Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5256 Kant
Judgement Date : 23 March, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF MARCH 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. VISHWAJITH SHETTY
W.A. NO.557 OF 2021 (LA-KIADB)
IN
W.P.No.13139 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB)
BETWEEN:
1. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD
5TH FLOOR, KHANIJA BHAVAN
BENGALURU 560001
REP. BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-2
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT
BOARD, 5TH FLOOR, KHANIJA BHAVAN
BENGALURU 560001.
... APPELLANTS
(BY MR. BASAVARAJ V. SABARD, SR. COUNSEL FOR
MR. H.L. PRADEEP KUMAR, ADV.,)
AND:
1. K.H. SHIVANNA
S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS.
2. G. ARUNA
W/O B. ANJANAPPA
2
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS.
3. PADMAMMA
W/O LATE B. VENKATEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
R1 TO R3 ARE
R/AT NO. KOLIPURA, JALA HOBLI
BK HALLI POST, YELAHANKA TALUK
BENGALURU 562149.
4. STATE OF KARNATAKA
VIDHANA SOUDHA
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGLAORE 560001
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY.
5. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE
VIKASA SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDI
BANGALORE 560001
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
6. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT
K.G. ROAD, BANGALORE 560009.
7. THE TAHASILDAR
BANGALORE NORTH (ADDL) TALUK
YELAHANKA, BENGLAURU 560064.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY MR. ADITYA SONDHI, SR. COUNSEL FOR
MR. CHANDAN S. RAO, ADV., FOR C/R1 TO R3
MRS. VANI H, AGA FOR R4, R5, R6 & R7)
---
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
02/03/2021 IN WP NO.13139/2019 (LA-KIADB) PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION WITH
COSTS THROUGHOUT.
3
THIS W.A. COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Heard on the question of admission.
This intra court appeal has been filed against the order
dated 02.03.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, by
which learned Single judge has quashed the preliminary
notification dated 07.08.2006 issued by the appellant under
Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short)
insofar as it pertains to the property of respondents 1 to 3
and has allowed the writ petition.
2. Facts giving rise to filing of this appeal briefly
stated are that respondent Nos.1 to 3 are the owners of land
bearing Survey No.7 measuring 6 acres of B.K.Palya Village,
Jala Hobli, Bangalore. A notification under Section 28(1) of
the Act was issued by the appellant on 07.08.2006.
Thereafter, a public notice was issued inviting for objections
from the land owners in respect of the land, which were
notified under the under Section 28(1) of the Act. The
Respondents No.1 to 3 filed their objections. The Special
Land Acquisition Officer by an order dated 26.11.2007
passed an order under Section 28(3) of the Act by which the
objections preferred by respondents 1 to 3 as well as other
land owners were rejected . Thereafter, no steps in the
acquisition proceedings were taken. The Respondent No.1 to
3 on or about 21.03.2019 filed a writ petition, in which a writ
of certiorari was sought for quashment of preliminary
notification dated 07.08.2006 issued under Section 28(1) of
the Act was sought on the ground that the proceedings of
acquisition are vitiated in law on account of efflux of time.
The learned Single judge by an order dated 02.03.2021 has
allowed the writ petition. In the aforesaid factual background,
this appeal has been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the learned Single judge grossly erred in quashing the
preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Act and it
ought to have been appreciated by the learned Single judge
that no timeline are fixed for completion of the land
acquisition proceedings under the Act. It is also submitted
that a proposal was submitted by the appellant to the State
Government in 2016 for issuing the final notification
however, the same was returned to the appellant by the
State Government seeking clarifications and therefore, the
final notification could not be issued.
4. We have considered the submissions made by
learned Senior counsel for the appellant and have perused
the record. In 'RAM CHAND AND OTHERS V. UNION OF
INDIA AND OTHERS', (1994) 1 SCC 44, the Supreme
Court was dealing with situations prevalent prior to
amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Land
Acquisition Act Amendment in 1984. In the aforesaid case,
the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and
declarations under Section 6(1) of the Act were issued on
23.01.1959, 24.10.1961 and 16.05.1966 and 13.01.1969
respectively. However, the awards were not passed. The
Supreme Court held that in view of decision in 'AFLATOON
V LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI', (1975) 4 SCC 285, there
was no justification for not passing the award and by placing
reliance on the aforesaid decision, it was held that two years
period would be a reasonable time for making an award, as
for when the statute does not prescribe a time limit for
performing an Act, the same has to be performed within
reasonable time.
5. However, a division bench of this court in 'H.N.
SHIVANNA AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND ANOTHER', W.A.NOS.3189-3201/2010 DATED
28.11.2012, held that issuance of successive declarations
are permissible and by placing reliance on decision of
Supreme Court in Ram Chand and others supra, held that 2
years time would be a reasonable time for issuance of
declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act. However it is
pertinent to note that the division bench in SHIVANNA's case
also held that provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
cannot be read into the Act and though no time limit is
prescribed under the Act, the acquisition is to be completed
within a reasonable time, say within 2 years, and still what is
the reasonable time has to be decided in the facts of
particular case. The Supreme Court in 'M.NAGABHUSHANA
VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA', (2011) 3 SCC 408,
negatived the contention that since, the award was not
passed within a period of 2 years from the date of declaration
under Section 28(4) of the Act, the acquisition would not
stand vitiated in view of the fact that Section 11(A) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are not applicable to proceedings
under the Act. Therefore, different time frames prescribed
under the Land Acquisition Act and consequences of default
thereof including lapsing of acqusition proceedings cannot be
read into the Act.
6. The right to hold the property is a constitutional
right which is guaranteed under Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India and no citizen can be deprived of his
property without following the due process of law. It is well
settled legal proposition that where a statute does not
provide for time limit for doing an Act, such an Act has to be
done within a reasonable time, and what would be
reasonable time has to be decided in the facts and
circumstances of the Act. [See: 'MEHER RUSI DALAL V
UNION OF INDIA', (2004) 7 SCC 362, 'P.K.
SREEKANTAN V P. SREEKUMARAN NAIR', (2006) 13
SCC 574 AND 'K.B NAGUR V UNION OF INDIA', (2012)
4 SCC 483]. Therefore, in the facts of the case, we have to
ascertain whether the Notification under Section 28(1) of the
Act stands vitiated in law on account of the delay caused in
issuing the final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act
within reasonable time, in the light of submission made by
learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2.
7. In the instant case, the preliminary notification
was issued on 07.08.2006. It is pertinent to mention here
that the appellants did not file objections before the learned
Single Judge to explain the delay caused in land acquisition
proceeding. In the absence of any explanation on behalf of
the appellant, the learned Single judge has rightly held that
there was an inordinate delay in completion of the
proceedings and even after a lapse of 14 years, neither final
notification has been issued nor any steps were taken to
complete the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the
learned Single judge in the facts of the case and in the
absence of any explanation on behalf of the appellant about
the delay in concluding the land acquisition proceeding has
rightly held that the notification dated 07.08.2006 issued
under Section 28(1) of the Act insofar as it pertains to the
land of Respondents 1 to 3 stood lapsed on account of efflux
of time and has rightly quashed the same. For the
aforementioned reasons, we do not find any ground to differ
with the view taken by learned Single Judge.
In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
SS
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