Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5433 Kant
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF MARCH 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S. SANJAY GOWDA
R.S.A.No.2138/2021 (DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
1. DR. P. VISHWANATHA NAYAK,
AGED 61 YEARS,
S/O LATE P.VARADARAYA NAYAK,
2. P.VENUGOPAL NAYAK,
AGED 56 YEARS,
S/O LATE P.VARADARAYA NAYAK,
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT 18-137,
V.V.NIVESHAN, MAIN ROAD,
PANEMANGALORE,
BANTWAL TALUK,
D.K.DISTRICT - 574 231. ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. ANANDARAMA.K. ADV0CATE)
AND:
1. P.SHRINIVASA PAI,
AGED 77 YEARS,
S/O LATE ACHYUTHA
@ JOGAPPA PAI,
No.202, CHITRA APARTMENT,
KODIYALAGITTU,
MANGALURU - 574 231.
2. KAVITHA MAURYA,
AGED 49 YEARS,
W/O RAJANIKANTA MARYA AND
2
D/O P.SRINIVASA PAI,
C/O P. SRINIVASA PAI,
No.202, CHITRA APARTMENT,
KODIYALAGITTU,
MANGALURU - 574 231.
3. ANITHA KINI,
AGED 45 YEARS,
W/O SUDHIR KINI,
C/O P.SRINIVASA PAI,
No.202, CHITRA APARTMENT,
KODIYALAGITTU,
MANGALURU - 574 231.
4. AJITH @ ACHUYUTA PAI,
AGED 37 YEARS,
C/O P.SRINIVASA PAI,
No.202, CHITRA APARTMENT,
KODIYALAGITTU,
MANGALURU - 574 231.
No. 2 TO 4 ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR,
GPA HOLDER, No.1 P.SRINIVASA PAI,
WHO IS NOW RESIDING AT OPPOSITE
ART PALACE, KOTTARA ROAD, BEJAI KAPIKAD,
MANGALURU - 574 231.
5. P.GOVINDA PAI,
AGED 82 YEARS,
S/O LATE P.UPENDRA PAI,
R/AT PAI COMPOUND MAIN ROAD,
PANEMANGALORE,
BANTWAL TALUK,
D.K.-574 231. ... RESPONDENTS
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC,
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 22.04.2021
PASSED IN R.A.No.50/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, D.K.MANGALURU,
DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
3
AND DECREE DATED:26.09.2019 PASSED IN O.S.No.7/2012
ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND
JMFC, BANTWAL D.K.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 24.02.2022, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs who had sought
for a decree of specific performance of a contract of sale,
which has however, been refused by both the Courts.
2. The facts leading to the filing of this second appeal are
as follows:
3. The suit schedule 'A' properties bearing Sy.No.18/19
measuring 0.20 acres and Sy.No.18/20 measuring 0.04 acres
situate at Panemangalauru village of Bantwal taluk, were the
joint properties of defendant Nos.1 to 4.
4. On 06.03.2002, the plaintiffs entered into a contract of
sale with defendant No.1 in respect of 'A' schedule properties
(as per Ex. P-9) and they proceeded to pay a sum of
Rs.2,25,000/-, by way of a cheque to the 1st defendant. This
cheque was however not encashed. It was also the case of
the plaintiffs that they had paid the balance sale
consideration of Rs.7,35,000/- to defendant No.1 through a
Bankers Cheque 28.03.2002 and the same had also been
encashed.
5. It was stated that on 17.05.2004, in respect of a
portion of the property, which was the subject matter of the
contract of sale, a registered sale deed was executed in
favour of Pramod K. by defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the
remaining extent of land was retained by the defendants
(which was described as plaint 'B' Schedule properties).
6. It was stated that on 16.03.2011, a sale deed was
executed by defendant Nos.1 to 4 in respect of 'B' Schedule
properties in favour of defendant No.5. It was also stated that
a legal notice dated 21.04.2011 was issued by the plaintiffs
calling upon defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed and to
this notice, a reply was also given on 28.04.2011 to which a
rejoinder was also issued on 25.05.2011.
7. Ultimately, on 04.06.2011, the suit was filed seeking for
specific performance and to enforce the contract of sale dated
06.03.2002.
8. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence
adduced before it came to the conclusion that an agreement
of sale had been executed on 06.03.2002 by defendant No.1,
whereby he had agreed to sell 'A' Schedule properties to the
plaintiffs. The Trial Court, however, held that the plaintiffs
had not proved that they were ready and willing to perform
their part of the contract and it also recorded a finding that
the possession of the 'B' Schedule properties had not been
handed over to the plaintiffs. The Trial Court also held that
the suit was barred by time and defendant No.5 was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice. The Trial Court,
accordingly, dismissed the suit.
9. In appeal, the Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the
entire evidence came to the conclusion that appreciation of
evidence by the Trial Court could not be found fault with and
its judgment and decree, dismissing the suit was justified. It
accordingly dismissed the appeal.
10. From the impugned judgments, it is seen that the Trial
Court, as well as the Appellate Court have come to the
conclusion that though a contract of sale had been entered
into between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 on
06.03.2002, but, the assertion that a sum of Rs.2,25,000/-
was paid under the contract of sale, had not been established
by the plaintiffs. A finding is also recorded that the cheque of
Rs. 2,25,000/-, given at the time of the contract of sale had
not been presented for encashment and the plea that the
plaintiffs had paid cash in lieu of the cheque was not proved.
11. Both the Courts have also held that the Bankers cheque
of Rs.7,35,000/- was handed over to defendant No.1 and the
said Bankers cheque had also been encashed.
12. The Courts have, however, held that defendant No.1
had issued a cheque for Rs.5,29,380/- to the plaintiffs on
28.02.2006 and this had been established by the production
of the challan under which, the said cheque was deposited
into the account of the plaintiffs. It has been recorded that
the plaintiffs in to prove that the said payment of Rs.
5,29,380/- related to another transaction had not placed any
material to show that there was some other transaction which
had resulted in the payment of the said sum of Rs.5,29,380/
and further there was no pleading of the plaintiffs regarding
any separate transaction also.
13. It is also noticed by the Courts that if the entire sale
consideration of Rs.9,60,000/- had been paid in 2002, the
question of defendant Nos.1 to 4 being allowed to receive a
further sum of Rs.1,95,000/-, when all of them had sold a
portion of the property to defendant No.1 on 17.05.2004 to
which the 1st plaintiff was a consenting witness, was
inconceivable and thus it could be concluded that the balance
sale consideration had not been paid in 2002.
14. Both the Courts have also found that since admittedly,
a sale deed was executed by the defendants in favour of
defendant No.5 on 17.05.2004, to which the plaintiff No.1
was an attesting witness, the execution of that sale deed in
favour of a third party, clearly amounted to a refusal to
convey the remaining property to him and therefore, the suit
ought to have been filed within three years from that date.
15. Both the Courts have taken notice of the fact that
though the plaintiffs claimed that the entire sale consideration
was paid in the year 2002, for nine years i.e., till 2011, there
was no demand made by the plaintiffs for the execution of
the sale deed and this conduct indicated that there was no
intention of the parties to enter into a sale transaction.
16. Thus, essentially both the Courts, on appreciation of the
oral and commentary evidence have recorded a finding that
the sale consideration as alleged in the contract of sale had
not been paid and the suit was barred by limitation.
17. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that
the entire approach of both the Courts was incorrect. He
contended that the evidence on record, especially, the fact
that defendant No.1 admitted the receipt of Rs.7,35,000/-
clearly established that the entire sale consideration had been
paid and since the entire consideration had been paid, both
the Courts had erred in refusing to grant a decree for specific
performance. He also contended that since the terms of the
contract of sale only stipulated time for payment of balance
sale consideration, time was never the essence of the
contract and the findings of the Courts that the date on which
the sale deed had been executed in favour of the defendant
No.5 i.e., on 17.05.2004 could not be considered as the date
on which there was a refusal on the part of defendant No.1 to
execute the sale deed. He also contended that the refusal to
grant a decree of specific performance by exercising the
discretion vested in the Courts would also amount to a
substantial question of law, which was required to be
considered by this Court.
18. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that even if the
plaintiffs were held not entitled for a decree of specific
performance, having regard to the fact that defendant No.1
had admitted that the receipt of the entire sale consideration,
this was an appropriate case whereby the Courts ought to
have directed repayment of the amount paid with interest or
even without interest.
19. He relied upon a series of judgments to put forth
various contentions regarding time being the essence of the
contract:
Sl. Case Law For the proposition
No.
(i) CHAND RANI (SMT) There was no presumption
(DEAD) BY LRs., vs.
KAMAL RANI (SMT) as to time being the essence
(DEAD) BY LRs., of the contract in case of the
[(1993) 1 SCC 519] sale of immovable property
(ii) NANJAPPAN vs. Even if the plaintiff was held
RAMASAMY AND
ANOTHER, not entitled to specific
performance, the Courts are
[(2015) 14 SCC 341]
required to refund the
advance amount paid by the
plaintiff
(iii) GOVIND PRASAD Time is not of the essence in
CHATURVEDI vs. HARI
DUTT SHASTRI AND cases of agreements of sale
ANOTHER, of immovable properties
[(1977) 2 SCC 539]
(iv) SUSHEELA M.PAREKH vs. Testing the readiness and
M.S.MANOHARAN,
willingness of the plaintiff by
[(2021) 4 KCCR 3208]
asking him to deposit the
money into court
(v) ALEX JOSEPH vs. Even if the sale agreement
MADHAVAN NAIR
was held to be a loan
[(2005) 12 SCC 378]
transaction, the direction to
refund the sums received
can be passed
(vi) P.MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Recovery of money paid
vs. P.VIJAYAKUMAR AND
ANOTHER, without interest when
warranted
[(2018) 15 SCC 80]
(vii) SHANKER SINGH vs. Regarding factors to be
NARINDER SINGH AND
OTHERS, considered for refund of
earnest money when the
[(2014) 16 SCC 662]
plaintiff was held not entitled
for specific performance
(viii) VIJAY KUMAR AND Regarding the obligation of
OTHERS, vs. OM
PARKASH, the seller to refund the sale
consideration on refusal to
[(2019) 17 SCC 429]
decree the suit for specific
performance of the buyer
(ix) RAJESHWARI vs. PURAN What would constitute a
INDORIA,
substantial question of law
[(2005) 7 SCC 60]
under S. 100 of the CPC
(x) BHAGWAN BALA Regarding dismissal of a
MAHANAVAR vs.
SANDIPAN LAXMAN second appeal summarily by
SHINDE AND OTHERS, the High Court
[(2002) 9 SCC 532]
(xi) R.LAKSHMIKANTHAM vs. Mere delay in filing of the
DEVARAJI,
suit cannot lead to the
[(2019) 8 SCC 62]
inference that the plaintiff
was not ready and willing
(xii) MADEMSETTY Regarding the exercise of
SATYANARAYANA vs.
G.YELLOJI RAO AND discretion under S. 20 of the
OTHERS, Specific Relief Act
[AIR 1965 SC 1405]
20. There can be no quarrel with the propositions of law
laid down by the Apex Court in the above judgments but it is
to be stated that none of them would apply to the facts of this
case.
21. The case put forth by the plaintiffs was that they had
entered into a contract of sale and had also paid the entire
sale consideration within thirty days of the contract of sale in
adherence to the term stipulated in the contract and they
were therefore entitled for a decree of specific performance.
This plea, on the face of it, appears rather simple and
plausible, but on closer scrutiny, would reveal that the plea is
untenable.
22. It is to be stated at the very outset, that it would be
most unnatural for a purchaser to pay the entire sale
consideration within thirty days of executing the contract of
sale and yet did not seek to secure the execution of a sale
deed for nearly a decade i.e., for more than nine years
thereafter.
23. Further, if it is also noticed that the
purchasers/plaintiffs, had two years after paying the entire
sale consideration, not only consented to the sale of a portion
of the property by the defendant Nos. 1-4, but had also
consented for the appropriation of a further sum of
Rs.1,95,000/-(the sale consideration stipulated in the said
sale deed executed by the defendants in respect of a portion
of the property)by the seller-defendant No. 1 is very strange.
If it is also noticed that the plaintiffs had thereafter not
sought for conveyance of the remaining portion of the
property for which he had already paid the consideration, is
not only strange but perplexing. This conduct makes it
manifestly clear that the plaintiffs were never really
interested in purchasing the suit property and the transaction
was not a genuine sale transaction.
24. The further fact that the plaintiffs/purchasers for 7
years thereafter i.e., from 2004 till 2011, did not even make
a demand for execution of the sale deed, though they claimed
that they had paid the entire sale consideration way back in
the year 2002 renders the entire transaction dubious sand
completely unreal.
25. These above-mentioned sequences of events, as
admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, viewed in the light of
the timeline of the transactions involving the suit property,
belies the case of the plaintiffs that they really intended to
purchase the suit property and had indeed paid the sale
consideration.
26. Notwithstanding the doubtful nature of the entire
transaction, it will have to be examined whether the case
pleaded by the plaintiffs was tenable and they were entitled
to a decree of specific performance.
27. As regards the execution of the agreement of sale, the
1st defendant does not dispute the execution of the same and
therefore the matter would have to be examined on the basis
that an agreement of sale had been executed.
28. The first step which followed the execution of the
agreement of sale was the assertion of the plaintiffs that they
had paid a sum of Rs.2,25,000/- as advance. The Appellate
Court has noticed that the 1st plaintiff (PW-1) had admitted
during his deposition that he did not have cash of Rs. 2.25
lakhs as on the date of execution of the agreement of sale. In
fact, this is the exact deposition of the plaintiff during his
cross-examination has stated as follows:
"PÀgÁj£À ¢£ÁAPÀzÀ MAzÀÄ wAUÀ¼ÉƼÀUÉ ¸ÀA¥ÀÆtð ºÀt ¥ÁªÀw¹ £ÉÆAzÀt ªÀiÁrPÉÆ¼Àî¨ÉÃPÀÄ JA§ ±ÀvÀð EzÉ. F ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀð JgÀqÀÄ ®PÀë E¥ÀàvÉÊzÀÄ ¸Á«gÀ£ÀÄß ²æÃ¤ªÁ¸À ¥ÉÊgÀªÀjUÉ ZÉPï£À ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ¤ÃrgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. D ZÉPï £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtUÉÆArgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. JgÀqÀÄ ¢ªÀ¸ÀzÀ°è £Á£ÀÄ £ÀUÀzÁV ºÀt PÉÆlÖzÀÝjAzÀ CzÀÄ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtªÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. D ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß »AzÀPÉÌ £Á£ÀÄ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀĪÀÅ¢®è."
He has also further stated as follows:
"¸ÁQëUÉ MAzÀÄ ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß vÉÆÃj¹zÀÄÝ ¸ÀzÀj ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß vÁ£ÀÄ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ gÀÆ.2,25,000/- PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÉÛÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ºËzÀÄ JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. CzÀ£ÀÄß ¤r 1 JAzÀÄ UÀÄgÀÄw¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. ¤r 1 ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß £À£Àß SÁvÉAiÀÄ°è ºÀt E®èzÀ PÁgÀt £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀt DV®èªÉAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀİè. ¤r 1 ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß DgÀÄ ¨Áj £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtPÉÌ ¸À°è¹zÀ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀð £Á£ÀÄ ¥sÉÆÃ£À ªÀiÁr ¸Àé®à ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄ ©lÄÖ ¸À°è¸ÀĪÀAvÉ PÉÆÃjPÉÆArzÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. ¸ÁQë ºÉüÀÄvÁÛgÉ vÁ£ÀÄ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ºÉÆÃV gÀÆ.2,25,000/- PÉÆnÖgÀĪÀÅzÁV £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ ¸ÀzÀj ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß £Á£ÀÄ vÁ¬ÄAiÀĪÀgÀ SÁvɬÄAzÀ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆnÖgÀÄvÉÛãÉ."
29. These admissions of the 1st plaintiff establish, firstly,
that he did not have the funds to pay the advance of Rs.
2,25,000/- and that the cheque given by him and had
remained with the 1st defendant uncashed. Secondly, it also
establishes that he had withdrawn the sum of Rs. 2,25,000/-
from his mother's account and paid the said sum by way of
cash to the 1st defendant. The 1st plaintiff could have thus
established his assertion that he had paid Rs. 2,25,000/- to
the 1st defendant by simply producing an extract of the Bank
statement of his mother's account. Since this has admittedly
not been done, the Appellate Court was justified in concluding
that the advance amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- was never paid to
the 1st defendant.
30. It is also to be kept in mind that in a case, where the
plaintiffs had entered into a written agreement of sale and
had given a cheque for Rs. 2,25,00/- as advance, it is
inconceivable that when this very advance sum of Rs. 2.25
lakhs was paid by way of cash in lieu of the cheque which was
not encashed, neither the return of the cheque had been
obtained nor a receipt had been obtained for the payment of
cash.
31. In fact, the Appellate Court has also noticed that when
a legal notice demanding the execution of the sale deed was
made in 2011, the said notice was silent about the mode of
payment. In my view, having regard to the totality of
circumstances stated above, both the Courts were compelled
to take the view that the advance sum of Rs. 2.25 lakhs was
not paid by the plaintiffs.
32. As regards the second step following the execution of
the agreement of sale i.e., the assertion that the entire
balance sale consideration of Rs. 7,35,000/- was paid within
30 days by the issuance of a Bankers cheque is concerned,
the Appellate Court has noticed that the 1st defendant did
admit that he had received this cheque and had also
encashed it. The 1st plaintiff in the course of his cross-
examination has stated as follows:
"¸ÀzÀj ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß £Á£ÀÄ ¸ÉÖmï ¨ÁåAPï D¥ï EArAiÀiÁ¢AzÀ ¸Á® ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ £À£Àß°èzÀÝ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß MlÄÖ ªÀiÁr gÉr EnÖzÉÝ. ¸ÀzÀj ¸Á®ªÀ£ÀÄß £Á£ÀÄ zÁªÁ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß CqÀªÀiÁ£À ªÀiÁr ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. PÀgÁj£À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛãÉ."
33. It is thus clear that the 1st plaintiff had to raise a loan
from SBI to pay the balance sale consideration. However, no
document evidencing the sanction of a loan was produced. If
this admission is viewed in the background of the fact that
the 1stplaintiff, as per his earlier admission, did not have cash
of Rs. 2,25,000/- just about 22 days before he entered into
an agreement of sale, it would clearly prove that the 1st
plaintiff did not have the funds to pay the balance sale
consideration of Rs. 7,35,000/-.
34. It is also to be kept in mind that the original agreement
of sale dated 06.03.2002 was not produced by the 1st plaintiff
and though it was stated that the said agreement was given
to the Bank at the time of availing the loan, no documents
were produced to show that a loan had been availed and as
collateral this agreement had been handed over to the Bank.
This also reinforces the fact that the plaintiffs did not have a
sum of Rs. 7,35,000/- at their disposal within 28 days of the
execution of the agreement of sale.
35. The Trial Court has recorded a finding that the 1st
defendant had taken a specific contention that he had
returned a sum of Rs. 5,29,380/- by way of the deposit of a
cheque into the Bank account of the 1st plaintiff, which had
been established by the production of Ex D-2, the Bank
Challan.
36. It is to be noticed here that this cheque was deposited
into the plaintiff's Bank account vide Ex D-2 on 28.02.2006
i.e., nearly 4 years after the agreement of sale and more
importantly 2 years after the sale of a portion of the property
that had been agreed to be sold under the agreement of sale,
to which the 1st plaintiff was a witness. The Trial Court has
noticed that the plaintiff had not placed any material to show
in respect of which transaction the said sum of Rs. 5,29,380/-
had been paid to the 1st plaintiff and thus this payment of Rs.
5,29,380/- proved the contention of the 1st defendant that
this was the amount paid towards the return of the sale
consideration of Rs. 7,35,000/-.
37. Admittedly, the 1st defendant was paid a sum of Rs.
1,95,000/- by means of a demand draft when a portion of the
property was sold in 2004. If the plaintiff had already paid the
entire sale consideration of Rs. 9,60,000/- payable under the
agreement of sale, the 1st defendant would not be permitted
to be paid this sum of Rs. 1,95,000/- as that would mean that
he was getting a sum in excess of the agreed sale
consideration which had been paid 4 years ago. It is in this
context, that the finding of both the Courts that the payment
of Rs. 5,29,380/- was towards the repayment of the sum of
Rs. 7,35,000/- paid under the Bankers cheque is to be
viewed. This finding of the Courts regarding repayment
cannot, therefore, be said to be improper or irrational.
38. Thus, since both the Courts have held that the payment
of the advance amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- had not been
established and the payment of Rs. 5,29,380/- by the 1st
defendant to the plaintiff had been proved and had thereby
established that it was towards repayment of the sum of Rs.
7,35,000/-, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to a decree of
specific performance.
39. The argument of the Learned Counsel that the finding
of the Courts that the suit was barred was erroneous cannot
also be accepted. The agreement of sale contains the
following recital:
"vÀ¥À²Ã®£É D¹ÛAiÀÄ §UÉÎ, F ¢£À¢AzÀ MAzÀÄ wAUÀ¼À M¼ÀUÁV, MAzÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀjAzÀ, JgÀqÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀÄ PÀæAiÀÄ zÀ¸ÁÛªÉÃdÄ §gɬĹPÉÆ¼ÀîvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ. ºÁUÉà §gɬĹPÉÆ¼ÀÄîªÀ ªÉÆzÀ®Ä G½PÉ ºÀt
gÀÆ¥Á¬Ä 7,35,000/- (J¼ÀÄ ®PÀëzÀ ªÀÄĪÀvÉÛöÊzÀÄ ¸Á«gÀ gÀÆ¥Á¬Ä) UÀ¼À£ÀÄß MAzÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀjUÉ JgÀqÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀÄ PÉÆqÀ®Ä §zÀÝjgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ°è JgÀqÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀjUÉ CxÀªÁ CªÀgÀÄ vÉÆÃj¹ PÉÆlÖªÀgÀ ºÉ¸ÀjUÉ vÀ¥À²®£À D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß gÉrAiÀiÁV AiÀiÁ ¥ÀævÉåÃPÀªÁV PÀæAiÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß §gÉzÀÄPÉÆqÀ®Ä MAzÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀÄ §zÀÝjgÀÄvÁÛgÉ."
40. The said clause clearly states that the sale deed was
required to be executed within a month and before the said
period the balance sum of Rs. 7,35,000/- was required to be
paid. The fact that a specific time of 30 days was stipulated
for obtaining the registration of the sale deed by itself makes
it clear that a time frame was fixed for the performance of
the contract and time was of the essence in the contract.
41. It may also be pertinent to state that there was a
specific recital regarding the consequence of the 1st defendant
not executing a sale deed in the agreement of sale. The said
Clause 9 reads as follows:
"F ¢£À vÀ¥À²Ã®£À D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß MAzÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀÄ JgÀqÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀ SÁ¸Á ¸Áé¢üãÀPÉÌ ©lÄÖ PÉÆlÖzÀÄÝ, JgÀqÀ£Éà ¥ÁnðAiÀĪÀgÀÄ ¸Áé¢üãÀ ºÉÆA¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ."
42. As could be seen from the said clause, if the 1st
defendant did not execute the sale deed within 30 days,
within which time the balance sale consideration was to be
paid, the plaintiff was required to sue for specific performance
and would also be liable for the cost of the said action and
damages not exceeding a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/-. This clause
leaves no room for doubt that time was fixed for the
performance of the contract and that penal consequences
would visit the 1st defendant if he did not execute the sale
deed.
43. However, despite a specific time frame fixed under the
agreement, admittedly, neither a demand was made from
2002 till 2011 nor was any action was brought before a Court
of Law for specific performance for more than 9 years and
this was despite the fact that the plaintiffs paid the entire sale
consideration in 2002 itself. This goes to show that the suit
was time-barred.
44. Both the Courts have also noticed that the 1st plaintiff
was a consenting witness to the sale deed executed by the
defendants 1 to 4on 17.5.2004in respect of a portion of the
suit schedule 'A' property which the plaintiff had contracted to
buy and this also amounted to a refusal on the part of the 1st
defendant to abide by the terms of the contract. Since the 1st
plaintiff was admittedly a witness to the sale deed executed
on 17.5.2004, it cannot be in dispute that the 1st plaintiff was
aware that a portion of the property for which he had paid the
entire sale consideration was sold. If the holder of an
agreement of sale had consented for sale of a portion of the
property for which he had paid the entire sale consideration
and yet did not seek for the execution of a sale deed in his
favour in respect of the remaining portion, both the courts
were justified in coming to the conclusion that assuming time
was not fixed for performance of the contract, the day on
which a portion of the property had been sold would
constitute the starting point of limitation to sue for specific
performance in respect of the remaining portion.
45. It is also to be noticed here that if an agreement of sale
holder consents for a sale of a portion of the property that he
had contracted to buy and thereafter does not make a
demand for execution of a sale deed in respect of the
remaining portion for 8 years thereafter, it is obvious that he
had abandoned or waived his rights under the agreement of
sale by virtue of his conduct.
46. The last argument of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the Appellate Court was not justified in refusing
to permit the production of additional evidence, cannot also
be accepted. The Appellate Court has found that all the
documents sought to be produced were in relation to a period
from 2001 to 2003, while the suit was filed only in 2011.
Since the Appellate court has found that the documents
sought to be produced were not required to enable it to
pronounce its judgment, it was justified in rejecting the same
since.
47. In conclusion, in my view, entertaining a suit filed for
specific performance in 2011 for enforcing an agreement of
sale of the year 2002 after the entire sale consideration was
allegedly paid in 2002 itself would neither be just or
equitable.
48. The prayer of the appellant for a refund of the earnest
money cannot also be accepted since both the Courts have
recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that he had paid the advance and that he had
received a sum of Rs.5,29,380/- from the 1st defendant in
2006 itself as repayment of the sum of Rs.7,35,000/- that he
had paid on 28.3.2002.
49. I am therefore of the view that there is no question of
law, much less a substantial question of law involved in this
second appeal and the same is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
RK CT:SN
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