Karnataka High Court
Arjunappa vs State Of Karnataka on 18 July, 2022
Bench: M.I.Arun
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JULY 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN
WRIT PETITION NO.49958 OF 2019 (KLR-LG) C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.49959 OF 2019 (KLR)
IN WRIT PETITION NO.49958 OF 2019
BETWEEN:
1. SRI.ARJUNAPPA
S/O LATE SRI MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
2. SRI.VENKATAPPA
S/O LATE SRI MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
PETITIONER NOS.1 & 2 ARE R/AT
NO.601, KAMMANAHALLI MAIN ROAD
NEAR MARIYAMMA TEMPLE
DODDAKAMMANAHALLI
GOTTIGERE POST, BBMP
BENGALURU - 560 083 ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SAMMITH S., ADV.)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
VIKASA SOUDHA
DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560 001
2
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
K G ROAD, NEAR DISTRICT
REGISTRAR OFFICE
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
SAMPANGI RAMA NAGARA
BENGALURU - 560 009
3. SRI. ADICHUNCHANAGIRI
MAHA SAMSTANA MUTT
A RELIGIOUS TRUST
REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.C.A.17
B MAIN ROAD, VIJAYANAGARA,
BENGALURU-560 040 ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. R.SUBRAMANYA, AAG FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI. K.N.PUTTEGOWDA, ADV. FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM DATED 20.07.2019
ISSUED BY R-2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT, BENGALURU, AS CONTAINED IN
ANNEXURE-J ETC.
IN WRIT PETITION NO.49959 OF 2019
BETWEEN:
1. SRI NARAYANAPPA
S/O LATE SRI KANAKAPPA
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
2. SMT. JAYAMMA
DAUGHTER OF LATE SRI KANAKAPPA
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
PETITIONER NOS.1 & 2 ARE
R/AT KAMMANAHALLI VILLAGE
GOTTIGERE POST, BEGUR HOBLI
BANNERGHATTA ROAD
3
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU - 560 083 ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SAMMITH S., ADV.)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
VIKASA SOUDHA, DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560 001
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
K G ROAD, NEAR DISTRICT
REGISTRAR OFFICE
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
SAMPANGI RAMA NAGARA
BENGALURU - 560 009
3. SRI. ADICHUNCHANAGIRI
MAHA SAMSTANA MUTT
A RELIGIOUS TRUST
REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.C.A.17
B MAIN ROAD, VIJAYANAGARA,
BENGALURU-560 040 ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. R.SUBRAMANYA, AAG FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI. K.N.PUTTEGOWDA, ADV. FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM DATED 20.07.2019
ISSUED BY R-2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT, BENGALURU, AS CONTAINED IN
ANNEXURE-S ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 16.06.2022 FOR ORDER AND COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
4
ORDER
1. The case of the petitioners in W.P.No.49958/2019
is that they are the owners of the property measuring 5
acres 14 guntas out of total extent of 16 acres 9 guntas
situated in Sy.No.49, Yelenahalli village, Begur Hobli,
Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru Urban District. The
schedule of the property is as follows:
SCHEDULE-A
All the piece and parcel of the land bearing Survey
No.49, measuring 5 Acres 14 Guntas out of total
extent of 16 Acres, situated at Yelenahalli Village,
Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru Urban
District as per the official memorandum issued by 2nd
and bounded on the:
EAST by: Private Property
WEST by: Private Property
NORTH : Sy. No.49 remaining portion of land
(Amended vide Court order dated
19.04.2022)
SOUTH by: Sy. No.49 remaining portion of land
2. The case of the petitioners in W.P.No.49959/2019
is that they are the owners of the property measuring 4
acres out of total extent of 16 acres 9 guntas situated
in Sy.No.49, Yelenahalli village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru
South Taluk, Bengaluru Urban District. The schedule of
the property is as follows:
SCHEDULE-A
All the piece and parcel of the land bearing Survey No.49,
measuring 4 Acres out of total extent of 16 Acres, situated
at Yelenahalli Village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru Urban District as per the official memorandum
issued by 2nd and bounded on the:
EAST by: Mufat Kavalu
WEST by: Property of Munishamappa
NORTH : Property of RangahalliAppaiahanna;
and
SOUTH by: Portion of Survey No.49 belonging to
Munivenkatappa.
3. The petitioners in both the writ petitions contend
that they are the owners of the properties mentioned
above and without acquiring the same, the said land
has been granted illegally in favour of respondent
no.3-Mutt by respondent No.1-State.
4. On the aforementioned grounds, the petitioners in
W.P.No.49958/2019 have filed the writ petition with
the following prayers:
"WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most
respectfully pray that this Hon'ble Court may
be pleased to:
a. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Certiorari quashing the Official
Memorandum No.LND (S) CR/07/19-20
dated 20/7/2019 issued by the 2nd
Respondent Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District, Bengaluru, as
contained in ANNEXURE-J.
b. grant an order, writ, or direction in
the nature of Mandamus directing the 3rd
Respondent not to carry out any
development works, construction works in
the Schedule B Property, and not to
encumber, alienate, create charge or lien or
lease or mortgage over the Schedule B
Property.
c. grant an order, writ, or direction in
the nature of Mandamus directing the 3rd
Respondent not to change the nature of the
Schedule-B Property,
d. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the
Respondents 1 and 2 not to hand over
possession of the Schedule-B Property to the
3rd Respondent.
e. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the 2nd
Respondent to initiate action for changing
the Mutation, RTC and other revenue
records in respect of the Schedule A
Property standing in the name of the father
of the Petitioners viz., late Sri
Munishamappa to the joint names of the
Petitioners;
f. grant an order, writ or direction to the
Respondents 1 and 2 not to dispossess the
Petitioners from the Schedule-A property till
the disposal of this Writ Petition,
g. Pass such other orders or direction as
deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of
the cases.
h. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the
Government Order bearing no. R.D. 02
L.G.2019 (E) dated 15/07/2019 issued by
the Respondent No.1, produced as
ANNEXURE-L."
5. The petitioners in W.P.No.49959/2019 have filed
the writ petition with the following prayers:
"WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most
respectfully pray that this Hon'ble Court may
be pleased to:
a. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Certiorari quashing the Official
Memorandum No. LND (S) CR/07/19-20
dated 20/7/2019 issued by the 2nd
Respondent Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District, Bengaluru, as
contained in ANNEXURE-S.
b. grant an order, writ, or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the 3rd
Respondent not to commence and carry out
any development works, construction works
in the Schedule-B Property, and not to
encumber, alienate, create charge or lien or
lease or mortgage over the Schedule B
Property;
c. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the 3rd
Respondent not to change the nature of the
Schedule-B Property;
d. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the
Respondents 1 and 2 not to hand over
possession of the Schedule-B Property to the
3rd Respondent.
e. grant an order, writ or direction in the
nature of Mandamus directing the 2nd
Respondent to initiate action for changing
the Mutation, RTC and other revenue
records in respect of the Schedule A
Property standing in the name of the father
of the Petitioners viz., late Sri Kanakappa to
the joint names of the Petitioners;
f. grant an order, writ or direction to the
Respondents 1 and 2 not to dispossess the
Petitioners from the Schedule-A property till
the disposal of this Writ Petition;
g. Pass such other orders or direction as
deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of
the cases.
h. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the
Government Order bearing no. R.D. 02
L.G.2019 (E) dated 15/07/2019 issued by
the Respondent No.1, produced as
ANNEXURE-T."
6. Annexure-L in W.P.No.49958/2019 and
Annexure-T in W.P.No.49959/2019 is the order passed
by respondent No.1 granting 8 acres 32 guntas of land
in Sy.No.49, Yelenahalli village, Beguru Hobli,
Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru Urban District to
respondent No.3-Mutt vide Government Order
No.R.D.02 L.G.B 2019(E), Bengaluru dated
15.07.2019.
7. Annexure-J in W.P.No.49958/2019 and
Annexure-S in W.P.No.49959/2019 is the official
memorandum issued by respondent No.2 granting 8
acres 32 guntas of land in Sy.No.49, Yelenahalli
village, Beguru Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru Urban District to respondent No.3-Mutt vide
Official Memorandum bearing No.LND(S)CR/07/19-20
dated 20.07.2019.
8. The petitioners in W.P.No.49958/2019 to contend
that they are the owners of the property have relied
upon the land grant certificate dated 28.02.1934, the
endorsement dated 26.04.1961, copy of the register of
distribution of Saguvali Chit maintained in the office of
respondent No.2 for the years 1931-1932 and 1932-
1933, copy of MR.7/1938-1939 dated 26.02.1940,
copy of pahani extract, RTCs. and encumbrance
certificate. The petitioners in W.P.No.49959/2019 have
relied upon the land grant certificate dated
10.10.1934, the endorsement dated 26.04.1961, copy
of the register of distribution of Saguvali Chit
maintained in the office of respondent No.2 for the
years 1931-1932 and 1932-1933, copy of M.R
No.6/1938-1939 dated 26.02.1940, the sale deed
dated 04.10.1939, copy of mutation M.R.No.8/1939-
1940, copy of the sale deed dated 09.02.1942,
encumbrance certificates, mutation register extract
M.R.No.7/1941-1942, copy of pahani extract for the
years 1964-65 to 1968-1969 and RTCs. Based on the
said documents, they contend they are the owners of
the lands granted to them. However, the said
documents are disputed by the respondents. In this
regard, during the pendency of the writ petitions,
certain documents were referred to State Forensic
Science Laboratory, Bengaluru for expert opinion and
as per the report, genuineness of certain documents
like grant certificate is doubted. However, the
respondents do admit that certain revenue documents
records the name of the petitioners as the owners of
the properties, but contend that the entries in the said
revenue records are not genuine. To summarise, the
ownership of the petitioners in respect of the
properties in question is disputed. It is not possible
for this Court to give a finding on disputed question of
fact, which requires recording of evidence, while
exercising the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
9. However, the petitioners contend that though
they are not in a position to establish their absolute
ownership over the properties in question in the
instant writ petitions, they have been able to prove
that their names find a place in the revenue records
maintained by the State in respect of the properties
concerned and that gives them a locus to challenge
the grant made in favour of respondent No.3-Mutt in
the instant writ petitions and they would not press the
other prayers sought by them in the writ petitions
other than questioning the grant of land in favour of
respondent No.3-Mutt.
10. Per contra, the respondents submitted that in the
absence of the petitioners proving their absolute
ownership over the properties in question, they do not
have a locus to question the grant made in favour of
respondent No.3-Mutt.
11. Taking into consideration the rival contentions
urged by the parties, the questions that arise for
consideration before this Court in the instant writ
petitions are as under:
1. Under the given facts and
circumstances of the case, can the
petitioners challenge the grant of land
made in favour of respondent No.3 in
the absence of proving their absolute
ownership over the properties?
2. If Yes, is the land granted by the State
in favour of respondent No.3 is contrary
to law and is liable to be set aside?
12. The petitioners to prove that they have the locus
to challenge the grant made in favour of respondent
No.3-Mutt have relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir
Ahmed and Ors. [(1976) 1 SCC 671]. Para 34, 35, 37, 38
and 39 reads as under:
"34. This Court has laid down in a number of
decisions that in order to have the locus standi to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a
personal or individual right in the subject matter of
the application, though the case of some of the writs
like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed
or modified. In other words, as a general rule,
infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some
legal interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary to
give him a locus standi in the matter (see The State of
orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta; Calcutta Gas Co. v.
The State of West Bengal; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v.
Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa; Gadda
Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh; State of orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall;
Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co.).
35. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is
not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in
those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially
affected by an act or omission of an authority, even
though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary
interest in the subject matter. That apart, in
exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who
was not a party to the proceedings before the
authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest
in the subject matter of the proceedings will be
covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the
English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with
it.
37. It will be seen that in the context of locus
standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant
may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i)
'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or
meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category
are easily distinguishable from those coming under
the first two categories. Such persons interfere in
things which do not concern them. They masquerade
as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the
name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no
interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the
judicial process either by force of habit or from
improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a
desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the
ulterior intent of some applicants in this category,
may be no more than spoking the wheels of
administration. The High Court should do well to reject
the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
38. The distinction between the first and second
categories of applicants, though real, is not always
well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were,
two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty,
and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a
sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous
fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the
central zone are those whose legal rights have been
infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the
category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-
circle the bounds which separate the first category
from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap
increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in
this outer zone may not be "persons aggrieved".
39. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers',
among them, some broad tests may be deduced from
the conspectus made above. These tests are not
absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according
to the circumstances of the case, including the
statutory context in which the matter falls to be
considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a
person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he
suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his
interest, recognized by law, has been prejudicially and
directly affected by the act or omission of the
authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has
suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a
decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully
deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him
something, or wrongfully affected his title to
something" ? Has he a special and substantial
grievance of his own beyond some grievance or
inconvenience suffered by him in common with the
rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be
heard by the authority before it took the impugned
action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the
exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of
jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the
statute, in the context of which the scope of the words
"person aggrieved" is being considered, a social
welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or
professional standards of conduct for the community?
Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of
particular individuals?"
(ii) Sir M. Visveswaraya Education Trust vs. State of
Karnataka [ILR 1991 KAR 2901]. Para 9 reads as
under:
"9. In the case of Gadde Venkateswara Rao v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., while
interpreting scope of Article 226 and who can file such
a petition, at para 8, the Supreme Court held as
follows:
"The first question is whether the appellant had
locus standi to file a petition in the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court
in Calcutta Gas Co; (Proprietary) Ltd., v. State
of West Bengal (1962) Supp 3 SCR 1 at Pg.6:
(AIR 1962 SC 1044 at pg. 1047), dealing with
the question of locus standi of the appellant in
that case to file a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution in the High Court, observed:
Article 226 confers a very wide power on the
High Court to issue directions and Writs of the
nature mentioned therein for the enforcement
of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for
any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that
persons other than those claiming fundamental
right can also approach the Court seeking a
relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not
describe the classes of persons entitled to apply
there under; but it is implicit in the exercise of
the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief
asked for must be one to enforce a legal
right...The right that can be enforced under
Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal
or individual right of the petitioner himself,
though in the case of some of the Writs like
habeas corpus or quo warranto this Rule may
have to be relaxed or modified.
Has the appellant a right to file the petition
out of which the present appeal has arisen? The
appellant is the President of the Panchayat
Samithi of Dharmajigudem. The villagers of
Dharmajigudem formed a committee with the
appellant as President for the purpose of
collecting contributions from the villagers for
setting up the Primary Health Centre. The said
committee collected Rs. 20,000 and deposited
the same with the Block Development Officer.
The appellant represented the village in all its
dealings with the Block Development
Committee and the Panchayat Samithi in the
matter of the location of the Primary Health
Centre at Dharmajigudem. His conduct, the
acquiescence on the part of the other members
of the committee, and the treatment meted out
to him by the authorities concerned support the
inference that he was authorised to act on
behalf of the committee. The appellant was,
therefore, a representative of the committee
which was in law the trustees of the amounts
collected by it from the villagers for a public
purpose. We have, therefore, no hesitation to
hold that the appellant had the right to
maintain the application under Article 226 of
the Constitution. This Court held in the decision
cited supra that "ordinarily" the petitioner who
seeks to file an application under Article 226 of
the Constitution should be one who has a
personal or individual right in the subject-
matter of the petition. A personal right need not
be in respect of a proprietary interest: it can
also relate to an interest of a trustee. That
apart, in exceptional cases as the expression
"ordinarily" indicates, a person who has been
prejudicially affected by an act or omission of
an authority can file a Writ even though he has
no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the
subject-matter thereof. The appellant has
certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at
his instance is, therefore, maintainable."
From the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
the above case it is clear that in order to assert that a
person has locus standi to file a Writ Petition he has to
prove that (a) 'ordinarily' such a person has a
personal interest or individual right in the subject
matter; (b) such a person has been prejudicially
affected by an act or omission of an authority which
act is complained of in the Writ Petition. On facts it
can be said that the principles laid down in the above
Decision have no application to the case on hand as
the appellants neither proved that they are personally
interested nor have a right in the subject matter nor
established they are prejudicially affected by an order
of lease."
(iii) M.S.Jayaraj vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and
Ors. [(2000)7 SCC 552]. Para 13 and 14 reads as
under:
"13. A recent decision delivered by a two-Judge
Bench of this Court (of which one of us is a party-
Sethi, J.) in Chairman, Railway Board & ors. vs.
Chandrima Das after making a survey of the later
decisions held thus: (SCC PP.478-79, para 17)
"17. In the context of public interest
litigation, however, the Court in its various
judgments has given the widest amplitude and
meaning to the concept of locus standi. In Peoples
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India it was
laid down that public interest litigation could be
initiated not only by filing formal petitions in the
High Court but even by sending letters and
telegrams so as to provide easy access to court.
(See also Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
and State of H.P. v. A Parent of a Student of Medical
College on the right to approach the court in the
realm of public interest litigation). In Bangalore
Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa the Court held that
the restricted meaning of aggrieved person and the
narrow outlook of a specific injury has yielded in
favour of a broad and wide construction in the wake
of public interest litigation. The Court further
observed that public-spirited citizens having faith in
the rule of law are rendering great social and legal
service by espousing causes of public nature. They
cannot be ignored or overlooked on a technical or
conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or
the absence of personal loss or injury. There has,
thus, been a spectacular expansion of the concept of
locus standi. The concept is much wider and it takes
in its stride anyone who is not a mere 'busybody'. "
14. In the light of the expanded concept of the
locus standi and also in view of the finding of the
Division Bench of the High Court that the order of the
Excise Commissioner was passed in violation of law,
we do not wish to nip the motion out solely on the
ground of locus standi. If the Excise Commissioner
has no authority to permit a liquor shop owner to
move out of the range (for which auction was held)
and have his business in another range it would be
improper to allow such an order to remain alive and
operative on the sole ground that the person who filed
the writ petition has strictly no locus standi. So we
proceed to consider the contentions on merits."
(iv) Ghulam Qadir vs. Special Tribunal and Ors.,
[(2002)1 SCC 33]. Para 38 reads as under:
"38. There is no dispute regarding the legal
proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can be enforced only by an
aggrieved person except in the case where the writ
prayed is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another
exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ
petition in public interest. The existence of the legal
right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been
violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction
of the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The
orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus
standi of a person to reach the court has undergone
a sea change with the development of constitutional
law in our country and the constitutional courts have
been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the
cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on
hyper-technical grounds. If a person approaching the
court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to
adversely affect his right which is shown to be having
source in some statutory provision, the petition filed
by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of
his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the
person is found to be not merely a stranger having
no right whatsoever to any post or property, he
cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having
the locus standi."
13. The respondents have relied upon the following
judgments and have contended that the petitioners
have no locus standi to prefer the instant writ petitions
and also that when there are disputed questions of
fact, the writ petitions need to be dismissed:
(i) Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. [(2013)4 SCC 465]. Para 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 16 and 19 reads as under:
"9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger
cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding,
unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls
within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a
person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury
can challenge the act/action/order, etc. in a court of
law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of
enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a
complaint by the appellant that there has been a
breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities.
Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right
available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ
jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course,
enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a
public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of
a person, provided that such person satisfies the
Court that he has a legal right to insist on such
performance. The existence of such right is a
condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction
of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such
extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for
must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the
existence of such right, is the foundation of the
exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal
right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right
of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction
of such right and approaches the Court for relief as
regards the same. [Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan
Gopal Rungta, Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., Calcutta
Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh;
and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare
Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar.]
10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out
of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an
advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by
the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved"
does not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a person
aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose
right or interest has been adversely affected or
jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home
Insurance Co. of New York, and State of Rajasthan &
Ors. v. Union of India).
11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of
Mumbai, a similar view was taken by this Court,
observing that, if a person claiming relief is not
eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to
be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the
selection of other persons.
12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A. P. this Court
held: (SCC PP.628-29, para 25)
"25.......The expression 'aggrieved person'
denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It
cannot be confined within the bounds of a
rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its
scope and meaning depends on diverse,
variable factors such as the content and
intent of the statute of which contravention is
alleged, the specific circumstances of the
case, the nature and extent of complainant's
interest and the nature and the extent of the
prejudice or injury suffered by the
complainant."
13. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas
corpus petition, has explained that the expression,
"next friend" means a person who is not a total
stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is
a complete stranger to the person who is in alleged
illegal custody. [Vide: Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The
Union of India ; Sunil Batra (2) v. Delhi
Administration., Nilima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar,
Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, Karamjeet
Singh v. Union of India, and Kishore Samrite v. State
of U.P.]
16. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., this
Court considered a similar issue and observed as
under:- (SCC P.54, para 38)
38. There is no dispute regarding the legal
proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved
person except in the case where the writ prayed is for
habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the
general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest.
The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is
alleged to have been violated is the foundation for
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the
aforesaid Article. The orthodox rule of interpretation
regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the court
has undergone a sea change with the development of
constitutional law in our country and the constitutional
courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing
with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely
on hyper-technical grounds. If a person approaching the
court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to
adversely affect his right which is shown to be having
source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by
such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not
having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is
found to be not merely a stranger having no right
whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-
suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi.
19. This Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District
Collector, Raigad held as under: (SCC PP.434-35,
Paras 58-60)
"58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-
President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he
could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim
the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant
cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an
averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it
is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of
law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can
only challenge the act or omission. There may be
some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the
eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a
legal right or legally protected interest of the
complainant but juridically harm of this description is
called damnum sine injuria.
59. The complainant has to establish that he
has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he
has sustained injury to any legally protected interest.
In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to
hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A
fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient
to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual.
There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can
be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas
reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.
60. Under the garb of being a necessary
party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case
as that of general public interest. A person having a
remote interest cannot be permitted to become a
party in the lis, as the person who wants to become a
party in a case, has to establish that he has a
proprietary right which has been or is threatened to
be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a
remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot
be heard as a party unless he answers the description
of aggrieved party."
(ii) Thimmarayaswamy vs. Gurumurthy [ILR 1991 KAR
2373]. Para 3 and 4 reads as under:
"3. We will assume for a moment that it is a rate-
payer. Than what is it that will enable it to come by
way of Writ Petition? In AIR 1949 Bombay 229, what
was laid down is as follows:-
"A rate-payer is undoubtedly
interested in the application of the
municipal fund both as a rate-payer who
has actually contributed to that fund and
also as a beneficiary who is entitled to
the various benefits which accrue to the
citizens by the application of that fund."
In laying down this proposition of law, the
learned Judges also referred to Section 45 of the
Specific Relief Act of 1877 and stated under Section,
45, Specific Relief Act, in order to satisfy the first
proviso a party must have some interest in property,
franchise or personal right, the injury to which alone
would entitle him to maintain a petition under that
Section. Again it was stated every rate-payer has a
right to prevent the public body to which he pays the
rates, from acting contrary to law or contrary to its
own charter. In these cases, the law assumes that the
member of the Corporation or the rate-payer has a
specific legal interest which entitles him to come to
Court in support of his right and in order to prevent
the Corporation or the public body from acting
contrary to law or their own charter. In the instant
case the appellant-Sangha was not even an applicant
for the allotment of site. Therefore, there is no legal
interest, much less specific legal interest.
4. To use the words of Lord Denning, the appellant-
Sangha is none other than "an interloper". Certainly, a
statutory Corporation like Panchayath has mis-
conducted itself. There are persons who compose
Panchayaths and will take care of it. Merely on the
ground that the appellant is a tax-payer, as we set out
which itself is in doubt, it does not enable it to bring
this quarrel to the fore by way of a Writ Petition. We
hold such a Writ Petition is not maintainable.
On this short ground, we dismiss the Writ
Appeal."
(iii) Punjab National Bank and Ors. vs. Atmanand Singh
and Ors. [(2020) 6 SCC 256]. Para 6 and 23 reads as
under:
"6. The Division Bench was also conscious of
the express stand taken by the appellant Bank
before the learned single Judge, raising the issue
of maintainability of the writ petition on the
assertion that the case involved complex factual
matters which cannot be adjudicated in exercise
of writ jurisdiction. In paragraph 8 of the
impugned judgment, the Division Bench noted
thus: (Punjab National Bank Case, SCC OnLine
Pat)
"8. Before the learned Single Judge as is
the stand in this appeal, the Bank filed
counter-affidavit in the writ application
raising serious doubt with regard to
existence of any case registered as Misc.
Case No. 4 (DW 1) PNB/1989-90. They took
the stand that no enquiry was ever
conducted nor there was any enquiry report
nor any official of the Bank ever deposed in
the enquiry. There was no record of those
proceedings and the certified copies, which
have been produced and were part of the
record of the writ application, were forged
and created by the writ petitioner. Another
objection was taken by the Bank in the writ
proceeding that the District Magistrate had
no power to adjudicate the matter and
order for enquiry. Yet another objection
was taken that the matter relates to
disputed questions of fact, which is not
maintainable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in writ jurisdiction."
23. In the next reported decision relied upon by the
respondent No. 1 in Babubhai (supra), no doubt this
Court opined that if need be, it would be open to the
High Court to cross-examine the affiants. We may
usefully refer to paragraph 10 of the said decision,
which reads thus: (SCC pp.715-16)
"10. It is not necessary for this case to
express an opinion on the point as to whether
the various provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure apply to petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to
which reference has been made, makes it clear
that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits
shall be followed in all proceedings in any court
of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made
applicable. The words "as far as it can be made
applicable" make it clear that, in applying the
various provisions of the Code to proceedings
other than those of a suit, the court must take
into account the nature of those proceedings and
the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to
provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to
aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been
vested in the High Courts to issue to any person
or authority, including in appropriate cases any
government, within the jurisdiction of the High
Court, orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the
procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in
the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of
having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be
defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it
needs to be emphasised, is essentially different
from a suit and it would be incorrect to
assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a
suit into the proceedings of a petition under
Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article
226 merely because in considering the
petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may
fall to be determined. In a petition under Article
226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues
both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction
is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must
be exercised on sound judicial principles. When
the petition raises complex questions of fact,
which may for their determination require oral
evidence to be taken, and on that account the
High Court is of the view that the dispute should
not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the
High Court may decline to try a petition (see
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda.If, however, on consideration of the
nature of the controversy, the High Court
decides, as in the present case, that it should go
into a disputed question of fact and the
discretion exercised by the High Court appears to
be sound and in conformity with judicial
principles, this Court would not interfere in
appeal with the order made by the High Court in
this respect."
This decision has noticed Gunwant Kaur (supra),
which had unmistakably held that when the petition
raises complex questions of facts, the High Court may
decline to try a petition. It is further observed that if
on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the
High Court decides to go into the disputed questions
of fact, it would be free to do so on sound judicial
principles. Despite the factual matrix in the present
case, the High Court not only ventured to entertain
the writ petition, but dealt with the same in a casual
manner without adjudicating the disputed questions of
fact by taking into account all aspects of the matter.
The manner in which the Court disposed of the writ
petition, by no stretch of imagination, can qualify the
test of discretion having been exercised on sound
judicial principles."
(iv) Syndicate Bank v. M/s Manyatha Residents
Association and Ors. (W.A No.2872/2013 and
connected matters DD 26.02.2021). Para 43 and 104
reads as under:
"43. In the context of filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, it is well settled by
several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
only persons aggrieved can file writ petition in their
personal / private capacity. In other words, there
must exist some legal or constitutional right which has
been violated or infringed and in such a case, a
person can file a writ petition.
104. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer
Point No.2 against the writ petitioners and in favour of
the appellants as the writ petitioners have not been
able to demonstrate in what way, in what manner,
their rights, if any, have been prejudiced or violated.
Consequently, the writ petitioners, not being
aggrieved persons, could not have maintained these
Writ Petitions."
14. There is no conflict in the above referred
judgments relied upon by both the petitioners and the
respondents. The petitioners are required to show that
they have some right over the properties and are
aggrieved by the grant order. Admittedly, in the
instant petitions, the names of the petitioners, as the
owners of the properties, are reflected in some of the
revenue records. Whether they are the absolute
owners or not in respect of the said properties and that
the said revenue records are genuine or not is a matter
to be decided by the trial court. But, the said entries
unless set aside or held that it does not confer any
right on the petitioners, it indicates some legal right to
the petitioners in respect of the properties concerned.
The said properties have been granted by the State in
favour of respondent no.3 herein. The appropriate
remedy for the petitioners to challenge the same is by
way of writ petition. Hence, under the given facts and
circumstances of the case wherein the petitioners
prima facie have been able to show that they have
some interest in the properties and are not strangers to
the same, it has to be held that the petitioners have
locus standi to question the grant made in favour of
respondent no.3-Mutt. In other words, the petitioners
have right to challenge the grant made by the State in
favour of respondent no.3 as violative of the Karnataka
Land Grant Rules, 1969. But the rights of the
petitioners over the properties concerned are not
examined herein. The petitioners to establish their
rights over the properties concerned, if they have any,
will have to approach the trial court or such other
authority, as the case may be. What is being
considered in the instant writ petitions is whether the
grant made by respondent nos.1 and 2 in favour of
respondent no.3 is in accordance with law by
considering the land concerned as a Government land.
Further, as the issue involved is being decided without
going into the disputed question of fact, dismissing the
writ petitions on the ground that it involves disputed
question of fact does not arise.
15. In respect of the grant of properties made in
favour of respondent no.3-Mutt, it is contended by the
respondents that the said grant is made under the
provisions of Rule 27 of the Karnataka Land Grant
Rules, 1969. The said rule reads as under:
"27. Powers of the State Government.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding
rules, the State Government may, suo motu, or on the
recommendation of the Divisional Commissioner or
the Deputy Commissioner, if it is of the opinion that in
the circumstances of any case or classes of cases, it is
just and reasonable to relax any of the provisions of
these rules, it may, by order direct such relaxation,
recording the reasons for such relaxation, subject to
such conditions as may be specified in the orders and
thereupon lands may be granted in such a case or
classes of cases in accordance with such direction."
Based on the said Rule, it is contended that grant can
be made by the State in favour of any person and there
is no requirement for assigning any reason. It is further
contended that respondent no.3 is a Mutt involved in
charitable activities and is working extensively for the
benefit of the public and the property granted is used
for public purpose. In this regard, the respondents
have relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Natural Resources Allocation, IN RE, Special
Reference No.1 of 2012 [(2012) 10 SCC 1]. Para 107,
120, 129 and 150 reads as under:
"107. From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it is
clearly perceivable that the action of the State,
whether it relates to distribution of largesse, grant of
contracts or allotment of land, is to be tested on the
touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. A law
may not be struck down for being arbitrary without
the pointing out of a constitutional infirmity as
McDowell case has said. Therefore, a State action has
to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14
of the Constitution. The action has to be fair,
reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent, non-
capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism,
in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and
equitable treatment. It should conform to the norms
which are rational, informed with reasons and guided
by public interest, etc. All these principles are
inherent in the fundamental conception of Article 14.
This is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
120. Therefore, in conclusion, the submission that
the mandate of article 14 is that any disposal of a
natural resource for commercial use must be for
revenue maximization, and thus by auction, is based
neither on law nor on logic. There is no constitutional
imperative in the matter of economic policies - Article
14 does not predefine any economic policy as a
constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of Article
39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted
to subserve the public good and uses the broad term
"distribution", suggesting that the methodology of
distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes
that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the
highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to
subserve the common good, and at times, may run
counter to public good. Hence, it needs little
emphasis that disposal of all natural resources
through auctions is clearly not a constitutional
mandate.
129. Hence, it is manifest that there is no
constitutional mandate in favour of auction under
Article 14. The Government has repeatedly deviated
from the course of auction and this Court has
repeatedly upheld such actions. The judiciary tests
such deviations on the limited scope of arbitrariness
and fairness under Article 14 and its role is limited to
that extent. Essentially, whenever the object of policy
is anything but revenue maximization, the executive
is seen to adopt methods other than auction.
150. In conclusion, our answer to the first set of five
questions is that auctions are not the only permissible
method for disposal of all natural resources across all
sectors and in all circumstances."
(ii) Sachidanand Pandey and Another v. State of West
Bengal and Others [(1987) 2 SCC 295]. Para 58 reads
as under:
"58. A deal like this cannot be concluded by
public auction. Here, we do not have a case, again, of
sale of a government property. Therefore, public
auction has necessarily to be ruled out. Only Taj
Group of Hotels came forward with an offer to start
the hotel. The lease was the culmination after a long,
elaborate and open procedure with nothing to hide
which therefore cannot justifiably be subject to
adverse criticism."
(iii) Sri Kumaraswamy.J. v. State of Karnataka and
Ors. (W.P No.20245 of 2010 DD 08.12.2015). Para 8,
9, 10 and 15 reads as under:
"8. Admittedly, the land is within the Bruhat
Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP). There has been
an amendment of Rule 97 of the Rules with effect
from February 6, 2008. It provides that from the date
of commencement of the Karnataka Land Revenue
(Amendment) Rules, 2007, gomal lands in the areas
comprised within the municipal corporation limits and
the areas within 25 kilometers from the outer limits of
BBMP, 10 kilometers from the outer limits of the other
City Corporations and 5 kilometers from the outer
limits of the City Municipal Councils, shall be disposed
of by the Deputy Commissioner subject to the general
orders of the State Government in this behalf.
9. Admittedly, the land is within the municipal
corporation limits and within 25 kilometers from the
outer limits of BBMP. Therefore, there was no bar on
the part of the government to exercise power under
Rule 27 of the Rules for relaxing the conditions for the
purpose of allotment of this land to the benefit of the
educational institutions.
10. Rule 27 of the Rules envisages that
notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding
rules, the State Government may, suo motu, or on the
recommendation of the Divisional Commissioner or
the Deputy Commissioner, if it is of the opinion that
the circumstances of any case or classes of cases, it is
just and reasonable to relax any of the provisions of
these rules, it may, by order direct such relaxation,
recording the reasons for such relaxation, subject to
such conditions as may be specified in the orders and
thereupon lands may be granted in such a case or
classes of cases in accordance with such direction.
15. In such circumstances, we find that there was
proper exercise of power by the government in
allotting this land in favour of the private respondent
for running educational institutions. We are not
inclined to entertain the prayers made in this public
interest litigation."
(iv) H.M.Muninarayana vs. State of Karnataka [ILR
2002 KAR 5114]. Para 3, 13, 18 and 20 reads as under:
"3. The petitioner has sought for quashing the order
dated 25.7.1991 at Annexure-A issued by the 1st
respondent under Rule 27 of the Karnataka Land
Grant Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the
Rules), in according sanction of 4 acres of land in Sy.
No. 63 of Hulimavu Village, Bangalore South Taluk in
favour of the 4th respondent for a total sum of Rs.
9,80,752/-.
13. Thereafter, the Government issued Annexure-A
granting the land in question at market value of Rs.
1,45,000/- per acre and directed the Deputy
Commissioner also to collect the conversion charges.
A condition was also imposed that the 4th respondent
should get the land use changed if the land use in the
CDP is different from which the land is granted.
18. The process of the grant in favour of the 4th
respondent does not suffer from any infirmity. The
provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and the
Rules made thereunder have been validly made both
in letter and spirit.
20. For all these reasons there is no merit in the writ
petition and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs."
(v) Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple vs. R.
Sathyamoorthy and others [(1999) 3 SCC 115]. Para
17 reads as under:
"17. It is, therefore, clear that this Court by consent
of parties wanted an adjudication by the High Court,
on the questions whether there was a dedication of
the corpus of the property or only a charge on the
income, and even if it was so whether there was a
specific endowment vested in the Commissioner, HR &
CE and whether the property could be permitted to be
sold when there was a prohibition in the trust deed,
whether permission of the District Court under Section
34 of the Trusts Act was sufficient and whether
permission under Section 34 of the Endowment Act,
1959 was necessary. Further, the Courts have a
general "parens Patriae" jurisdiction over trusts for
charitable and religious purposes and a question of
public interest was involved because of the
contentions raised by the Commissioner, HR & CE.
16. Based on the aforementioned judgments, it is
contended that the grant need not be by way of public
auction, it can be given in favour of any person in
public interest as in the instant case.
17. Per contra, the petitioners contended that it is
essential for Government to record the reasons for
invoking its extraordinary power and favouring a
person and it is contended that the same is not done in
the instant case. In this regard, they have relied upon
the judgment of this Court in B.Sidramappa v. State of
Karnataka [ILR 1990 KAR 1233]. Para 5 and 6 reads
as under:
"5. Rule 27 which is cited in the order at Annexure-M
as furnishing power to Government to pass the said
order reads:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the
preceding rules, the State Government may,
suo motu, or on the recommendation of the
Divisional Commissioner or the Deputy
Commissioner , if it is of the opinion that in the
circumstances of the case or classes of cases, it
is just and reasonable to relax any of the
provisions of these rules, it may, by order
direct such relaxation, recording the reasons
for such relaxation subject to such conditions
as may be specified in the orders and
thereupon lands may be granted in such a case
or classes of cases in accordance with such
direction."
Under the scheme of Land Grant Rules, the
Government has no direct role to play since power to
grant lands under the Rules is distributed amongst the
subordinate authorities, the lone exception being
under Rule 7(3)(iii) whereunder Government will have
to be consulted in case lands sought to be granted are
beyond the powers of the subordinate authority. In
this case the land granted to each of the individual
grantees being less than three acres, the same was
well within the powers of the Tahsildar and it is he
who had granted the lands to the grantees. Therefore,
Government had nothing to do with the grants made.
But, then, Government has the exceptional power
under Rule 27 by virtue of which in certain special
cases it can intervene to remove difficulties in the
making of a grant by relaxing the conditions stipulated
for grant of land. Following such relaxation the land
becomes amenable to grant without offending the
existing Rules. But, that power can be exercised only
in the manner laid down by that Rule and amongst
other things by recording reasons for Government's
intervention in the matter. The Government is also
required to make it clear as to why it was seeking to
interfere in a given case to the negation of Rules
which will also lead to a countermanding of the power
exercised by the granting authorities under the Rules.
Herein the order made by Government under
Annexure-M purporting to be one made under Rule 27
is certainly open to the twin objections put forward by
the petitioners. The first one is that in the guise of
exercising power under Rule 27 the Government
purported to liquidate the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner that had in turn affirmed the order of
the Assistant Commissioner, on appeal. Judicial or
quasi-judicial orders can only be interfered with in
exercise of appellate powers or by a revisional
authority. In exercise of powers to relax land grant
rules, the order of an Appellate Authority made under
the Land Revenue Act cannot be wished away as has
been done herein. In exercise of that extra-ordinary
power under Rule 27 the Government cannot set aside
the order of the Deputy Commissioner made on
appeal under the Land Revenue Act. This is the first of
the two vices that afflict the Government Order.
6. The other and the second vice which affects the
Government Order is the exercise of authority under
Rule 27 bereft of reasons although Government is
statutorily enjoined to give reasons. Power being
given to a particular authority and norms laid down as
to the manner in which the power has to be exercised
then such power has to be exercised only in that
manner and not otherwise. In RAMACHANDRA v.
GOVIND, the Court laid down:
"Where a power is given to do a certain
thing; in a certain way, the thing must be
done in that way or not at all and other
methods of performance are necessarily
forbidden. This rule squarely applies where
the whole aim and object of the legislature
would be plainly defeated if the command to
do the thing in a particular manner did not
imply a prohibition to do it in any other."
In the case on hand the rule in question enjoins
recording of reasons for relaxing the Land Grant Rules
in certain cases to overcome impediments if any in
the way of granting lands. Such a deviation from the
rule becomes permissible if requisite inputs are there
and not otherwise. Where Government has not
recorded reasons at all and not stated as to why they
had thought fit to interfere in the matter by exercising
power under Rule 27, it would be a case of rendition
of jurisdiction in a manner contrary to law and,
therefore, the same without more renders such an
order otiose."
18. Admittedly, the impugned grant order in the
instant case or the proceedings leading to it does not
record the reasons for granting the land in favour of
respondent no.3-Mutt by excluding similarly placed
persons. It merely records the purposes for which the
land has been used. It is not the case of the
respondents, that respondent no.3-Mutt alone is in a
position to use the land for the purposes mentioned in
the grant order. It is not the case of the respondents
that respondent no.3-Mutt was in occupation of the
land earlier to the grant or that there are no other
similarly situated Mutts, Trusts, Societies or other
persons, who are carrying on activities similar to that of
respondent no.3-Mutt and the act of the Government in
granting the land in favour of respondent no.3-Mutt in
the manner done in the instant case without giving an
opportunity to similarly situated persons to seek grant
of the property involved smacks of favouritism and is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and
the same is liable to be set aside. However, subject to
the petitioners establishing their rights over the
properties, if any, this does not preclude respondent
nos.1 and 2 to consider the case of respondent no.3
afresh along with similarly situated persons in
accordance with law.
19. The judgments relied upon by the respondents do
not come to the rescue of respondent no.3-Mutt as they
contemplate a situation where the grantee is a class by
itself and has no competition.
20. For the aforementioned reasons, the following
order is passed:
ORDER
(i) The Government order bearing No.R.D.02
L.G.B 2019(E), Bengaluru dated
15.07.2019 passed by respondent no.1
vide Annexure-L to the petition in
W.P.No.49958/2019 and Annexure-T to the
petition in W.P.No.49959/2019 is hereby
set aside. Consequently, the Official
Memorandum bearing No.LND(S)CR/07/
19-20 dated 20.07.2019 issued by
respondent no.2-Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District vide Annexure-J
to the petition in W.P.No.49958/2019 and
Annexure-S to the petition in
W.P.No.49959/2019 is hereby set aside;
(ii) Thereby, the grant of land by respondent
nos.1 and 2 in favour of respondent no.3-
Mutt in respect of the properties which are
the subject matters of the writ petitions is
set aside;
(iii) Consequently, respondent no.3-Mutt is
entitled to the amounts paid by them to
respondent nos.1 and 2 as consideration
towards the grant;
(iv) The writ petitions are disposed of
accordingly. No order as to cost;
(v) Pending I.As. in these petitions do not
survive for consideration and they stand
disposed of accordingly.
Sd/-
JUDGE
hkh.
