Sri.Ramaiah vs The Chief Secretary
2022 Latest Caselaw 8064 Kant

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

       DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF JUNE 2022

                       BEFORE

         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN

REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.1007 OF 2021 (DEC-INJ)

BETWEEN:

SRI.RAMAIAH
SON OF DASARA CHIKKA
HOTTENNA @ HOTTEPPA
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
RESIDENT OF PANATHUR
VILLAGE AND POST
VARTHUR HOBLI
BANGALORE EAST TALUK
BANGALORE 560 103                      ... APPELLANT

(BY SRI.HARISH H. V., ADV.)

AND:

1.     THE CHIEF SECRETARY
       GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
       VIDHANA SOUDHA
       BANGALORE 560 001

2.     THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
       BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT
       D C COMPOUND, KEMPEGOWDA ROAD
       BANGALORE 560 009

3.     THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
       BANGALORE NORTH SUB DIVISION
       VISVESHWARAIAH TOWER
       BANGALORE 560 001
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4.   THE TAHSILDAR
     BANGALORE EAST TALUK
     KRISHNARAJAPURAM
     BANGALORE 560 016                  ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI.SUBRAMANYA R., AAG A/W
    SRI.SRINIVAS GOWDA R., AGA FOR R1 TO R4)

     THIS RFA FILED UNDER SECTION 96(1) OF THE CPC,
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 04.09.2021
PASSED IN O.S.NO.25232/2008 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVI
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYO HALL, BANGALORE,
DISMISSING    THE   SUIT  FOR   DECLARATION    AND
INJUNCTION.

     THIS RFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
20.04.2022 FOR JUDGMENT AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, M.I.ARUN J.,
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                     JUDGMENT

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in

O.S.No.25232/2008 dated 04.09.2021 by the XXVI

Additional City Civil Judge at Mayohall, Bangalore

(CCH-20), plaintiff therein has preferred this appeal.

2. For the sake of convenience, parties are

referred to as per their status before the trial Court.

3. The case of the plaintiff is that 1 acre 38

guntas of land in Sy.No.5 of Bhoganahalli Village,

Varthur Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk was granted in

favour of the Poojari/Archak of Sri.Muthurayaswamy

Temple by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inam

Abolition, Bengaluru vide order dated 16.07.1958. The

said Archak sold the land in favour of the plaintiff as

per the sale deed dated 01.10.1960 and the plaintiff in

turn sold the same in favour of one Nazeer in the year

1966. But however, he repurchased the same from the

same Nazeer in the year 1967 and he has been in

continuous possession of the same since the date of

the first purchase on 01.10.1960 without any hindrance

or interference and he contends that he has become

owner of the property by way of adverse possession. It

is further submitted that some of the villagers in order

to knock off the property filed a false suit in

O.S.No.626/2003 which was renumbered as

O.S.No.280/2004. The 2nd defendant in order to harass

the plaintiff has tried to interfere and disrupt the

possession of the plaintiff and hence for the said

reasons, the plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit with

the following reliefs:-`

(i) "To declare that the plaintiff is the owner of schedule property acquired by way of adverse possession and continues in possession of the suit property right from 1960.

(ii) To grant an order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any decisions and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit schedule property in any manner either by defendants or from their agents, servants or any persons claiming through under them..

(iii) To grant any other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble court deems fit pass under the circumstances of this case."

4. The said original suit went uncontested and

hence, the same was allowed by judgment and decree

dated 12.10.2011. The same was challenged by the

defendants in RFA No.126/2013 and this Court by its

order dated 06.01.2021 was pleased to remand the

matter back to the trial Court permitting the

defendants to file the written statement and contest

the suit.

5. Thereafter, all the defendants being the State

filed the written statement through defendant No.4

wherein, it is contended that the land in question was

granted in favour of Sri.Muthurayaswamy Temple and

not in favour of the Archak and the alienation of the

property in favour of the plaintiff by the Archak of the

temple was illegal and that the plaintiff has failed to

prove his adverse possession and on the said ground

the defendants prayed for dismissal of the original suit.

6. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed

the following issues:-

(i) Whether the plaintiff proves that the occupancy right had been granted in respect of the suit schedule land in favour of one Dasappa-Priest of Sri. Muthurayaswamy Temple of

Bhoganahalli village by the Spl.Deputy Commissioner for Inam Abolition?

(ii) Whether the description of the schedule property is correct?

(iii) Whether the plaintiff proves that he has purchased the suit schedule land from his predecessor-in-title as averred at para-3 of the plaint?

(iv) Whether the plaintiff proves that he was in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of the suit?

(v) Whether the plaintiff proves that he has acquired title to the suit schedule property by way of adverse possession against the defendants?

(vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and permanent injunction as sought for?

(vii) What order or decree?

7. The plaintiff to prove his case has examined

three witnesses and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.48. The

defendants have examined one witness and got marked

Exs.D.1 to D.10.

8. Based on the pleadings and evidence let in,

the trial Court has answered the aforementioned issues

in the following manner:-

Issue No.1: In the Negative Issue No.2: In the Affirmative. Issue No.3: In the Negative. Issue No.4: In the Negative. Issue No.5: In the Negative. Issue No.6: In the Negative. Issue No.7: As per final order.

The trial Court has dismissed the suit. Aggrieved

by the same, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

9. As a Court of First Appeal, I have examined

the pleadings and evidence let in before the trial Court.

The question that arises for consideration in the instant

appeal is:-

Whether the trial Court erred in concluding that the plaintiff has failed to establish his title to the property by way of adverse possession?

10. Ex.D.7 is the Certified copy of the order

sheet in INM Case No.149/1957-58. It reads as

under:-

"16-7-58 Order Under Section 10 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954.

S.No.5: This is a sthal inam granted by the inamdar in favour of Sri.Muthurayaswami temple of this village and has to be regarded as a religious inam although it is not recognized in the quit rent register. Therefore the above land is registered in favour of the temple under section 4 of the Act, Dasappa the priest being allowed to enjoy the land as Poojari as long as he performs the temple duties."

The above document is not in dispute. It

establishes the fact that the land in question is granted

in favour of Sri.Muthurayaswamy Temple with the

Poojari being allowed to enjoy the land as long as he

performs the temple duties. The owner of the land is

the temple and not the Poojari.

11. Ex.P.1 is the certified copy of the sale deed

dated 01.10.1960 by which the Archak of the temple

sold the property in favour of the plaintiff herein and

the plaintiff was put in possession of the property. The

said sale deed is not in dispute. Ex.P.2 is the certified

copy of the sale deed dated 13.07.1966 by which the

plaintiff sold the property in favour of one Nazeer and

Ex.P.3 is the sale deed dated 24.02.1967 by which, the

plaintiff purchased back the property from the said

Sri.Nazeer. Above said sale deeds are not in dispute.

12. Ex.P.5 and 6 are the RTC for the years 1969-

70 to 1981-82 which records in Column No.11 that the

property has been sold to the plaintiff herein. Ex.P.4 is

the mutation register and M.R.23/88-89 records that

the plaintiff has purchased the property by registered

sale deed bearing No.2939 dated 10.10.1960.

Thereafter, the name of the plaintiff is found in Column

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No.9 of RTC continuously. The aforementioned

documents are also not in dispute.

13. When this was the position, the Special

Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District in RRT (2)

CR.22/ 2006-2007 initiated proceedings against the

plaintiff and his vendor Dasappa and concluded that the

land was allotted to Sri.Muthurayaswamy Temple and

that the said Dasappa had no right to alienate the land

and the land being the Government land, being violated

illegally by the said Dasappa by way of selling the same

in favour of plaintiff, has passed an order resuming the

land to Government, free from all encumbrances by

evicting those who are in possession. The said order is

produced as Ex.P.43. The order passed by the Special

Deputy Commissioner was challenged by the plaintiff in

W.P.No.9983/2009. This Court while refusing to

interfere with the order passed by the Special Deputy

Commissioner also taking into consideration that

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O.S.No.25232/2008 was already pending, has observed

as follows:-

"6. Be that as it may, even as pointed out by the learned AGA if in terms of Section 10 (3) of the Inams Abolition Act, 1977, the land had vested in the state government then the revenue entry to show this legal position cannot be characterized as one illegal or lacking in jurisdiction. However, it is made clear that the view expressed by the Deputy Commissioner one way or the other is neither conclusive nor binds a civil court. It is open to the petitioner to approach the Civil Court and seek suitable relief."

The aforementioned order passed by the Special

Deputy Commissioner and the order passed in

W.P.No.9983/2009 are not in dispute.

14. On the strength of the observations made in

W.P.No.9983/2009, also, the plaintiff has sought to

contest O.S.No.25232/2008 wherein, he has sought to

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perfect his title to the property by way of adverse

possession.

15. The plaintiff has examined himself as PW-1

and has deposed in his examination-in-chief that he

first purchased the property in question by a sale deed

dated 01.10.1960 and since then he has been

continuous unhindered possession of the property to

the best knowledge of defendants and other general

public and villagers. He has deposed that he has got

the necessary revenue documents mutated in his name

and has paid up to date tax and that he has been in

continuous possession for 47 years without any

hindrance or interference. He has stated, though he

had initially sold the property to Nazeer in 1966 and

repurchased the same in 1967, he never parted

possession of the property.

16. He has been subjected to cross-examination

and his evidence in so far as it relates to his possession

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of the property being continuous and unhindered from

past 47 years, adverse to the interest of the true owner

has not been impeached.

17. PW-2 is the adjacent land owner of the

property in question. He has supported the case of the

plaintiff and has categorically stated that the plaintiff is

in enjoyment of the suit schedule property since

01.10.1960 continuously without any interference or

hindrance and that the possession of the plaintiff is to

the knowledge of the defendants and other villagers

from that time. The defendants for reasons best

known to them have not cross-examined him.

18. PW-3 is also an erstwhile owner of another

adjacent property and he has also deposed similarly as

PW-2 and he has also not been cross-examined.

19. The deposition of the aforementioned

witnesses and the exhibits mentioned above clearly

establishes the possession of the plaintiff in respect of

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the suit schedule property being adequate in continuity,

adequate in publicity, adverse to the defendants in

denial of their title and in their knowledge. Further, the

order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner at

Ex.P-43 by which he has sought to resume the land to

the Government free from all encumbrances by evicting

those who are in possession shows that the plaintiff

was in possession as on the date of passing of the

order and it is not the case of the defendants that the

said order has been implemented.

20. Defendants have examined defendant No.4,

the jurisdictional Tahsildar as DW-1. He has no

personal knowledge about the property concerned and

his knowledge is based on the records available with

the defendants and based on the same has deposed

that the plaintiff does not have adverse possession over

the same. However, in the cross-examination he

admits the sale deed dated 01.10.1960 and the RTCs,

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mutation entries and the krishi pass book reflecting the

name of the plaintiff as the owner of the property.

21. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, reads as

under:-

"Extinguishment of right to property.- At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished."

22. Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963, reads

as under:-

Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run

112. Any suit (except a Thirty Years When the suit before the Supreme period of Court in the exercise of limitation its original jurisdiction) would by or on behalf of the begin to Central Government or run under any State Government, this Act including the against a Government of the State like suit by of Jammu and Kashmir. a private person.

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23. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides that

on the determination of the period hereby limited to

any person for instituting a suit for possession of any

property, his right to such property shall be

extinguished. It means, if the suit is not filed within

the period of limitation prescribed, then not only the

period of limitation comes to an end, but, his right will

also come to an end and it stands extinguished.

24. For a suit to be filed by a State Government,

as in the instant case, the period of limitation as per

Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is 30 years.

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

R.Hanumaiah and another vs. Secretary to

Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department

and others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 203, at

paragraph Nos.19 to 23 has held as under:-

"Nature of Proof required in suit for declaration of title against the Government.

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19. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory

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suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government. Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.

20. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner,

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ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings

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that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.

21. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the government : whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title. Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession - authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title).

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22.   Mere       temporary             use     or     occupation
      without         the         animus             to        claim

ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government. To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored.

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23. As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may."

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs. Manjith Kaur

and others reported in (2019) 8 SCC 729, at

paragraph Nos.51, 52, 53, 60 and 63 has held as

under:-

"51. The statute does not define adverse possession, it is a common law concept, the

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period of which has been prescribed statutorily under the law of limitation Article 65 as 12 years. Law of limitation does not define the concept of adverse possession nor anywhere contains a provision that the plaintiff cannot sue based on adverse possession. It only deals with limitation to sue and extinguishment of rights. There may be a case where a person who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession is sought to be ousted or has been dispossessed by a forceful entry by the owner or by some other person, his right to obtain possession can be resisted only when the person who is seeking to protect his possession, is able to show that he has also perfected his title by adverse possession for requisite period against such a plaintiff.

52.Under Article 64 also suit can be filed based on the possessory title. Law never intends a person who has perfected title to be deprived of filing suit under Article 65 to recover possession and to render him remediless. In case of infringement of any other right attracting any other Article such as in case the land is sold away by the owner after the extinguishment of his title, the suit can be filed by a person who has perfected

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his title by adverse possession to question alienation and attempt of dispossession.

53.Law of adverse possession does not qualify only a defendant for the acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, it may be perfected by a person who is filing a suit. It only restricts a right of the owner to recover possession before the period of limitation fixed for the extinction of his rights expires. Once right is extinguished another person acquires prescriptive right which cannot be defeated by re-entry by the owner or subsequent acknowledgment of his rights. In such a case suit can be filed by a person whose right is sought to be defeated.

60.The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e., adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a

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title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser's long possession is not synonym with adverse possession. Trespasser's possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and large the concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.

63. When we consider the law of adverse possession as has developed vis-à-vis to property dedicated to public use, courts have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession. There are instances when such properties are encroached upon and then a plea of adverse possession is raised. In Such cases, on the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that rights should not accrue. The law of adverse possession may cause harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe that it would be advisable that

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concerning such properties dedicated to public cause, it is made clear in the statute of limitation that no rights can accrue by adverse possession."

27. Thus, adverse possession is not a right

conferred by any statute. It is a common law concept,

wherein upon extinguishment of rights by virtue of

lapse in the period of limitation within which a person

has to institute a suit, the other person gets a right of

adverse possession. A person to claim adverse

possession should be in possession of the property

which should be adequate in continuity, adequate in

publicity, adverse to competitor in denial of title and to

his knowledge. A suit can be filed by a person who has

perfected his title by adverse possession to question

alienation and attempt of dispossession. Law of

adverse possession does not entitle only the defendant

for acquisition of title by way of adverse possession,

but it may be perfected by a person who is filing a suit.

However, Courts while entertaining a plea of adverse

possession against the Government should be vigilant

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and careful as it is possible that parties may set up a

claim of adverse possession against the Government in

connivance with Government servants and when the

land is reserved for public utility, no rights can accrue

by adverse possession.

28. In the instant case, the property was

purchased by the plaintiff by way of a sale deed in the

year 1960. The sale deed is an invalid document as

the vendor had no title to the property. The land was

granted to the temple and the vendor/Archak only had

a right to utilize the proceeds of land for his benefit as

long as he performed temple duties and he had no

right to alienate the same. The plaintiff thereafter sold

the property in favour of one Nazeer in the year 1966,

but purchased back the same in the year 1967 and

thereafter, he has been in continuous unhindered

possession of the same claiming to be owner of the

property in full knowledge of the general public

including the villagers and the defendants. The

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revenue documents produced, show that from the year

1969-70, the sale in favour of the plaintiff is

acknowledged and thereafter, he has been recognized

as the owner also in the revenue entries. The

deposition of the plaintiff witnesses in respect of

plaintiff being in possession of the property

continuously since he purchased the property till

proceedings were initiated against him in the year 2006

as per the order passed by the Special Deputy

Commissioner at Ex.P.43, which is beyond 30 years

with adequate publicity, adverse to the defendants has

not been impeached in the cross-examination. Further,

the property in question was granted to the temple to

be utilized for the exclusive benefit of the

Archak/Poojari of the temple and thus, under the given

peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the

property cannot be considered to be a land reserved for

public utility as held by the Supreme Court in (2019) 8

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SCC 729 (Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs

Manjith Kaur and others).

29. The defendants have contended that the

claim of the plaintiff to the property is based on title as

well as adverse possession and have relied upon the

judgment passed in (2020) 15 SCC 218

(Narasamma and others vs. A. Krishnappa) to

canvass the proposition that when such a claim is

made, the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief on the

ground of adverse possession. Factually, the said

contention has to be held as incorrect as the prayer in

the plaint pertains to declaring the plaintiff as the

owner of the schedule property by way of adverse

possession and the said case laws does not support the

case of the defendants.

30. It is further contended by the defendants

that an Archak or a Poojari is like a servant or

caretaker and when the property is allotted to a

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temple, he cannot set up the claim of adverse

possession and a mere mentioning of the name of the

Poojari in the revenue records does not give him any

right and the defendants have relied upon the decision

of the Supreme Court reported in (2021) 10 SCC 222

(State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Pujari

Utthan Avam Kalyan Samiti and another).

31. The said preposition also does not come to

the rescue of the defendants as in the instant case, the

Poojari/Archak has alienated the property in favour of

plaintiff in the year 1960 itself and the suit for adverse

possession is filed not by Archak or Poojari, who was

there when the land was granted in favour of the

temple but by the plaintiff who is a subsequent

purchaser.

32. The defendants also relied upon the

judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2010) 2 SCC

461 (Mandal Revenue Officer vs. Goundla

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Venkaiah and another) and (2019) 8 SCC 729

(Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs Manjith

Kaur and others) and contends that an encroacher is

not entitled to file a suit for adverse possession. In the

instant case, the possession of the plaintiff as already

stated above is adequate in continuity and adequate in

publicity and adverse to a competitor in denial of title

and his knowledge and he cannot be termed as an

encroacher. The defendants have also contended that

the Archak of the temple was having only permissive

possession and not an adverse possession and he

cannot file a suit for adverse possession and they rely

upon the judgment of Supreme Court in (2010) 5 SCC

203 (R.Hanumaiah and another vs. Secretary to

Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department

and others). However, as already stated above, it is

the original Archak, who was there when the temple

was granted the property can be considered to be in

permissive possession and not the plaintiff. The trial

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Court erred in not appreciating the aforementioned

facts and has erroneously dismissed the suit.

33. For the aforementioned reasons, the

judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is liable

to be set aside and the suit has to be decreed as

prayed for. Hence, the following:-

ORDER

(i) The judgment and decree dated 04.09.2021

passed in O.S.No.25232/2008 by the XXVI

Additional City Civil Judge at Mayohall,

Bangalore (CCH-20) is hereby set aside.

(ii) O.S.No.25232/2008 is hereby allowed and

the plaintiff is declared as the owner of the

schedule property by way of adverse

possession.

(iii) Defendants are permanently restrained from

interfering or otherwise dispossessing the

plaintiff from the suit schedule property.

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(iv) Office is directed to draw decree

accordingly.

       (v)    No order as to costs.




                                               Sd/-
                                              JUDGE



MH/-