Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 9442 Kant
Judgement Date : 23 June, 2022
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JUNE, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.4210/2022 (CPC)
BETWEEN:
SMT. H. V. KALPANA SUNDARI
W/O G. V. SRIDHAR,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
R/AT NO.B2,
KRISHNA APARTMENTS,
6TH MAIN, 18TH CROSS,
MALLESHWARAM,
BENGALURU - 560 055
... APPELLANT
(BY SRI. SOURABH R. K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI VINAY KRISHNA H V
S/O LATE H V NANDAKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
R/AT NO.81, 4TH MAIN ROAD,
BETWEEN 12TH AND 15TH CROSS,
MALLESHWARAM,
BENGALURU - 560 003.
2. M/S NAGA CONSTRUCTIONS
A PROPRIETORSHIP CONCERN,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.242/3,
18TH CROSS, 7TH MAIN,
SADASHIVANAGARA,
BENGALURU-560080
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR,
SRI G SELVA KUMAR,
S/O SRI M C GURUSAMY.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
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SRI. T..S. CHANDRAPRABHA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1;
SRI. B.S. MANJUNATH, ADVOCATE FOR C/R2)
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
ORDER 43 RULE 1(r) R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC, AGAINST THE
ORDER DATED 30.05.2022 PASSED ON I.A.NO.I IN OS.NO.210/2022
ON THE FILE OF THE XIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, BENGALURU CCH.18, REJECTING THE I.A.NO.1 THE FILED
UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC.
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL COMING ON FOR
ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The appellant is the plaintiff in O.S.No.210/2022 on
the file of the XIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City (for short, 'the civil Court'). The appellant
calls in question the civil Court's order dated 30.05.2022,
and the civil Court by this impugned order has rejected the
petitioner's application (I.A.No.1) under Order XXXIX Rule
1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPC').
2. This Court must record the circumstances
leading to the present suit and the civil Court's conclusions
before deciding on whether there should be any
interference with the impugned order. Sri. H.V.Krishna
Murthy is the undisputed owner of the subject property
[the property bearing No.81/2, PID No.7-3-81/2, 4th Main
Road between 13th and 15th Cross, Malleshwaram,
Bengaluru - 560 003]. On his demise in the year 1967,
Smt. H.V.Rajalaxmi (his wife), Sri. H.V.Nanda Kumar (his
son and the first respondent's father) and the appellant (his
daughter) have entered into a Palu Patti dated 20.01.1971.
The appellant was a minor at this time and therefore, her
mother has signed the Pallu Patti on her behalf.
Admittedly, in this partition, the appellant is given the
subject property, and in terms of this partition, the
appellant has continued as the owner in possession of the
schedule property until the year 2010.
3. On 24.03.2010, the appellant, her mother and
her brother (Smt. H.V.Rajalaxmi and Sri. H.V.Nanda
Kumar) have executed and registered the Partition Deed,
and in this partition, the parties have realigned their rights.
For the purposes of these proceedings, it would suffice for
this Court to record that the subject property is allotted to
Sri. H.V.Nanda Kumar and the appellant is allotted two [2]
units in the apartments building constructed in the
property allotted in the earlier partition to the appellant's
mother and her brother, Sri. H.V.Nanda Kumar. Further, a
certain agricultural land in Turahalli Village, Uttarahalli
Village, Bengaluru South Taluk is also allotted to Sri.
H.V.Nanda Kumar.
4. The Bengaluru Development Authority [BDA]
has acquired this land, and this has resulted in certain
proceedings before this Court, including the challenge to
the acquisition proceedings and a claim for allotment of
sites in lieu of compensation in terms of money. The
parties have also participated in a reference under Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the appellant has
examined herself as one of the witnesses in such reference
proceedings. In her evidence in this reference, the
appellant has referred to the Partition Deed without any
caveat. She has not stated in her evidence that she had
any reservation about the terms of the Partition in the year
2010.
5. In the meanwhile, Sri. H.V.Nanda Kumar has
executed Gift Deed dated 08.06.2017 transferring the
subject property in favour of the first respondent. The
appellant and the first respondent have later signed
subsequent agreements i.e., Agreement dated 28.11.2019
and the Supplementary Agreement dated 24.02.2021. In
the first agreement, the first respondent has agreed to
share the compensation payable in terms of the reference
award with the appellant, and he has also agreed to
transfer to the appellant two [2] apartments, each
measuring 1500 Sq.ft., in the building proposed in the
subject property. The first respondent has later signed the
Joint Development Agreement with the second respondent
on 05.06.2020.
6. In the subsequent Supplementary Agreement
dated 24.02.2021, the appellant and the first respondent
have renegotiated the amount payable and the number of
apartments to be transferred. The appellant has agreed to
receive a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- as against the agreed
amount of Rs.40,00,000/- and to receive an additional
apartment as against the originally agreed two [2]
apartments. The appellant and the first respondent have
detailed the facilities that will have to be provided by the
first respondent in the three [3] apartments with the first
respondent also agreeing that if there is any default in the
delivery of possession of the subject three [3] apartments,
he would pay a sum of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.60,000/- every
month.
7. It is not disputed that as of the date of the suit
viz., 07.01.2022, the second respondent (the developer),
who has entered into the aforesaid Joint Development
Agreement with the first respondent, has started
construction and the subject property, though defined as a
vacant plot in the plaint schedule, was not so even as of the
date of the suit.
8. The appellant has filed the present suit for
declaration that the Partition Deed dated 24.03.2010, the
subsequent Gift Deed dated 08.06.2017 in favour of the
first respondent, the Joint Development Agreement and the
contemporaneous Power of Attorney in favour of the second
respondent are null and void and not binding on the
plaintiff. The appellant in fact, seeks declaration that the
Partition Deed dated 24.03.2010 is void ab initio. The
appellant has asserted that the cause of action for the suit
is when she came to know that her deceased brother, Sri.
H.V.Nanda Kumar, and the first respondent have played a
fraud on her in obtaining the Partition Deed dated
24.03.2010.
9. The appellant has filed an application under
Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC for "temporary injunction
restraining the respondents and their agents from alienating,
encumbering or altering the nature of the suit schedule
property (described as a vacant site)" during the pendency
of the suit. The civil Court has rejected this application for
three fold reasons: the civil Court has opined that the
appellant has not challenged the agreement dated
28.11.2019 or the Supplementary Agreement dated
24.02.2021; the appellant has not approached the Court
with clean hands; the appellant has failed to prove the
balance of convenience or irreparable hardship. The civil
Court, which has recorded certain observations, has also
recorded that those observations are only for deciding the
application and cannot affect the merits of the case.
10. Sri. Sourabh R.K., the learned counsel for the
appellant, submits that the civil Court has failed to
consider that a partition cannot be revisited, and if it so
revisited, it would be hit by Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act 1872. Therefore, the impugned Partition Deed
dated 24.03.2010 is void ab initio. Even if there are
repeated references and admissions as regards the Partition
Deed dated 24.03.2010 in the Agreement dated 28.11.2019
and the Supplementary Agreement dated 24.02.2021, such
references or admissions cannot confer any rights under
the Partition Deed. Therefore, the appellant has made out
a prima facie case for grant of injunction.
11. Sri. Sourabh R.K further submits that in law,
the appellant would be required only to challenge those
documents which are used to deprive her title. Therefore, it
would suffice for the appellant to challenge the Partition
Deed dated 24.03.2010, and she is not required in law to
challenge either the Agreement dated 28.11.2019 or the
Supplementary Agreement dated 24.02.2021. If the
Partition Deed fails, so must these agreements. Even
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otherwise, the appellant need not impugn the agreements
given the circumstances of the case.
12. Per contra, Sri. D.R.Ravishankar, the learned
Senior counsel for the first respondent, submits that the
Partition Deed dated 24.03.2010 and the subsequent
agreements constitute a composite transaction. This
Partition Deed and the subsequent agreements relate not
only to the land acquired by the BDA and the subject
property but also to the two [2] apartments allotted to the
appellant in the apartments building constructed in the
property allotted to her mother and brother in the earlier
partition. The appellant is in possession and control of
these two [2] apartments for many years. The appellant is
elective in her reasons to challenge the Partition Deed dated
24.03.2010 and that would amount to approbating and
reprobating. If the appellant is guilty of approbating and
reprobating, a proposition that is an offshoot of the rule of
equity, the Courts must reject the application for temporary
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injunction. The civil Court has therefore rightly rejected
the application.
13. The learned Senior counsel, as regards the
reasons for executing the Agreement dated 28.11.2019 and
the subsequent Supplementary Agreement dated
24.02.2021, submits that the records would bear out that
the appellant, a law graduate, has constrained the
appellant to execute these agreements, and the present suit
is another effort to constrain the first respondent. He
argues that the Agreement dated 28.11.2019 is executed
just before an application is filed to bring her on record as
a legal representative of the deceased mother in the
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 and the Supplementary Agreement dated 24.02.2021
is executed just a day before she appeared before the
reference Court to file her affidavit in lieu of examination in
chief. He takes pains to argue that the appellant, who has
had detailed the negotiations on the nature of the
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completion of the apartments and the damages to be paid
in the event of delay, cannot allege any fraud in execution
of the Partition Deed dated 24.03.2010.
14. This Court must, at the outset, record that in
exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, this Court will not
substitute the civil Court's discretion unless this Court is
persuaded to opine that such exercise of discretion is either
perverse or contrary to the law. This Court must refer to
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd.
And Anr. vs Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp
(1) SCC 727.
15. It is undeniable that the appellant, who is a
party to the impugned Partition Deed dated 24.03.2010 as
also the subsequent agreements, has not raised any
complaint about the execution of these documents until
she has filed the present suit and when she files the suit,
though she mentions that the construction is commenced
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for building apartments building, she describes the
property as a vacant site. The appellant has agreed to
receive certain advantages not only under the impugned
Partition Deed but also the subsequent agreements. Unless
the appellant establishes circumstances to show that these
documents would be nebulous notwithstanding the benefits
she has accepted, she would not be entitled to any relief.
The plaint averments do not suffice to make out a prima
facie case in this regard. This Court, at this stage, must
opine that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
appellant cannot renege on different sets of transactions
only on the ground that the Partition Deed dated
24.03.2010 is hit by the provisions of Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872.
16. Further the appellant cannot, even at this stage,
cannot dispute that she has not come out with all the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the impugned
Partition Deed or the subsequent documents. Thus, there is
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undeniable delay and suppression of material facts, and
both these circumstances militate against grant of
temporary injunction. As such, this Court is of the
considered view that the civil Court has not erred in
exercise of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appellant's
application.
There is no reason for interference, and the appeal
stands disposed of accordingly.
SD/-
JUDGE
RB
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