Karnataka High Court
Ashok Nagappa Meti vs The State Of Karnataka on 1 December, 2023
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 01st DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO.104571 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
ASHOK NAGAPPA METI,
AGE. 55 YEARS,
OCC. PREVIOUSLY WORKING AS SECOND DIVISION
ASSISTANT, GOVERNMENT HIGH SCHOOL,
MORAB, RAIBAG TALUK, BELAGVI DISTRICT,
R/O. GOUDAR PLOT, NEAR MALLIKARJUN TEMPLE,
RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI 591317.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.VIJAY K. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SHIVAKUMAR
HIREMATH 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
Digitally signed by
SHIVAKUMAR DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY & SECONDARY
HIREMATH
Date: 2023.12.05 EDUCATION, M.S. BUILDING,
11:27:53 +0530
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
R/BY ITS REGISTRAR, M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, GA FOR R1;
SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
2
CERTIORARI AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BELAGAVI
DATED 01.07.2021 IN APPLICATION NO.5722/2017 VIDE ANNEXURE-
O AND ETC..
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD, RESERVED ON
01.12.2023 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
This writ petition is filed assailing the order dated
01.07.2021 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative
Tribunal, Belagavi (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in
Application No.5722/2017, whereby, the application of the
petitioner was rejected.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this petition are
that, the respondent No.2 laid a trap on the petitioner
alleging that the petitioner and Sri. Shantappa the BEO of
Raibag have demanded and accepted illegal gratification
for encashing the earned leave of the complainant. A joint
enquiry was conducted. The Enquiry Officer has submitted
the report to the first respondent holding that, charges
levelled against the petitioner are proved. The
Upalokayukta has recommended to the first respondent to
impose punishment of compulsory retirement of the
petitioner. It is averred that, the criminal proceedings
initiated against the petitioners in Special Case
No.175/2003 has ended in acquittal. It is further averred
that, the petitioner has assailed order dated 28.08.2017 of
the first respondent, wherein the first respondent has
imposed penalty of compulsory retirement of the petitioner
before the tribunal, the tribunal vide impugned order dated
01.07.2021 rejected the application of the petitioner.
Being aggrieved by the same the present petition is filed.
3. Sri. Vijay K. Naik, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner submits that, the tribunal has committed
gross error in not appreciating the fact that, the criminal
case initiated against the petitioner in Special Case
No.175/2003 has resulted in acquittal of the petitioner. It
is submitted that, the charges leveled against the
petitioner and the evidence on record are one and the
same. Hence, the tribunal ought to have considered the
same by allowing the application filed by the petitioner
seeking to set aside the impugned order of imposing
punishment of compulsory retirement of the petitioner. It
is submitted that, though the petitioner have urged other
grounds in the writ petition, however, he is not pressing
those grounds except the ground referred at paragraph
No.19 of the petition. He seeks to allow the writ petition.
4. Per contra, Sri. Anil Kale, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No.2 supports the impugned
order of the tribunal and submits that, the tribunal on
taking note of the evidence available on record has
recorded the categorical finding that, the order passed by
the first respondent is in conformity with the earlier order
passed by the tribunal, the first respondent has issued a
second show cause notice to the petitioner considered his
reply and passed the impugned order. It is submitted
that, the tribunal has recorded the finding that, the
proceedings in the criminal Court and the domestic enquiry
are based on different principles i.e. the standard of proof
required in the domestic enquiry and the criminal trial are
different and also mode of enquiry are different. Hence, no
interference is called with the order of the tribunal. He
seeks to dismiss the writ petition.
5. Learned Government Advocate supports the
impugned order of the tribunal and submits that, the
enquiry held by the Lokayukta is fair and proper and after
providing sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, the first
respondent has imposed penalty, which does not call for
any interference in the present petition. He seeks dismissal
of the writ petition.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents and
perused the material available on record.
7. The petitioner was working as Second Division
Assistant in the Government High School, Morab of Raibag
District. One Sri. Shatteppa Lakkannavar, Teacher files a
complaint alleging that, the petitioner and BEO have
demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.4,000/- to sanction
Earned Leave Encashment benefit, he has paid Rs.2,000/-
and later trap was laid by the respondent No.2 Lokayukta,
the petitioner was caught red handed. It is not in dispute
that, the first respondent has entrusted the enquiry to the
Upalokayukta and accordingly a joint enquiry was
conducted against the petitioner and the BEO. Pursuant to
the trap laid, criminal proceedings were also initiated
against the accused under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The
enquiry report was submitted on 27.06.2012 holding that,
charges leveled against the petitioner are proved and
charges leveled against the BEO are not proved. The
Upalokayukta vide recommendation/letter dated
28.08.2012 has recommended to impose penalty of
compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Considering the
enquiry report and the recommendation, the first
respondent has imposed penalty of compulsory retirement
of the petitioner in accordance with Rule 8 (vi) & (viii) of
the CCA Rules, which was later corrected and corrigendum
were issued on 13.05.2014 and 21.05.2014. The order of
punishment and subsequent corrigendums were assailed
before the tribunal in Application No.8050/2014. The
tribunal vide order dated 28.09.2016 allowed the said
application by quashing the order of penalty and
corrigendums by reserving specific liberty to the
respondent No.1 to pass fresh order after furnishing the
copy of the report and recommendation of the
Upalokayukta to the petitioner and thereafter considering
the reply submitted by the petitioner.
8. It is borne out from the record that, the first
respondent has issued second show cause notice on
27.09.2016 and the petitioner has submitted his reply and
thereafter considering the enquiry report and the reply of
the petitioner, the impugned order of imposing penalty of
compulsory retirement was passed by the first respondent.
9. On perusal of the charges leveled against the
petitioner in the domestic enquiry which reads as under:
"Charge:
That you the DGO-1 Shanthappa Babanna Bil and
DGO-2 Ashok Nagappa Meti while as working as BEO and
SDA respectively in the O/o BEO at Raibagh in Belgaum
District demanded bribe from the complainant viz.,
Sathyappa Chennappa Lakkannavar who was a teacher
of Government Higher Primary School, Kankanvadi,
Raibagh Taluk, Belgaum District and from other teachers
to prepare and send Surrender Leave Encashment bills to
the Treasury and on 10/12/2002 you demanded and
received bribe of Rs.1600-00 from the complainant
failing to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to
duty unbecoming of Government servants and thereby
committed misconduct under Rule 3(1) of Karnataka Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules 1966."
The articles of Charges were served on the petitioner,
the petitioner has participated in the Enquiry Proceedings.
On completion of detailed enquiry, Enquiry Report was
submitted holding that, the disciplinary authority has
proved the charges leveled against the petitioner. The
enquiry report further indicates that, the petitioner has
been provided with the sufficient opportunity in the
enquiry proceedings, the disciplinary authority has
examined four witnesses. Out of the said four witnesses
two witnesses have supported the case of disciplinary
authority. The petitioner DGO has not examined any
witness, nor produced any documents. The enquiry Officer
has recorded the categorical finding that, the charges
leveled against the petitioners have been proved. The said
finding of the Enquiry Officer is on appreciation of the
evidence available on record and the said finding have
been re-examined by the tribunal while considering the
application of the petitioner and further recorded a finding
that, there is no infirmity in the finding recorded by the
Enquiry Officer. This Court does not find any infirmity in
the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the
tribunal calling for any interference in the present petition.
The first respondent taking note of the enquiry report, the
recommendation and the reply of the petitioner has
imposed the punishment on being prima-facie satisfied
that disciplinary authority has proved the case. The
impugned order of respondent No.1 does not call for any
interference in the present petition.
10. The only contention urged by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that, the petitioner has been
exonerated in the criminal proceedings in Special Case
No.175/2013 arising out of the same incident, hence, the
petitioner is required to be exonerated from the
departmental enquiry proceedings. Before considering the
said contention, it would be useful to refer the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Karnataka and another Vs. Umesh, reported in (2022)
6 SCC 563, wherein, at paragraph Nos.16 to 23 held as
under:
"16. The principles which govern a disciplinary
enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal
trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the
criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish
the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The
purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to
enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee
which results in a violation of the service rules governing
the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal
prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond
reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of
misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of
probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a
criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a
disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding
in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction.
17. In a judgment of a three judge Bench of this
Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, Justice V R
Krishna Iyer set out the principles which govern a
disciplinary proceedings as follows:
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic
enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of
evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may
not apply. All materials which are logically
probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and
credibility. It is true that departmental
authorities and Administrative Tribunals must
be careful in evaluating such material and
should not glibly swallow what is strictly
speaking not relevant under the Indian
Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not
necessary to cite decisions nor text books,
although we have been taken through case-law
and other authorities by counsel on both sides.
The essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of
natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis
and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or
surrender of independence of judgment vitiate
the conclusions reached, such finding, even
though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held
good. However, the courts below misdirected
themselves, perhaps, in insisting that
passengers who had come in and gone out
should be chased and brought before the
tribunal before a valid finding could be
recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel
for the respondent referred, based upon certain
passages from American Jurisprudence does
not go to that extent nor does the passage
from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement.
The simple point is, was there some evidence
or was there no evidence -- not in the sense of
the technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as
men of understanding and worldly wisdom will
accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of
evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic
tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any
evidence in support of a finding is certainly
available for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the
record. We find, in this case, that the evidence
of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is
some evidence which has relevance to the
charge leveled against the respondent.
Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order
is invalid on that ground."
(emphasis supplied)
These principles have been reiterated in subsequent
decisions of this Court including State of Rajasthan v. B K
Meena, Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah
Mazdoor Sangh ; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd.; and CISF v Abrar Ali.
18. In the course of the submissions, the
respondents placed reliance on the decision in the Union of
India v. Gyan Chand Chattar. In that case, six charges were
framed against the respondent. One of the charges was
that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the
railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges
proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those
findings and imposed the punishment of reversion to a
lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no
evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery
since the witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not
making the payment could be the expectation of a
commission amount. The respondent placed reliance on the
following passages from the decision:
"21. Such a serious charge of
corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as
it brings both civil and criminal consequences
upon the employee concerned. He would be
liable to be prosecuted and would also be
liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in
such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of
quasi-criminal nature was required to
be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to
the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere
probabilities.
31. .... wherein it has been held that
the punishment should always be
proportionate to the gravity of the
misconduct. However, in a case of corruption,
the only punishment is dismissal from service.
Therefore, the charge of corruption must
always be dealt with keeping in mind that it
has both civil and criminal consequences."
19. The observations in paragraph 21 are not the
ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were made
while discussing the judgment of High Court. The ratio of
the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the
judgment, where the test of relevant material and
compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh
(supra) was reiterated:
"35. ...an enquiry is to be conducted
against any person giving strict adherence to the
statutory provisions and principles of natural
justice. The charges should be specific, definite
and giving details of the incident which formed
the basis of charges. No enquiry can be
sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be
conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction
in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on
the part of the delinquent cannot be a
misconduct. The authority must record reasons
for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of
the statue defining the misconduct."
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry
against the respondent appears to be the
outcome of anguish of superior officers as there
had been an agitation by the railway staff
demanding the payment of pay and allowances
and they detained the train illegally and there
has been too much hue and cry for several hours
on the railway station. The enquiry officer has
taken into consideration the non-existing
material and failed to consider the relevant
material and finding of all facts recorded by him
cannot be sustained in the eye of the law."
(emphasis supplied).
On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the
above decision that there was no relevant material to
sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was
only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that
the motive for not paying the railway staff "could be"
corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the
Court for determining the validity of the departmental
proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for
arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural
justice were complied with.
20. In Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, this Court has held:
"9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not
debar an employer from exercising the power
to conduct departmental proceedings in
accordance with the rules and regulations. The
two proceedings, criminal and departmental,
are entirely different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. In the
disciplinary proceedings, the question is
whether the Respondent is guilty of such
conduct as would merit his removal from
service or a lesser punishment, as the case
may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings,
the question is whether the offences registered
against him under the PC Act are established,
and if established, what sentence should be
imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the
mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry
and trial in both the cases are significantly
distinct and different."
21. The Court also held that:
"13. Having considered the submissions made on
behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of
the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the
High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the
acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a
Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The
disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the
Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the
Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during
the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to
find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct
under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining
whether he should be continued in service. The standard of
proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the
rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on
the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary
proceedings, which is different from the evidence available
to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed no
interference by the High Court."
22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does
not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the
disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the
evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct
has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry.
The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its
review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice
have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is
based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing
the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed;
and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority
suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is
disproportionate to the proven misconduct.
23. However, none of the above tests for attracting
the interference of the High Court were attracted in the
present case. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having
exercised the power of judicial review found no reason to
interfere with the award of punishment of compulsory
retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded
its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon a
domain which falls within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
employer. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with
the principles of natural justice. The findings of the inquiry
officer and the disciplinary authority are sustainable with
reference to the evidence which was adduced during the
enquiry. The acquittal of the respondent in the course of
the criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of the
disciplinary authority or the finding of misconduct in the
disciplinary proceeding."
Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra, the case on
hand where a detailed enquiry has been conducted by the
respondent No.2, wherein, the disciplinary authority has
produced as many as four witnesses and out of those
witnesses two witnesses have supported the case of
disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority has
produced as many as ten documents to substantiate the
charges leveled against the petitioner. On a close scrutiny
of the evidence on record and the enquiry report, it is
evident and proved that, the petitioner has received
Rs.1,600/- as a bribe from P.W.2 in connection with the
bill, which further proves that, there was a demand of
bribe by the petitioner and was accepted by him. This
Court keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra, the mere
acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings is not
a ground to exonerate the petitioner from the
departmental enquiry proceedings. The acquittal has no
impact or baring on the disciplinary proceedings initiated
by the department as the standard of proof in the
departmental enquiry and the evidence required and proof
required in the criminal proceedings are different. The
employer is required to enquire into allegation of
misconduct of its employee in the departmental enquiry
and the appreciation of evidence in such enquiry is based
on preponderance of probabilities, however, in the criminal
proceedings the prosecution is required to prove the case
beyond reasonable doubts. The acquittal of the petitioner
in the criminal proceedings is on the ground that, the
prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt and the acquittal is not honourable acquittal. The
allegations/charges and the evidence before the two
proceedings are different and the standard of proof
required in both the proceedings are different. Hence,
mere acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal
proceedings has no absolutely bearing on the fair and
appropriate enquiry conducted by the respondent No.2 and
consequential punishment imposed by the respondent
No.1. Hence, there is no merit in the contention urged by
the learned counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, the
same is rejected.
11. This Court do not find any error in the finding
recorded by the tribunal calling for interference in this
petition. For the reasons recorded supra, this Court does
not find any merit in the present case, accordingly,
dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
SVH/-
