Karnataka High Court
Sri Xxxxx vs The Registrar General on 10 April, 2024
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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NC: 2024:KHC:14572
WP No. 6504 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 6504 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI XXXX
S/O XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
2. SRI XXXXX
S/O XXXXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
Digitally signed 3. XXXXX
by NAGAVENI S/O XXXXXX
Location: HIGH XXXX
COURT OF
KARNATAKA XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. SATHISHA D J., ADVOCATE)
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WP No. 6504 of 2024
AND:
1. THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU-560001
2. THE REGISTRAR
CITY CIVIL COURT
BANGALORE-560001
3. THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU-560001
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MANMOHAN P N., ADVOCATE)
THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT TO THE
RESPONDENTS TO CONSIDER THE REPRESENTATION OF THE
PETITIONERS AT ANNX-C, DTD. 11.01.2024 AND ANNX-D DTD.
10.01.2024, CONSEQUENTLY MASKING OF PETITIONERS NAME
FROM THE COURT DATABASE IN PROCEEDING
SC NO.726/2016 WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE THE XLV
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court seeking the following
prayer:
"1) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing to the
Respondents to consider the representation of the
petitioners at Annexure - C, dated 11/1/2024 and
Annexure - D, dated 10/1/2024, consequently masking of
petitioners name from the court database in proceeding
SC No.726/2016 which is pending before the XLV
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Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru as per
Annexure = A.
2) Grant such other and further relief as this
Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper under the facts and
circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and
equity."
2. Heard Sri Sathisha D.J., learned counsel for petitioners
and Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for respondent No.1.
3. The petitioner gets embroiled in a crime in Crime
No.907/2014 for the offences punishable under Sections 188,
294, 370(3), 370A and 109 r/w. Section 35 of the Karnataka
Excise Act and Sections 103 and 105 of the Karnataka Police
Act. The petitioners were arrayed as accused Nos.26 to 28.
The police after investigation filed a charge sheet which is
pending in S.C.No.726/2016, which proceedings were called in
question before a coordinate bench of this Court in
Crl.P.No.5964/2017. The coordinate bench quashed the
proceedings against the petitioners - accused Nos.26 to 28, in
terms of the order dated 20.02.2018. It is an admitted fact
that as on today, there is no challenge to the said order and
the order has become final. In the light of the said order
becoming final, the representation seeking to mask the name
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of the petitioners from the data base, having not merited in
favourable consideration, the petitioners are before this Court
in the subject petition.
4. The issue in the lis need not detain this Court for the
long or delve deep into the matter. This Court considering the
identical prayer of masking of the name of the accused, in the
light of the 'B' report being filed and 'B' report accepted by the
concerned Court, in W.P.No.25557/2023, disposed on
28.02.2024, has held as follows:
"9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute.
The petitioner is alleged of exchanging lewd messages
with the daughter of the complainant. Therefore, the
crime comes to be registered in Crime No.105 of 2021.
The police conduct investigation and in the detailed final
report would opine that it was a false case and,
therefore, 'B' report is filed. The concerned Court
accepts the 'B' report and closes the proceedings
against the petitioner by discharging him of the
allegations. The situation is that the petitioner who was
once an accused becomes blame free today. The
charge sheet itself was not filed against him, as the
investigation led to filing of 'B' report. The 'B' report,
even after it being notified to the complainant was not
contested and, therefore, the petitioner was discharged
on acceptance of 'B' report resulting in closure of the
case. In those circumstances, the name of the petitioner
being dubbed as an accused even after the aforesaid
circumstance, undoubtedly leads to grave prejudice to
the petitioner. He is on a higher pedestal than any of
the accused who would get acquitted after a full blown
trial. The petitioner, at the threshold itself, is declared
to be innocent. The issue is whether the name of the
petitioner-accused should be masked in the digital
records of this Court. She would submit that the other
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respondents have already yielded to the request of the
petitioner and have masked the name of the petitioner
in their records. What remains is only the masking of
the name in the digital records of this Court.
10. The law in this regard cannot be termed to be
static, but dynamic. Dynamic, I deem it necessary to
observe, as it should evolve like evolution of the
Constitution of India, which is a dynamic document. A
facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is that
every citizen in the country should have a life with
dignity; the dignity does get trampled on account of
various acts of a citizen. Those acts are punishable after
a due process of law. If the result of due process of law
is absolving of any person of alleged guilt, those
persons become the ones who would get a right to live
with dignity, having no blame against them.
11. This Court, in plethora of cases, comes about
issues where crimes are registered without any rhyme
or reason and lead to quashment of those proceedings
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., sometimes on the sole score that it was
frivolous or an act of wreaking vengeance, inter alia. It
is therefore, after the accused gets blame-free by a
process of law, he cannot be seen to be carrying the
sword of him being accused on his head, for all his life.
Right to oblivion; right to be forgotten are the principles
evolved by the democratic nations, as one being a facet
of right to informational privacy. Countries like France
and Italy, had by themselves evolved the concept of
right to oblivion, which dates back to 19th century.
Europe, in the European Union has, over privacy and
personal data, evolved the principle of right to be
forgotten, as a right to be a part of ones right to
personality, which encompasses dignity, honour and
right to a private life. The aforesaid principles evolved
from time to time, can be paraphrased into what could
become right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of JUSTICE K.S.
PUTTASWAMY(RETD) v. UNION OF INDIA1. The
Apex Court considers various facets of privacy; one such
(2017) 10 SCC 1
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privacy is informational privacy. On informational
privacy, the Apex Court observes as follows:
"Informational privacy
629. The right of an individual to exercise
control over his personal data and to be able to control
his/her own life would also encompass his right to
control his existence on the internet. Needless to say
that this would not be an absolute right. The existence
of such a right does not imply that a criminal can
obliterate his past, but that there are variant degrees
of mistakes, small and big, and it cannot be said that a
person should be profiled to the nth extent for all and
sundry to know.
630. A high school teacher was fired after
posting on her Facebook page that she was "so not
looking forward to another [school] year" since the
school district's residents were "arrogant and snobby".
A flight attendant was fired for posting suggestive
photos of herself in the company's uniform. [Patricia
Sánchez Abril, "Blurred Boundaries: Social Media
Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee", 49
Am Bus LJ 63 at p. 69 (2012).] In the pre-digital era,
such incidents would have never occurred. People
could then make mistakes and embarrass themselves,
with the comfort that the information will be typically
forgotten over time.
631. The impact of the digital age results
in information on the internet being permanent.
Humans forget, but the internet does not forget
and does not let humans forget. Any endeavour
to remove information from the internet does not
result in its absolute obliteration. The footprints
remain. It is thus, said that in the digital world
preservation is the norm and forgetting a
struggle [ Ravi Antani, "the resistance of
memory : could the European union's right to be
forgotten exist in the united states?", 30
Berkeley Tech LJ 1173 (2015).] .
632. The technology results almost in a
sort of a permanent storage in some way or the
other making it difficult to begin life again giving
up past mistakes. People are not static, they
change and grow through their lives. They
evolve. They make mistakes. But they are
entitled to re-invent themselves and reform and
correct their mistakes. It is privacy which
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nurtures this ability and removes the shackles of
unadvisable things which may have been done in
the past.
633. Children around the world create
perpetual digital footprints on social network
websites on a 24/7 basis as they learn their
"ABCs" : Apple, Bluetooth and chat followed by
download, e-mail, Facebook, Google, Hotmail and
Instagram. [Michael L. Rustad, Sanna Kulevska,
"Reconceptualizing the right to be forgotten to
enable transatlantic data flow", (2015) 28 Harv
JL & Tech 349.] They should not be subjected to
the consequences of their childish mistakes and
naivety, their entire life. Privacy of children will
require special protection not just in the context
of the virtual world, but also the real world.
634. People change and an individual
should be able to determine the path of his life
and not be stuck only on a path of which he/she
treaded initially. An individual should have the
capacity to change his/her beliefs and evolve as
a person. Individuals should not live in fear that
the views they expressed will forever be
associated with them and thus refrain from
expressing themselves.
635. Whereas this right to control
dissemination of personal information in the
physical and virtual space should not amount to
a right of total eraser of history, this right, as a
part of the larger right to privacy, has to be
balanced against other fundamental rights like
the freedom of expression, or freedom of media,
fundamental to a democratic society.
636. Thus, the European Union Regulation
of 2016 [Regulation No. (EU) 2016/679 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27-4-
2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive No. 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation).] has recognised what has been
termed as "the right to be forgotten". This does
not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are
to be obliterated, as some may have a social
ramification. If we were to recognise a similar
right, it would only mean that an individual who
is no longer desirous of his personal data to be
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processed or stored, should be able to remove it
from the system where the personal
data/information is no longer necessary,
relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate
interest. Such a right cannot be exercised where
the information/data is necessary, for exercising
the right of freedom of expression and
information, for compliance with legal
obligations, for the performance of a task carried
out in public interest, on the grounds of public
interest in the area of public health, for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical
purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or
defence of legal claims. Such justifications would
be valid in all cases of breach of privacy,
including breaches of data privacy."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court considers the entire spectrum the right
to privacy and the 'right to be forgotten' evolved in the
European Union Regulation of 2016, by the European
Parliament. The Apex Court recognizes the right to be
forgotten to be a basic right under the right to
informational privacy. It has observed the right of an
individual to exercise control over his personal data and,
to be able to control his or her own life would
encompass his right to control over its existence on the
internet. The Apex Court observes that the impact of
digital age results in information on the internet being
permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does not
forget and does not let humans forget. Therefore, the
soul of the judgment of the Apex Court quoted supra is
that the footprints in certain circumstances should not
be permitted to remain, as it is an
anti-thesis to right to be forgotten.
12. The Apex Court, again in a case concerning
squabble between husband and wife, wherein this Court
had rejected the plea of the parties therein to mask the
names, directed this Court to evolve a methodology of
masking the names of both the accused and the victim.
The order passed by the Apex Court in XXXX v. YYYY2
reads as follows:
"ORDER
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1123
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IA No. 68521/2022-CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION
1. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has
entered appearance and joins in the request made by the
petitioner.
2. The petitioner submits that the display of her
name in the public domain with respect to offences
committed on the modesty of woman and Sexually
Transmitted Disease (STD) has caused immense loss by
way of social stigma and infringement of her personal
privacy. Even if the name of the respondent No. 1 appears,
it causes the same result. The petitioner pleads the
'right to be forgotten' and 'right of eraser' being
rights of privacy, the name of the petitioner as well
as the respondent be removed/masked along with
the address, identification details and case numbers
to the extent that the same are not visible for search
engines.
3. We thus, call upon the Registry of the
Supreme Court to examine the issue and to work out
how the name of both the petitioner and respondent
No. 1 along with address details can be masked so
that they do not appear visible for any search
engine.
4. The IA and the Miscellaneous Application
accordingly stand disposed of.
5. The needful be done within three weeks from
today by the Registry."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. The High Court of Delhi in the case of SJ v.
UNION OF INDIA3, has held as follows:
"3. The petitioner is a 33-year-old XXXXX
graduate who unfortunately got embroiled in a criminal
case in relation to which XXXXX was registered under
Section 384 of the Penal Code, 1860, Sections 66-A
and 67-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
The said FIR resulted in a settlement and the same
was quashed in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.
1207 of 2022 vide order dated 2-6-2022. The said
order records that the petitioner and Respondent 2
therein, had friendly relations for the last 18 years and
2023 SCC OnLine Del.3309
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due to an immature prank of the petitioner, the FIR
got to be registered. The relevant portion of the order
quashing the FIR is set out below :
"6. This petition is filed for quashing of
FIR No. 293 of 2021 under Section 384IPC
registered at PS Chittranjan Park, Delhi and the
proceedings emanating therefrom. Although,
the FIR was initially registered under Section
384IPC but later on Sections 66-C and 67-A of
the Information and Technology Act were also
invoked while filing the charge-sheet.
7. The brief facts of the case are that the
petitioner and Respondent 2 are childhood
friends and have good/friendly relations since
18 years, however an immature prank went out
of hand and led to filing of the present FIR on
23-9-2021. The complainant and the present
petitioner have settled the dispute vide
settlement dated 29-9-2021. The petitioner has
remained in custody for about a week before he
was bailed out on the strength of the said
settlement. The petitioner undertakes not to
repeat the act in future. The affidavit of the
complainant is also on record, which stands
verified.
8. The complainant/Respondent 2 is
present through videoconferencing and has
been duly identified by the investigating officer,
who states the matter has been settled with the
petitioner and she has no objection if the FIR is
quashed against the petitioner. The learned APP
for the State has also no objection, if this
petition is allowed.
9. Considering the above settlement
between the parties and chances of conviction
of the petitioner are bleak, there is no use to
continue with the proceedings of the present
FIR as complainant has settled all the disputes
and has received the settled amount from the
petitioners.
10. Accordingly, the petition is
allowed. Consequently, XXXXX under Section
384IPC registered at XXXXX Delhi and
the proceedings emanating therefrom are
quashed, subject to payment of cost of Rs
10,000 in lawyers' welfare fund, XXXXX or
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association and the receipt be handed over to
the IO within one week from today. Pending
application(s), if any, also stands disposed of."
... ... ...
6. This Court, in a matter relating to removal of a
court order from the internet, observed as under :
"8. The question as to whether a court order
can be removed from online platforms is an issue
which requires examination of both the right to privacy
of the petitioner on the one hand, and the right to
information of the public and maintenance of
transparency in judicial records on the other hand. The
said legal issues would have to be adjudicated by this
Court.
9. The right to privacy is well recognised
by the Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench
judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India [K.S.Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017)
10 SCC 1]. In Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. Quintillion
Business Media (P) Ltd. [Zulfiqar Ahman
Khan v. Quintillion Businessman Media (P)
Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8494] this Court had
examined this issue and while granting an
interim order, this Court had held as under :
'8. In fact, it is the submission of learned
counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff's
personal and professional life has been
hampered irreparably and further damage is
likely to be caused if appropriate relief is not
granted against the republication of these two
articles. The original publisher having already
agreed to pull down the same, this Court
having directed that the same ought not to be
republished, the plaintiff, thus, has a right to
ensure that the articles are not published on
multiple electronic/digital platforms as that
would create a permanent atmosphere of
suspicion and animosity towards the plaintiff
and also severely prejudice his personal and
professional life. The printouts of the articles
from www.newsdogapp.com, which have been
shown to the court, leave no doubt in the mind
of the court that these are identical to the
articles published on www.thequint.com, which
have already been pulled down.
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9. Accordingly, recognising the plaintiff's
right to privacy, of which the "right to be
forgotten" and the "right to be left alone" are
inherent aspects, it is directed that any
republication of the content of the originally
impugned articles dated 12-10-2018 and 31-10-
2018, or any extracts/or excerpts thereof, as
also modified versions thereof, on any print or
digital/electronic platform shall stand restrained
during the pendency of the present suit.
10. The plaintiff is permitted to communicate
this order to any print or electronic platform including
various search engines in order to ensure that the
articles or any excerpts/search results thereof are not
republished in any manner whatsoever. The plaintiff is
permitted to approach the grievance officers of the
electronic platforms and portals to ensure immediate
compliance of this order.'
10. Recently, the Orissa High Court
in Subhranshu Rout v. State of Odisha [Subhranshu
Rout v. State of Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878] ,
decided on 23-11-2020, has also examined the aspect
and applicability of the 'right to be forgotten' qua right
to privacy, in a detailed manner including the
international law on the subject.
11. It is the admitted position that the
petitioner was ultimately acquitted of the said charges
in the case levelled against him. Owing to the
irreparable prejudice which may be caused to the
petitioner, his social life and his career prospects, in
spite of the petitioner having ultimately been acquitted
in the said case via the said judgment, prima facie this
Court is of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to
some interim protection, while the legal issues are
pending adjudication by this Court.
12. Accordingly, Respondents 2 and 3 are
directed to remove the said judgment dated 29-1-
2013 in Custom v. Jorawar Singh Mundy [Custom
v. Jorawar Singh Mundy, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 359]
from their search results. Respondent 4 Indian Kanoon
is directed to block the said judgment from being
accessed by using search engines such as
Google/Yahoo, etc. till the next date of hearing.
Respondent 1 to ensure compliance of this order."
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7. In the opinion of the court, the fact that the
entire career of the petitioner, who is a young
executive, is likely to be jeopardised due to the
continued presence of the impugned articles on the
internet would weigh in favour of directing the removal
of these publications. Moreover, the court has to draw
a balance between the right to access information, in
general on the one hand and the petitioner's well-
being, mental health, career prospects and prospects in
life and family on the other hand. The fulcrum of any
society following the rule of law would be to reform a
person and not condemn a person permanently. While
bearing these factors in mind and considering the order
extracted above, it is deemed appropriate to direct all
the publishers i.e. Respondents 3 to 10 to remove the
articles which have been collectively attached to the
petition as Annexure P-1.
8. In addition, access to the said articles shall also be
blocked by Respondent 2/Google LLC.
9. MeitY shall also issue directions for blocking of any
articles relating to the petitioner and the FIR which has been
quashed, within 48 hours. The present order shall be
communicated by Mr Rakesh Kumar learned CGSC, to MeitY
for necessary compliance.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner shall provide
learned counsel for the respondents all the specific URLs of
the articles of which removal is sought. The list shall be
communicated by the end of day to the respondents.
11. The said URLs shall be removed within 48 hours
and the access to the same shall be blocked by the
respondents.
12. Insofar as the Indian Express is concerned, one
week's time is granted to the said respondent to remove the
articles."
(Emphasis supplied)
The High Court of Delhi permits masking of the
name of the accused in all the search engines.
14. Evolving this concept of a right to be
forgotten or right to erasure have been the subject
matter of the Personal Data Protection Bills notified from
time to time. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018
recognizes the right to be forgotten. Likewise, the
Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 also recognizes the
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right to correction and erasure. The Government of
India notifies the Digital Personal Data Protection Act,
2023, on 11th August, 2023, to come into force from the
date of its publication in the official gazette. The Act
also recognizes the right of erasure of personal data.
The aforesaid are referred only to lay emphasis, on the
fact that the law in this regard is also evolving in the
country.
15. It becomes germane at this juncture, to
notice the judgment of the Queen's Bench of the United
Kingdom rendered on 13-04-2018, which also
recognizes the said principle in NT 1 v. GOOGLE LLC4
wherein the Queen's Bench has held as follows:
"1. These two claims are about the "right
to be forgotten" or, more accurately, the right to
have personal information "delisted" or "de-
indexed" by the operators of internet search
engines ("ISEs").
... ... ...
38. Point 2 highlights the fact that the CJEU
regarded the sensitivity of the data in question as an
important element in striking the balance. Point 4
explains why it may be misleading to label the right
asserted by these claimants as the "right to be
forgotten". They are not asking to "be forgotten". The
first aspect of their claims asserts a right not to be
remembered inaccurately. Otherwise, they are asking
for accurate information about them to be "forgotten"
in the narrow sense of being removed from the search
results returned by an ISE in response to a search on
the claimant's name. No doubt a successful claim
against Google would be applied to and by other ISEs.
But it does not follow that the information at issue
would have to be removed from the public record, or
that a similar request would have to be complied with
by a media publisher on whose website the same
information appeared. In these proceedings the
claimants are not asking for any such remedy. It is
also worth noting here a point that I shall come back
to: a successful delisting request or order in respect of
a specified URL will not prevent Google returning
search results containing that URL; it only means that
the URL must not be returned in response to a search
on the claimant's name.
[2018] EWHC 799 (QB)
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... ... ...
101. In my judgment, both versions of the
argument would fail on the alternative ground that the
processing involved when Google Search makes
available third party content that happens to be of a
journalistic nature is not properly regarded as
processing undertaken "solely" or "only" for journalistic
purposes, as required by Article 9 and s 32. In Google
Spain, the Grand Chamber indicated at [85] that it did
not consider an ISE would process solely for
journalistic purposes, and although that was not an
integral part of the Court's reasoning I consider it is
true. I also accept the argument of Ms Proops, for the
ICO that Google's approach to the journalism
exemption is to be resisted because it would have
consequences that cannot have been intended by the
legislators. The argument, shortly stated, is that the
effect of ss 3, 45 and 46 of the DPA is to impose
severe constraints on the ICO's powers of enforcement
where data are processed for the special purposes. If
Google's activities fall within that description, it would
be able to operate the "right to be forgotten regime"
without regulatory oversight and control. I consider
my conclusions to be consistent with the stricture
contained in Article 9 of the DP Directive, that Member
States may provide for journalistic exemptions "only if
they are necessary to reconcile ... privacy with ...
freedom of expression" (emphasis added).
... ... ...
165. Behind these competing submissions lie
some obvious difficulties. It is not a simple matter of
applying s 4 of the 1974 Act, without regard to other
factor or considerations. Such a hard-edged approach
would be incompatible with human rights
jurisprudence, and the fact-sensitive approach that is
required. The argument for the ICO, and the argument
with which Mr Tomlinson ended up, acknowledge as
much. The Court's task is to interpret and apply the
will of Parliament as expressed in a statute passed
some 25 years before the advent of the internet, to a
set of facts of a kind that Parliament cannot then have
foreseen; to do so consistently with the will of
Parliament as expressed via the HRA in 1998; and to
do so in the light of the fact that it was not until 2004
that the Courts identified the existence of the common
law tort of misuse of private information. The
conclusions arrived at then have to be fitted into the
scheme of the "right to be forgotten", first
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authoritatively recognised in a CJEU judgment of 2014
by which this Court is bound, by reason of the 1972
Act.
... ... ...
230. My conclusions are:-
(1) The delisting claim is not an abuse of the court's
process, as alleged by Google.
(2) The inaccuracy complaint is upheld, and an
appropriate delisting order will be made, its
terms to be the subject of argument.
(3) The remainder of the delisting claim also
succeeds. An appropriate order will be made, in
terms to be the subject of argument.
(4) The claim for misuse of private information
succeeds.
(5) But Google took reasonable care, and the
claimant is not entitled to compensation or
damages."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. The Queen's Bench declines to accept the
contentions of Google for delisting the name of the
accused therein. The claim of the appellant before the
Queen's Bench, on an allegation of misuse of private
information succeeded. The distilled essence of the
judgments rendered by the Apex Court and the
judgment of the Delhi High Court, as also that of the
judgment of Queen's Bench all quoted supra would
mean that, even an accused who has been discharged
or acquitted honourably by a competent Court of law
has a right to live with dignity.
17. Article 21 of the Constitution of India
mandates that no person shall be deprived of his life or
liberty except in accordance with law. The expression
'life' cannot be seem to connote a mere animal
existence, it has a much wider meaning. It takes within
its sweep right to live with dignity. In the crime, once
the accused gets acquitted - honourably, discharged by
a competent Court of law, or this Court would quash
those crimes in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. and those orders become final, the
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shadow of crime, if permitted to continue in place of
shadow of dignity, on any citizen, it would be travesty of
the concept of life under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Every citizen born in this nation, governed by the
Constitution, has a right to live with dignity. What is
being sought for, is masking of the name of the
petitioner in the cause title of the case found in the
records of this Court.
18. In the peculiar facts of the case, no fault can
be found with such a demand. I deem it appropriate to
observe that when identical demands are made by those
accused or victims, as the case would be, accused who
come within the circumstances narrated hereinbefore,
the Fourth Estate should also consider masking,
delisting and deleting their names from their respective
digital records and not drive them to this Court seeking
such deletion. However, it is made clear that mere
erasure of the name of the petitioner in the cause title,
does not mean that he is entitled to seek such erasure
from the police records. The direction would be only
to enable the internet forget, like the humans
forget. If it is allowed to stay on record, the
internet will never permit the humans to forget."
One of the circumstances that this Court had observed is that,
any accused against whom a crime is quashed invoking Section
482 Cr.P.C. and those orders becoming final, such person is
entitled for masking of the details in the database. In the light
of the issue standing covered, the prayer sought by the
petitioners deserves to succeed.
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5. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The writ petition stands allowed.
b. Mandamus issues to the respondents to consider the
representations of the petitioners dated 10.01.2024 and
11.01.2024 and mask the names of the petitioners from
the database of the concerned Court in S.C.No.726/2016,
pending before the XLV Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru.
c. The Registrar General of the High Court of Karnataka is
directed to mask the name of the petitioners in its digital
records pertaining to Criminal Petition No.5964/2017,
forthwith.
Sd/-
JUDGE
NVJ
