadow witness and IO had been to the office of this accused and discussed about the pending work of the complainant, this accused has demanded and accepted bribe amount of Rs.17,000/- from his as alleged by the prosecution, under such circumstances, mere seizure of the amount marked at MO-11 itself conclude the guilt of the accused. Since the evidence of PW-1 & 2 creates doubt in the mind of the court about the allegations of the prosecution about the demand and acceptance of bribe amount by this accused from the complainant, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, this court answered Point No.2 & 3 in the negative."

7. It would be relevant to extract the cross-

examination of the complainant who is examined as

P.W.2 in the proceedings, which reads as under:

"4. Afterwards, I along with the Investigating Officer, staff of Investigating Officer and two witnesses went to the office of DGO at 4.00 P.M. I entered the office of DGO. One witness whose name I do not remember followed me. After I entered the office of DGO I saw the DGO opening the tiffan box. On seeing me, the DGO conveyed message to me with right palm to remain for a While. My friend Kaushik was with me. I placed tainted cash Rs.17.000/-on the table. Afterwards I came out of the office and wiped my face with kerchief with the help of both hands.

9. Cross examination by Advocate Sri. Veeresh Reddy.S. Patil: 1 now admit the certified copy of my evidence consisting of nine sheets in Special C.C. number 74/2017 which is now shown to me which is now marked as per Ex D1. was cleared. My old bill till 01/07/2015 was cleared. My subsequent second bill was pending. The said bill was to be placed on 30/11/2015. Bills were

being paid through online. I admit that bill will be cleared in chronological order. I was taken to Lokayukta Police Station by my friend Kaushik for the purpose of lodging complaint. On lodging of the day of my handwritten complaint case was not registered against the DGO. Afterwards I have not lodged complaint in writing before the Investigating Officer. On the instructions of Kaushik I placed the cash on the table. After the entry of the Investigating Officer to the office of DGO I was asked by the Investigating Officer to sit in a particular place. Finger wash process of the hands of DGO was not conducted in my presence. Mahazar was not drawn in the office of DGO. On the instructions of Lokayukta Police staff I signed on the papers placed before me by Lokayukta Police staff. No certificate was obtained from me by the Investigating Officer touching recording of voice of DGO. My mobile hand set has been seized by the Investigating officer. The Investigating Officer has not seized the receipt touching the mobile hand set purchased by me. I admit that I was advised by Kaushik to lodge complaint in order to see that clearance of my bill will be done at the earliest. It is not true that Kaushik was talking to the Investigating officer

during pre-trap and trap proceedings. It is not true that Kaushik alone was with me in Lokayukta Police Station and others were out of Lokayukta Police Station.

8. The relevant portion of cross-examination

of P.W.1 (Shadow witness) is extracted as under:

"11. ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ಪರ ಾ ಾಯ ಾ ೕ ೇ ೆ .ಎ . ಾ ೕ ರವ ಂದ ಾ ೕ ಸ ಾಲು:-

ಾನು 'ೆಂಗಳ*ರು ನಗರ +ಾಗದ ,ೋ ಾಯುಕ. /0ೕ 1ಾ2ೆ3ೆ ಬರುವ ಮುನ6 ನನ6 ಕ7ೇ ಯ ಚಲನ ವಲನ ಪ9ಸ.ಕದ0: ಆ ಬ3ೆ; ನಮೂದು <ಾ ಲ:. ಾನು =ೆ>ಷ @.@.ಸು,ೈ 74/2017 ರ0: =ಾB ನು ದುC ಏಳE FಾGೆಗಳ ೊ6ಳ3ೊಂಡ ನನ6 =ಾIದ ದೃKೕPÀÈತ ಪ Lಯನು6 ಈಗ ನನ3ೆ Nೋ ಸ,ಾ ದುC ಅದು PQಾ ೆ -3. ಆ ಾ ಕ ಸಾ ಾರರ ಕ7ೇ ಯ ೊಠ ಯ 'ಾ ಲು ಮುಚSಲ> Tತು. ಎಂಬುUಾ ಮತು. ಾನು ಆ ಕVೇ ಯ ಮNೊ.ಂದು ೊಠ ಯ 'ಾ 0ನ ಮುಂ+ಾಗದ0: PಂLUೆCನು ಎಂಬುUಾ PQಾ ೆ -3 ರ 6 ೆಯ FಾGೆಯ0: ನನ6 FೇW ೆಯ0: ಕಂಡು ಬರುತ.Uೆ. XgÁå ಯು ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ೊಠ Yಂದ Fೊರ ಬಂದು ಸೂಚ ೆ ೊಟT ನಂತರ ಾನು ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವ 3ೆ ಕ ೆ <ಾ Uೆನು ಎಂಬುUಾ ಯೂ ಸಹ PQಾ ೆ -3 ರ 6 ೆಯ FಾGೆಯ0: ಕಂಡು ಬರುತ.Uೆ.

12. ಾನು ^ದಲ 'ಾ 3ೆ 'ೆಂಗಳ*ರು ನಗರ +ಾಗದ ,ೋ ಾಯುಕ.

/0ೕ 1ಾ2ೆ3ೆ FೋUಾಗ ಮUಾ ಹ6 1:15 ಗಂ_ೆ`ಾ ತು.. ಾನು XgÁå 3ೆ ಪ Qೆ6 FೇWಲ: ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು ನನ6 ಸಮIಮ ಾ aೕ ಕ ಪಂಚ ಾbಯ ಪ c dಗಳನು6 ನeೆ@ಲ: ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯಲ:. ಾನು ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ೊಠ aಳ3ೆ FೋUಾಗ ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರು ಊಟ <ಾಡುL.ದCರು. ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರ ಂದ ಹಣ ವಶಪ @ ೊಂ ಲ:

ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯಲ:. ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ೈಗಳ 'ೆರಳEಗಳನು6 NೊGೆ@ಲ: ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯಲ:. ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ಾ ಂ ನ iೇಬನು6 ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು NೊGೆ@ಲ: ಮತು. ಾ ಂಟನು6 ವಶಪ @ ೊಂ ಲ:

ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯಲ:. ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು ವಶಪ @ ೊಂಡ ಕಡತದ FಾGೆಗಳನು6 ಾನು ಪ ೕ0@ ನಂತರ ಅವ9ಗಳ bೕ,ೆ ಸjಗಳನು6 <ಾ ರುNೆ.ೕ ೆ. ಆ Uಾಖ,ೆಗಳ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಾ ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು XgÁå 3ೆ ಪ Qೆ6ಗಳನು6 ೇWಲ:. ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ಕ7ೇ ಯ0: _ಾ mn ಪಂಚ ಾbಯನು6 <ಾಡ,ಾ ಲ: ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯ ಲ. ಾನು ಆ ಾ ತ ಸ ಾ ೌಕರರ ಕ7ೇ Yಂದ ಅಂದು ಮNೆ. ಪ9ನಃ 'ೆಂಗಳ*ರು ನಗರ +ಾಗದ ,ೋ ಾಯುಕ. /0ೕ 1ಾ2ೆ3ೆ ಾಪಸುp ಬಂUೆನು. ತP[ಾ\ ಾ ಯವರು ನನ6 ಸಮIಮ ಾಂ ಾ qT rಗಳ ಅಂಶಗಳನು6 ೇW@ಲ: ಮತು. ಾಂ ಾ qT r ಅನು6 ವಶಪ @ ೊಂ ಲ: ಎಂಬುದು ಸ ಯಲ:. 'ೆಂಗಳ*ರು ನಗರ +ಾಗದ ,ೋ ಾಯುಕ. /0ೕ 1ಾ2ೆಯ0: _ಾ mn ಪಂಚ ಾbಯನು6 <ಾಡ,ಾ ಲ:."

9. Upon careful examination of the witnesses

examined on behalf of the department and on taking

cognizance of evidence of P.W.8 in criminal

proceedings, it is noted that P.W.8, a superior Officer

of BBMP admitted during criminal proceedings that the

bill payable to the complainant was due after

30.11.2015 whereas the complaint had been filed on

20.11.2015. It is significant that P.W.8 in criminal

proceedings did not identify the voice of the petitioner

in the CDs produced, which undermines the veracity

of the allegations. The complainant during

departmental enquiry admitted to have placed tainted

cash on petitioner's table and the shadow

witness(P.W.1) did not accompany and was not a

witness to the alleged trap laid by the authorities.

Therefore, there was total lack of corroborative

evidence before the criminal Court. The absence of

shadow witness (P.W.1) during the alleged placement

of cash on petitioner's table and the subsequent

drawing of trap panchanama at the Lokayukta office

raises a serious question about the integrity of the

evidence presented even before the Departmental

enquiry.

10. The Enquiry Officer has proceeded to hold

that the charges are proved and this finding is arrived

at by the Enquiry Officer on an assumption that P.W.8

in criminal proceedings has identified the petitioner's

voice in the CD recordings. This is clearly contrary to

the finding of the criminal Court which is culled out

supra. The enquiry Officer appears to have misread

the findings recorded in the criminal proceedings.

Contrary to the conclusion drawn by the criminal

Court, the enquiry Officer has erroneously held that

the petitioner's voice is identified and the allegation of

illegal gratification is successfully substantiated.

11. In the light of the aforementioned

discrepancies, inconsistencies and misinterpretations,

it is abundantly clear that the disciplinary proceedings

against the petitioner lacks merits. The petitioner

having been honorably acquitted in the criminal case

cannot be subjected to punitive measures based on

flawed and biased enquiry.

12. The disciplinary authority is clearly carried

away by the recommendations made by the

Lokayukta. Any recommendation by the Lokayukta

and Upalokayuktha is not binding in stricto senso.

The Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal .vs. State of

Rajasthan [Civil Appeal No.7935/2023] has

emphasized that if the charges in both departmental

enquiry and criminal Court are similar and the

evidence, witnesses and circumstances align, the

acquittal can be considered in judicial review.

13. The judgment rendered by this Court in the

case of P.V. Rudrappa .vs. The State of Karnataka and

another [WRIT PETITION.No.9642 of 2020

DD.30.1.2024] is squarely applicable to the present

case on hand. It would be germane to extract the

relevant paragraph which read as under:

"2(b) What is observed by the Apex Court in AJIT KUMAR NAG vs. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD., 2005 SCC Online SC 1352 at para 11 is worth reproducing:

"As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object

of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.

However, the above observations are by way of general rule which admits at least one exception namely the abnorm of honourable acquittal."

(emphasis supplied)

14. Furthermore, the Division Bench of this

Court while elucidating the plea of honorable acquittal

and its effect on disciplinary action and taking note of

numerous precedents has observed as under:

"3(b) The concept of 'honourable acquittal' is easy to say, but difficult to employ, there being no statutory definition thereof, more particularly in the IPC, Cr.PC & Indian Evidence Act. Lord Williams, J. in ROBERT STUART WAUCHOPE vs. EMPEROR (1934) 61 ILR Cal.168 observed: "The expression 'honourably acquitted' is one which is unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals...".

The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI V MEHER SINGH, (2013) 7 SCC 68 at para 25 explained the same:

"...the expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."

(c) The idea of 'honourable acquittal' is not easy to define although it can be illustrated. If an accused is

discharged at pre-trial stage or the criminal proceeding launched against him is quashed, there is no difficulty in treating the same as the cases of 'honourable acquittal' for the limited purpose of disciplinary enquiry. (We are mindful that the question of acquittal comes post trial). A case of 'honourable acquittal' may arise when, after trial the Criminal Court orders acquittal with any of nearly the following illustrives:

(i) the accused is falsely prosecuted to seek vengeance or for some ulterior motive.

(ii) that there is absolutely no evidence to implicate the accused in the proceedings;

(iii) there is very little evidence which is Insufficient to connect the accused with the commission of crime;

(iv) the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges against the accused;

(v) the prosecution witnesses are unworthy of any credit and their version does not generate any confidence.

We again say that the above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. We would also add a caveat that in considering as to whether the case of delinquent is of 'honourable acquittal', the entire judgement in Criminal Case should be perused. It is also desirable to secure a copy of record of the proceedings for examination, unless the said exercise poses practical difficulty. At least, it should be open to the delinquent employee to produce such copies."

(emphasis supplied)

15. It would be apposite to cull out the findings

recorded by the criminal Court in Special CC. No.

74/2017, the same are extracted as under:

"28. Though the complainant has admitted in his examination-in-chief with regard to his appearance before the Lokayukta police and filing of his complaint as per Ex.P-1 and conducting trap by the Lokayukta police against this accused and seizure of amount, but he has denied the fact of filing of his complaint before the Lokayukta Police voluntarily and the fact of demand and acceptance of bribe amount by the accused on 24-11-2015. In his cross-examination by the counsel for the accused on page-8 he has stated about his complaint and it reads as follows;

"..........It is true that, on 21-11-2015, I had been to the office of the accused. It is true that, my complaint marked at Ex.P-1 was prepared by my friend Kaushik and thereafter, I put my signature on the same."

so, this statement goes to show that, he is not the scribe of that complaint. Because in his examination-in- chief on page-1 about the complaint he has deposed before the court and it reads as follows;

"......On enquiry to my friend Kaushik he advised me to go and file a complaint before Lokayukta Police. Thereafter, on 20-11-2015 he has taken me to Lokayukta Office and discussed with the Lokayukta Police".

29. In his examination-in-chief on page-2 para-3 he has stated that, he went into the chamber of the accused and voluntarily paid the bribe amount despite no demand from the accused and it reads as follows;

".........when I went into the chamber of the accused he was having his lunch. On my discussion with him and offering the bribe amount to him he mad indication to wait. On enquiry to my friend he told me to keep the bribe amount on the table and to come out."

This statement of complainant goes to show that, though there was no demand of bribe amount by the accused he had voluntarily offered the same and despite of his refusal he kept the said amount on the table. In view of the same, it is clear that, there was no demand and acceptance of bribe amount by the accused.

33. By considering the evidence of PW- 1 & 2 given before the court on oath along with the case of the prosecution, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused for having demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 17,000/- from the complainant on 24-11- 2015 as alleged against him."

(emphasis supplied)

16. The Division Bench of this Court in the

judgment culled out supra has provided illustrative

scenarios to define what constitutes an honorable

acquittal. These scenarios encompass situations where

the accused is exonerated due to various factors such

as false prosecution, lack of evidence, or unreliable

witnesses. From the above culled out portions, what

can be gathered is that the petitioner's acquittal aligns

with the concept of honorable acquittal as outlined by

the division bench in case of P.V. Rudrappa(supra).

The findings of the criminal Court in Special

C.C.No.74/2017 unequivocally indicate that the

prosecution has miserably failed to substantiate its

case regarding the alleged demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification. Furthermore, the evidence

presented by prosecution witnesses PW-1 and PW-2

do not sufficiently support the allegations of demand

and acceptance of bribe amount. This indicates a

failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the

charges against the accused, which is consistent with

the division bench's illustrative scenario of the

prosecution's failure leading to an honorable acquittal.

Therefore, the order of compulsory retirement passed

in the departmental inquiry cannot stand in light of

the petitioner's honorable acquittal in the criminal

Court.

17. Considering the similarity between the

charges in both the departmental inquiry and the

criminal court, along with the alignment of evidence,

witnesses, and circumstances, it becomes evident that

the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal Court

preceded by a categorical finding that the prosecution

has "miserably failed" to substantiate the allegations

of demand and acceptance of bribe carries significant

weight in the departmental inquiry. It is incumbent

upon the adjudicating authority to meticulously

scrutinize and accord due regard to the findings and

determination of the criminal Court. Failure to do so

would constitute a lapse in the procedural rigor

essential for fair and just adjudication. Regrettably,

the Additional Registrar (Enquiries) has failed to

discharge this imperative duty. This oversight

compromises the integrity and validity of the order

passed by the Enquiry Officer rendering it vulnerable

to challenge and nullification.

18. Given these intricate considerations, it

becomes patently clear that the order mandating the

compulsory retirement of the petitioner, arising from

the departmental inquiry, is bereft of a solid

foundation upon which to sustain its legitimacy. In this

vein, the imposition of an order of compulsory

retirement in the departmental inquiry stands in stark

contrast to the honorable acquittal obtained in the

criminal court. To allow such disparate outcomes to

coexist would not only undermine the sanctity of the

judicial process but also flout the cardinal principle of

non bis in idem, wherein an individual should not be

subject to double jeopardy for the same alleged

offence.

19. In the light of the principles cited supra,

the impugned penalty of compulsory retirement is not

sustainable. In the light of manifold discrepancies and

misinterpretations that has plagued the impugned

penalty inflicted by the disciplinary authority, this

Court is more than satisfied that this is a fit case to

interfere. In compliance of principles of fairness and

equity, the impugned penalty is liable to be quashed.

20. For the reasons stated supra, this Court

proceeds to pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The writ petition is allowed.

(ii) The impugned order bearing No.Na Aa E 491 Mng 2017 dated 11.04.2023 issued by respondent No.1 as per Annexure-"M" is hereby quashed.

SD/-

JUDGE *alb/-